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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis will be to decipher why Acholi ethnic identity remained 
such a critical political tool in late and post-colonial Uganda, from 1950-1985, 
just before the outbreak of civil war in 1986. The thesis will centre not on the 
inevitability of the war, but will instead focus on the political processes that 
preceded it. It will seek fill a gap in a historiography of a people whose 
contribution to the Ugandan nation state goes beyond that of collective 
suffering, violence, paramilitary warfare and ethnic conflict. To effectively do 
this there will be an assessment of how Acholi gender, class and social 
hierarchies, religious identities, regional identifications and the much-touted 
‘martial’ identity have been utilised internally and externally to politically 
reinforce Acholi ethnicity in late-colonial and post-colonial Uganda.  
Ugandan political engagement has continually allowed the politics of 
ethnicity to take a centre stage. Even in the present day, Uganda remains 
ethnically and regionally divided between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’. Bantu-
speaking ethnic groups in the southern, central and western Uganda, 
including the Baganda, Basoga, Bagisu, Banyoro, Batoro, and Banyankole, 
dominate the South. The North, which is home to the Nilotic groups, 
encompasses the Acholi, Lango, Madi, Alur, Iteso, and the Karamojong 
peoples. Historically, the political and ethnic divisions between the peoples of 
Northern and Southern Uganda have contributed to the country’s contentious 
post-colonial history. This thesis will argue that political hostilities between the 
peoples of the two regions were a by-product of the economic and political 
policies of the colonial government and the administrations that followed. 
Regional demarcations, sanctioned by the British and adopted by post-
colonial regimes, reinforced strong ethnically divided local governments 
founded on pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Acholi socio-political 
institutions. Economic underdevelopment played a large part in fostering 
political tensions between Northern and Southern Uganda and served as 
useful tool for Acholi power brokers to negotiate for political and economic 
capital with the state, by utilising the politics of regional differentiation through 
the ‘Northern identity.’ Consequently, with onset of decolonisation Ugandan 
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‘nationalism’ became a localised movement driven by ethnically homogenous 
local governments and kingdoms.  
For the Acholi ethnic group, the most visible of their colonial and post-
colonial identities has been that of the ‘martial race’. Acholi soldiers joined the 
army largely as a means to access job opportunities, and by doing so they 
became the representatives of state coercion and violence. Yet those that 
joined did not do so to deliberately suppress other ethnic groups: rather 
employment opportunities were limited in the locality and the army corps 
provided access to economic and social mobility. Despite being the most 
visible identity nationally, the ‘martial identity’ has not been the most dominant 
locally, or even the driving force within the Acholi polity in the last thirty-five 
years. Acholi late-colonial and post-colonial history has been informed by the 
historical processes that have shaped the relationship between the Acholi 
‘moral ethnicity’ and ‘political tribalism’. The latter provided an opportunity for 
politically minded Acholi to participate within national politics, yet the former 
kept them tied to the locality. As the political representation of the Acholi 
outside the region ‘political tribalism’ was combative, utilising religious, clan, 
and regional identities to make demands against the state. The prominence of 
ethnopolitics within national politics ensured that within the repertoire of the 
Acholi ‘cultural tool kit’, ethnopolitics remained the dominant tool for external 
political engagement.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
1.0 Aim 
 
The aim of this thesis will be to decipher why Acholi ethnic identity remained 
such a salient political tool in late and post-colonial Uganda. It will do so by 
discerning how Acholi traditions, social structures and cultural identities have 
been used as political tools to engage with the Ugandan state from 1950-
1985. To effectively analyze this centre-periphery relationship, this thesis will 
assess how Acholi gender and social hierarchies, religious and regional 
identifications and the much-touted ‘martial’ identity have been negotiated 
internally within the geographical and political boundary of Acholi, and 
externally within the political boundary of the Ugandan state. More 
significantly, it will assess whether these particular identity markers, served to 
reinforce or in fact challenge the notion of a unified Acholi ethnic identity, both 
internally and externally.  
By looking specifically at centre-periphery politics in Uganda, this 
research will challenge previous analysis offered by scholars such as 
Mahmood Mamdani who argued that the colonial legacy of state bifurcation 
between rural and urban, and ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’, cumulated in post-colonial 
decentralised despotic authority in the rural locality.1 In the case of the Acholi 
of northern Uganda, this analysis obscures a more complex history of political 
engagement between the Ugandan political centre and the locality. 
Furthermore, whereas Mamdani utilised a comparative approach of urban 
‘citizens’ and rural ‘subjects’, with specific focus on South Africa and western 
Uganda, this thesis will focus on one local population within the Ugandan 
state. This will allow for a more in-depth analysis of centre-periphery political 
engagement in Uganda.  This research will also expand chronologically and 
analytically on previous works on Acholi political history by Cherry Gertzel and 
Colin Leys.2 Whereas these scholars concentrated primarily on local party 
                                                
1 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(London: James Currey, 1996). 
2 See: C. Leys, Politicians and Policies: An Essay on Politics in Acholi, Uganda, 1962-65, 
(Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967): C. Gertzel, ‘Party and Locality in northern 
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politics and politicians in Acholi from 1945-1965 within a wider national 
context, this research will instead seek to incorporate the political agency of 
the constituents which these local politicians purported to represent. Thus, the 
following chapters will therefore look at the vertical relationship between ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ politics and the horizontal structures of power that dictated the 
patron-client network among Acholi communities from 1950 to 1985.  
This approach will allow for a more in-depth analysis of a local political 
history, which will show that, among the Acholi at least, a system of 
decentralised despotic authority could not be effectively imposed within the 
locality. This was primarily because state sponsored local political elites and 
the Ugandan central government did not have the resources to unilaterally 
assert political dominance within Acholi. Consequently, as apposed to 
highlighting the authority of state sponsored ‘citizens’, the decentralised 
system of governance adopted in late colonial and post-colonial Ugandan 
state, emerged as a result of the states’ weakness and inability to assert 
unilateral political and administrative control over the rural locality. In Acholi, 
this weakness opened various avenues among local power contenders to 
engage with and state sponsored authorities in an effort pursue individual 
and/or collective political goals.  
Moreover, among Acholi ‘subjects’, a process of enabling the ‘citizens’ 
through the reciprocity of privilege can also be observed, where this 
demographic sought to utilise whatever avenues available to gain access to 
the world of the established local power-brokers. This meant that whilst the 
state continually failed to invest in the local population, Acholi ‘subjects’ 
continued to believe in the possibility of state power to affect positive change 
in their lives.  Yet in order to retain their scarcity value and maintain their 
access to state resources, local and national political elites reinforced a 
system of patronage and clientelism. Whilst on one hand they dutifully paid lip 
service to calls for community development and political empowerment of 
their constituents, in reality, they continued to relish in the ‘politics of the belly.’ 
Arguably, on economic and political terms, this interplay inevitably benefitted 
the patrons the most. However, their dependence on local voters to gain 
                                                                                                                                      
Uganda, 1945-1962’ Institute of Commonwealth Papers No. 1 Vol. 16 (London: The Althorne 
Press, 1975).  
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political legitimacy locally and nationally, created a symbiotic relationship 
between the centre and periphery placing limits on either group gaining 
concrete dominance of the other. Consequently, as apposed to being simply a 
sphere where local individuals and groups retreated from state intrusion, the 
Acholi locality provided a crucial socio-political platform from which local 
power contenders could engage with state authority. 
However, given this often paradoxical political relationship in the 
locality, the external face presented by the Acholi, continued to be one of 
ethnic unity. This research will further argue that the salience of ethnopolitics 
within the Ugandan post-colonial state was as a result of colonial legacies 
embedded within post-colonial political and social structures of power, which 
continued to emphasize the importance of the ‘tribe’, locality, and region. After 
independence, the confrontation between ethnically homogenous local 
governments, and the push for political centralisation under the premise of 
nation-building, resulted in religious, tribal and regional factionalism, as 
successive governments sought political and military allegiances from their 
respective ethnic groups. This factionalism was further emphasised with the 
continuation of the colonial policy of economically underdeveloping one region 
at the expense of another. Consequently, in the aftermath of independence, 
the peoples of Acholi and the northern districts continued to juxtapose their 
socio-economic situation vis-à-vis their more economically developed 
southern counterparts, by utilising the ‘victim identity’. This victimisation 
discourse was effectively fed through the lens of political tribalism, as Acholi 
political elites sought to claim their share of the ‘national cake’ by emphasising 
ethnicity and regional allegiances as the key tool for political engagement with 
central government. Furthermore, within the locality, economic 
underdevelopment stunted the emergence of any growth of organised labour 
movements that could be channelled externally through national party political 
allegiances. This meant that Acholi ethnic identity emerged as the most 
effective tool to make collective political demands against the state.  All these 
factors ensured that national politics in post-independence remained 
structured along regional and ethnic lines.  
However, within Acholi intra-group interactions and local politics, chronic 
economic underdevelopment also meant that more fragmented, clan, 
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religious, and party political identities came to the forefront, as the internal 
competition for economic and political resources ensued. This ensured that 
Acholi remained an ethnically homogenous yet socially and politically divided 
locality.  Internal political competition pitted local competitors against each 
other, drawing in ‘traditionalists’ ‘modernists’, young and old, with each faction 
(re)imagining and politicising different aspects of Acholi cultural ‘traditions’ to 
solidify their political, economic and social positions within the locality and 
beyond. This ensured that, internally at least, the notion of a unified, politically 
coherent Acholi ethnic identity remained a fallacy. Yet given that ethnopolitics 
was so intrinsically entrenched with the Ugandan postcolonial state, even 
among these competing local actors, this fallacy had to be maintained to 
retain the connection with the political centre and to compete with regional 
and ethnic ‘outsiders’ particularly during times of overt political instability. In 
short, fragmented localised political grievances, could only gain legitimacy 
and authority externally if channelled through the more unifying the lens of 
ethnopolitics. Consequently, late colonial and post-independence discourses 
of ethnopolitics in the locality emerged through the peoples of Acholi’s long-
term engagement with the Ugandan state.  
 Engaging with these themes and time frame within a doctoral thesis is 
undoubtedly ambitious. Moreover, the concepts that will be discussed here 
offer little sympathy to linear narratives. Acholi history, much like the history of 
the Ugandan post-colonial state, is complex and challenging. This history 
does not present a single story or argument. Instead what we have are layers 
of narratives, and interpretations that often contradict each other. As Mbembe 
discusses more generally, ‘African social formations are not necessarily 
converging towards a single point, trend, or cycle. They harbour the possibility 
of a variety of trajectories, neither convergent nor divergent, but interlocked, 
paradoxical.’3 More importantly, by using obdurate theories to try and 
decipher the ‘African trajectory’ scholars risk presenting a history of perpetual 
instability, violent conflicts and political failure, feeding in the inherent view of 
Africa as the modern world’s ‘other’, rather than trying to understand what 
guides internal political engagement within African societies. Within this 
                                                
3 A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony (California: University of California Press, 2001), 16. 
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assessment, Charles Anderson’s work on ‘power contenders’ in Latin America 
holds clear commonalities to the Ugandan nation state. Anderson argues that 
‘rather than viewing Latin American politics as unpredictable and unstable, 
analysis should attempt to identify the persistent stable patterns.’ By doing so, 
one is able to clearly see how a variety of techniques are utilised to mobilise 
power, all of which are legitimate. These varieties and techniques can either 
be ‘the power contenders’ that challenge each other for political superiority, or 
the means in which power is negotiated. They could include, but are not 
limited to military rule, the Church, oligarchic authority, or voter appeal.4 
Whilst it could be argued that pairing this historiography with elusive concepts 
such as ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ only hinders the task further, this is in fact not 
the case. The malleability of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ actually allow for a more 
in-depth understanding of the time period, giving voice to various identity 
markers and ‘power contenders.’ In this way, the archival and oral sources 
can be given room to speak and tell their stories. 
 
1.1. Ethnicity and Politics in Post-Colonial Uganda. 
 
The Acholi (Acoli5) people are “a martial race” whose natural instincts are 
skewed towards war-like activities.6 
 
On 17 February 2011 Ugandans went to the ballot box to cast their vote in the 
country’s second multi-party presidential election since 1980. Of the eight 
candidates that contested against the incumbent National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, two, Norbert Mao and Olara 
Otunnu were Acholi. Despite opinion polls consistently placing Museveni 
ahead, among the Acholi there was a feeling of genuine optimism that there 
                                                
4 C.W. Anderson, ‘Towards a Theory of Latin American Politics’, The Graduate Centre For 
Latin American Studies, Vanderbilt University, Occasional Paper No.2 (1964), 1-8; J. Wiarda 
and M. M. Mott, (eds.) Politics and Social Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition? 
(Westport Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2003). 
5 There is no ‘h’ in the Acholi language and as such the ‘c’ is pronounced ‘ch’ as in the 
English church. Acholi language purists would not then spell ‘Acholi’ with an ‘h’, as this is 
purely a modification used to aid with pronunciation, and for the purpose of this paper it will 
be used for that reason. 
 
6 Sam Olara, ‘President Yuweri Museveni on the Acholi’, The Independent, 25 January 2011. 
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could be change after twenty-four years of NRM rule. Campaign slogans such 
as ‘We must take our country back’ from Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) 
representative Olara Otunnu, and ‘A new leader. A new beginning,’ from 
Democratic Party (DP) representative Norbert Mao, were prominent in the 
Ugandan media.7 Whilst on the surface both candidates claimed that they 
were primarily concerned with putting an end to what they considered to be 
the corrupt government of the NRM, closer analysis immediately brings to 
light the ethnic and political tensions that have for so long characterised 
politics in Uganda.  
Ugandan political engagement has continually allowed the politics of 
ethnicity to take a centre stage. Even in the present day, Uganda remains 
ethnically and regionally divided between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’. Bantu-
speaking ethnic groups in the southern, central and western Uganda, 
including the Baganda, Basoga, Bagisu, Banyoro, Batoro, and Banyankole, 
dominate the South. The North, which is home to the Nilotic groups, 
encompasses the Acholi, Lango, Madi, Alur, Iteso, and the Karamojong 
peoples.8 For the Acholi, and indeed other ethnic groups in Uganda, ethnic 
identities have historically proven to be a powerful political commodity. Both 
Milton Obote and General Idi Amin played upon ethnic divisions for political 
gain, with Obote, of Lango ethnicity, targeting the previously dominant 
Baganda Kingdom from 1966-67, while Amin’s regime engaged in massacres 
of the Acholi and Lango peoples.9 After his return to power in 1980, Obote 
continued the same trend of his first presidency by ensuring that Northerners 
from Acholi and Lango dominated the army corps, to contend with military and 
political threats to his administration.10 
                                                
7 Edris Kiggundu, ‘Otunnu unveils campaign team’, The Observer, 31 January 2010; Micheal 
Ssali, ‘Election special: “I want a new beginning”, Mao on the future’, Daily Monitor, 17 
January 2011.   
8 F. K. Girling, The Acholi of Uganda, Colonial Office (London: HMSO, 1960), 1: Amuru was 
only established in 2006 and until then was part of Gulu district. 
9 J. Okuku, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda (Uppsala: 
Nordic African Institute, 2002). 
10 Y. Olum, Multiparty Politics in Uganda (Kampala, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2011, 
64.   
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The clearest example of the strategic use of ethnic cleavages in the 
2011 election campaign can be found in an interview with the DP candidate 
Norbert Mao in January 2011. Listing Mao’s ethnic origins - his father being 
an Acholi and his mother a Munyankole - the interviewer asked which region 
was giving Mao the most support. Mao replied, ‘it may surprise you that my 
base is not primarily ethnic. My base is generational; my base is a 
demographic base.’ He then added, ‘the other base is that I have always been 
in the North. The North identifies with me and they know that no one else 
cares about peace and reconstruction than me.’11 The character of Ugandan 
politics is never more apparent than in this statement. Despite his 
protestation, Mao’s base is primarily ethnic. He stood apart as the most 
popular candidate among the Acholi in Northern Uganda and it is this ethnic 
demographic that he has continually courted during the election campaign. It 
is also important to point out that in every single election campaign, Museveni, 
a Munyankole from Ntungamo district in the South, has never won a majority 
in the Acholi districts and had consistently performed poorly in the region.  
The outbreak of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) conflict in 1987 
instigated what former United Nations (UN) Undersecretary-General Jan 
Egeland described in 2004 as one of the ‘biggest neglected humanitarian 
emergencies in the world.’12 The war with the LRA that plagued Northern 
Uganda for well over two decades is one of the reasons why the current 
President is so unpopular in the region. The conflict has over the years 
resulted in the internal displacement of around two million civilians and around 
60,000 children being kidnapped by the LRA.13 There are no official figures for 
the total death toll, but it is estimated that around 100,000 people have been 
killed as a direct result of the war, with tens of thousands also perishing in 
                                                
11 Michael Ssali, ‘I want a new beginning - Mao on the future’, Daily Monitor, 17 January 
2011. 
12 Jeevan Vasagar, 'A litany of horrors', The Guardian, 2 November 2004; J. Seaton, ‘The 
New Ethnic Wars and the Media’ in T. Allen, and J. Seaton (eds.), The Media of Conflict: War 
Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence (London: Zed Books, 1999), 43-63. 
13 T. Allen, Trial Justice; Mike Thomson, ‘Who can stop the LRA?’, 16 February 2011. BBC 
World News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9397000/9397111.stm, [Accessed. 
30. September 2013]. 
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government IDP camps from disease and malnutrition.14 Numerous 
accusations of brutality by NRA soldiers against Acholi civilians during the 
conflict have been levied against the government, leading many Acholi to 
believe that rather than helping to restore peace in the Acholi communities, 
the NRM’s motives were more concerned with eradicating them all together.15 
It is perhaps not surprising that in describing the government’s policies in the 
region politicians repeatedly refer to Museveni’s statements likening the 
Acholi to grasshoppers who were trapped in a bottle ‘in which they will eat 
each other before they find their way out’, and of the Acholi as ‘a martial race 
whose natural instincts are skewered towards war-like activities.’16 While 
these statements have never been documented through a credible source, 
nor has the President ever publically acknowledged making them, their infamy 
points to the hostile relationship between the NRM regime and the peoples of 
Acholi.  
On the other hand, Ugandans who adhere to this view of the Acholi as 
warmongers highlight the brutality of the LRA; a group formed in Northern 
Uganda whose primary recruits have been Acholi, including the leader Joseph 
Kony.   
                                                
14 Will Ross, Forgiveness for Uganda's former rebels, BBC News. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3951277.stm  
[Accessed. 30. September 2013]. This estimate is for the period between 1987 and 2004. 
15 A. Branch, ‘Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern 
Uganda,’ 1986-1998, African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2005) 3; Alfred Nyongesa 
Wandera, ‘Otunnu ‘Unleashes Dossier On Alleged Acholi Genocide’, Daily Monitor, 5 January 
2011. 
16 Finnström, Living With Bad Surroundings Acholi, 147; Sam Olara, ‘Politics of Acholi 
Marginalisation is not a Myth’, The Independent, 25 January 2011 
http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3847:politics-
of-acholi-marginalisation-is-not-a-myth&catid=112:election-watch&Itemid=370 [Accessed 1 
February 2011]. 
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Map 1: Ethnic Groups in Uganda. Source: S. Lindemann, Increased Power sharing in Museveni’s 
Uganda has led to the decline of civil wars, New LSE Research. 17  
 
The view is taken that if the Acholi are capable of committing such 
atrocities against their own people, they must be inherently violent and war-
like by nature. Others point to events in the Luwero District seventy-five 
kilometres north of Kampala, which was the scene for the so-called ‘war in the 
                                                
17 Map referenced from Stefan Lindemann, ‘Increased Power sharing in Museveni’s Uganda 
has led to the decline of civil wars’, New LSE Research, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/09/19/new-lse-research-increased-territorial-power-
sharing-in-museveni%E2%80%99s-uganda-has-led-to-the-decline-of-civil-wars/ [Accessed 25 
September 2013]. 
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bush’ between Museveni’s NRA and Obote’s Ugandan National Liberation 
Army (UNLA).18 The role that Acholi soldiers, who were disproportionately 
overrepresented in the UNLA, played during the guerrilla war still resonates 
today. UNLA recruits removed around 750, 000 civilians from the Luwero 
district to specially created refugee camps, in an effort to eliminate Museveni’s 
support base. Those who did not enter the camps were automatically 
presumed to be NRA guerrillas and faced violent reprisals from the UNLA. 
The ‘Luwero Triangle’, as it became known, is to this day synonymous with 
large-scale human rights abuses including rape, torture and mass executions. 
Following the victory of the NRA it was the Acholi who were seen as the main 
perpetrators of the atrocities particularly by Museveni’s supporters in 
Uganda.19   
However, depictions of the Acholi as war-like outsiders are not new 
construct. These images are the result of a historical process steeped in 
colonial and post-colonial political structures, economic underdevelopment, 
and autocratic leadership, channelled through the politics of ethnic 
differentiation. 
Ethnic identities were often highly politicised by colonial 
administrations, which followed a policy of ‘divide and rule’, whereby 
some groups were favoured and given access to greater political and 
economic power than others. The British tended to characterise 
different groups according to racial characteristics, treating some (the 
Hausa in West Africa, the Acholi in East Africa) as the ‘martial races’. 
The favoured groups, such as the Buganda, typically had greater 
access to opportunities in education and positions in the colonial 
administration, whilst the martial races were treated as sources of 
recruitment for the military- a dichotomy that has continued well into the 
post-colonial period.20 
 
                                                
18 O. O. Amaza, Museveni's Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman (Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, 1998). 
19 C. Dolan, Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 235; I. Leggett, Uganda (Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers, 2001). 
20 D. Beswick and P. Jackson, Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2001), 48. Also see; T. Parsons, The African rank-and-file: Social 
Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Portsmouth: 
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The story of post-independence Uganda and the Acholi is not unique within 
African post-colonial discourse as it contains familiar elements which can be 
seen throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda and Nigeria, have been explained along ethnic lines by the 
international media.21 These protracted, highly violent conflicts – often 
involving young combatants and resulting in gross humanitarian abuses –
have since come to define the peoples of sub-Saharan, particularly to external 
observers.22 Yet immediately after independence, Uganda appeared to have 
a promising future with its growing economy and relative political stability. 
Independence was embraced by Ugandan civil society with the country’s first 
democratic elections to the National Assembly drawing in three quarters of the 
population.23 Decolonisation was to be the era that would bring an end to the 
factionalism of tribalism and give Africans a new national identity, setting them 
on the way to modernisation.24 Ugandan politicians propagated the rhetoric of 
democratisation, detribalisation and modernisation to their newly independent 
constituents urging them to believe that the post-colonial Ugandan nation 
state would no longer be about the ‘tribe’ but about economic development 
and the ‘nation’.25 They were encouraged by international political analysts 
and academics who. Using theories of development and modernisation, 
argued that there was a clear path to economic and political development-
driven through the mechanisms of capitalism, which all countries followed-and 
if Africa were placed on that path, it would inevitably develop or ‘catch up’ to 
the West.26  
The counter-argument against such development and modernisation 
theories came from African writers such as Franz Fanon who placed Africans 
squarely within the structures of global politics. Africans were urged them to 
                                                
21 Allen, ‘The New Ethnic Wars and the Media’. 
22 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 
1999). 
23 J. Carter, ‘Independence for Uganda.’ The World Today, Vol. 18, No. 9 (1962), 375 
24 B. Berman, D. Eyoh, W. Kymlicka, (eds.) Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford: James 
Currey, 2004), 8. 
25 Olum, Reality Check: Multiparty Politics in Uganda. 
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tear off the constraints of colonialism and look to the lumpen-proletariat for the 
inspiration to find an African resolution for Africa’s political, economic and 
cultural reality that would not emulate their colonisers.27 This assessment fed 
into the neo-colonialism school of thought, which looked at decolonisation 
simply as a Western process of informal control of African states by 
multinational elites. The argument was extended by Basil Davidson and 
Crawford Young, who argued that despite the enthusiastic drive for 
reinvention by new ‘post-colonial’ states, they had in fact inherited not only 
colonial structures, ‘but also its routines, practices and its more normative 
theories of governance’ with Davidson observing that although ‘the coinage 
may have changed, the currency was still the same.’28 The colonial ‘coinage’ 
argument has its merit, particularly when viewing Africa’s colonial and post-
colonial history. The British system of ‘indirect rule’ had emphasised strong, 
ethnically divided local governments at the district level, and after 
independence these local actors and institutions needed to be centralised if 
the process of de-tribalisation was to be a success. However, with the onset 
of the nationalism project, post-colonial African states instead became 
embroiled in protracted and violent sectarian conflicts often fought along 
ethnic lines.29  Ethnic conflict in post-independence Africa has been attributed, 
in part, to the colonial tribalisation of indigenous pre-colonial cultural groups, 
cumulating in an ethno-structured system of governance, which remained 
embedded within the post-colonial state.30  However, as Martin Doornbos 
argues, ethnic conflict in Africa is not as result of the political expression of 
traditional distinctiveness vis-à-vis technologically and culturally homogenising 
                                                
27 F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin Books, 1990). 
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forces’, it is instead the articulation of social, economic and political 
inequalities unique to each post-colonial African state.31  
More recently, Daniel Posner traced the impact of recurrent trends of 
multi-party and single party rule in Africa, in view of why certain ethnic 
cleavages are emphasised during regime change. Posner argues that political 
competition within multiparty settings in the context of Kenya and Zambia has 
been conducive to reinforcing ethnic cleavages related to more unifying 
blocks, which give credence to distinctions based more on religious, linguistic 
and regional identities. This is primarily because both candidates and voters 
can belong to multiple groups. Consequently the decision of who to vote for is 
determined by who is better placed, at the time, to maximize access to state 
resources.32 Thus the decision to vote along regional, tribal or religious lines 
is determined by which identity marker is more politically or socially relevant to 
the voter at the time. Within the context of Uganda, this scenario can be more 
easily observed during the multi-party election campaigns in the early 1960s 
were regional and religious identities came to the forefront. However, the 
installation of a one party system from 1968-1980 and 1986-2005 reinforced 
more localised political cleavages.  Consequently, ‘the transition from one-
party to multiparty political competition therefore has the potential to alter the 
identities that people embrace and, through this, the ethnic cleavages that 
come to matter in politics.’33 However, within one-party-rule, ‘the effective 
arena of political conflict shrinks from the nation as a whole to the level of the 
local electoral constituency’, thus emphasising more localised political 
cleavages.34 Posner also concedes that although certain political cleavages 
may be emphasised during a regime change, ethnopolitics still remains an 
effective and unifying political tool, as in both settings politicians and voters 
                                                
31 M. Doornbos, ‘Linking the Future to the Past: Ethnicity and Pluralism’, Review of African 
Political Economy, No. 52, Fundamentalism in Africa: Religion and Politics (1991), 58; 
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33 Ibid.  
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will still use ethnicity as an instrument to achieve their political goals.35  
Similarly, Berman attributes, in part, the impact on authoritarian rule in Africa, 
which has resulted in the elimination of the ‘political meaning of citizenship’, 
by maintaining a decentralised system of authority in the locality sustained by 
a patron-client network. In this climate, the single party state offers a ‘national 
arena within which the distribution of material resources between ethnic 
communities [can] be negotiated between the leaders of various groups, 
without having to resort to the public mobilization of their supporters.’36 Within 
this context, ‘citizenship’ becomes less about the nation, but about the 
autochthonous claims of established communities over the territories within 
the nation.37   
In his case study of ethnic conflict in the district of Kibaale situated 
within the Kingdom of Bunyoro, Elliot Green adds to this discourse, by 
attributing the rise of ‘nativism’ to consecutive government policies which have 
emphasised political jurisdictions based on local, rather the regional or 
national lines. The introduction of the Resistance Council (RC) system in 
1986, by the current regime in Uganda, has in Kibaale, contributed to a rise in 
‘local claims of indigeneity’ as means to exclude fellow citizens from access to 
resources.’38 The RC system -later rebranded as the Residence Council- has 
been lauded as the most far reaching restructuring of local government in 
Uganda, altering the political system from a top down focus, to a more locally 
orientated political distribution of power, based on ‘residency’ rather then 
‘descent’.39  In Kibaale, this has led to violent clashes with Bakiga migrants 
and the Banyoro, with the latter arguing that local government was being 
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monopolised by the Bakiga who were ‘plotting to dominate them through tribal 
voting.’40  
Local Banyoro repeatedly refer to both the Bakiga migrants to Kibaale 
and the absentee Baganda landlords who own land in the district as 
non-natives, despite the fact that members of all three groups are 
Ugandan citizens . . . As the Kibaale example sadly makes clear, the 
shift to a residence-based system of rights has merely meant that 
ethnic conflicts have been reframed rather than removed: whereas in 
the past rural political contestation took place between groups 
distinguished by tribe or ethnicity, it now takes place between groups 
claiming indigeneity over local political jurisdictions. Indeed, as most 
ethnic groups continue to be defined along territorial lines in Uganda – 
and elsewhere in Africa – the RC system may have helped to devolve 
ethnic conflict from the regional to the local level, but it has neither 
changed the names of the groups in conflict with each other nor has it 
done anything to reduce the amount of ethnic conflict or advance 
nation building.41 
 
More widely, the articulation of conflict along ethnic and tribal lines, as 
in the case of Uganda, can be attributed firstly, to the colonial and post-
colonial decentralisation of governance, modelled along the established 
colonial boundaries of native authority.42 This helped to demarcate, 
geographically and politically distinct ethnic groupings. Post independence, 
ethnopolitics quickly became a state sponsored military and administrative 
exercise, utilised to obtain and/or retain political power often under the guise 
of nation building and political centralisation. As state leaders sought to 
weaken local political authority, they became reliant on political and military 
support from members of their own tribal groups, further militarising national 
politics along ethnic lines. During the process of decolonisation and the 
decade following independence, the colonial political and economic 
dominance of the Kingdom of Buganda provided a convenient platform from 
which other competing Kingdoms and local authorities could make demands 
against central administration in Entebbe, located within the Kingdom of 
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41  Green, ‘Demography, diversity and nativism in contemporary Africa: evidence from 
Uganda’. 
42  J. Okuku, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda, (Uppsala: 
Nordic African Institute, 2002), 7-8. 
 25 
I                
Buganda.  The other three Kingdoms of Ankole Bunyoro, and Toro as well as 
the princedom of Busoga, all had a centralised monarchical political system. 
However, internal competition and traditional rivalries between these 
monarchical heads, coupled with the fear of continued Baganda political 
dominance in an independent Uganda, prevented the emergence of political 
alliances between these predominately Bantu speaking Kingdoms.43  
In Acholi, local governments born out of the colonial Native 
Administration, fought to keep a level of political autonomy post-
independence, emulating the colonial system of indirect rule, which had 
localised administrative and political power.  Indeed, the Acholi political 
allegiance to their ethnic locality has its roots firmly entrenched within their 
encounters with colonial and missionary institutions, with the latter using 
education as a tool to alter indigenous African values.44 Much of the 
missionary work in Uganda and across the continent took the form of cultural 
imperialism that worked in conjunction with the ‘economic imperialism’ being 
pursued by colonial governments.45 Christian missionaries participated in a 
reciprocal relationship with the colonial administration, which allowed for the 
effective administration of the indigenous population. By creating a literate 
intelligentsia, encouraging groups to document their histories and traditions, 
missionaries gave African communities ‘the tools to imagine a larger 
community than previously existed.’46  
Missionary activity on the continent ran parallel to the expansion of 
Western imperialism. The Berlin Conference in 1884-5 formally instigated the 
colonial partition of Africa, which not only cut across geographical lines but 
cultural ones as well.47 Whilst each European power had its own unique way 
of ruling their colonial subjects, the one commonality that ran across the 
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British, French, Portuguese and Belgian colonialists was the ethos of ‘divide 
and rule.’48 For the British this ethos was satisfied through their governing 
principle of ‘indirect rule’ whereby rather than administering the natives 
directly, they employed tribal chiefs to govern.49 The regional divisions of the 
colonised countries along ethnic lines undoubtedly fostered ethnic divisions, 
which were actively encouraged by the British administrators. In Uganda, 
British District Commissioners (DC) were appointed to man their regions, and 
laws enforced to restrict migration within regions, essentially keeping ‘the 
natives where they belonged.’50 Ethnic stereotypes were readily created, as 
with the Acholi who were marked out as a martial race, while their southern 
counter-parts, particularly the Baganda, received praise for their sophisticated 
political system and were regarded as ethnically superior.51 Utilising the 
‘Hamitic thesis’, British travellers such as John Hanning Speke rationalised 
the ‘political sophistication’ of the Buganda Kingdom in terms of the Baganda 
being descendants of the Gala Hamites of Ethiopia.52 The assertion that the 
Baganda were somehow more sophisticated was instrumental in the use of 
Baganda agents to spread British political control throughout the rest of the 
Protectorate. The division between Northern and Southern Uganda was 
further emphasised with the economic policies of the colonial powers. 
Considered culturally superior, the Baganda Bantu-speaking South enjoyed 
more economic investment, while the North was left relatively undeveloped 
and its peoples marginalised in basic sectors such as education, health and 
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service sector employment.53  
Tribal and ethnic identities emerged in Uganda primarily as a result of 
the colonial Native Administration, which sought to unite groups that shared 
certain cultural commonalities such as language, shared traditions and 
geography, so as to administer them effectively.54 The Acholi, much like the 
peoples of Karomojong, Lango, Madi and Alur of the northern regions, did not 
have a pre-colonial history of traditional centralised leadership, comparative to 
the Kingdoms of the south.55 Uganda’s colonial experience undoubtedly left 
an institutional and political legacy that is now widely accepted as being 
paramount in the construction and reification of more centralised, politically 
based ethnic demarcations.56  Whilst colonialism has left a lasting legacy on 
the peoples of Acholi, it is important to stress that the purpose of this thesis is 
not to attribute all post-colonial African ethnic conflicts to the division of the 
continent, be it internally or externally. In fact, as Frederick Cooper rightly 
assesses in his reference to the Rwandan Civil of War of 1994:  
 
It is not helpful to look at the conflict as the age old division of Africa 
into neatly separate cultures, each a distinctive separate 
community with a long history of conflict with people who were 
‘different,’ unable to function with western-style institutions because 
such intentions do not fit the reality of Africa.57 
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Cooper’s comments are well placed in modern Africanist literature with 
Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka warning against taking the view that the 
politicisation of ethnicity was simply an imposition from above consumed by 
the susceptible masses.58  
Acholi political identities were undoubtedly shaped by the social, 
economic and political structural forms of power embedded within the late 
colonial and post-colonial Ugandan state. Structural forms of power 
encompass both micro and macro forms of authority. These can be related to 
social hierarchies/class, religion, gender, ethnicity, codified laws, customs, 
and the embedded norms and values that govern intra and inter group 
behaviour. To be accepted as productive members of their societies, 
individuals are essentially forced to conform to the rules and regulations 
dictated by these structures of authority. However, as Anthony Giddens 
argues, individual agents also play an integral part in both ‘constraining’ and 
‘enabling’ structural forms of power, which dictate both state-societal and 
group-to-group interactions.59 Thus ‘in and through their activities, agents 
produce the conditions that make these activities possible.’60 Giddens 
‘structuration’ theory gives credence to both structural forms of power and the 
agents who participate within it, creating mutually dependent relationship, 
which is ‘produced and reproduced’ through the repetition of action and social 
encounters.’61  
The ‘colonial coinage’ argument in many respects disengages with 
African agency as it proposes that Ugandans simply inherited the colonial 
structures of power and thus played little part in its construction and/or 
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maintenance.62 Indirect rule as practiced by the British meant that such an 
imposition from above would have never been possible had there not been a 
two-way political discourse between the colonised agents and the colonisers.  
Within the context of the colonial encounter, Acholi agents enacted specific 
strategies of action in an attempt to collaborate with and/or challenge colonial 
authority.63 Moreover, colonial attempts to unitise Acholi clan groups would 
not have been possible without the pre-existing cultural markers and socio 
political structures that governed relations between pre-colonial groupings in 
Acholi. With the salience of ethnopolitics post-independence, these cultural 
markers became the most effective and viable tools within Acholi ‘moral 
ethnicity’, where political strategies could be formulated in the face of internal 
and external competitors.64 Indeed, as Bayart argues more generally: 
 
The colonial moment is an encounter with other dynamics equally 
endowed with their own historicity, which no amount of military 
occupation, political repression, ‘civilising mission’ evangelization or 
economic development can efface. These other dynamics correspond 
to the trajectories of pre-existing indigenous social groups during the 
colonial moment, acting in pursuit of their own interests and in 
accordance with strategies of moral repertoires that could not be 
reduced solely to the new order.65 
 
In post-colonial Uganda, it was not as simple as inheriting alien structures of 
the colonial state: these were the political structures that had gained 
authenticity during the colonial period, and they were the same political 
structures which   Ugandans continued to use to govern themselves post-
independence. Furthermore, it was not that Ugandans lacked the imagination 
or the initiative to a create state that was completely altered from the colonial 
state, but rather that the post-colonial state was and should be considered an 
African reality, steeped in the politics of tradition, Western political ideology, 
patriarchy, clientialism, nepotism, and strong localised political structures. 
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Advocates of the ‘dependency’ and ‘underdevelopment’ theories 
pointed specifically to this post-colonial reality of clientalism and economic 
underdevelopment, placing the blame squarely on the colonial economy, and 
the African agents who upheld it.66  Yet Acholi cultural commentators such as 
Okot p’Bitek, and pan-Africanists such as Fanon sought to go beyond 
economics by highlighting the effect that colonialism and Western ideology 
had and was having on African indigenous communities. Indeed Fanon’s 
analysis of the black African with the ‘white mask’ critiqued the colonised 
African’s emulation of the ideologies and language of his colonisers as a 
mechanism to elevate himself ‘above his jungle status . . . becoming whiter as 
he renounces his blackness’67 Yet by rejecting his indigenous cultural 
customs and trying to fit into society that will ultimately reject him, the black 
man develops a dual identity and consciousness having to simultaneously live 
within two worlds, resulting in a hatred of his ‘black skin’ which keeps him on 
the periphery of the ‘white’ society’ he is striving to be accepted into.68 
 Similarly, p’Bitek’s Wer pa Lawino (1966) and Wer pa Ocol (1968) 
(Song of Lawino and Song of Ocol) poignantly depicted the effect of 
colonialism on the Acholi cultural and political landscape.69 Through his prose 
p’Bitek, makes a plea to the Acholi, and Africans more widely, warning them 
against the dangers of losing their culture in favour of Western customs. Song 
of ‘Lawino’s’ impact is grounded in the voice of Lawino, a non-Western 
educated Acholi village girl. Through the character, p’Bitek is able to paint a 
vivid image detailing the clash of cultures between the Acholi ‘traditional’ ways 
of life, and Western social and political institutions. Appealing to her educated 
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husband, Ocol, Lawino urges him not to not to forget his Acholi roots, and the 
ways of his ancestors. Lawino compares Acholi customs and Western 
customs, concluding that the traditional ways were equal to, if not better than 
the ways of the white man. 
 
Ocol rejects the old type 
He is in love with a modern woman 
He is in love with a beautiful girl 
Who speaks English 
He says he has read extensively and widely 
And he can no longer live with a thing like me.70 
  
Through Lawino, p’Bitek offers no apologies for or even defence of indigenous 
practices such as polygamy which were found so unpalatable by the Western 
missionaries, but outlines why Acholi customs are suitable and essential for 
the Acholi: 
 
The ways of your ancestors 
Are good, 
Their customs are solid 
And not hollow 
They are not thin, not easily breakable 
They cannot easily be blown away 
By the Winds 
Because their roots reach deep into the soil71 
 
Lawino’s character is contrasted with her husband Ocol, who no longer finds 
any satisfaction in the Acholi customs and traditions and has instead 
wholeheartedly embraced his new Westernised identity, with p’Bitek 
lamenting that this new generation of Western educated Africans would 
‘obliterate tribal boundaries, ‘and throttle native tongues to dumb death.’72 
p’Bitek depicts the ‘Ocols’ of Uganda as the handmaidens of colonialism who 
held little respect for indigenous African traditions and were detrimental to the 
African way of life. Through his works, p’Bitek’s critique on the effects of 
colonialism on Uganda loosely feeds into the dependency theorists 
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72 Ibid., 124.  
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‘conceptual framework for understanding the politics of dependent countries’ 
that showed ‘power to be in the hands of ruling classes whose economic 
hegemony derived from their role as handmaidens of the capitalist [colonial] 
order.73  
Ugandan scholar Mahmood Mamdani freely admits that as a younger 
man he was among the generation of academics inspired by the dependency 
theorists, who believed that the impact of colonialism in Africa was purely 
down to economics. With the benefit of hindsight, he assesses that this was in 
fact not the case.74 Moving away from what he terms the limits of the 
framework of the political economy as a tool of analysis, Mamdani 
encourages the dismantling of African identities, arguing that ‘the process of 
state formation generates political identities that are not only distinct from 
market-based identities, but also cultural identities.’75 Indeed p’Bitek also 
illuminates important points about the internal conflicts within ethnic and 
cultural groupings beyond the colonial and post-colonial political economy. 
The impact of colonialism on Acholi gender roles, social hierarchy, and a 
politicised religious identity are never more apparent than in songs of Lawino 
and Ocol. Once a proud wife, daughter and mother, Lawino now has to 
contend with a husband who no longer sees her value within the homestead. 
Ocol’s masculinity is continually questioned by his wife, who does not 
understand why he wishes to bury his head in books, and no longer respects 
his parents.76  
Their manhood was finished 
In the classrooms 
Their testicles  
Were smashed 
With large books.77 
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75 Ibid. 
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A religious dimension of conflict is added by Ocol’s ‘conversion’ to Catholicism 
and Lawino’s rejection of missionary education, opting instead to adhere to 
the jogi (spirits, jok: singular) who had guided her ancestors for so long.78 
Ocol and Lawino offer viable but contrasting depictions of Acholi identity. 
p’Bitek deliberately takes a highly critical view of Ocol, who to his mind has 
rejected his roots and is no longer behaving like an ‘Acholi’ man. However, 
although seemingly despised by p’Bitek, this thesis will argue that Ocol is a 
valid representation of the numerous Acholi, who through their encounter with 
Western institutions steadily adapted to their changing social, political and 
economic landscape. p’Bitek makes it clear that it is Ocol’s eagerness to 
adopt the ‘the white mans’ way over his own peoples, which he deplores. 
However, the disdain with which Ocol is treated by the author brings to light 
one major point of concern; mainly the inability to look at the character 
objectively and see that Ocol’s Westernisation is not merely an imposition 
from above, but an internal negotiation of self-identification. 
In another respect, it was Lawino and her real life sisters who allowed 
this dual identity to not only develop but to thrive in late colonial and post-
colonial Uganda. They were the mothers who worked tirelessly in the 
homestead to bring up young boys and girls. They instilled in them Acholi 
cultural norms and values, whilst preparing them to go to school to acquire the 
education that would one day allow them to take their position in the new 
Uganda. Many actively embraced new Western religious teachings and 
encouraged their children to do the same. This is a process which many 
Acholi underwent during colonisation, post-independence, and it is a process 
which still continues today. More interestingly, today, the Ocols of Uganda, 
not only regard themselves as Acholi, but have wholeheartedly embraced 
their ethnic identification and continue to use it as a tool for political 
engagement.  They have not, as Ocol promised, obliterated tribal boundaries, 
but have continued to emphasise them in post-colonial Uganda.  
Consequently, while it is important to assess the impact of colonialism 
on African communities, academic analysis must attempt, as Mamdani 
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argues, to ‘historicise African agency’ by emphasising the African experience 
of colonialism and how this shaped African post-colonial cultural, political and 
ethnic identities.79 This line of questioning emerged around the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in response to the systematic collapse of African nation-states, 
which ushered in an era of political instability, military coups, civil war and the 
rise of authoritarian single party regimes ensuring recurrent trends of 
democratisation followed by destabilisation. Uganda’s post-colonial economic 
and political decline began in the mid-1960s amidst the political turmoil 
created by the Obote regime and the subsequent coup d’état of Idi Amin, 
which had a detrimental effect on the economy. The manipulation of ethnic 
and political identities resulted in widespread massacres from 1966, finally 
cumulating with civil war in 1986. By the time Museveni staged his coup d’état 
in 1986, in the aftermath of the failure of the IMF Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP), Uganda had become one of the poorest countries in sub-
Saharan Africa.80 Independence had not eradicated colonial ethnic tensions 
nor had it forced Ugandans to shed the tribal/clan and ethnic affiliations, 
showing that modernisation/development model had comprehensively failed. 
Similarly and disappointingly for the dependency theorists, despite the 
prolonged period of economic depression in the 1970s and 1980s, which 
weakened global capitalist structures, a proletarian uprising did not occur, nor 
did Africans shed their colonial legacy by abandoning the elitist politics of 
patrimonial/clientelism. By focusing on ‘the strong’ state as a mechanism for 
modernisation and in its various forms of dependency theorists on both sides 
of the spectrum were left with models which could no longer be viably applied 
to the African reality.81  
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This realisation opened up yet another era in Africanist literature 
focusing heavily on the study of ethnicity and its role in African political 
identity. As Young stated, the time had come when it was no longer ‘feasible 
to look at ethnicity as a cultural hangover.’82 In fact in the face of the 
dissolution of African nationalism, it was more pertinent to conclude that 
ethnicity was in fact the realisation of the effects of modernisation and the 
struggle for power and resources.83 The emphasis on African ethnic identities 
rather than African political and economic trajectories was spearheaded by 
the publication in 1989 of Jean-François Bayart’s acclaimed book, The State 
in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, which sought to change the way which 
scholars viewed Africa and its politics. Bayart aimed to look at Africa, 
specifically the behaviour of its peoples, not through the eyes of the 
modernisation or dependency theorists, but through the eyes of Africans 
themselves. He argued that African politics is authentic to Africans and rather 
than placing them into these Western based theoretical trajectories, 
Africanists should accept that African politics is very much rooted in the 
African experience of governance, tradition and culture.84 This revolutionary 
approach opened up new opportunities for Africanists, specifically those 
disillusioned by the failures of the modernisation process, who wanted to go 
‘beyond the facile generalizations and intellectual or cultural prejudices, which 
demean Africa.’85 As Berman has argued:  
 
African ethnic politics is not simply a cynical instrument of elite 
manipulation. African ethnicities are complex and protean expressions 
of the often distinctive African experiences of modernity grounded in 
the material realities of state and market and the confrontation of class, 
gender and generation.86  
 
From the late 1980s ‘ethnicity’ found a firm place in Africanist literature. John 
Lonsdale famously and influentially differentiated ‘moral ethnicity’ from 
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‘political tribalism’ while other scholars looked at what role, if any, ethnicity 
could play in the African democratic process and some went about trying to 
find its roots beyond the colonial state.87 What these studies showed was that 
African ethnic identities had neither decreased nor vanished within the post-
colonial state. This focus on ethnicity opened up an opportunity for academics 
to adopt a more pluralistic approach to scholarly research on Africa, 
incorporating multiple disciplines with historians, sociologists and political 
scientists embracing multi-focal approaches in an effort to dismantle and 
historicise African ethnic groups and the various identities, which they 
encompass. Even anthropologists, previously dismissed as the handmaidens 
of colonialism, were welcomed back with open arms as political scientists 
such as Patrick Chabal adopted anthropological methodologies, seeking to 
look at ‘politics from below’ by ‘focusing [the] camera at eye level and 
engaging with politics as it is played out in real life.’88 The proliferation of 
academic literature on ‘identity politics’ over the past thirty years is reflection 
of the need to understand how groups and individuals have politically 
mobilised in an attempt to make political claims within their locality, nation 
states or even globally. More significantly this discourse has sought to look at 
the cultural tools, power structures and social environments which create and 
nurture these politicised identities precisely because: 
 
Political movements are rarely, if ever, the spontaneous and 
unmediated expression of grassroots feelings of injustice. Elites 
typically play an important role in deciding a movement’s goals and 
tactics. And if we attend to these elite strategies, it becomes clear that 
identity claims are often shaped – and distorted – by intragroup and 
intergroup power dynamics.89  
 
The clearest point that studies of African ethnic identities over the last two 
decades have shown is that shifting African identities have nearly always 
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incorporated some sort of ethnic identification. The pluralism in this stems 
from the ability of these identities to adapt, or indeed be adapted, in the face 
of local, regional, national and global changes. Consequently, this thesis is a 
product of its time, acknowledging the political role ethnic identification has 
and continues to play in Uganda, but also goes beyond this by dismantling 
ethnic identity, and assessing the importance of other points of identification, 
whether it is religious, class, gender, or generational and how they have 
politically negotiated within the locality and the centre.90 Indeed as Carola 
Lentz states, ‘ethnic ideologies are powerful and strategically efficient to many 
precisely because they hide space for multiple interpretations and processes 
of negotiation.’91 
 
1.2. Definitions and Terminology  
 
Ocol and Lawino 
 
Through out this thesis characters depicted in the Okot p’Biteks books Song 
of Ocol and Song of Lawino will be used stylistically when referring generally 
to members of the Acholi middle class, rural peasantry, urban labourers and 
lower ranking military personnel. The Ocols can consist of local and national 
politicians, large business owners who have the means to buy labour, high 
profile religious leaders, high-ranking military personnel, mid to high level civil 
servants within local government, and local professionals such as teachers. 
Where the analysis is based on one single member or group within these 
characterisations, this will be made clear throughout the main text.  It should 
also be noted that within these characterisations there are also further socio-
economic and political divisions. For instance, among the Lawinos, urban 
labourers and lower-ranking military personnel are more likely to have access 
to a waged employment compared to rural subsistence farmers who tend live 
hand to mouth. Moreover, the formers migration to urban towns and cities 
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such as Gulu and Kampala allows them exposure to economic, ethnic and 
political social groups, which tend to be more diverse in comparison to their 
rural counterparts. Consequently, this urban demographic has the potential to 
form political identities based on a more nationally orientated industrial 
movement. However, in Acholi, as will be discussed further in chapter four, 
chronic regional underdevelopment and lack of industry placed restrictions on 
the formation of any mass, centralised, proletarian workers’ movement that 
could transcend the locality.  
Among the Ocols, local professionals such as teachers, tended to have 
a lower economic and political profile, in comparison to say urban business 
owners or local and national politicians. However, their education levels as 
well as unrestricted access to the minds of a new generation of Acholi 
children undoubtedly placed them in a position of social and political 
influence. This can be more clearly observed in the 1950s and 1960s when 
local schools became a hotly contested battleground for the two major political 
parties in the region. Moreover, the teaching profession could also act as a 
gateway to formal politics given that a number of Acholi politicians that 
emerged post-independence came from a teaching background. 
Whilst Ocol and Lawino are labels imposed by the author, it is also 
illuminating to highlight more commonly used local terms that convey similar 
socio-economic demarcations. These terms are diverse and generally denote 
physical appearances, education levels, wealth and/or political power. Thus 
among the rural population words such as, Lulonyo (the rich), Wige Lobo 
(owners of the world/boss) and Mufuata mingi (a Kiswahili word meaning 
either fats/oils) generally used to describe an overweight person as this often 
symbolises wealth. The expression Lucung iwibye, is perhaps the most 
descriptive.  This literally translates to ‘those who stand on top of an anthill’ 
and is popularly used to describe local politicians who would often utilise the 
risen platforms of anthills to stand on whilst addressing potential voters. On 
the reverse side, the terms used to describe the Lawinos by the Ocols tend to 
denote the formers lower socio-economic status and level of education. Whilst 
English words such as ‘villagers’ and ‘local people’ are commonly used, other 
terms such as Lutedoro are also common. This word literally translates to 
‘those who sit at the base of the granary’, and is used due to the fact that 
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villagers with the unavailability of chairs would use the raised base of granary 
to sit on whilst listening to political speeches. Finally, the term Dano 
(people/person) has a deep social stratification connotation, as it is usually 
used to describe the Lawinos as the ‘commoners’ of Acholi society. However, 
by adding the adjective ‘big’ as in ‘Dano Madit’ (big people/person), this 
expression can then be used to refer to those within the higher echelons of 
Acholi society.      
Throughout the this thesis, other expressions, denoting the social, 
political and economic demarcation between Ocol and Lawino such as the 
‘silent majority’, ‘power-brokers’, ‘political/local elite’, and the ‘haves and have 
not’ have also been used at times where there is a need to convey context 
outside the Acholi locality and Uganda more widely. Where these terms 
appear in thesis, they will be grounded within theoretical analysis and debates 
on social virtue, social contracts, and the reciprocity of privilege.  
Consequently, the terms Ocol and Lawino will be used specifically when 
analysing local interplay between Acholi local elites and the rural peasantry or 
urban dwellers with lower socio-economic profiles. 
There is also a gender dimension that needs to be considered. Firstly, 
Acholi women were vastly underrepresented in the local and national archives 
for the period under research. This was primarily through lack of education 
and the patriarchal social order. This is point that p’Bitek highlights with his 
characterisation of ‘Lawino’ as the uneducated village wife whose domain is 
very much the female-dominated domestic sphere. In many respects, 
p’Bitek’s depiction of these gender roles reflects the reality of many Acholi 
women in the Ugandan late-colonial and early post-colonial state. Secondly, 
within this author’s categorisation of the Lawinos, the patriarchal social order 
within Acholi society meant that women were further marginalised in favour of 
the Acholi man.  Consequently, despite sharing a similar economic status as 
their female counterparts, Acholi men do not fully conform to the socio-
political characterisation of Lawino. Whilst they may have been marginalised 
from the world of the Ocols, they were still afforded access to certain 
commodities primarily because of their gender. These assertions will be 
discussed further in chapter three and more briefly in chapter five.  
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Finally, in some instances during the thesis there is an implicit tension 
when differentiating between the Ocols and Acholi chiefs. In many regards, 
the chiefs were themselves the Ocol given their social and political status 
within the locality and their access to education, particularly post-
independence. Where this tension emerges, the political tensions between 
modernist versus traditionalists come to the forefront. Within this debate, we 
are able to observe how these two competing groups emphasised different 
tools, languages and rhetoric to ensure their foothold within local and national 
politics. More significantly, this tension highlights clearly how local chiefs 
emphasised the political and administrative structure of the colonial Native 
Authority and Acholi cultural ‘traditions’ to compete with the new demographic 
of Ocols born out of the late colonial market economy. This tension can also 
be observed throughout the thesis with the recurrent battle between these two 
groups, to gain power at the expense of the other.  Significantly however, 
within the cataclysmic decade of the 1980s, political domains became blurred; 
there we see more clearly the Ocols and chiefs’ adopting each other’s ‘tools’ 
to capitalise on the political opportunities presented by a state on the verge of 
collapse. Thus when the opportunity arose, each group was happy to infringe 
on the others political domain, if it helped to further their individual and 
collective goals. 
 
Identity  
 
In the social sciences ‘identity’ is used as an umbrella term to describe an 
individual's comprehension of his or herself as a discrete and separate entity. 
This identity is visualised through certain markers that could include, but are 
not limited to, dress language and geography. These markers provide the 
‘membership status, which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as 
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same 
order.’92 For these identity markers to have any significance, their meaning 
has to be recognised by those who observing the characteristics of the 
identity being presented. As an example, an Acholi living in a village in 
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England would perhaps find it easier to identify themselves as Ugandan or 
even African first to their neighbours, as opposed to as an Acholi. This is 
primarily because, the identity markers that distinguish an Acholi in Uganda, 
be it language, traditional food, or specific ceremonial dress, would not be so 
readily recognisable by the majority of the population in rural England. The 
Acholi identity would in this instance loose its significance to the people 
perceiving it, as they would attach little importance to the particularities of the 
identity markers. However, if the Acholi in question were back in Uganda, to 
simply identify oneself as African or even Ugandan would make little sense, 
unless the statements were politically motivated; if they were a deliberate 
attempt to move away from the confines of regional, ethnic or even national 
demarcations.  
Ethnic identity can be referred to as; ‘the individual level of 
identification with a culturally defined collectivity’, and ‘the sense on the part of 
the individual that he or she belongs to a particular cultural community.’ These 
identification points generally include a common language, geographical 
point, culture and sometimes a shared religion.93 Culture can be broadly 
defined as, ‘the system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviours, and 
artefacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and with 
one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation through 
learning.’94 A cultural collectivity is therefore a group of people who share and 
observe these customs, whether symbolically or materially. And so culture is 
formed and strengthened through sharing the same material space, and when 
this is not possible, normative values, thoughts and beliefs transferred 
generationally provide the basis for the continuation of cultural beliefs beyond 
the confines of the home, locality, region, and even country. However, culture 
itself is not static, and like ethnicity changes and adapts according to time and 
changes in the material space such as the effects of modernisation and 
political institutions.   
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Ethnicity and Nationalism  
 
As one of the most prolific writers on ethnicity and nationalism, Anthony D. 
Smith coined the term ‘ethnosymbolism’ as a ‘soft’ form of primordialism. To 
Smith, ethnic identification is based on emotional ties that are shaped by a 
person’s historical and cultural background.95 While rejecting the primordial 
view that national identities are atavistic, he also disagrees with the 
structuralist view that these two identities are completely new constructs. 
Smith argues that without a significant prior history of ethnicity, there can be 
no nations or nationalism, ‘only states imposed from above.’96  Anthropologist 
Fredrick Barth made an important distinction between cultural and ethnic 
groups.97 Barth argued that rather than seeing ethnicity or ethnic groups as a 
fixed reality or container wherein people lived, ethnicity should instead be 
observed as the interaction between groups. It is these interactions that 
perpetuate cultural differences and create boundaries.98  This work marked a 
distinct shift in the study of ethnicity. By looking at the relationships between 
groups, and the process of identity constructions, Barth rejected the classical 
primordialist school of thought, which looked upon markers, such as common 
language, ancestry and geographical points as the key roots ethnic 
identification. For Barth, and those who followed, ethnicity is viewed as a lived 
identity constantly changed and reinvented in accordance to external and 
internal stimulus.99 The structuralist approach gives ethnicity and ethnic 
identity a certain amount of flexibility, allowing it to change and adapt. This is 
a limited departure from Smith, who readily accepts that nation states are 
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indeed modern constructions. However, it is ethnicity, which he views as the 
foundation of nationalism and national identity in its ‘soft’ primordialist form.100  
Barth’s research provides a feasible distinction between culture and 
ethnicity, and by doing so he is able to offer a deeper insight into the nature of 
ethnicity. To Barth, ethnicity is: 
 
A political process by which people seek to form groups and to 
differentiate one set of people from another, by appealing to the 
idea of ineluctable cultural difference. In fact, people can readily 
invent cultural differences if it is in their political interests to do so. 
Ethnicity is the pursuit of political goals-the acquisition or 
maintenance of power, the mobilisation of a following-through the 
idiom of cultural commonness and difference.101 
 
The unavoidable cultural differences or commonness that Barth refers to, 
such as recognisable common practices that bind generations, provide 
cultural groupings with the raw materials which can be used to effectively 
mobilise a group or community against potential physical or political threats 
from ‘outsiders.’ John Lonsdale later extended this assessment in his 
frequently cited work on politicised ethnicity drawing the reader to consider 
two sides of ethnic identities by differentiating between ‘political tribalism’ and 
‘moral ethnicity.’ To Lonsdale, ‘moral ethnicity’ is a process of ‘ourself-ing’ and 
‘political tribalism’ that of ‘othering.’ ‘Political tribalism’ is the external face of a 
group and determines how its members behave in relation to 
‘others’/outsiders.102 Within an ethnic group, moral ethnicity is the internal 
discourses of social responsibility and it is the moral codes and actions that 
are conducted day-to-day determining how people should behave among 
themselves. Yet as Lonsdale states there also needs to be a further 
differentiation between the ‘moral economy’ of a group and ‘moral ethnicity.’ 
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All ethnicities have at their core a moral economy that allocates 
reputation by the means to which people pursue their self-interests. 
Reputation’s criteria are historically negotiated but appear to be 
immemorially ‘given’. No pre-colonial African society was 
communalistic in its own day, for instance, but all were technically so 
simple that any individual accumulation of wealth ineluctably incurred 
social obligations which had to be constantly repaid. Rich and poor had 
duties to each other; patronage had to earn its service. Reputations 
measured the quality of each. 
 
The established codes of conduct and interactions within this moral economy 
are not static and must be continually renegotiated within the group to 
maintain equilibrium through reciprocal relations, regardless of whether the 
power structures are vertical or horizontal. Within the moral economy of a 
group, members and individuals  
 
earned their living, discharged social obligation, resolved disputes, 
earned reputation and trust as self-realised men or women.  Cultural 
competition energised pre-colonial Africa but prudence set limits to 
cultural chauvinism. Cultures were permeable; big men took wives 
from other ethnic ‘others.’ The poor might take to inter-ethnic 
migration in search of alternative protection, marriage and trade.103  
 
 
However the colonial encounter meant that ethnic consciousness and 
differentiation became sharper as:  
 
Alien rule, economic changes and literacy affected social relations. 
Local power became concentrated unprecedentedly in the hands of 
official chiefs and their kin. Migrant labour subverted household 
disciplines and generational relations, women’s market production 
called in question existing gender relations. Religious change 
challenged the elder’s monopoly on access to unseen power; literacy 
gave scandalous new assurances to the young, to women or the poor. 
. .  The penetration of colonial capitalism forced people to debate such 
formally implicit moral economies within increasingly explicit ‘moral 
ethnicities’. These new social competitions fostered new arguments 
about what forms of achievement made one a good member of the 
local community.104 
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While Barth arguably takes a more negative view of ethnicity, particularly 
compared to cultural identity, Lonsdale looks at it as the cradle of civility 
which, in the African context, provides an internal environment where 
inequalities can be questioned regardless of class or social hierarchy, gender 
or generation. ‘Moral ethnicity’ shows that Africans have the cultural tools to 
question and resist the oppressive apparatus of their states and provides 
individuals and groups with the tools to compete ‘for the scarce goods of 
modernity, as well as for access to local resources of land and labour.’105 
Lonsdale states emphatically that this version of a living ethnicity within a local 
context has nothing to do with political mobilisation, which is instead the 
external face of an ethnic group presented to contend with ‘outsiders’. 
However, negotiations on ‘how best to represent one’s community in the 
external, unequal arena of state power’ must always be reconciled within the 
enclave of ‘moral ethnicity’.106 Consequently, it is the cultural commonalities or 
the pre-colonial moral economy of African communities which have laid the 
foundations to allow for the development of the social discourses that govern 
relations within ‘moral ethnicity’ and ‘political tribalism’. As Lonsdale readily 
acknowledges, colonial rule sharpened ethnic consciousness as it 
encountered Western institutions, be it institutes of education, the market 
economy, or the centralisation of the native polity. This contributed to the 
creation, definition and politicisation of African tribal/ethnic groups. However, 
the tribalisation/ethnification of these groups would not have been possible 
had there not existed the cultural commonalities with which the colonial 
administration or even members of a cultural group could use to attempt to 
construct a coherent, and seemingly unified ethnic identity.  
 
The ‘Cultural Took Kit’ 
 
Cultural traits are not always unique to a single ethnic group and can cross 
clan, tribe and ethnic boundaries. Generally, cross-cultural similarities are 
inevitably more evident among groups living in close geographical proximity to 
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each other. In 1965 anthropologist Michael Moerman published a paper on 
ethnographic research he had conducted on the Lue group in northern 
Thailand. In trying to answer the question ‘who are the Lue?’ Moerman 
encountered several difficulties in pin pointing a precise definition. When he 
posed the question to the Lue, the typical characteristics described to 
differentiate themselves were also present in several neighbouring groups.107 
Similarly, the Acholi are ethno-linguistically and culturally related to several 
groups in Northern Uganda and neighbouring countries such as Sudan and 
Kenya. Numerous similarities can be seen in ‘Acholi’ customs including 
marriage, rituals, funeral and naming ceremonies with neighbouring groups 
such as the Lango. The word ‘jok/ juok’ which is used to describe Acholi pre-
colonial deities is the same term used by groups such as the Lango, Anuak in 
Sudan and Alur in Northern Uganda. These commonalities are what 
Lonsdale, Barth and Smith argue, bind groups together. However, what 
ultimately separates them, as will discussed further in the next chapter, is 
what ‘cultural tools’ groups choose to use, emphasise or discount when faced 
with internal and external competition. On her work on cultural symbolism and 
strategies Ann Swidler coined the term ‘cultural took kit’ which she argues, 
provides a repertoire ‘of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 
strategies of action.’108  
Strategies of action are cultural products; the symbolic experiences, 
mythic lore, and ritual practices of a group or society create moods and 
motivations, ways of organizing experience and evaluating reality, 
modes of regulating conduct and ways of forming social bonds, which 
provide resources for constructing strategies of action. Settled cultures 
constrain action over time because of the high cost of retooling to 
adopt new patterns of action.  In unsettled periods, in contrast, cultural 
meanings are more highly articulated and explicit, because they model 
patterns of actions that do not come naturally. Ultimately, structural and 
historical opportunities determine which strategies, and thus which 
cultural systems succeed.109  
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For the Acholi, pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial, economic and social 
changes had a direct correlation to the ‘cultural tools’, which were emphasised 
or discounted in relation to their changing political and social environments. 
These are the tools that govern relationships within moral ethnicity and can 
include, shared ancestry, shared geographical boundaries, language, 
symbols, rituals, stories and established social norms and values which 
dictate the relationship between elders, youth, men and women. Colonial rule 
sharpened certain culture identities, fragmenting culturally common groups 
into more politically distinct tribal groups, whilst others such as clan and 
chiefly allegiances provided the political tools to contend with the threats form 
‘outsiders’. Within the repertoire of the ‘cultural kit’, chiefs, youth, women, 
politicians and peasants could obtain the tools to voice their grievances 
internally and externally. However, the fluidity of cultural identity means that 
even within the accepted boundaries of ‘Acholiness’, individuals and internal 
micro-groups can also act in various ways to emphasise or even devalue 
certain cultural norms and values, according to specific internal 
circumstances.110 Thus clan and chiefly allegiances can be emphasised over 
other more unifying cultural traits – such as geographical locations and a 
shared language – as individuals and micro-groups fight for scarce 
commodities. 
Having failed to find a satisfactory definition of what made the Lue 
‘Lue’, Moerman in the end was forced to conclude that someone was ‘Lue’ by 
simply believing and calling themselves ‘Lue’, and acting in certain ways to 
validate their ‘Lueness’.111  However, it is not just enough to call yourself 
‘Acholi’ or act in certain ways to validate ones ‘Acholiness’. Membership is 
always negotiated by the established nucleus of a cultural or ethnic group. In 
Acholi, membership is generally carried through the paternal lineage, as 
culturally a woman marries into her husband’s family. Consequently, Acholi 
daughters remained economically lucrative as through marriage they could 
provide their families with a much-needed injection of cash and/or cattle 
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through bridewealth. Not paying the bridewealth sometimes impeded a 
traditional marriage, as a woman would not be accepted to belong to a man’s 
familial lineage unless the bridewealth had been paid in full. However, a man 
could take his new wife home and continue to pay the balance in instalments. 
Finnström notes that many Acholi will argue that a woman’s loyalties will 
remain uncertain until bridewealth has been paid.112 In cases where the 
husband dies before completing payment, the wife, with her children, can 
return to her family and if she remains unmarried her daughters’ bride-wealth 
will be given to her family instead of her husband’s.113  
In cases of inter-marriage, where the man is ‘Acholi’ any children born 
would generally be accepted as belonging to the ‘Acholi’ ethnic group. 
However, as can be observed in the 1970s and 1980s, ancestral ties were 
more readily challenged as political instability and scarce economic 
commodities heightened internal competition within the region. Even those 
who had assumed their ‘Acholi’ identity by living in Acholi districts for years, 
acquiring the established cultural traits and acting in certain ways to validate 
their ‘Acholiness’, were targeted as outsiders and potential threats to the 
established community. Similarly, with the relative political and economic 
stability of the 1950s and early 1960s, regional rather than ethnic identities 
emerged as the key tool for political engagement. Thus, cultural and ethnic 
identities are lived experiences, never static, always negotiated and 
continually challenged.   
 
1.3. A Note on the Archives and Sources 
 
The research herein is primarily qualitative, making use of primary and 
secondary materials including oral testimonies. The archives in Uganda give a 
vivid reflection of the political history of the country from its status as a British 
Protectorate to its post-colonial history. Offering a wealth of colonial and early 
post-colonial documents from district staff records to minutes from presidential 
meetings, the National Archives in Entebbe offer clear insight into the official 
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mind. These records were contextualised within wider colonial and imperial 
debates through the Colonial Office records in the British National Archives in 
Kew. The Uganda Christian University (UCU) in Mukono, which holds the 
Church Missionary Society (CMS) archives and the White Father (WF) 
Archives at Rubaga Cathedral in Kampala, provided access to missionary 
documents, although the majority were again from the colonial period. The 
archives in Entebbe and the well-stocked Africana library at Makerere 
University in the capital Kampala are particularly strong for the 1960s. The 
political euphoria of the first decade independence is reflected in the 
abundance of documents produced and preserved from this time period. As 
Ugandans took control of central government, political activity at the local and 
national level produced a wealth of correspondence, petitions, audits, 
accounts manifestos, intelligence reports and official minutes from local and 
national governmental councils.  The documents paint a picture of a country 
actively engaged in its political future with local and national political actors 
openly challenging the state and holding it accountable without the fear of 
retribution that would come to characterise the 1970s and 1980s. As a 
consequence, the majority of the sources that have been engaged with in the 
1950s and 1960s are written documents produced by state actors, local 
political and non-political actors as well as religious institutions, all of which 
are well represented in the archives. Politics in Uganda in the early 1960s is 
largely reflective of Derrida’s assertion that ‘effective democratization can 
always be measured by this essential criterion: the participation in and access 
to the archive, its constitution, and its interpretation.’114 It is also a testimony, 
to the relative inclusiveness of Ugandan polity in the early 1960s that allowed 
so many voices to find a place in the nation’s archives.  In addition, there is 
more usage of newspaper reports within these chapters, in direct correlation 
to the relative freedom of the press enjoyed during the 1950s-1960s 
compared to the heavy censorship imposed by Amin and Obote’s second 
administration. Thus, during the chapters of the thesis certain source genres 
will disappear or emerge depending on the time period being discussed. 
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Similarly, certain themes are also emphasised according to political contexts. 
Generational conflicts are more readily observed within the archives in the 
1950s and 1960s, as politically inclusive governments tend to empower 
various sections of a society to persecute collective grievances. However, the 
repressiveness of Amin’s regime and the marginalisation of the Acholi 
educated elite suppressed the political dialogue between the traditionalists 
and modernists in Acholi society. Similarly, the economic depression and 
political turmoil of the 1980s gave rise to individual political and economic 
considerations rather than any collectivised movements as the competition for 
commodities in Acholi increased. Thus the battle between the ‘Ocols’ and the 
chiefs can be observed more clearly within the relative political inclusivity of 
the 1950s and early 1960s.     
The documents of the 1970s and the 1980s presented a more 
challenging task. The National Archives and Makerere University simply did 
not hold a satisfactory amount of data for this time period. This is where the 
district archives in Gulu, the largest town in Acholi, and Kitgum in East Acholi, 
became significant. The archives in Gulu were preserved and offered an 
abundance of documents relating to the 1970s and 1980s. The documents in 
Gulu and Kitgum pertained specifically to local institutions and actors and as 
such were more relevant to the project than many of the sources found at 
Entebbe and Makerere. They have consequently contributed the bulk of the 
evidential research in this project. The district archives, particularly in Kitgum 
are un-catalogued and un-preserved. Anyone that attempts to visit them must 
have the time, patience and diligence to trawl through the storerooms of 
discarded documents. However, the time invested in carrying out this task will 
certainly reap fulsome rewards.  
 
1.4. War, Collective Memories and Oral Histories  
 
Nothing good has happened to the Acholi. Acholi are different because 
they have been mistreated. They have not been given any 
opportunities. That is what makes us different.115 
                                                
115 IF/M) NAU: Interview with private security guard, Gulu, 25 June 2012. Interviews were 
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For this thesis, oral history was pivotal to researching the history of a people 
who have traditionally documented their past through oral tradition. 
Furthermore, the nature of high politics in the Ugandan post-colonial nature 
state has always utilised a process of exclusion of subalterns. Whilst the 
archives were useful in understanding the nature of the state and those who 
control it, those documents generally only provide the historian with one side 
of the story.116 Much like historical memories, archives and archival 
documents are social and political constructs. ‘Their origins lie in the 
information needs and social values of the rulers, governments, businesses, 
associations, and individuals who establish and maintain them.’117 Archives 
and oral histories are not simply a collection of information, but are in 
themselves ‘sites of contested knowledges.’ It is the dichotomy between what 
is being presented and the meaning, intention and words used to create these 
sources that are the most significant. Archival researchers should utilise a 
more contextual approach by adopting ethnographic methodologies rather 
than just extracting information.118 Subsequently, oral interviews and 
testimonies can help the researcher to obtain a clearer understanding of the 
stories to be told by engaging with those who are not engaged with in the 
archives. Furthermore, although the archives can offer some insight into 
questions regarding identity such as ‘who are we?’, when the question is 
posed to an individual who has lived the experience it becomes less about the 
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content of the answer and more about the intention, interpretation, 
terminology and context. This allows the researcher greater depth in 
understanding the concepts of a lived identity and in some cases brings to 
light structural relations between the state and the locality that may have 
otherwise been overlooked.  
Because the politically active generation from the 1950s is dying, there 
is less use of oral testimonies in chapter three. However, oral testimonies 
were particularly pertinent when faced with a proliferation of documents 
produced by military intelligence agents in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
militarisation of politics in Uganda from the late 1960s meant that anti-
subversive task forces such as the General Service Unit (GSU) and Amin’s 
infamous State Security Bureau (SSB) became the primary producers of 
military intelligence in the Acholi districts. However, ‘members of the GSU 
were untrained for their anti-subversive role [and] could well have been 
tempted from time to time to proffer dubious items of information as evidence 
of their diligence’119 The nature of the sources for these decades demanded 
more stringent use of oral testimonies to understand the relationship between 
the state and the locality beyond the premise of structural state violence and 
control. The clandestine nature of these reports were however particularly 
insightful in bringing to light state decay, corruption and paranoia.  Given that 
many of the documents were likely never intended for public view, they 
unwittingly convey civil agency in the face of authoritarian rule. The 
government’s fear of subversive behaviour and the unrelenting directive to 
target anyone who posed a threat to the administration opened an avenue for 
official politico-military engagement with civilians within the archives. Through 
oral testimonies the researcher can see how some local actors engaged with, 
conformed to, challenged and manipulated state institutions within a violent 
and oppressive political climate.  
Oral testimonies are particularly important in the Acholi context 
because historians have shied away from conducting any in-depth archival 
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research on Acholi history prior to the LRA conflict. The period between 1960 
and 1985 has largely been marginalised in favour of Acholi colonial history 
and the LRA insurgency. This is partly because the instability of Uganda’s 
post-colonial past, in common with many sub-Saharan nation states, has 
meant that national and district archives have been largely neglected or 
destroyed.120 This is particularly true for Northern Uganda, which was a 
conflict zone for well over twenty years. Consequently, many of the district 
archives in Acholi have remained largely inaccessible, understaffed and 
underfunded. Indeed, as Stephen Ellis discusses, ‘contemporary historians do 
not have at their disposal the conventional archives afforded to those whose 
interests lay primarily in the colonial period.’121 The difficulties faced by 
researchers in accessing archival material due to lack of government 
investment in the preservation of the nation’s archives, and the prominence of 
the LRA war, has ensured that Acholi post-colonial history been largely 
marginalised in favour of contemporary international academic discourses 
regarding the LRA insurgency. In this sense, the events in northern Uganda 
over the past twenty years have informed how the histories of the peoples of 
the region has been written and debated.  
Undeniably, the prominence of the LRA insurgency in the Acholi 
historical and political narrative, coupled with a lack of any significant archival 
research on the Acholi past has in the present day led to the reification of a 
collective history of ‘victimisation’. 
 
The ‘victim’ is the diminished agent par excellence . . . Victims are, by 
definition, passive objects who have been acted upon by other forces, 
not active agents. They are defined by the mark that has been made 
on them rather than the mark that they have made on the wider world. 
In as far as they are victims; they are devoid of volition or intent.122  
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As such there are continual references by the international media to the 
‘“Acholi and child soldiers”, the “Acholi and the LRA’” and the ‘”Acholi and the 
Displacement Camps”.’123 The perpetuation of the ‘victim identity’ has not 
been limited to international commentators. It has also been effectively utilised 
by the Acholi to highlight their grievances to a previously indifferent 
international and regional community.124 In many ways it is this ‘victimisation’ 
discourse, channelled externally through ethnopolitics, which continues to 
drive the political economy of Acholi today. Moreover, this ‘victim identity’, as 
this research will show, is not a new construct. It can also be observed in how 
the Acholi engaged with late colonial and post-colonial political institutions by 
utilising grievances of regional underdevelopment. 
This research is also in many ways a continuation of this presentist 
discourse, as it acknowledges that the past and the present are intrinsically 
linked.125 Firstly, as Foucault’s analysis of subjectivity in historical research 
argues, it is futile to argue that historians can completely detach themselves 
from that which is being researched.126  Complete objectivity, or a detachment 
from contemporary discourses and experiences is something the historian 
may strive for, but can never fully achieve. Secondly, the process of 
discussing significance and meaning when analysing archival sources and 
oral testimonies undoubtedly forces the historian to make certain judgements 
and conclusions drawn from outside the archives, since information does not 
exist, nor can it be conveyed, within a vacuum.127 However, this is a process 
that is necessary as historical research depends as much upon ‘intuitive as 
upon analytical methods.’128  
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This thesis focuses primarily on how political events and structures 
within Uganda have shaped Acholi identities over a period of thirty-five years. 
It is axiomatic that identities, be they collective or individual, are continually 
evolving and are shaped by the histories from which they were formed and 
nurtured. They are not contained within a ‘dead past’, but instead their very 
existence is given credence by a continued dialogue between the past, 
present and the future.129 This assessment becomes even more pertinent 
when dealing with oral testimonies from those whose memories of the past 
cannot be disentangled from their present situation.  
Northern Uganda is currently going through a process of post-conflict 
rehabilitation, aided by numerous governmental and non-governmental 
organisations that are placing emphasis firmly on post-conflict reconstruction, 
transitional reconciliation and ethnojustice. Consequently, institutions such as 
Justice and Reconciliation Project, (JRP), Acholi Religious Leaders Peace 
Initiative (ARLPI), and Civil Societies for Peace in northern Uganda, to name 
but a few are numerous in the region. The primary arguments that emerged 
following the various failed peace talks with the LRA, were that any process of 
transitional justice would have to factor in Acholi indigenous methods of 
reconciliation. The consensus emerged even before the withdrawal of LRA 
troops in northern Uganda. In April 1997, kacoke madit (big gathering), a 
meeting of a cross section of Acholi including religious leaders, government 
ministers and representatives of the LRA and NRM was held in London with 
the aim of discussing ways of bringing lasting peace to the region by 
accommodating traditional methods of reconciliation.130 Furthermore, in 2000 
the Ker Kwaro Acoli (KKA), the Acholi cultural institution, was reinstated by 
article 246 of the Ugandan Constitution.131 KKA claims to have its ‘roots in the 
                                                
129 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
130 ‘The Bending of Spears” producing consensus for peace & development in Northern 
Uganda, commissioned by:  International Alert December 1997, (Personal Copy). 
131 ‘Community Perspectives on the Mato Oput Process, Collaborative Transitions Africa, The 
Institute for Global Leadership, Tufts University: The Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, 
Gulu University, October 2009. 
 56 
I                
traditional and political organisations of the Acholi people as chiefdoms.’132 
Finally clause 3.1 of the unsigned Juba Peace Accords stated that, ‘traditional 
justice mechanisms . . . shall be promoted with necessary modifications as a 
central part of the framework for accountability and reconciliation.’133 
The popularisation of ‘ethnojustice’ in the region has not been without 
its critics. Adam Branch states that since the mid-2000s increased foreign 
funding and foreign agencies and donors have contributed to the promotion of 
traditional reconciliation and justice to make it a major growth industry in 
northern Uganda.134 Furthermore, the emphasis on chiefly authority, derived 
from ‘authentic’ pre-colonial Acholi cultural traditions, and advocated for by 
groups such as the KKA is predominately exclusive of those that do not fit into 
the patriarchal chiefly hierarchy, particularly Acholi women and young men.135  
The LRA conflict, post-conflict reconstruction and the emphasis on 
ethnojustice and chiefly authority, raise some important points regarding the 
limitations of historicising Acholi ‘moral ethnicity’ in relation to how the 
interviewees that were consulted for this project remembered the past.  
Undeniably, the experience of war, collective suffering and post-conflict 
reconstruction has served to reinforce Acholi ethnic identity both internally and 
externally, by reaffirming group solidarity through collective suffering and 
remembrance. This can be observed within current discourses, formal and 
informal, regarding the NRM’s perceived political persecution of Acholi, 
accusations of genocide and the governments ‘plan’ to eradicate the peoples 
of Acholi all together, as revenge for Acholi actions in Uganda’s political 
past.136 
These local discourses bring to light some of the limitations concerning 
oral history and the act of remembering the past in the context of the present. 
The relationship between the Acholi past and its present can notably be 
observed when some informants argued adamantly that the position of Laloyo 
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Maber (Good ruler/Acholi paramount chief) preceded the 1930s, when it fact 
the post was officially sanctioned by the British in 1959. This observation 
could be used to argue that the current emphasis on chiefs as the pillars of 
‘authentic’ pre-colonial Acholi traditions has gone some way to perhaps 
elevate perceptions of their power in the Acholi political past. More 
significantly, within the discourses of victimisation, the government failure to 
effectively facilitate post-conflict reconstruction, and the emphasis on Acholi 
‘tradition’ as a mechanism to affect justice and reconciliation, has placed 
‘ethnicity’ and ‘tribe’ at the centre of Acholi formal and informal political 
discourses. However, this is not to argue that the prominence of ethnopolitics 
in Acholi today is simply a result of the LRA conflict. In fact, whilst it has been 
argued that tribal identities are irrelevant at village level social interactions, ‘at 
least until soldiers start killing each other’, Uganda’s violent post-colonial 
history, ensured that there has been more periods of instability than 
stability.137 Consequently, especially within the context of the LRA conflict, 
how has the experience of war shaped how the past is now remembered?  
The answer to this question is more difficult to ascertain from the archives of 
the period under research, but oral histories can offer some insight. This is 
when the act of remembering, the language and terminology used by the 
interviewee whilst recounting past experiences become pivotal. This was 
observed by the author when informants would use expressions such as 
‘human rights abuses and violations’, whilst recounting their experiences 
during the preceding decades prior to war, although this international rhetoric 
only appears in the local archives in the mid-1980s. Whilst all these points 
could benefit from further research beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
important to acknowledge how localised social categories of ethnicity and 
identity continue to be shaped by contemporary debates and social contexts. 
Critics of oral history such as Marwick and Hobsbawm have pointed to 
the methodology’s subjugation to human memory, specifically its unreliability 
and the social factors that shape that which is being memorialised, with 
                                                
137 T. Allen, ‘Ethnicity and Tribalism on the Sudan-Uganda Border’, in K. Fukui and J. 
Markakis, (eds.), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (Oxford: James Currey, 1994), 
133. 
 58 
I                
Hobsbawm adding that oral history is a slippery medium for preserving 
facts.138 Evidence of ‘false memories’ readily presented themselves when the 
researcher was conducting interviews in Northern Uganda. When recalling 
their memories of the HSM, two informants pointed to a specific time where 
Alice Lakwena used her spiritual powers to cause a large rock or mountain to 
internally combust. While this account is highly dubious, it also provides an 
opportunity to access how stories became ‘factual’ accounts and how they are 
then remembered. Other researchers have detailed similar stories regarding 
the ‘exploding rock’, in some form or other, which seems to have its origins in 
the teachings of Alice Lakwena who told her followers that any stones thrown 
at the enemy would be blessed and subsequently explode like a grenade.139 
However, this could also be an indication of how researchers influence the 
memories of their informants. It is possible given the large number of 
academics currently doing fieldwork in Northern Uganda, that some of them 
without prompting could have brought up the story of the exploding rock, 
creating, as Hobsbawm states, flaws in the informant’s memory.140 However, 
the significance of oral history ‘is not that the methodology is merely 
interested in facts,’ but as Portelli argues, ‘is concerned more with the 
participant’s perception of what is true.’141 Much in the same way as the 
financial account audits found in the district archives in Uganda convey a 
history of economic poverty, oral testimonies reveal how those who lived 
through that poverty experienced, understood and conceptualised it. In a 
similar vein, historical memories are intrinsically linked to current events that 
continue to shape memories of the past. For the majority of the interviewees 
consulted for this project, the LRA conflict and Amin’s dictatorial rule 
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continually serve as a reference point to how pre-war experiences are 
remembered. Informants overwhelmingly painted a picture of Obote’s first 
presidency as prosperous and progressive, yet the archival documents refute 
this. Given the events that occurred after 1970, it is unsurprising that their 
memories are largely comparative between what was ‘bad’ and what was 
‘worse’. Furthermore, Obote’s standing as a ‘Northern’ President, compared 
to the current President’s Southern identity brings to light what part regional, 
ethnic affiliations and political processes play in historical memory. “‘The 
discrepancy between fact and memory ultimately enhances the value oral 
sources as historical documents” by helping to see how people make sense of 
significant events and indeed what makes these events significant to them.’142  
It is dangerous to undervalue oral history, a methodology which, if 
approached with due diligence ‘and interdisciplinary collaboration can allow 
‘reliability of a high order [to] be achieved.’143 
The transformation of archival and oral sources into a historical 
narrative is clearly a subjective one.144 The question remains, how is this 
subjectivity further challenged when the researcher, as it is in this case, is a 
native to the region being researched? Any form of qualitative research is 
affected by the role of researcher, their personal views, their understanding of 
the environment they are studying, and more importantly in the case of oral 
research, how they are viewed by the people they are trying to study. 
Practically, my British and Ugandan identities were both an asset and a 
hindrance. Born in Uganda to an Acholi father and Lango mother, my 
Ugandan identities were instrumental in allowing me unrestricted access to 
the local archives in Gulu and Kitgum, as well as to Acholi informants. 
Undoubtedly, the fact that I could speak the local language, as well as having 
an easily identifiable Luo name, were contributing factors for this. However, 
whilst my ‘Acholiness’ opened access to informants, my British identity placed 
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limits on me being comprehensively accepted by Acholi informants.145 I was 
immediately marked out as a potential collaborator who could use my 
Western identity to highlight the plight of the Acholi, their historical suffering, 
victimisation, and economic and political neglect by the current Ugandan 
government. This clearly made it more difficult to conduct interviews as a 
large amount of time was spent discussing the current political situation. But 
as the interviews progressed it proved to be beneficial in giving the informants 
time to become used to the interview environment and consequently talk more 
openly.  
My personal connection to Acholi will clearly raise questions about 
‘objectivity’. Undeniably the impact that the LRA/HSM war has had on own 
family has undoubtedly shaped my informal understanding of the Acholi 
political past. Moreover, coming to United Kingdom as the dependent of a 
political asylum seeker initiated a process of self-identification rooted in the 
discourses of victimisation that is prevalent among the Acholi Diaspora in the 
United Kingdom who have been directly or indirectly affected by the process 
of war. This ‘victim identity’ was instrumental in stoking my own interest in to 
researching the Acholi political past in order to move beyond the premise of 
simply what was done to them, and show how, despite their tumultuous 
history, the peoples of the region adapted and survived by developing and 
mobilizing their own political agency. It is futile to argue that my life 
experiences, Western education and cultural background have had no 
bearing on my analysis of the sources, as it is impossible to completely 
disentangle ones ‘subjective self’ from that which is being researched.146 
Bearing all this in mind, this researcher has nonetheless attempted to 
approach the sources critically; contextualise information by utilising wider 
academic discourses and tried to obtain as comprehensive a historical 
narrative as methodologically possible. 
 
                                                
145 M. Agar, The Professional Stranger: An Informal Introduction to Ethnography (New York: 
Academic Press, 1996). 
146 Foucault, Power/ Knowledge; V. Wlkerdine, Daddy's Girl: Young Girls and Popular Culture 
(London: Macmillan, 1997), 59. 
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1.5. Interview Samples and Methodology  
 
In order to provide a multifocal analysis interviewees were drawn from a 
diverse group of Acholi informants. However, the time restraints of a doctoral 
research project restricted the number of informants who could be consulted. 
The participants ranged from rural peasant farmers, security guards to civil 
servants, with a relatively equal split between men and women. In total fifty-
four individuals were formally and informally interviewed, including two 
separate group interviews consisting of fifteen and ten individuals. The larger 
group consisted entirely of Acholi women with the smaller group equally split 
between the genders. The decision to conduct a group interview with only 
female participants was in part due to the previous interview experiences, 
where it was difficult to draw out the voice of women in a rural household, 
particularly if their husbands were present. In these cases the wife would 
continually defer to her husbands narrative in view of him being the head of 
the household.  
The samples of informants were somewhat random in as much as no 
individuals were identified as potential informants prior to embarking on the 
fieldwork. However, given the time frame of the period under research and the 
theories under discussion all those that were interviewed needed to be within 
a certain age bracket, with a minimum age of forty-five. This minimum age 
was set to ensure that the informants were old enough during the period 
under research where they could be able to articulate and recall clearly their 
past experiences. There also needed to be an equal split between various 
socio-economic statuses’ representing urban and rural dwellers. Inevitably, 
many of the informants who fitted into the category of Lawino were located 
predominately in more rural areas of northern Uganda, whereas the Ocols, 
consisting of large business owner, civil servants, were more prominent in the 
larger towns and cities such as Gulu, Kitgum, Entebbe and Kampala. 
Whilst in northern Uganda, I decided to employ a local research 
assistant who knew the town and surrounding areas well, as it would not have 
been advisable to simply walk into a village and ask to interview individuals 
without prior introduction. Consequently, as designated ‘insider’, my research 
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assistant did the preliminary work in identify potential informants after being 
given a brief of the demographic I was interested in consulting. He was also 
pivotal in providing transportation to more remote villages where he 
accompanied to make initial introductions.  
 I was also able to gain access to potential informants through a local 
NGO which I volunteered for as a researcher in Gulu. Whilst my work was to 
interview their beneficiaries regarding the merits of traditional mechanisms of 
justice and reconciliation in Acholi post conflict, one of my stipulations was 
that I would be able to conduct research for my thesis among their 
beneficiaries who fit my age profile and agreed to the interview. My work with 
the NGO allowed me to gain access to groups based all around in Acholi in 
rural areas surrounding Gulu and Kitgum.  It must also be noted that among 
the interview samples, informants living in Gulu and its environs are overly 
represented in comparison to Kitgum and its surrounding rural areas. This is 
primarily because I was based in Gulu and would make frequent trips lasting 
one to two weeks to Kitgum to consult that archives and conduct interviews.  
The initial plan was to conduct the archival research in Kampala, 
Entebbe and Mukono first before travelling to Gulu (West Acholi) and Kitgum 
(East Acholi) to spend a period of 3-4 months where most of the interviews 
would take place. As well as being host to the district archives, these two sites 
were chosen because they are the two major towns in Acholi, with an 
estimated population of around 375, 0000 and 260,000 respectively.147  
However, because of migration in and out of Acholi districts, during the 
archival research in southern Uganda, I inevitably came across Acholi 
informants who fit the required profile. Living and researching in Kampala and 
Entebbe gave me the opportunity to interact with a diverse group of Acholi 
residing in these areas, whether it be civil servants working in the archive 
sites, security guards at houses of friends and colleagues, or Askaris at local 
                                                
147 Kitgum District Local Government Five-Year Development Plan, Republic of Uganda, 27 
April 2012, http://npa.ug/wp-content/themes/npatheme/documents/North/Kitgum%20DDP.pdf 
[Accessed, 25 July 2014]: Gulu District, Ministry of Water and Environment, Republic of 
Uganda, 2010, file:///Users/a/Downloads/gulu%20(1).pdf, [Accessed, 29 July 2014]. These 
figures are estimates and have likely increased, as there has not been a population census 
carried out in Uganda since 2002.  
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restaurants and shopping centres. Some of these individuals had migrated out 
of Acholi during the timeframe of the period under research whereas others 
were new migrants. Moreover, some of the Acholi informants I had the 
opportunity to interview in Gulu and Kitgum, were also predominately based in 
Kampala and Entebbe. These groups and individuals provided an interesting 
narrative of Acholi migrants living outside of the region and their continued 
connection to their ancestral villages in Acholi, which is explored in more 
depth in chapter four.    
The formal interviews were in-depth conversations lasting from one to 
three hours, which was inevitably very time-consuming. However, this was 
necessary to create an environment whereby the interviewee could have the 
time to be comfortable and speak as openly as possible. Furthermore, as the 
research methodology utilised more of a narrative interview style, it was 
important to give informants time to tell their stories from their own individual 
perspectives.  Where a question and answer methodology was adopted it was 
structured to allow the informants to think about the themes being discussed 
within this thesis, mainly religious and political affiliations, Acholi indigenous 
cultural practices, social hierarchies and gender roles. Inevitably some 
informants needed less prompting during the interview process as the act of 
remembering the past allowed them to self prompt as each story and/or 
memory fed into another. In view of the previous discussion on how the 
present interlinks with the past, there were situations where I had to guide the 
informants back to the scope of the research questions when memories and 
experiences of the LRA conflict became overly dominant within their narrative. 
This had to be approached sensitively and thoughtfully so as not to appear 
dismissive or disinterested in the trauma of war. In nearly all cases, I 
deliberately chose not to interrupt these recollections, as it seemed important 
and helpful for the informants to relay these experiences to me. Whilst these 
experiences were recorded, they have not been used directly in the thesis 
even though all the informants were happy for me to do so, not least to 
highlight the horrors of war faced by many Acholi within the last thirty years.   
   There were also a number of informal conversations, mainly carried 
out during long journeys in crowded minibuses, social events, bars, and 
restaurants. These informal interactions contributed significantly to my overall 
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understanding of ethnicity, culture and identity in Acholi. Whilst informal, all 
the peoples I spoke to were made aware of the research I was conducting in 
the region, as this would naturally follow after introductions, with discussion of 
what I was studying and why I was interested in pursuing certain topics for 
conversation. In addition, during formal one-to-one interviews, family 
members, friends, would walk in with refreshments, hear the tail end of a 
conversation, contribute something, joke or disagree and then walk out. 
Sometimes it could be as brief as one minute, sometimes a little bit more and 
in some instance, if the informant agreed I would make arrangements to 
interview the contributor at another time within a more formal capacity, if they 
fit into the age bracket. Where this was not possible, these brief interjections 
were nonetheless recorded and placed under my list of informal interviews 
and interactions.  
 
1.6. Thesis Structure 
 
The following chapter of the thesis will cover the early colonial period by 
examining the processes that led to the formation of the Acholi as a politically 
and geographically centralised ethnic group. This chapter will be used to 
establish long-term trends of ethnicity in Acholi and Ugandan politics and will 
provide the baseline for analysing shifts in Acholi post-colonial identities.  
The chapter covering the 1950s will provide the base-line for the 
interrogation of the relationship between high and low politics in Acholi during 
the run up to independence. More generally, by incorporating the politics of 
decolonisation and the rise of Ugandan ‘nationalism’ we are able to see more 
clearly the corollaries of colonialism in post-independence Ugandan and 
Acholi politics. All the chapters will deal specifically with how social, political 
and cultural structures formed, harnessed and changed Acholi identities. The 
emphasis once again will be on processes, and as such it proved important to 
follow a chronological trajectory rather than a thematic one. The thirty-five 
years covered were undoubtedly the most tumultuous and formative in 
Uganda’s colonial and post-colonial history, and any attempt at following a 
thematic structure would have only served to further confuse the already 
complex historiography. Each decade following the 1950s offers its own 
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monumental event, from the end of British rule, first decade of independence, 
the rule of Idi Amin in the 1970s, to the subsequent coup d’états that 
characterised the early 1980s. Only by laying out the chronology can one 
really begin to understand the patterns, themes and structures that drove 
those formative years.  
All the chapters will look at how Acholi identities were utilised externally 
through ‘political tribalism’, how they were shaped and reconciled in the 
locality within the Acholi ‘moral ethnicity’. This will allow for a much clearer 
understanding of the relationship between the political centre of the state and 
periphery.148 However, the 1980s offers an interesting perspective as during 
this period we witness a merger of these two platforms. The economic and 
political collapse of the state opened an avenue for political pluralism giving 
multiple ‘power contenders’ the opportunity to engage outside of their  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
148 Lonsdale, ‘Political Tribalism and Moral Ethnicity’. 
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Chapter 2.0. Indirect Rule In Acholi 
 
The very nature of Acholi political organisation made it unsuitable as a 
tool of British administration.149  
 
 
Tarsis Kabwegyere argues, ‘if the colonial administration of Acholi did not 
amount to the “the creation of a “tribe”, it is difficult to see what else it was.”’150  
Kabwegyere follows an established group of Africanists who have argued that 
ethnic ideologies only developed in contact with the European ‘thinking about 
tribes’, which the missionaries and colonial officers brought to Africa. In short: 
that ‘tribes’ and ‘tribalism’ in Africa are by and large a colonial ‘invention’.151 
However, whilst it is widely accepted that the colonial encounter instigated the 
centralisation and politicisation of tribal identities in Africa, in order to fully 
understand the salience and complexities of ethnopolitics within African 
states, we must as Carola Lentz points out, identify not only the importance of 
understanding ‘the colonial construction of ethnic categories’, but also their 
‘embeddedness in pre-colonial models of identity.’ Lentz advocates for a 
multifaceted approach by ‘analysing how ethnic categories, boundaries and 
institutions were created and continually redefined by colonial officials, 
                                                
149 R.M. Bere, ‘An Outline of Acholi History’, Uganda Journal, Vol.11 No.1 (1947), 58  
150 T.B. Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation: The Nature and Effect of Colonialism in 
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missionaries, anthropologists, chiefs, labour migrants and educated elite.’152 
This approach allows us to assess tribal identities within African societies 
outside the colonial construction framework by ascertaining how certain 
groups and individuals internalised the colonial political demarcation of local 
communities, and what part these groups placed in the reaffirming and 
maintaining these politicised tribal identities. By doing we are able to assess 
not only the corollaries of colonial rule within the post-colonial state, but also 
help to explain the salience of tribalism and tribal identities within the post-
colonial state.  Indeed, as Tim Allen argues, the term ‘”tribe’’” has now 
become an indigenous term for something which can be of immense 
importance.’153 
The very nature of indirect rule, drawn from the ethos of ‘divide and 
rule’, undoubtedly centralised and politicised localised clan and groups in 
Acholi, as colonial officers and missionaries sought to label social groups in 
an effort to better administer the peoples of the regions. Western missionaries 
in particular, contributed to the creation of tribal boundaries in colonial Africa, 
through the development of vernacular languages and the production of 
written accounts of local/tribal tribal histories. In doing so, they ‘helped create 
a powerful new idiom and new avenues for the expression of consciously 
identified and clearly bounded ethnic (tribal) identity.154 This was drawn from 
the underlying belief that if the civilised people of Europe belonged to nations, 
Africans must then belong to tribes. Thus the missionaries set about 
identifying dominate groups and neatly placing them into tribal categories. The 
popularisation of standardising the vernacular language resulted in a large 
number of publications concerned with historicising clan groups in Uganda 
and colonial Africa more generally.155  
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When it came to establishing the effective occupation of Acholi, the first 
British colonial administrators and missionaries to encounter the Acholi in the 
late nineteenth century had already had prolonged encounters with the 
Baganda in the South, and consequently their assessment of Acholi and its 
peoples was largely comparative to their views of these centralised southern 
kingdoms. Acholi and its peoples had to be moulded to fit British colonial 
economic ambitions, mainly to serve as a source of labour, cash-crops such 
as cotton, and manpower for the army for the wider development of the 
colony, whilst Buganda would remain as the political and administrative hub of 
the Protectorate.156 By the turn of the twentieth century the British 
administration in Uganda had decided that Northern Uganda’s future lay in its 
union with the Bantu speaking south as opposed to Sudan. Despite 
administrators’ views of the people in Acholi as ‘naturally lazy’ and the land as 
economically unviable, competition from French and Belgian colonial interests 
in the region forced them to bring Acholi into the political fold of the Uganda 
Protectorate.157 Acholi was colonised at the peak of high imperialism and its 
corollary environment of scientific racism. Consequently, the British deployed 
preconceived nineteenth-century racial stereotypes upon the peoples of 
Acholi to fit their political and economic ambitions in the wider Protectorate. 
Describing the Northerner as an immoral person who often went naked, they 
also remarked on his ‘woeful independence and the haphazard division of 
territory among chiefs none of which had much control over their subjects 
[sic].’158  
 
In greeting and salutation there is a complete absence of the humble 
demeanor of the Bantus. A curt how do you do? May be accompanied 
with a military salute or offer of a hand to shake [sic]. A warrior will 
remain standing upright, grasping his spear and looking straight in the 
face of the interlocutor, even if he be an important official or a big chief. 
This independent character of the Nilotic tribes is apparent in all their 
                                                
156 Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 6: M. Mamdani, Imperialism and 
Fascism in Uganda (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1983), 10-11. 
157 Girling, The Acholi of Uganda, 149-50. 
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mainly, the Luo speaking group who include, the Lango, Teso, Karamojong, Alur, Madi and 
Acholi.  
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dealings with outsiders, marking itself in open contempt of Bantu 
peoples and complete indifference to even the arts and learning of the 
white man. Each man is inclined to take an independent line of his 
own, and to win a chief to Christianity does not require the adhesion of 
his subjects. On the other hand such a character affords the finest soils 
for the growth of a stalwart type of Christianity.159 
 
Indirect rule had already proved to be relatively successful in Buganda, and it 
was a system that the British were keen to introduce in Acholi. British 
representatives were sent to the Northern region to secure as much support 
from the chiefs as possible to ensure a smooth establishment of colonial rule. 
Treaties were quickly drawn up ready to be signed by the chiefs. Dwyer 
describes these documents as being ‘couched in the most formal diplomatic 
prose and containing blank spaces for the appropriate names and dates’ 
being purely a ‘pre-emptive attempt to control the foreign affairs of Acholi.’160 
  However, whilst the British faced initially faced minor armed opposition 
from larger and more prosperous Acholi chiefdoms such as the Payira 
chiefdom between 1898-1900, and rebellions from the peoples of Lamogi in 
1911-12161, these were easily quashed using the colonial administration’s 
military resources and capabilities.  Chief Awich of the Payira chief was 
reported to have mobilised around 5000 men who proceeded to distract and 
evade government troops.162 He was eventually captured and exiled in 
1900.163 The British soon realised however that regardless of the problems 
posed by some recalcitrant chiefs, the most challenging task they faced was 
convincing the Acholi to produce more than they consumed. This was made 
                                                
159 UCU: Uganda Notes and Diocesan Gazette, No.1 Vo.13 (1913). 
160 Dwyer, The Acholi of Uganda, 61-62. 
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more difficult without the mobilising influence of a paramount chief. Therefore, 
one of the first requests made by newly appointed British administrative officer 
R.J.D. MacAlister was the return of Awich, whom he assessed, would ‘be 
useful if worked properly.’164  
Although Frederick Lugard would not officially codify the policy of 
indirect rule until 1920, with limited resources and European manpower the 
British had long realised that they needed authoritative educated chiefs who 
could effectively to govern indirectly under official supervision.165 The more 
educated the chief, the more power and responsibility was bestowed upon 
them, a fact that Awich and many other Acholi quickly realised. Soon many 
were taking full advantage of the missionary schools, with chiefs sending their 
sons to be educated. It was the realisation, as Finnström states, that the 
Acholi needed knowledge of the colonial system in order to oppose or 
collaborate with the British which drove the Acholi to seek to understand the 
language of their colonisers.166 
 The institutionalisation of British rule in Acholi followed a process of 
disarmament of the local population which saw an estimated total of 5000 
rifles being collected.167 Following this, the first British administrative centre 
was established in Gulu in 1910 and in 1914 a second one was established in 
Kitgum in East Acholi. Following the end of the First World War British 
influence in Acholi became overtly intrusive: 
Acholi firearms were confiscated and destroyed. Following this, many 
people were forced to move near roads built throughout the district, 
facilitating both communication and administrative control. Political 
authority in the district was also restructured. First, the imported 
Buganda-style council of chiefs, with a new ‘paramount’ chief, was 
further entrenched. Second, many formerly independent chiefdoms 
were amalgamated, thereby extending the authority of some chiefs 
over peoples they had never previously ruled. Third, even those chiefs 
remaining in office were controlled much more than before, with “their 
duties prescribed and their political activities strictly supervised.” Cotton 
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production also, of course, furthered two fundamental material objects 
of colonial rule: the Acholi could use the money to both pay taxes and 
purchase the imported European consumer goods increasingly 
penetrating the colonial economy.168 
 
In an attempt to establish an effective system of Native Authority one of 
the first things the administration did was to allow only chiefs who had been 
appointed the administration to keep their rifles. This had a twofold effect. 
First, it gave the chiefs weapons, which allowed them to exercise military and 
social power over their subjects thus reinforcing their big man persona. 
However, its second effect was to keep the chiefs under control, as any acts 
of rebellion would result in the loss of their colonial sponsored authority. The 
principle premise that guided indirect rule was that the British lacked the 
manpower and economic resources to administer directly. However, even if 
they had possessed the resources, it is questionable whether they would have 
utilised direct rule given the success indirect rule had had in the Kingdom of 
Buganda.169  Regional border demarcations began in Acholi, and British DCs 
were appointed for each region to ensure effective administration of the 
Protectorate. To this end, the decision was made in 1914 to separate some of 
the northern-most chiefdoms, which now make up the town of Nimule, leaving 
them within the Sudanese border. This was in exchange for the government 
of Sudan relinquishing control of the West Nile.170 Dwyer discusses the effect 
of regional boundaries on Acholi socio-political structure and blames the 
British for failing to comprehend how difficult it must have been for the Acholi 
to understand why a line was being drawn between them and their Lango and 
                                                
168 Atkinsnon, The Roots of Ethnicity, 5-6. 
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Sudanese neighbours.171 The consequences of this were the division of the 
region along tribal lines, which not only reinforced tribal identities, but also 
created new regional ones.  
The British administration immediately tasked itself with creating and 
appointing suitable chiefs who could effectively transmit British interests in the 
region. As a consequence, the chosen chiefs, whether hereditary or non-
hereditary, found themselves bestowed with a substantial amount colonially 
sanctioned of power. They were given vast responsibilities over their subjects, 
and were armed and supported by the police.172 The numerous pre-colonial 
chiefdoms provided colonial administrators with the foundations for the native 
administrative units.173 ‘Competent’ chiefs were left to rule under British 
‘guidance’, and if no such chief was available, a new one with no traditional 
hereditary claims was instated. For example, Oteka Okello-Mwaka of Puranga 
was installed as a non-hereditary chief, specifically because of his political 
astuteness, education and willingness to comply with the colonial 
administration.174  To this end, Acholi chiefs increasingly acted as cultural and 
political intermediaries between a centralised and economically viable Acholi 
on one hand and British indirect rule on the other.175  
 
2.1. Acholi Challenges to Indirect Rule 
 
Much has been written about the oppressiveness of chiefly authority in 
colonial Uganda, with the focus being placed firmly on the Kingdom of 
Buganda. This is primarily because Buganda remained the centre of British 
economic and political interests and was thus deemed to be more significant 
for British colonial ambitions in the Protectorate. The Kingdom already ‘had a 
highly developed and centralised political system and a chiefly hierarchy. This 
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made possible a readily workable association with the British.’176 The 1900 
agreement signed between the British and Buganda, bestowed a substantial 
amount of power on Baganda county chiefs (Bakungu) at the expense of 
traditional clan elders in the Kingdom.177 Under the agreement the county 
chiefs were given land (malio estates), which as Twaddle argues, transformed 
the client-chiefs of Buganda into a landed aristocracy’, with their subjects as 
tenants.178 Bestowed with the colonial authority to collect taxes, judge cases, 
‘the sheer intensity of power possessed by Bakungu chiefs in Buganda’ meant 
that they came to dominate the lives of their subjects. Inevitably conflict 
between the Bakungu chiefs and the subjects arose stemming from land 
disputes, high taxes, trade restrictions and the increasingly autocratic rule of 
the chiefs. This eventually resulted in political organisations such as the 
Young Buganda Association (YBA) being formed in 1919 to voice the 
grievances of young, most educated Buganda men against the authority of 
colonial appointed chiefs.179 
Drawing from his on research resistance movements in rural Uganda - 
primarily the southwestern - and urban South Africa, Mahmood Mamdani 
argues that as opposed to enforcing custom and enabling power among the 
African tribes, the introduction of the colonial Native Administration actually 
‘consolidated the non-customary power of chiefs in the colonial 
administration.’180  
It did so in two ways that marked a breach from the pre-colonial period. 
For the first time, the reach of the Native Authority and the customary 
law that it dispensed came to be all embracing. Previously autonomous 
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social domains like the household, age sets, and gender associations 
now fell within the scope of chiefly power. At the same time any 
challenge to chiefly power would now have to reckon with a wider 
systematic response.181  
 
Chiefly authority in Mamdani’s assessment ‘was like a clenched fist’ resulting 
in the creation of despotic leaders in the locality.182 In Acholi however, the 
relationship between chiefs and their subjects was far more complex than 
Mamdani’s assessment, primarily because colonial chiefly authority in Acholi 
drew its power in part from pre-colonial clan and chiefly allegiances, as 
apposed from just colonial sanctioned authority. Secondly, the Acholi, unlike 
the Baganda and Banyoro had not lived under a prolonged system of 
monarchical-political centralisation, making it harder for the British to unitise 
its administration. Consequently, British rule in Acholi was arguably only 
intrusive on rudimentary administrative and political level, but less so on the 
indigenous social-political structures within Acholi communities, especially 
among the rural peasantry.  
Outside Buganda, the 1919 Native Authority Ordinance had defined 
and institutionalised the powers of colonial chiefs giving them the official 
authority to administer their designated territories in matters relating to public 
order, the native courts, and tax and rent collection.183 Indeed, many of the 
chiefs quickly realised how effectively they could abuse the new system for 
their own gains. Cases of nepotism and clan favouritism became well 
documented often placing the offending chiefs at odds with their subjects.184 
Undeniably, the institutionalisation of colonial chiefly authority in Acholi 
resulted in the creation of some oppressive chiefs. British Social 
anthropologist Franklin Knowles Girling who had spent nine months in Acholi 
from 1949-50 conducting research for his doctoral thesis, recalled observing 
divisional chiefs ordering ‘beatings, fines and imprisonments. ‘You see we 
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must rule by fear. The people are lazy, they do not realise what good things 
the government is doing for them. How can we Acholi progress unless we 
grow cotton, pay our taxes and dig latrines as the government wants us to 
do?’185 However, when the Native Councils were re-organised circa 1937-8 it 
was not simply a response to the Acholi reacting against to ‘despotic’ chiefly 
authority as much as the British Administration’s realisation that chiefly 
authority was being challenged by pre-colonial clan allegiances. Furthermore, 
it was also an acknowledgement that ‘unqualified British support’ for colonial 
appointed chiefs who had no customary rights to their office, ‘would eventually 
make the colonial administration the target of resistance [in Acholi].186 The 
tension between hereditary and non-hereditary chiefs in Acholi, was further 
reaffirmed by Girling what stated that:  
 
The Acholi are always careful to distinguish between the ladit kaka me 
Governmente, (government chief) and the ladit kaka me cik Acholi 
(elder according to Acholi custom). The latter performs the ritual of his 
lineage, and has a certain authority over its members. Thus at every 
level of the present political structure of the Native Administration in 
Acholi District there is a divorce between the present political authority 
of the Government appointed chiefs and the ritual authority which is all 
the remains of the past political power of the traditional functionaries.187 
 
Girling’s comprehensive study of the Acholi was one of the first attempts to 
establish a detailed examination of Acholi social practices and political 
structures. Prior to his research in Acholi, Girling has already spent time in 
Barcelona volunteering for the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil 
War and was member of the Oxford Communist Party who was sympathetic 
to Marxist ideology.  Girling’s political leanings may have been inscribed on 
his ethnographic research in Uganda, particularly regarding his observations 
on the intrusion of the western capitalist economy on the peoples of Acholi. 
Girling conveys that prior to the colonial encounter, clan communities within 
Acholi placed emphasise on the sharing of goods, labour as a means to 
ensure the smooth running of a household, village and domain, with each 
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member being allocated a productive rule.188  This system according to 
Girling, allowed the peoples of pre-colonial Acholi, to maintain a ‘relative’ 
homogeneity’ of social order.189 The transformation of the ‘moral economy’ of 
pre-colonial Acholi following the institutionalisation of British rule undoubtedly 
disrupted socio-political power relations, fostering, in Lonsdale’s terms, new 
‘social competitions’ between local competitors, each trying to find their 
footing with the emerging colonial political economy and claim a share of the 
‘colonial cake’.190 
The introduction of non-hereditary chiefs had not been met with 
enthusiasm among the Acholi, particularly among the hereditary chiefs and 
their clan members. Girling argues that the arbitrary powers of the chiefs were 
kept in check by the existence of hostile groups, be it marginalised hereditary 
chiefs, or competing clan leaders from whom any aggrieved Acholi could seek 
support.191 Consequently, chiefs, particularly non-hereditary ones, did not hold 
the monopoly of power in Acholi. By 1936 the British had decided to 
implement a completely hereditary system of clan chiefs within the Acholi 
Native Authority. This meant that chiefs would no longer be nominated or 
even created by colonial government. The new system meant that each clan 
chief was given a designated area that roughly coincided with pre-colonial 
clan boundaries, resulting in around fifty such divisions.192 If the clans were 
too small, they would be combined with another clan with which they were 
friendly. However problems arose when it became clear that the clans were 
too numerous and simple administrative duties such as the trying of Native 
Court cases were becoming impossible. As a consequence, the system was 
once again changed in 1943.193  
The process of restructuring the Native Administration in Acholi was 
designed to make the administration manageable and, most importantly, 
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acceptable to the Acholi. The fifty county divisions that had been 
acknowledged in 1936 were eventually reduced to twenty-two areas called 
Jagoates, which were in turn grouped into six counties, a reduction from the 
original eight. The chiefs in each county, called Jagos, were a mixture of 
hereditary and non-hereditary chiefs elected after nomination from the District 
Council and the final approval of the District Commissioner (DC). Tellingly, the 
archives give more insight into how some of the non-hereditary chiefs were 
treated. Responding to Lord Hailey who had questioned whether all six Acholi 
county chiefs had hereditary claims, the DC of the Northern Province 
responded that ‘some had, some were good men who had been moved into 
the area. There are two of this type who are now doing very well, although 
they do not do so well in their own areas.’194 It could be argued that the 
reason why the two non-hereditary chiefs were unpopular in their areas was 
because there would have been un-appointed chiefs who had hereditary 
claims within that particular county. Understandably the people of that county 
would no doubt have a sense of loyalty towards that chief, whom they would 
have considered to be the rightful head of the clan. Added to this, the non-
hereditary chiefs would have been viewed as a direct tool of the British 
administration and would have had to deal with the negative connotations 
which that role may have brought.  
Under the chiefs in the new political hierarchy were the mukungu 
(parish chiefs) chosen by the county council. There would be around two or 
three of these under the jago, depending on the size of the county, totalling 
around seventy-one in all. Each mukungu would be responsible for between 
four hundred to seven hundred poll tax payers.195 To avoid any conflict of 
interest, if the council elected a mukungu, he could no longer represent his 
own clan in Acholi. Another perhaps more important reason for this, was that 
from the British perspective, emphasis was placed on the creation of a wider 
Acholi tribal identity. Thus Chiefs could act as unifying political figures who 
would centralise the various clans into a larger tribal group that could be more 
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easily administered. As colonial officer Bere later commented, ‘the urgent 
trend of modern administration has been to bring the clans together and to 
make Acholi conscious of their unity as a single people.’196 As such it was 
imperative that the villagers were encouraged not to attach too much 
importance to their clan identities.197 It was also an indication that pre-colonial 
clan identities still remained an important point of reference for many Acholi. 
 
2.2. Christian Missionaries in Acholi 
 
Clan identities were largely unaffected by colonial rule primarily because 
colonial authority did not directly dictate the domestic lives of many Acholi. 
That responsibility was left in the hands of Anglican and Catholic 
missionaries, who went about trying to convert and ‘civilise’ the indigenous 
population.  
 
Indirect rule as practiced by the British encouraged to a certain extent 
the continuation of traditional life. The peasants were supposed to 
change only in particular ways. They were to support an administration 
appointed chief, pay taxes, convert to Christianity, and acquire some 
education. Otherwise they were to carry on with their traditional life.198 
 
The institutionalisation of British rule in Northern Uganda ran parallel to 
missionary activity, with the main organisation in the region being the Verona 
Fathers (VF) and the Church Missionary Society (CMS). No other agent had 
more impact on Acholi society than the missionaries, whose influence became 
so great that they in fact became a tool of indirect rule.199 Whilst Native 
Administration acted as a main artery for colonial power, missionary 
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institutions were, within a limited capacity, its capillary authority.200  The 
Verona Fathers were the first to enter the region, building their first missionary 
station in Gulu in 1911.201  However, the British CMS had full support from the 
colonial government and acted as an extension of the British administration. 
This was re-enforced by some CMS missionaries who behaved like colonial 
administrators and took on duties such as collecting taxes, passing legal 
judgements and paying salaries. The acquisition of power in Acholi quickly 
became geared towards identification with the missionaries.202 In most cases, 
being Anglican was the pre-requisite for becoming a chief. In 1913, of the 
thirty-six Acholi baptised, thirteen were appointed as native chiefs. The 
Catholic missionaries, not wanting to be outdone, embarked on a recruitment 
campaign and in some cases went as far as to bribe Protestants with material 
goods in an attempt to get them to convert to Catholicism.203 The 
missionaries’ success in Acholi lay in first converting the locals and then using 
converts to proselytise. The spread of Christianity in region was accelerated 
through access to new structures of opportunity which having a Christian 
education and identity be it Catholic or Protestant provided. This was 
something that the peoples of Acholi quickly became aware of. Becoming a 
‘Christian agent’ became an attractive prospect as it opened many doors to 
the newly emerging market economy, especially if one was a teacher or had 
received a Western education. However, as missionary teachings and the 
commodities that they provided became more entrenched in Acholi 
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worldviews, the political contest for power in the locality between the two 
denominations and their Acholi converts also became more prominent.204 
When in 1919 famine was reported in Chua, East Acholi, the colonial 
administration was prompted to create the Chua Relief Fund. Due to the 
climate in Chua being relatively harsh, the peoples of the region had become 
accustomed to dealing with sporadic outbreaks of famine by travelling to other 
parts of Acholi to source food. Consequently, the human cost the famine had 
been kept relatively low with four deaths reported by February 1919. To help 
alleviate the effects of the famine, the colonial administration requested that 
the VF, who had a mission station in the area, undertake the responsibility of 
distributing food to the population.205  There are two key points to bear in mind 
here.  First, in view of the VF distributing food relief to the people of Chua, the 
connection between resources and religion was in this case being reinforced. 
Moreover, oral testimonies suggest that in regards to the initial conversion of 
souls, the Acholi utilised the politics of survival, aligning with a denomination 
that was better served to provide them with the most resources, be it food, 
clothes, and the proximity to hospitals or schools.206  The second key point 
regarding the distribution of food during famine was that British administrators 
utilised Acholi colonial chiefs, who provided the much-needed connection to 
the central administration. As well as the chiefs, the pastoral work of the 
missionaries in the remote regions and their collaboration with the colonial 
state was instrumental in the attempt to bridge the gap between the rural 
periphery and the administrative centre in Gulu.  It is this connection, which 
would play a pivotal role in the centralisation of Acholi ethnic identity in post-
independence years, where the symbiotic relationship between the locality 
and central government would prove to be a highly prized and contested 
political tool. 
However, much like colonial administrators the missionaries lacked the 
manpower to directly oversee a comprehensive ‘conversion’ of the Acholi to 
Christian teachings.  
                                                
204 UNA/E C.2456 Box 22 ‘Mission Schools: Denominational Differences’ 1937-38.  
205 UNA/E Box 1 No. 2135C: Northern Province Annual Report for 1918-19. 
206 Oral interviews conducted in Gulu, Kitgum 2012; UNA/E File C:2456: Mission Schools: 
Denominational Differences. 1937-38.  
 81 
I                
The mission attempt to exercise strict control only over the households 
living in the immediate vicinity of their churches, who are regarded as 
“the people of the mission”. [However] the indirect influence of the 
missions extends beyond the confines of these villages. They maintain 
varying degrees of authority over their scattered congregations in many 
parts of the areas through their schools and in other ways.207 
 
Despite the growth of the colonial market economy and increased investment 
in cash crops, a vast majority of Acholi still remained very poor, with 
subsistence agriculture being the dominant method of farming.208 As one 
government report concluded, ‘the traditional attachment to the land occupied, 
combined with the rigidity of tribal boundaries, retarded local migration’, thus 
ensuring that a sizable percentage of the population remained contained 
within their pre-colonial clan boundaries.209 Furthermore, census estimates for 
the years 1911, 1921, 1948 and 1959 showed that the Acholi had one of the 
lowest population densities in the Protectorate.210 Even by 1962, the region 
was still vastly under-populated. Acholi was fifty per cent larger, but had a 
population thirty per cent smaller than the average district in Uganda. The 
sparse distribution of the population and the size of the district greatly 
hindered the distribution of services to the remotest areas. What this meant 
was that large numbers of the Acholi peasantry were left relatively untouched 
by the formal colonial economy. Even missionaries, whose reach far extended 
that of the Native Administration, could only play a relatively superficial role in 
the institutionalisation of colonial rule in Acholi. Consequently, alongside 
emerging Acholi identities shaped by the experience of colonialism, Acholi 
pre-colonial practices such as polygamy and traditional religious practices 
continued to be emphasised among those on the hinterlands of colonial 
power. 
                                                
207 Girling, The Acholi of Uganda, 188. 
208 The Economic Development of Uganda: Report of a Mission Organised by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Uganda 
Government.  (John Hopkins Press, 1962), 15 &17. 
209 Ibid. 
210 B.W Langlands, ‘The Population Density of Acholi District’, Occasional Paper N.30; 
Department of Geography (Kampala: Makerere University, 1971), 20. 
 82 
I                
 
TABLE I 
Uganda Political Divisions and Population (Thousands)* 
 
* SOURCE: Uganda Protectorate, 1961 Statistical Abstract, East Africa Statistical Department. 211  
 
 
 This meant that any centralised Acholi tribal or ethnic identity emerging 
during the colonial period continued to have a strong indigenous cultural 
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Uganda 
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Province and District Total Population African 
Population 
Land Area in 
Square Mile 
Population 
Density per 
Square 
Mile 
     
Buganda Province 
1,881 1,834 16,138 117 
Mengo East 613 607 5,101 120 
Mengo West 725 688 4,588 158 
Masaka 444 440 3,781 117 
Mubende 99 99 2,668 37 
     
Eastern Province 
1,903 1,873 10,971 173 
Busoga 677 661 3,443 197 
Mbale Township 14 8 9 937 
Bukedi 400 398 1,575 253 
Bugishu 353 353 1,638 215 
Teso 458 453 4,306 106 
     
Western Province 
1,503 1,498 17,098 87 
Bunyoro 129 128 4,723 27 
Toro 349 347 4,745 74 
Ankole 531 530 5,728 90 
Kigezi 494 493 1,902 260 
     
Northern Province 
1,249 1,245 33,327 37 
Acholi 287 286 10,783 27 
Lango 354 353 4,464 79 
Karamoja 172 171 12,216 14 
West Nile, Madi 436 435 5,864 74 
     
Total 6,536 6,450 77,534  
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content, weakening colonial intrusion and allowing stronger development of 
pre-colonial lineage based clan identities.212 
 
2.3. The Colonial Market Economy and the Birth of the Ocols. 
 
In Acholi and Uganda, the colonial government continued to reap the rewards 
of increased cash revenue derived from the export of cotton, the main cash 
crop in the Northern Provinces from 1920 to the late 1930s. Cotton exports 
reached an all-time peak of 402,000 bales in 1937-38 and by the mid-1950s 
cotton and coffee accounted for eighty per cent of Uganda’s export 
earnings.213  But most of the money produced from cotton production and 
trade was not being redirected back into developing the region. In 1946 the 
total revenue drawn from direct taxation and other grants in Acholi stood at 
£33,545. The total expenditure for that year, including spending on education, 
salaries for chiefs, prisons, police and the maintenance of roads, was 
£26,804, suggesting a ‘profit’ of £6741. The British continued to under-
develop Acholi by taking out more money than they were willing to invest 
toward equitable prosperity among the populace. However, this was the 
reality of the political economy of British indirect rule in Uganda. It was driven 
by the need to designate certain regions as more economically and politically 
viable for colonial ambitions, as with Buganda, whilst Acholi was to act merely 
as a reserve for labour and cash crops.214  
Nonetheless, colonial institutions still offered some Acholi the 
opportunity to capitalise on the growing colonial market economy. For chiefs 
in the Native Administration, high wages and colonial sanctioned power were 
an incentive to continue to operate within the colonial political economy. 
Becoming a member of the Native Council was lucrative and highly 
competitive. County chiefs were paid £105 to £270 annually, depending on 
the length of service and the number of taxpayers. They also received a 
house and pension. Parish chiefs received £21 to £45 annually but without a 
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pension or a house.215 In comparison to Acholi subsistence farmers who 
survived from hand to mouth, this amount of money paid to a single individual 
was unprecedented. The monetary rewards afforded to government chiefs 
elevated their pre-colonial status as traditional heads of clans and made them 
viable economic and political contenders entrenched in the colonial system. 
However, the principle reality that guided political economy in Acholi was the 
realisation that the British Administration was the focus of political power. 
Girling reported that, ‘many Acholi, both educated and otherwise believe that 
the Divisional and County chiefs are potentially subject to the direct control of 
British officials.’216 This chasm between the direct authority of the chiefs and 
indirect rule of the British provided the space for political engagement within 
which chiefs could be bypassed and appeals made directly the ‘big man.’  The 
challenge to chiefly authority was not as Mamdani argued a response to their 
despotic rule: rather, it was a result of the emergence of a new Acholi political-
consciousness rooted in the colonial market economy. 
From the 1920s, Acholi had become firmly entrenched in the market 
economy and national labour market. The cultivation, trade and sale of cotton 
introduced a socio-economic structure never before seen in the region. To aid 
the movement and trade of cash crops, new roads were built which in turn 
created new market towns.217 The process of resettlement around the new 
roads had started in 1914 when a compulsory system of moving a vast 
number of the Acholi near the main roads was initiated. As well as ensuring 
that administration was easier, another reason for this forced migration was to 
remove the Acholi from communal cultivation, which according to the colonial 
government, was necessary for the ‘intellectual, economic and moral 
progression of the people.’218 New jobs and opportunities gave young 
mission-educated Acholi men the incentive to move around the region and the 
Protectorate to seek employment. They were no longer compelled to stay 
within their clan structures and work the land of their fathers and forefathers 
before them. Even for those who decided to stay, economic opportunities 
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were still available at home, with many staying to take advantage of rising 
cotton prices.219 Whilst there are few reliable or official figures detailing 
demographic growth at this time, Langland’s population survey shows the 
population of major towns such as Gulu growing consecutively every year 
from 1911.220 Unmarried young men who were not tied down by familial 
responsibilities were more likely to migrate to urban towns.  Labour migration 
also proved to be a viable way for those on the periphery of localised political 
and economic power to go out and seek their fortune in the wider 
Protectorate. Colonial administrators were all too willing to encourage this 
movement because the more labour they could utilise in Uganda the higher 
the yields from cash crops. As well as travelling to the southern regions of 
Jinja and Kampala, Acholi labour migrants also stayed closer to home. Many 
Acholi migrant workers joined plantations in Bunyoro where planter permits 
were issued by the British to allow workers to be recruited from areas such as 
the West Nile, Gulu and Chua, with migrants coming in ‘considerable 
numbers.’221  
As movement in and out of the Province became easier, the border 
divisions became more stringent. As cash crop returns grew, colonial officers 
turned their eyes to the business of tax collection, a task that was easier to 
administer through set political borders. This task fell primarily to the chiefs, 
some of who carried out the task faithfully.  Others took a more opportunistic 
view, and accusations of embezzlement and incompetence were levied by 
both colonial officers and competing chiefs.222 Acholi demands for internal 
border demarcations were driven largely by the realisation among chiefs of 
the informal economic and political rewards that could be obtained by 
administrating larger tax boundaries. Consequently, it was no longer the 
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British reinforcing the borders but indigenous political elite who began to 
advocate for new internal demarcations.223  
Among educated Acholi youth, demands for political representation 
coincided with the colonial institutionalisation of chiefly power. These 
demands were mobilised through an organisation known as the Young Acholi 
Association (YAA). Formed in 1921, three years after the formation of the 
Young Baganda Associations, the YAA started as a semi-political organisation 
demanding political reform and a place within the Native Administration. This 
was the first time that Acholi youth were identified as a specific political 
category. In pre-colonial and colonial Acholi, aside from chiefly or ritual power, 
the gerontocratic social order posited a social hierarchy within the community 
along lines of age, marital status and gender.224 The importance of marriage 
in Acholi is further highlighted by p’Bitek who stated that in Acholi society, ‘you 
may be a giant of a man. You may begin to grow grey hair. You may be bold 
and toothless with age. But if you are unmarried you are nothing.’225  To be 
considered a ‘man’, Acholi men were expected to get married, have children 
and thus and ensure that the paternal clan lineage was carried through to the 
next generation. As discussed previously, Acholi pre-colonial societies were 
highly socialised with designated productive roles that ensured the effective 
running of a village, clan and chiefdom. This placed emphasis on familial units 
and consequently if a man remained unmarried and single, he would be 
unable to fulfil the culturally prescribed social obligations and productive roles 
within this system.  
Missionary education and new economic opportunities created a new 
generation of educated Acholi men whose economic and political aspirations 
extended beyond the social obligations of village life. Members of the YAA 
were men who had been educated primarily in the mission schools, although 
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some had had the opportunity to further their education by attending 
institutions such as Makerere College in Uganda’s capital Kampala. They had 
found employment in administrative positions as schoolmasters and 
government clerks.226 They had had the opportunity to mix with students 
outside Acholi, and had seen some of the discontent that was steadily 
growing among the young and educated elsewhere in Uganda, particularly in 
Buganda. While little is known about the Association, at this time there were 
other similar ethnic based movements from other parts of the Protectorate, 
most notably the Mubende Bunyoro Committee, the Young Lango 
Association, and the Basigu Welfare Association.227 Outside of Acholi, the rise 
of these organisations was a reflection of the changing face of the Ugandan 
polity. The Native Council Ordinance of 1919 had not only created new 
administrative positions for Ugandans, but it had also created a new breed of 
white collar, educated, Ugandan civil servants.228 This new bureaucratic class 
inevitably started to demand more rights, particularly in regards to salary and 
working conditions. Jan Jelmert Jørgensen argues that the creation of white-
collar unionism was a result of state refusal to improve working conditions. 
The demarcation of these youth associations along ethnic lines has two 
explanations. First, as Jørgensen rightly points out, the colonial state’s 
unwillingness to listen to their grievances meant that such associations were a 
fertile recruitment ground for ‘state appointed chiefs’ who, because of their 
positions and background, were more likely to channel their political 
grievances along ethnic lines.229 Second, given the colonial state’s systematic 
demarcation of Uganda along regional and ethnic lines, it was a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that ethnic identities began to play such a visible part in Ugandan 
daily life. The politicisation of this identity became more evident as socio-
political and economic cleavages became more apparent within the market 
economy and political arena. 
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Post-war colonial concerns about the onset of growing political 
discontent in the colonies prompted Lord Hailey in 1947 to lead a research 
team tasked with conducting survey to assess political associations that had 
been formed in Britain’s African colonies.230 A report to Hailey from the DC of 
the Northern Province in Uganda provides very little information on the early 
political aspirations of the YAA and any activities that its members may have 
engaged in. However, it does offer a detailed account of how the colonial 
administration went about de-politicising members of the group. Accepting 
that the organisation was started mainly because younger Acholi wanted a 
place in the Native Administration, the DC assessed that the rising discontent 
could be dealt with by nominating many of the members of the Association 
into the Native Councils and committees. As well as this, an Acholi 
Association was formed with the patronage of the British, with the aim of 
organising sports tournaments and social gatherings. A clubhouse was built 
with a library which received book donations and a grant of twenty-five 
pounds from the British Council on behalf of the King George V Memorial 
Trust. The Association also received an annual grant of two hundred pounds 
from the Acholi Native Administration.231  
The Acholi Association was created primarily to counter-act the political 
aspirations of members of the YAA. Its success is echoed in the DC’s letter 
explaining how the political aspirations of the younger members of the tribe 
had been satisfied. By including them in the Native Administration, increasing 
available facilities, and keeping them busy with social activities, the colonial 
administration had succeeded in the ‘cessation of interest in the Young Acholi 
Association.’ He went as far as to say that there was now very little danger of 
any similar organisations springing up in the district.232 Furthermore, 
organisations such as the Acholi Traders Supply Co-operative Association 
were formed, with the approval of the British, specifically to ‘satisfy those 
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members of the tribe who look to trade as a form of achievement.’233 The DC 
concluded that the creation of these organisations in the field of politics, 
economics, and social welfare would be sufficient to meet the demands of the 
future. Presumably, given that the letter was written in 1947, against a 
background of growing anti-colonial movements in southern Uganda, the 
British felt that it would not be long before that discontent spread into Acholi. 
What this tells us about the political aspirations of young and largely educated 
demographic of Acholi men is that, at this point at least, their political 
grievances were not specifically aimed at the colonial administration or alien 
rule: rather it was the emergence of a generational conflict born out of the 
paradox of the colonial administration. As Terrence Ranger explains more 
generally: 
The pre-colonial movement of men and ideas was replaced by the 
colonial custom-bounded microscopic local society. It was important for 
colonial authorities to limit regional interaction and thus to prevent a 
widening of focus on the part of Africans. But at the same time the 
colonial powers wanted to extract labour from these rural societies, so 
that young men were being drawn to places of employment very much 
more distant than the range of journeying in the pre-colonial past. 
These young men were expected to be at one and the same time 
workers in a distant urban economy and acceptant citizens in the tightly 
defined microcosmic society.234 
 
What this meant in Acholi and Uganda was that the growing demographic of 
educated young men and migrants were shaped by the administration to 
service the colonial economy returned to their tribal homes only to be 
subjugated to the authority of elders and the Native Administration. This set 
the stage for a generational conflict where elders, feeling threatened by the 
skills of this new educated and well travelled demographic, retaliated by 
emphasising the importance of gerontocratic authority and tradition.235 As 
Richard Waller points out, elders in Africa ‘continued to hold most of the cards 
throughout the colonial period.’236 The formation of the YAA and the 
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appeasement of its members by the British indicated the growing internal 
political competition among young educated Acholi men. It was also an 
indication of the growing resentment towards the authority of the elders and 
the limited access to the Native Administration. Yet indicators of generational 
conflicts such as negotiations over bride price and marriage do not readily 
appear in the district archives in Acholi. However, Timothy Parsons notes the 
conflict between elders and young returning Acholi soldiers after the Second 
World War regarding high bride prices. ‘In Uganda, Acholi veterans 
complained that elders conspired to appropriate their savings by making it 
more costly to marry.’237  The fact that Acholi was one of the last regions to be 
incorporated into the Protectorate meant that their exposure to the colonial 
economy was later in coming.   
Furthermore, restricted access to education and British economic 
underdevelopment in the region meant that the Ocols position as political 
power brokers emerged after a longer period of colonial rule. It would not be 
until the 1950s that the Ocols would become more politically vocal and 
economically visible. More significantly, by containing this emerging educated 
demographic within politically demarcated regional and ethnic territories, the 
British were unwittingly sowing the seeds for the creation a new generation of 
politically minded Acholi men whose political conscious would be deeply 
rooted within their ethnic boundaries. The formation of the YAA marked the 
birth of the Ocols, a new generation of Acholi men who had been born and 
brought up in the colonial political economy and who would grow up to 
become the political face of the Acholi ethno-national identity, in late colonial 
and post-independence Uganda. 
Another migrant labour group that must also be considered are those 
Acholi who joined the rank and file of the army, mainly the King’s African 
Rifles (KAR). From the onset of the First World War the British started to 
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actively recruit in the Northern Province.238 Colonial records indicate that 
during the recruitment process 1,117 infantry recruits were drawn from the 
region with 155 from Acholi a number which would rise steadily in future. The 
majority of the recruits, totalling 954, came from the West Nile.239 The high 
proportion of Northern recruits in the armed forces can be observed with a 
complaint made circa 1928-29 by African soldiers in the 4th Battalion KAR 
stating that several of them who were stationed in Bombo had been refused 
permission to attend church services. The document provides a list of the 
seventy-four complainants, of which thirty-six had Luo/Nilotic names. Although 
it is difficult to ascertain how many of these men were Acholi, it does reaffirm 
that there was a disproportionate number of Northerners in the army.240 For 
the majority of Acholi recruits who were motivated by monetary considerations 
rather than other factors such as a forging a high-ranking military career, the 
army offered a steady wage-compared to the intermittency of local labour 
wages-clothing and food, a fact that the colonial officers were all too aware of. 
Regarding complaints that some discharged army personnel who were 
returning to their homes had not received their pay, the Provincial 
Commissioner warned that these complaints were ‘likely to act as a serious 
deterrent for recruiting.’241 Gardner Thompson makes the argument that the 
high proportion of Northern recruits in the army should be attributed to 
‘hardship and want’ as opposed to ‘contemporary tribal stereotyping’ that 
defined the peoples of the region as ‘martial races’.242 Thompson’s point is 
valid in so much as there were fewer job opportunities in the North compared 
to the relatively prosperous South, thus making the region a prime recruiting 
ground for the army. However, the designation of the Northerners as martial 
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tribes was also reinforced by the colonial government’s wider political and 
economic ambitions in the Protectorate. In so much as the Bantu speaking 
peoples of southern and central Kingdoms, mainly the Baganda were deemed 
to be more politically conscious and administratively sophisticated, by 
predominately recruiting soldiers from Northern regions, the British could, as 
Doornbos argues ‘create a power balance’ based on the ‘divide and rule 
model’ by concentrating military authority away from the administrative and 
political hub in southern and central Uganda.243 The Northern tribes could, if 
the need arose, be used to suppress any political or military challenges from 
the South. Consequently, whilst initially a regional designation, with the 
election of a Northern President in post-independence Uganda, and the 
continued disproportionate recruitment of Acholi and Lango soldiers into the 
national army, the designation would become more specifically ethnic, as will 
be discussed further in chapter four.  
  
2.4. Conclusion 
 
Formalised through the Native Authority, British indirect rule in Acholi 
subsumed a large portion of Acholi indigenous social-political structures. This 
created a bifurcated bureaucratic state, which emphasised the customary 
authority of the locality through the Native Administration and civil authority of 
the colonial government in the centre.244 Despite attempts by the British to 
make the Acholi conscious of their identity as a political and tribal ‘unit’, the 
Native Administration served to reinforce Acholi clan and chiefly allegiances. 
This created fragmented internal socio-political organisations that challenged 
colonial attempts to unitise the ‘Acholi tribe.’ The establishment of Native 
Administration structures elevated chiefly power above its pre-colonial status, 
resulting in the politicisation of clan and chiefly allegiances as competition for 
access to political office increased. Christian missions provided avenues for 
incorporating Christianity and Western education into Acholi society, while the 
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colonial market economy allowed labour to be bought and produce to be sold. 
However, these avenues were limited to a select few who had direct access to 
arterial sources of power, through their proximity to a major town, road, school 
or mission complex. At the same time, despite the growth of the colonial 
market economy and increased investment in cash crops, a vast majority of 
Acholi still remained poor and on the periphery of colonial authority. Low 
population density and the geographical size of Acholi greatly hindered the 
distribution of services to remote rural areas. What this meant was that large 
numbers of the Acholi peasantry were left relatively untouched by the formal 
colonial economy. This meant that any centralised Acholi tribal or ethnic 
identity emerging during the colonial period continued to have a strong pre-
colonial cultural content, weakening colonial intrusion and allowing stronger 
development of indigenous cultural institutions. However, in the coming 
decade, this demographic would also become aware acutely of the ‘benefits’ 
of the colonial political economy as they strove to provide access for their 
sons to a Western education that could one day open new professional 
opportunities away from village subsistence farming. 
Indirect rule also brought preconceived racial stereotypes which were 
made to fit colonial economic and political ambitions, as members of the 
Northern tribes, including the Acholi were marked out as the strong ‘martial 
race’ whose men were better formed to service the army. Furthermore, British 
economic ambitions designated the peoples of the North were to act as a 
reservoir for menial labour, whilst their southern and central counterparts were 
earmarked for the service sectors. Yet these labour migrants and servicemen 
were politically contained within their tribal boundaries, reinforcing once again 
the connection to their ancestral homesteads.  
More significantly for the development of Acholi ethno-national 
identities, colonial rule opened new avenues for educated young Acholi men 
to challenge the traditional systems that emphasised gerontocratic power. 
This fostered an ongoing generational conflict which was sustained by the 
political economy of colonial indirect rule. The British encouraged labour 
migration to sustain their colonial ambitions yet at the same time discouraged 
ethnic and regional integration within the wider Protectorate. This resulted in 
the creation of a well-educated, young male Acholi demographic that was 
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politically contained within microcosmic and mono-ethnic societies. To fulfil 
their emerging political and economic ambitions and gain access to the Native 
Administration, this demographic would have to challenge the traditional 
authority of chiefs. Primarily because of their high levels of education and 
exposure to political structures outside of Acholi, it was to be this young 
educated elite that would be instrumental in the politicisation of Acholi identity 
during the last decade of British rule in Uganda. Whilst they had learnt the 
language of the colonisers and their regimes of power, the localised political 
vocabulary which developed, as the next three chapters will show, was to be 
distinctively ethnic in its content.  
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3.0. Using the Language They Taught Us: Decolonisation and the Acholi 
1950-1962.  
 
I joined the UNC because I thought that the Kabaka wanted to become 
king of Uganda.245 
 
Contrary to Mamdani’s assessment of the emergence of African nationalism, 
Ugandan nationalism was not born of out of some sort of African polyethnic 
collective class struggle against imperial/capitalist oppression. Nor did it arise 
from Ugandans wanting to be recognised as ‘trans-ethnic’, or as a unitary 
nation: it was instead the divisive politics of ethnonationalism which served as 
the principle tool for making separatist demands against the colonial 
government.246 The administrative and political segregation of native 
authorities through the ethos of ‘divide and rule’ had proved crucial in 
preventing interregional and interethnic violent conflict. As the different ethnic 
regions were administered separately, there was little or no competition for 
resources such as land and political office.247 With the onset of 
decolonisation, the British would, in a sense, become victims of the success 
of their own project. For the British administration, the decade leading up to 
independence would be spent combating the separatist ambitions of the 
Baganda, by emphasising the political importance of local governments and 
Native Authorities outside of the Kingdom. By the eve of independence this 
exercise would prove to be a catch twenty-two position, as by encouraging 
strong ethically divided local governments, colonialism paved the way for the 
divisive politics of ethnonationalism. Strong localised political institutions 
created by the British, meant that in the decade leading up to independence, 
the politics of decolonisation was to be driven by local rather than national 
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considerations. Consequently, in the lead up to independence, local 
politicians, chiefs and religious leaders, adopted the language of tribal 
sectarianism, as they evoked tribal stereotypes, clan allegiances, religious, 
regional, and ethnic demarcations, as political tools against potential national 
and local competitors, rather than the colonial authority.   
In Acholi, the emergence of anti-colonial nationalist sentiments was not 
initially a direct attack on European rule. Firstly, the colonial native 
administrations in the Acholi districts were largely founded on Acholi 
indigenous socio-political identities. If anything, the colonial systems of 
governance emphasised clan, regional and ethnic political allegiances as 
opposed to fostering Ugandan nationalism. Moreover, the colonial 
administration’s political focus on the Kingdom of Buganda and its drive to 
develop the Acholi Local Government (ALG) provided the opportunity for 
members of the Native Authority to engage in the comparative politics of 
regional underdevelopment. Utilising the British’s own political ambitions, 
Acholi chiefs sought to further extend their authority within the locality by 
lobbying for the creation of key political posts and the installation of a 
paramount chief who could potentially rival the status of the Kabaka. 
However, chiefly authority in Acholi was countered by the emergence of a 
new breed of local politicians as viable political power contenders against 
colonial sponsored chiefly authority in the locality. Born out of the colonial 
political economy, these politically minded Ocols actively embraced the 
emergence of political parties, using them not only as tool to challenge the 
dominance of chiefs within the local government, but also as an avenue to 
gain access to the political centre.248 Between these competing local factions, 
the ‘victim identity’ emerged as a key unifying political tool that could be used 
nationally, to make economic and political demands against the colonial state 
on behalf of the peoples of Acholi and their northern counterparts. 
However, competition for political office was fierce and competitive as 
local politicians campaigned along religious, clan and intraregional 
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demarcations to gain votes, placing limits on the emergence of a politically 
coherent Acholi ethnonational identity.  For the Lawinos, situated outside of 
formal politics, religious identities became sharpened, as affiliations with a 
Christian denomination would open the door for mission-run institutions that 
could provide access to education and health services.249 Capitalising on 
these religious identities, local and national politicians reinforced a two party 
system driven by partisan religious politics which pitted Acholi Catholics 
against their Protestant counterparts. Furthermore, the Lawinos containment 
within the rural periphery ensured that whilst, on one hand, this demographic 
strove to gain access to the world of the Ocols, clan and chiefly allegiances 
still remained an important point of reference. Thus, even within the emerging 
competition between the Ocols and the chiefs, political activity in Acholi was 
not a straightforward contest between the ‘modern’ Ocols and the ‘traditional’ 
chiefs, insofar as the Ocols needed to engage with the language of the old 
system to secure their political footing in the new era of party politics.  
 
3.1. Regionalism and the ‘Northern’ Identity.  
 
Cherry Gertzel argues that political activity at the district level in Acholi from 
1945 to1962 was largely nationalistic in orientation, and that it was focused in 
the district primarily because there were ‘institutions at that level within which 
the colonial administration could be challenged.’250 These councils became an 
arena for nationally orientated local leaders, who provided the links through 
which an African leadership at the centre could challenge the colonial 
government.  Local governments offered easier opportunities to be elected 
into office and as such district councils developed faster than legislative 
councils. Gertzel disagrees with the argument that political parties developed 
slowly in Uganda because politics at the district level was satisfactory enough 
for the actors and as such there was less desire to participate at a national 
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level.251  However, as Dwyer suggests, the concept of nationalism is in itself 
an ambiguous one. In Africa, nationalism could be related more towards local 
or sectional grievances.252 Gertzel’s argument is true in some respects, 
particularly regarding the local councils as a platform for political activity. The 
disagreement arises in the assessment that political activity in the district, 
especially in the 1950s was largely nationalistic in orientation. Undeniably 
Acholi politicians embraced the new emerging national consciousness and 
tried to ensure that their political positions in the locality would be guaranteed 
post-independence. However, on a regional level, localised grievances took 
centre stage, and this was in turn channelled to the political centre through the 
politics of ethnonationalism and regional factionalism. In this respect the idea 
of an all-encompassing Ugandan nationalist movement was superficial from 
its inception. Anti-colonial rhetoric lacked any unified political coherency as 
they were channelled through specific local grievances. Since ethnic groups 
divided regions, these divisions were translated to the national political stage.  
Within the decade leading to independence in 1962 the principal 
problem faced by British officials was the lack of unity that manifested itself 
into tribal, linguistic, religious, economic, political and social factionalism. With 
Uganda split between four major kingdoms and ten districts, each political 
entity ruthlessly guarded their identity, power and resources.253 Questions 
regarding who was better equipped to rule and which ethnic group was the 
most culturally advanced and most politically qualified for leadership, started 
to appear more frequently in the Ugandan national media from the early 
1950s. The comments section in The Ugandan Herald/Argus, a daily national 
newspaper written in English, provided the platform for the educated parties 
on all sides to air their views. As the mudslinging ensued, old colonial tribal 
stereotypes were readily utilised as political weapons reinforcing ethnic and 
regional identities. 
  
Between the Bantu and the Nilotics, Bantu people are more advanced 
of the two and account for three fourths of the population. They have 
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had a longer culture. Nilotics never covered themselves until the white 
man arrived, and they often mutilated themselves. Of all the peoples of 
the Protectorate, the Buganda who inhabit the Central Province have 
been in the forefront in the shaping of things and all the dramatic 
happenings in the Protectorate have taken place in Buganda, giving 
the Protectorate its name, its history, its culture, its education and its 
religion.254  
 
 
The question of Buganda superiority and what role the kingdom would play in 
the new nation state of Uganda had started long before the 1950s. 255 The 
British and the Baganda had enjoyed a relatively favorable relationship even 
before the 1900 agreement, with Baganda Christian agents helping the British 
to consolidate control of the Protectorate.256 However, relations between the 
two parties became strained as early as 1931, when it became apparent that 
the British were considering creating an East African Federation 
encompassing, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika.257 The Baganda feared that 
if such a federation were to be created it would lodged most of its powers with 
the white settler population in Kenya, making their kingdom a mere satellite 
state.258 The return of the Kabaka in 1955, following his deposition in 1953 his 
continued belligerence towards British authority, marked the beginning of 
overt grass-roots opposition specifically aimed at British colonial rule in 
Buganda.259 In 1952 Uganda’s first national political party the Uganda 
National Congress (UNC) was formed in Kampala, championing the demands 
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of the farmers, industrial workers, peasants and anyone who felt aggrieved by 
the political and economic inequalities of the colonial administration.260  
The significance of the UNC was not simply that it was officially 
Uganda’s first major political party, but that it transcended regional boarders, 
attracting support all the way from the South to the Northern Provinces. The 
formation of the UNC in 1952 was relatively late compared to other British 
colonies.261 Anthony Low makes the argument that emergence of political 
parties in Uganda was tardy because before the 1950s very few Africans from 
Uganda had been educated in or even visited Britain or America. The small 
minority that did had not even gained layman’s knowledge of Western politics. 
Furthermore, the lack of European or Asian political organisations within the 
Protectorate meant that unlike Rhodesia and South Africa where non-African 
political organisations provided a stimulus to modern African political 
movements, in Uganda, this did not occur. There were few countrywide 
political confrontations between Europeans and Africans that could stir up 
Ugandans.262 Rather than looking at how the marginalisation of Ugandans 
from Western political and formal democratic intuitions stunted nationalistic 
politics, it could be argued that this exclusion actually strengthened its 
localised roots. Furthermore, just because a larger number of Ugandans were 
not being sent abroad does not mean that they were wholly excluded from 
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Western political thought-processes. When considering the Acholi, Western 
style education was being provided by the missionaries in the locality, which 
allowed for the incorporation of British Christian political doctrines into 
Acholi/Ugandan political consciousness. Ugandan political parties that did 
emerge were more inward looking: they gave the participants the time and 
opportunity to deal specifically with local and regional political grievances. And 
while there were reports on the struggle for freedom in Kenya, and in South 
Africa, there were no figures like Jomo Kenyatta or Julius Nyerere to 
nationalise political, social and economic grievances within Uganda.263  If 
such a leader had existed, regional political institutions would most likely have 
rejected them, because strong local institutions had created strong localised 
political identities.  
The UNC arrived in Acholi in 1953 after establishing headquarters in 
Lango. However, the party quickly realised that unlike in Lango, where they 
enjoyed somewhat of a political monopoly, in Acholi they would face greater 
opposition. Three years after the first UNC headquarters opened in Gulu; the 
Democratic Party’s (DP) arrival in the district would provide a formidable 
political adversary creating a competitive ground from which ‘Uganda would 
become a two-party state.’264 Benedicto Kiwanuka, a Muganda Catholic 
politician established the DP in 1956 as a moderate conservative party. 
However, the DP quickly became known as a party for Catholics and 
southerners, as it sought to counter the dominance of the largely Protestant-
led UNC.265 The founders of the UNC, Ignatius Musazi and Abu Mayanja, 
both southerners, visited Gulu in 1953 to appoint a chairman for their Acholi 
branch. Peter Oola, an Acholi, was chosen knowing that he was better served 
to appeal to his own ethnic homeland. Oola was educated in a CMS school in 
Gulu, served in the KAR, and then had returned back to the region to work as 
a civil servant.  His service in the KAR meant that he had spent some time in 
Nairobi and had come in contact with Kenyan politicians who would have 
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undoubtedly influenced his political views.266 Peter Oola’s first meeting with 
Musazi was in Kampala were he became acquainted with the UNC.267 In fact, 
a vast majority of the Acholi party leaders, be it DP or UNC, were drawn from 
this pool of educated young men, some of whom had had the opportunity to 
travel outside Acholi and had had their interests peaked in regards to African 
politics. Upon returning to their districts they were able to capitalise on the 
growing tensions within the Protectorate, particularly matters pertaining to 
land, cash crop farming and the rights of the rural peasantry within Acholi 
districts.268 There was also the issue of the ‘Baganda question’ and the 
Kingdom’s place within the Protectorate. Acholi UNC and DP supporters, 
while showing loyal allegiance to the respective parties, did not primarily 
identify with other UNC and DP supporters in the rest of the Protectorate, in 
particular Buganda. Added to this, the connection between the UNC branch in 
Gulu and the headquarters in Kampala was relatively lax. Despite Oola 
making several visits to Kampala and abroad as a member of the UNC 
delegation, political activities in Acholi meant that rather than the UNC 
headquarters controlling the branch in Gulu, Oola was able to touch base with 
the centre and but never allowed the centre to control him. This allowed the 
UNC in Acholi to develop more as an autonomous branch of the UNC 
nationwide.269  
Rivalry between the UNC and DP ensured that political cohesion in 
Acholi remained impossible, despite the need for a strong political front to 
combat continued economic and political underdevelopment in the region. 
Rather than campaign specifically on these populist issues, both the UNC and 
DP in Acholi, at least externally, conceptualised their election campaign 
through the politics of regional and ethnic factionalism. Both political parties 
quickly capitalised on the growing hostility towards the Baganda and the 
Kabaka, mobilising the Acholi to join the UNC to counter Buganda political 
dominance.  As one Acholi recruit to the UNC recounted, ‘I joined the UNC 
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because I thought that the Kabaka wanted to be king of Uganda.’270 Being a 
largely Southern-based party proved to be problematic for the DP, as the 
perceived political and economic superiority of the Buganda Kingdom, made 
Acholi DP recruits inherently hostile towards their Southern counterparts. This 
was primarily because in Acholi the Kabaka was rejected as a symbol of 
Ugandan self-determination. The politics of decolonisation gave opportunistic 
politicians the perfect tools to mobilise followers along localised grievances 
using the economic and political marginalisation of the ‘Northerner’ to gain 
political support in Acholi.  Politicians continued to encourage debates that 
juxtaposed the Baganda and the rest of the Kingdoms within the Protectorate 
and the tribes in Northern Provinces, further ethnocising local and national 
politics. To gain votes, win elections and access the centre, Acholi politicians 
needed to appeal to the constituents in their locality. To remain in power, they 
had to advocate for the needs of their ethnic constituents at the national level. 
They could neither cut these ties without sustaining loss nor gain a substantial 
grass roots following outside of their ethnic political base.  
By 1958 the UNC had won five out of the ten seats nationally available 
for African representatives in the Legislative Council elections, while the DP 
only won one, with the other four taken by independents.  In Acholi, the 
elections results were not as clear-cut, as the UNC candidate only clawed his 
way to victory by 320 votes with 14, 483 against the DP’s 14, 163 total. This 
was in contrast to the results in Lango where the UNC candidate beat his DP 
competitor by 32, 218 votes.271 The remarkable victory for the UNC in Lango 
was made possible under the leadership of the educated, young and dynamic 
Lango politician, Milton Obote, who not only gave the UNC second highest 
majority in the country, but also the highest percentage of votes overall.272 
With his success in the Legislative Council elections he was quickly elevated 
to Deputy Prime Minister of the UNC under the Chairmanship of Joseph 
Kiwanuka.  From 1960, disputes within the UNC resulted in several splits, with 
Obote eventually leaving the party to form the Uganda People’s Congress 
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(UPC) in 1959-60. This was to be the death knell of the UNC as a political 
force among the Acholi and the rest of the Protectorate, as illustrated by their 
poor performance in the 1960 elections.273  
Milton Obote encompassed both the Lango identity regionally and the 
Northern/Nilotic one nationally. The transference of Acholi political support 
from the UNC to the UPC can be understood in terms of the North-South 
divide and the leadership of Obote. Even during the internal conflicts within 
the UNC, the party branch in Acholi had already shown its allegiance to 
Obote. When a dispute broke out between Obote and Kiwanuka regarding 
UNC funds donated by China, the branches in Acholi and Lango passed a 
resolution calling for the resignation of Kiwanuka, despite condemnation from 
the Party headquarters in Kampala. As Obote started to gain a greater 
following within the UNC, he utilised his political capital by calling for Sir 
Frederick Crawford’s resignation, specifying the sluggish pace towards self-
governance. Once again the UNC headquarters rebutted him stating that only 
the Secretary-General of the Party had the authority to make such a 
statement.274 Evidently, even before the official split of the UNC, the Northern 
branches of the Party were already showing independence from the official 
party mouthpiece in Kampala. In Obote, the Acholi found a political 
spokesman with whom they could identify regionally. This political utilisation of 
the Northern identity did not go unnoticed. Following his dismissal from the 
Party as Chairman, Kiwanuka remarked that his suspension was a 
manifestation of tribalism, while Obote simply dismissed it as ‘Operation clean 
up.’275  
The physical, cultural and linguistic proximity of Acholi to Lango was a 
valuable political tool for Acholi UPC politicians. The fact that Lango provided 
the UPC with its strongest support base in the country meant that Acholi 
politicians could further capitalise on the political capital of the Northern 
identity. Under the leadership of Obote, the UPC in Acholi continued to 
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strengthen regional and political allegiances with Lango.276 Obote was 
opportunistic enough to exploit this regional connection. In 1960 he had 
written a letter to the supervisor of the elections in Lango offering an 
alternative boundary division of the electoral districts in Lango and in Acholi. 
The British were immediately suspicious and critical of the proposal, claiming 
that if the boundaries were to be amended it would split areas over which the 
UPC had a weaker hold, and amalgamate them into larger UPC 
constituencies assuring a victory for the party in Acholi. This was seen as a 
deliberate political ploy to strengthen Obote’s party support base at the 
expense of the DP. However, such was Obote’s popularity in Lango the 
British conceded that regardless of whether the boundaries were adjusted or 
not, a UPC victory in Lango was almost guaranteed.277 The election 
supervisor suggested that Obote’s proposals should be considered locally 
with regards to the impact they would have in Acholi, as it was it was probable 
that Obote’s proposals were more of an attempt to tailor the elections results 
for the benefit of Otema Allemedi and Peter Oola, the two UPC candidates in 
Acholi. Both candidates were known to have strong political and personal ties 
to Obote and frequently sought his advice on how to run their own election 
campaigns. The reorganisation of the boundaries would then have been of 
mutual convenience for them.278 Obote’s popularity in the North was 
commented on by the election supervisor who concluded that, within the DP, 
no Acholi representative ‘holds a place in his party hierarchy comparable to 
that of Mr Obote, and would scarcely seem to be in a position to bring the 
same influence to bear on matters under discussion as their rivals.’279  But 
was this because he was a Northerner? Irrefutably yes. Even though the 
electoral map was evenly split between the two parties in Acholi, it is apparent 
from the fact that the leader of the DP, Benedicto Kiwanuka, a Muganda, did 
not command the same admiration as Obote did in Acholi.  
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Aside from his Lango identity, Obote was astute enough to recognise 
early on that to gain support in his ethnic region, he needed to highlight the 
political and economic grievances of the Northern Province. Prior to joining 
the UNC, he had sent a letter to The Uganda Herald arguing that the political 
underdevelopment of the Northern region by the British had left the Province 
and its peoples at a distinct political disadvantage. 
 
We semi-hamites and Norsemen [Nilotes] of Uganda feel that the 
Congress aiming at ‘Self-governance’ in Uganda is therefore hastening 
and leaving us behind because of our present inability to aim so high. It 
must be pointed out to the Congress here and now that with us the 
question of questions lies in education and rapid developments of 
African Local Governments.280 
 
A question that could be posed is, did this letter make Obote a tribalist, 
considering the events that were about to unfold in post-independence 
Uganda? The answer is probably not, but in this context he can be considered 
as a regionalist. As a designated ‘Northerner’ and an aspiring politician, he 
needed to appeal to his base by emphasising that it was he alone who truly 
understood the grievances that plagued that region. The North was still vastly 
underdeveloped compared to the South, particularly in regards to education.  
In 1952 there were 1912 pupils in secondary schools in the Protectorate but 
only 151 were from the Northern Provinces. In the junior schools they 
constituted only 501 out of 3605 pupils.281  Through his letter to The Uganda 
Argus, Obote was also playing on the fear that as the Baganda had already 
been privileged with better educational facilities, they inevitably would become 
the leaders in an independent Uganda.282 By emphasising regional economic 
divisions Obote created an image of himself not as a Ugandan politician, but a 
politician from the North. This identification would later come back to plague 
him throughout both of his presidential terms as the political landscape 
shifted.  
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By the late 1950s the colonial government had resigned itself to 
relinquishing control of the Protectorate. The Wild Report of 1959 had already 
codified the handing over of political power to Ugandans. Ugandans were to 
cast their vote in 1961 for country’s first nationwide direct elections to the 
Legislative Council in preparation for self-governance.283 However, Buganda 
was still proving to be a nuisance for the British as internal divisions within the 
kingdom regarding what part, if any, the Baganda would play in an 
independent Uganda reached fever pitch in 1960. While some Muganda 
politicians saw no reason why the kingdom should not participate in the 
upcoming 1961 elections, others saw it as a complete betrayal of the Lukiko 
and the Kabaka.284 The Buganda government called for a boycott of the 1961 
elections, ensuring that less than two per cent of eligible voters from the 
kingdom exercised their right to vote.285 Despite this, the rest of Uganda 
enthusiastically exercised their political rights and participated in the elections 
with a voter turnout of seventy-five per cent.286 While Ugandans embraced the 
idea of political freedom from the British, the Kabaka wanted to ensure that it 
would be his kingdom that would either stand as the centrepiece of Ugandan 
nationalism, or be granted outright independence.287  For their part, the British 
were unsure about how to deal with the ‘Buganda question’. They were 
reluctant to leave the kingdom at the mercy of non-Baganda given the political 
and economic power that the Kingdom held. However, they were more 
inclined to accept a unitary Ugandan state as opposed to any sort of national 
federation that guaranteed Buganda autonomy, which could prove a 
hindrance to their future political and economic ambitions in the region.288  
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The debates regarding the ‘Buganda question’ were further 
exacerbated by the Bukedi Riots broke which broke out in January 1960 in the 
Eastern Provinces. The riots were mainly centred on economic issues 
pertaining to taxation, and the oppressive authority of the local chiefs in the 
kingdom.289 There was an increase of attacks on colonial infrastructure 
including railway lines, Owen Falls Dam, Kampala north switching station, 
district offices and non-African businesses. Detailed emergency plans were 
sent out to all the DCs in the Protectorate giving them the legal power to deal 
with any further strikes, while the KAR battalion in Jinja were placed on high 
alert.290 To combat the civil disturbances, the British continued to introduce 
emergency legislations outlawing any activities that could lead to public 
disorder, including the prohibition of any gatherings exceeding twenty-five 
people.291 In some ‘problem’ areas such as Masaka and Mubende, strict 
curfews were enforced along with notices prohibiting the carrying of sticks, 
and the forced surrender of firearms as well as the control of the movement of 
vehicles and persons. Restrictions on the media including press censorship 
and radio monitoring were also enforced.292  
Table 2: Central Government, Expenditures Law and Order/ Defence 1947-61293 
 
            
 
Value in £ `000 
Year 1947 1950 1953 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 
Administration, 
Defence 
535 881 1,244 2,413 2,644 2,670 2,553 2,259 
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Law and Order 264 522 900 1,659 1,889 2,097 2,304 2,415 
         
Total 
799 1,403 2,144 4,072 4,533 4,767 4,857 4,674 
 
 
Following the disturbances in Buganda that had begun in 1947, the Colonial 
government continued to increase expenditure on defence year on year. From 
1947 to 1961 there was an average annual increase of forty-two per cent 
spent on maintaining law and order in the Protectorate.  In Acholi, police 
surveillance had begun from the moment the UNC had arrived in the region in 
1953. The Police Special Branch was tasked with recording and reporting the 
details of political meetings in within Acholi districts. The nature of the colonial 
government’s surveillance on political activists in the locality effectively set a 
precedent and provided the blue print for military intervention and intelligence 
gathering that would continue to be utilised by future regimes. In Buganda, the 
colonial government’s aim of ending violent anti-colonial campaigns was 
systematised through the implementation of various states of emergencies 
from the 1950s.294 This sanctioned the use of military force and state 
censorship as a means of dealing with political dissidents.  
In Acholi however there were no notices placed that restricted travel or 
any state imposed curfews. In the lead up to the 1961 elections, minor 
clashes were reported during public meetings, although these were not 
serious enough to warrant any meaningful intervention from the predominately 
Northern police force. Local chiefs were instead instructed to try and contain 
the disturbances.295 Similar riots such as the one seen in Bukedi were not 
replicated and if any did break out, they were small and sporadic and had very 
little to do with events going on in Southern and Eastern Uganda. Only three 
strikes were recorded from 1961-62, and were due to specific local issues, 
such as a strike by workers in Acholi Inn due to late payment of wages.296 
Nonetheless, Acholi UPC and DP politicians in the region were quick to 
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capitalise on the national debates and disturbances that were taking place by 
giving them a regional nuance. Some deliberately sought to mislead potential 
supporters in regard to how they should vote by stating that the Wild Report 
had recommended that people should only vote for the DP, as they were the 
only party that was concerned with development. In another incident DP 
politicians told a crowd of supporters that the UPC were directly responsible 
for the outbreak of the Bukedi Riots and would hinder national progression 
and independence.297  
The UNC/UPC298 in Acholi saw the Bukedi Riots as a way to level the 
playing field, particularly after they lost several seats to the DP in the local 
council elections of 1959. Because the DP now controlled the council, UPC 
politicians mobilised supporters in the region by claiming that if the DP were 
victorious, they would raise poll-tax rates for all Acholi. The allegation was 
strongly denied as DP representatives countered that in fact poll tax was only 
being increased for government workers earning over 750 shillings per month. 
Furthermore, tax for the ordinary person would remain unchanged.299 
Although the standard rate of taxation was fifty shillings, in some divisions 
local council assessment committees were known to regard a lesser rate of 
thirty-five shillings as a reasonable standard for the ordinary man. In fact, only 
a very small number of Acholi, around seven per cent, actually paid a higher 
tax rate than the set standard.300 The Acholi who were liable to pay the higher 
tax brackets were few and far between, and mainly worked in civil service jobs 
or in plantations in the South.301  Poll-tax rates in the region remained 
relatively stable from the late colonial period through to the end of Obote’s first 
presidency. When the standard rate was increased to sixty-one shillings in 
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1961 it was quickly reduced the following year after being deemed too high.302 
In summation, taxes were not a significant enough issue to drive Acholi to the 
streets to riot. Regional underdevelopment and lack of industry placed 
restrictions on the formation of any mass, centralised, proletarian workers’ 
movement in the region. More importantly, economic marginalisation limited 
the development of a pronounced economically grounded Acholi class identity 
that could be fed into a larger national industrial workers movement. 
Despite the political tensions brought on by the Bukedi Riots, direct 
elections to the Legislative Council went ahead as planned in March 1961 
resulting in a victory for the DP.  The DP’s success in the elections lay in the 
animosity between the Protestant-dominated royal establishment of 
Buganda’s government hierarchy, and the DP’s largely Catholic leaders. 
When the Buganda government requested a boycott of the elections the DP 
ignored the instruction and went on to claim victory.303 ‘Hence the first Prime 
Minister of Uganda, Benedicto Kiwanuka, was reviled by the Buganda 
government for both ignoring the boycott and daring to place himself, a 
Catholic Muganda commoner, in position superior to the King of Buganda.’304  
By this time the UNC had become completely factionalised into various 
smaller parties, and the UPC, still under the leadership of Milton Obote 
emerged as the main challenger to the DP’s political dominance. The failure 
of the Buganda Kingdom to segregate, and the fallout from the DP victory 
prompted a coalition between the UPC and the newly formed Kabaka Yekka 
(KY) (Kabaka Only) party. It was a calculated decision by both the Kabaka 
and Obote to ensure victory in the 1962 elections.305 As Horowitz assess, 
‘both the Kabaka Yekka and the UPC regarded the DP as their rival. Only the 
UPC and KY had not been competing for votes because neither competed in 
the territory of the other.’306  Under the terms of the coalition, the UPC had 
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agreed to support Buganda’s demands at the 1961 and 1962 constitutional 
negotiations in London for a federal post-colonial state. The conference was 
held between September and October 1961 and during the negotiations UPC 
and KY delegates agreed that the Kingdom would be granted the option of 
having some member of the National Assembly indirectly elected by the 
Lukiko. It was agreed that ‘Buganda would also control her own civil services 
without supervisory interferences from the Ugandan government.’307 If the 
coalition was to prove successful in the 1962 elections, the Kabaka was to be 
installed in the largely ceremonial role of President, with Obote as Prime 
Minister. The terms of the coalition ensured that the Buganda government 
would have its power strongly entrenched within the post-colonial state.308    
From 1950 to 1962 Ugandan nationalism was driven by the divisive 
politics of ethnopolitics and regional factionalism, which served as the 
principle tool for making separatist demands against the colonial state. The 
colonial system of governance, which had emphasised clan, regional and 
ethnic political allegiances, provided the platform for which Ugandan and 
Acholi politicians campaigned for electoral support and political power. This 
meant that anti-colonial rhetoric lacked any unified political coherency as they 
were channelled through specific local and regional grievances. In the locality, 
regional underdevelopment and lack of industry placed restrictions on the 
formation of any mass, centralised, proletarian workers movement that could 
be fed into a larger national political movement. Consequently, the ‘Northern 
identity’ provided a more unifying political tool to mobilise the peoples of the 
region. In addition, the political dominance of the Buganda Kingdom provided 
the UNC/UPC and DP in Acholi a clear political platform in which they could 
engage in the comparative politics of underdevelopment, by utilising the 
‘Northern identity’. Through the political prowess of the Milton Obote, Acholi 
politicians capitalised on the UPC’s growing dominance, by forming strong 
political allegiances with their regional counterparts, the Lango, further 
ethnocising party politics in the run-up to independence.  
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3.2. Clan Politics and the Extension of Chiefly Authority 
 
There were among northerners more awareness of events taking place 
in the south than one might have thought, although the population 
generally appeared to be concerned only with its small circle. 309 
 
At a local/regional level, within the Acholi Local Government (ALG), there was 
an emerging expression of political activism driven by Acholi chiefs in reaction 
to the Kabaka’s post-colonial political ambitions in Uganda. With the colonial 
government’s political focus placed firmly in resolving the ‘Buganda question’, 
Acholi chiefs saw an opportunity to manipulate the political situation to suit 
their own ambitions in the locality. Like Obote, Acholi chiefs were quick to 
utilise the politics of regional underdevelopment, using it to renegotiate the 
power relations between the British and members of the ALG. In 1951 Acholi 
chiefs in the ALG sent a petition to the Governor of Uganda, pointing to the 
economic disparities between the Northern and Southern Provinces which 
they felt placed the Acholi in a perpetual cycle of ‘ignorance poverty, and 
disease.’310  
 
Our sons and daughters are regrettably absent in the United Kingdom. 
The whole province cannot possibly be devoid of suitable candidates. 
The present method of selection in the Protectorate is not appealing to 
them. We state frankly that the South, the developed part, has had far 
more attention given to it . . . we suggest a provincial election or 
candidates by quotas. We stress still that the Northern Province should 
receive immediate and special attention.311 (emphasis added). 
 
The petition offers some insight into the perception of Southerners and British 
rule in Acholi. The ‘victim’ identity pointed at institutional marginalisation and 
sought to designate regional underdevelopment as a political battleground. 
Once again, this was not an unfounded accusation by the councillors. In 1951, 
of the ten students in contention for an overseas scholarship, only one was 
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from the Northern Province. Alluding to the reasons for this, the colonial 
administration acknowledged that as the region was lagging behind in 
education they could not find more suitable candidates from the North.312 
Furthermore, data for the total income of Ugandan households in 1959 
showed that the Northern Province had the lowest cash incomes per head 
compared to all the other provinces the Protectorate.313  
The economic and political profile of Buganda fed into the growing 
North-South divide and the politics of ‘them’ and ‘us.’ Acholi politicians and 
chiefs designated the Southerners as the overly privileged group in the 
Protectorate, a characteristic that would be evoked over and over again 
throughout the decade. However, just as the councillors were rejecting their 
counterparts in the South, they were also embracing another group, this time 
to the North.  
 
Regarding the inter-territorial boundary between the Sudan and 
Uganda, this point has been raised several times by the Government. It 
is indeed a difficult task and requires international consideration, but 
we still feel that our lost brothers who are Acholi speaking should be 
included in our Province, for the sake of our progress as a unit.314 
(emphasis added). 
 
This was in response to a border adjustment between Northern Uganda and, 
what is now South Sudan, which meant that a small population of Acholi 
speaking people were now designated as Sudanese nationals. The 
terminology expressed by the councillors in particular the usage of words 
such as ‘unit’ and the call to the lost brothers and sisters now designated as 
Sudanese instead of Acholi, points to a greater sense of an Acholi 
ethnonational identity. This idea can be further reinforced by the request of 
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the councillors for the government to develop them more economically so that 
they too could gain more political independence.315  
The British had in 1950 created two new ministerial posts in the 
council, the Lawirwodi (Paramount Chief) and Lagolkop Madit (Chief 
Judge).316 The creation of the positions had come about after three years of 
negotiations with the colonial administration, and was not so much a 
concession but a politically opportunistic ploy by both the British and the 
Acholi chiefs. In 1949 the Acholi Local Council had first set forth a resolution 
requesting that the positions be created, although it was not passed due to 
the fact that the standing committee had not been given the opportunity to 
discuss the directive.317  Within the colonial administration there were 
immediate concerns regarding the vague, often extreme ideas put forth by the 
Acholi councillors regarding the creation of the two posts.318 It was decided 
that before the councillors made such major alterations to the constitution, it 
was imperative that they were shown first-hand the potential disadvantages 
that might arise from the creation of the posts. A tour of fifteen councillors had 
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already been arranged by the request of the Acholi councillors so that they 
could travel to other Provinces to observe their political institutions. 
The councillors were encouraged to examine the local government 
machinery of the districts in the Eastern Provinces and Bunyoro with focus 
being on similar positions of paramount chief, Secretary-General (katikiro) and 
Chief Judge. The councillors were undoubtedly influenced by the political 
structures and activities within the other districts in Uganda, in particular the 
Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro. The close proximity of Bunyoro meant 
that the Kingdom was easier to observe and the dominance of Buganda within 
the Protectorate ensured that it maintained a high political profile. In this 
endeavour, the councillors had the support of the populace, and when the 
posts were finally created they were very well received. But as it would 
transpire, the councillors would not limit themselves to mere ceremonial 
positions, they wanted to emulate the power that was afforded to their 
counterparts elsewhere in the Protectorate.  
The two offices were to be held in rotation among the county chiefs. 
Those who held the positions were afforded enormous prestige and 
ceremony, as the councillors themselves readily acknowledged. ‘The holders 
of these positions are far above the country chiefs and this is something that 
they did not have before. They look forward to further such developments so 
that they can have a strong central office for their local government.’319 
Although, it was intended that the position of Lawirwodi would be purely 
ceremonial, it grew in status rapidly. The appointment of an Acholi paramount 
chief gave council members political confidence in their dealings with the 
colonial government. They soon began to bypass political hierarchies and 
overreach their authority within the locality. The situation prompted the DC to 
complain that, ‘it had been increasingly difficult to get council members to 
understand that their powers were limited and that they did not have the 
authority to overrule government policy or a decision by a higher council.’320  
In return, the councillors argued that if it was the intention of the colonial 
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administration to develop what they termed as ‘their backward people’ these 
two post holders should be awarded greater responsibility within the local 
government. ‘Given that both the Lawirwodi and the Lagolkop Madit had 
provided such long service to the administration, it was only right, that that His 
Majesties Government should recognise officially the seniority and the powers 
that such chiefs held.’  Interestingly enough one of the signatories of the letter 
was none other than the Lawirwodi himself.321  
The petition makes apparent certain power dynamics in Acholi at this 
time. Firstly, it relates to the power structures between the colonial 
government and the Acholi Local Government. The language used is not that 
of the powerless and subjugated. Yes, the councillors are self-deprecating in 
regards to ‘their peoples’ economic and social backwardness, but they also 
knew who they were talking to and were willing to concede these points to 
allow them to make more demands on the administration. 
 
If it is the interest of his Majesty’s government to develop our backward 
people by handing over power to them, as the people prove capable of 
exercising such, give more responsibility to local government. The 
creation of the two new posts in our local administration would only be 
nominal until this position is rectified and brought to reality. We do not 
mean to bring the power held by the Protectorate government as per 
with the level of the local governments but at least a corresponding 
release of power should be affected [sic].322  
 
This was a strong, confident local council, which was manipulating the political 
structures that were initially nurtured by the British in order to make demands 
on their colonisers, while at the same time strengthening their political and 
social positioning within the Protectorate. The response to the petition by the 
administration was equally telling. Given what was now happening within 
Buganda, it served British interests to encourage political growth among other 
tribes, particularly in the North and the West of the Protectorate. This was to 
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be conducted through the development of institutions of local government. 
The 1949 African Local Government Ordinance had previously provided each 
district with an African Local Government that consisted of chiefs and the 
District Council and gave a statutory basis to the system. By 1955 the 
Ordinance allowed for larger and more representative District Councils who 
were responsible for district affairs.323 The most important thing to emerge for 
these ethnically homogenous district councils was that the districts that they 
represented assumed political prominence in the 1950s. This was largely 
because they provided the institutions in which political support could be 
gained, as by that time local governance had already acquired political 
significance for the local population.324  Outside of their districts local council 
members were given some opportunities to represent their various regions by 
being nominated to institutions such as the Uganda Development Council 
(UDC). The UDC had been enlarged not only to include all ministers directly 
involved in economic policy, but also to incorporate an African representative 
from all the provinces in the Protectorate.325 Consequently the British had 
already laid down the foundations of strong local councils that could be used 
to deal with the ‘Buganda problem.’ As Darwin states, ‘the British had no 
mercy for separatism but in this case they could tolerate nationalism.’326 
Appealing to the tribes who already resented the idea of Baganda superiority, 
they started to magnify Ugandan Local and Legislative Councils at the 
expense of the Buganda Lukiko. As a result, ideas were put forward such as 
providing the first printing press to serve the Nilotic areas, as the Bantus 
already had numerous periodicals written in the vernacular, with the Provincial 
Commissioner remarking that he considered ‘the need for one to be a very 
high priority, not only on political grounds but also in the development and 
welfare campaign.’327  
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There was an active push for the education of local chiefs in Western 
systems of governance and economic structures that took the form of 
organised tours in the United Kingdom. In 1949, it was decided that a group of 
chiefs from within the different regions of the Protectorate would travel to the 
UK so that they could gain a better understanding of British systems of 
governance. Against the backdrop of the Buganda riots, it was hoped that the 
visit would help promote better relations between Africans and the colonial 
administration. These trips continued throughout the decade, with another 
party of eight Ugandan councillors being sent on tour in 1956. Alongside 
these tours Ugandan students were sent abroad to study at colleges in the 
UK, with two Acholi male students out of a total of seven nationwide being 
sent to South Devon Technical College and awarded diplomas for a course on 
the British system of governance.328 
Antonio Opwa, county chief of Chua, was the representative from 
Acholi chosen to participate in the 1949 tour. His memoirs suggest that he 
understood the part he was expected to play and exactly what was expected 
of him. ‘Naturally, most people have more faith in what is explained to them by 
one of their own rather than a foreigner.’329 The tours were also an opportunity 
                                                                                                                                      
Clubs and Scouts nears 7000” The Uganda Argus, 1956: From the mid-1950s the colonial 
government was certain that independence was now a question of when instead of if. The 
administration started to invest heavily in community development, welfare, agriculture and 
education as they started to prepare African men for positions in power. In Acholi, as well as 
chiefs, youth groups were targeted as the British sought to properly mould the new generation 
of potential leaders. A new library was also opened up at Sir Samuel Baker School in Gulu 
where the Governor Sir Andrew Cohen remarked that although other people in the 
Protectorate may have had longer periods of education those in the Northern Province had 
every chance ahead of them. There was a drive to get the young to join local youth clubs and 
scout groups to teach them skills of communication and team building which seemed to be 
gaining some success as the 1954 Census showed that there had been an increase of 7,000 
scouts within a period of a year with the best increases coming from the Acholi were 999 
scouts had been recorded. Scout groups had been growing steadily after the war when 
members were encouraged to serve their communities by working in post offices sorting mail 
or other duties that were deemed to be socially meaningful.  
328 ‘Ugandan Chiefs Visit Britain’ The Uganda Argus, 6 October 1956. 
329 A. Opwa, An East African Chief in England: Chief Antonio Opwa. A Chief of the Acholi 
People of Uganda (Nairobi, Kampala, Da es Salaam: The Eagle Press, 1952). 
 120 
I                
for chiefs, from all around the Protectorate to interact with their regional 
counterparts. It was an opportunity to gather information on how the other 
districts in Uganda compared socially, economically and politically. The tours 
themselves were exhaustive with the chiefs expected to visit as many British 
intuitions as possible. These included courts, prisons, various infrastructures 
and industries, farming schools and farms, and co-operative societies from all 
over the country. Chief Opwa’s testimony, published in 1952, is somewhat 
problematic, not least regarding the language and terminology used. 
Describing an instance where they were invited to attend a church service in 
Balmoral where the Royal family was in attendance, Opwa recounts the 
moment when he first saw the King; ‘we were close to the man on whose 
shoulders rested the heavy responsibility of looking after the British Empire. 
He stood erect and silent while we asked God to let him reign long over us.’330 
However, the original manuscript written in Acholi, found in Gulu district 
archive, is not only missing this statement, but does not have many of the 
British expressions in the published manuscript. This indicates that for all 
intents and purposes the book was altered dramatically during its translation 
to English. The question of why this was done can be found in the response to 
the manuscript by the then acting Commissioner of the Northern Province D. 
K. Burner, 
 
Mr Allen’s opinion of Mr Opwa came as a disappointment especially as   
Mr Opwa was about the most suitable person to send to England from 
the Northern Province. I myself have seen Mr Opwa since his return 
and heard him give a talk to Africans on his experiences. He certainly 
seems to think that all that is necessary is to send the youth of Acholi 
to be educated in Great Britain and then all will be set fair in Acholi. Mr 
Opwa records an advanced and progressive life but it seems to have 
been accompanied not by corresponding impression of the centuries of 
effort in skill and work required to achieve it, but rather just by feeling 
that it happens, and that the only thing required to make it happen here 
is to send a lot of people to be educated in England. In short my first 
opinion of what Mr Opwa has gained is disappointing to me.331 
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Given the general disappointment in Chief Opwa and his original manuscript, 
the insight he had ‘gained’ from the tour was a bittersweet pill for the British to 
swallow. Internally it fed into the belief held in London and among British 
officials in Protectorate that Ugandans were nowhere near politically evolved 
enough to be granted independence. As such, the insertion of ‘may he forever 
reign over us’ into the manuscript was really a belief that they should continue 
indefinitely to hold close economic and political ties with the Ugandan state, 
regardless of whether independence was granted or not.332  
Yet the belief that Ugandans were not ready for independence was a 
blow to British post-colonial economic ambitions, which placed emphasis on 
the continued agricultural development of the Protectorate. A developed 
agricultural sector meant more produce and more money, and a stable 
political climate meant that the economic ambitions could be carried on 
peacefully after independence. In fact as calls for independence became 
more frenzied later on in the decade, it appeared that the British were going to 
hold out until the political and economic situation was stable enough for their 
exit. Some British politicians opposed to independence warned Ugandan 
politicians amidst the campaigning that they should ‘never forget that while the 
world can get on without Uganda, Uganda cannot get on without the world.’333 
This cautionary tale was echoed by the Governor Sir Andrew Cohen who said 
when questioned about a target date for independence, ‘our task jointly with 
you, is to build up Uganda into a strong, happy and prosperous country which 
when the time for self-governance come can take its proper place in the 
world.’334 The concessions that the British started to make to the local 
governments were in a sense a reflection of their wider political ambitions 
concerning post-independence Uganda. Rather than laying the foundations 
for Ugandan nationalism, the consolidation of power in local governments 
actually emphasised regional and ethnic identities. This policy would not only 
come back to derail British post-colonial ambitions in the Protectorate, but it 
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would make its attempts at peacefully centralising political and social 
institutions in post-independence Uganda almost impossible.  
Returning to the installation of Lawirwodi and Lagolkop Madit, for the 
Acholi, these positions were considered major victories, as they believed that 
it placed them on par with the Baganda and their King. Chiefs defied the 
administration by continually using the term ‘paramount chief’ despite being 
warned that it was ‘nothing of the sort.’335 After all, the colonial government 
was already dealing with one problematic ‘King’ in Buganda, they did not wish 
to contend with another in the North. While the administration in this sense 
encouraged Acholi ethnonationalism, they were openly reluctant to provide 
the tools that could help to form strong Local Administrative Governments 
independent of British authority. What the interplay with the ALG and the 
colonial administration shows is that while the councillors wanted more 
access to political power in the locality, they were still prepared to work within 
colonial authority. Acholi politicians and chiefs in this sense were astute 
enough to manipulate the political situation in Buganda by making increased 
political demands on an administration that was slowly loosing authority over 
its Protectorate. If the British wanted a more politicised and centralised Acholi 
ethnic identity, then they had to be willing to make certain concessions and 
actually give more power to them. This was, as Low terms it ‘the liveliness of 
fourth phase politics’ in Acholi that occupied and satisfied a great deal of 
those in the local councils.336  
As local government intuitions and their members continued to gain 
prominence, internal debates within Acholi became increasingly politicised. 
These debates focused on specific regional issues pertaining to land, 
taxation, boundaries and social welfare. Acholi chiefs were instrumental in 
stoking many of these political confrontations as they sought to extend their 
growing power beyond their specific political domain. Sanctioned by state 
policy that focused on Native Authorities, county chiefs and sub-parish chiefs 
used their authority to extend clan borders, increase tax revenue and 
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challenge potential competitors. Complaints started to flow into the DC’s office 
in Gulu outlining disputes between chiefs trying to overreach their designated 
clan boundaries. In 1952 the DC A.H. Russell was summoned to resolve a 
complaint brought forward by the chief of Aswa against his counterpart in 
Omoro district, regarding the latter sanctioning the movement of certain 
taxpayers without his consent. The minutes detailing the dispute show a 
pronounced jealousy among the chiefs:  
 
From time to time when I was Secretary of the Local Government there 
had been people who had disliked [me], and who indeed had wanted to 
kill [me]. I have no desire to make Aswa any bigger or alter any 
boundaries and I am quite willing to be moved from Aswa, if Rwot 
Omoro wanted to move to Aswa and thereby have a larger 
population.337 
 
These boundary and land disputes were not isolated and as the decade 
progressed boundary disputes became overtly political going hand-in-hand 
with the formation of political parties in the region. They became so frequent 
that they started to become a hindrance to the daily running of the Acholi local 
councils. The disputes were however less about the actual boundaries 
themselves but were rather a manifestation of the competition and jealousy 
among the chiefs seeking to extend their political authority. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, hereditary chiefs and their subjects jealously guarded 
Acholi pre-colonial clan identities. The large number of traditional chiefs had 
proven a problem to the colonial administration as clan allegiances were used 
by the Acholi to undermine the installation of non-hereditary chiefs. To 
contend with this, the British incorporated a large number of these clan groups 
into the border divisions within Acholi. Although the number of Acholi chiefs in 
the Native Administration had been reduced in 1938-39 from fifty to thirty 
Acholi chiefs were still overly represented within local government. In 1957 
out of the thirty-five members of the ALG with seats, thirty were chiefs. This is 
compared to the West Nile where chiefs only accounted for thirteen out of 
thirty-three and in Teso where only five chiefs took the twenty-five seats 
represented despite the latter having a larger population 
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British administrators were often called in to mediate disputes as it was 
not simply enough for the county chief to be present, as their authority was 
also subject to challenge by local political competitors. Given the numerous 
clans and chiefs within the region, it would have been very unlikely that 
someone other than a British official would have been able to facilitate the 
meetings. Even the elected Lawirwodi did not have a mandate, as he was not 
accepted by all the different clans in Acholi, not least because the majority of 
Acholi would have undoubtedly wanted a chief who came from the clan/and or 
district. As the British placed more power in the hands of the chiefs those 
living within the domains were swept up in the quarrels that were burdening 
the local councils, taking sides and further reinforcing chiefly political 
boundary demarcations. Threats against sitting chiefs increased, often 
instigated by former-chiefs and their supporters. In one particular case in 
Puranga, the county chief complained to the DC that that campaign against 
him had become so bad; his supporters had ‘become fearful for their own 
lives.’338  
 Clan and tribal allegiances became more pronounced as the stakes on 
who would control them became higher. This was further roused by the 
colonial government’s directive for economic stimulus through the agricultural 
sector, which encouraged progressive farms and farmers.339 The directive 
was reinforced in 1955 by the East African Royal Commission (EARC), which 
stated that if efficient mixed farming were to succeed traditional systems of 
land tenure would have to be reassessed and changed.  ‘The EARC Report 
was critical of the fact that under customary land tenure, land was not treated 
as a commodity that could be sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise dealt with 
commercially. Hence, it had no commercial value.’340 Consequently, there 
needed to be a move towards properly demarcated smallholdings, 
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individualisation of land ownership, mobility in the transfer of land and 
encouragement of progressive farmers.341  
In Acholi the idea that a single individual could own land proved to be 
highly contentious.  The EARC report ‘caused a political stir’ in Uganda with 
most districts overwhelmingly rejecting its recommendations.342 Acholi 
traditional systems of land ownership meant that the tribe as a whole used it, 
with only members of that particular tribe having the right to cultivate on the 
land, as long as there are no interferences with the neighbours ‘boundaries.’ 
The cultivators were guaranteed full security as long as they were making use 
of the land. The ‘ownership’ of the land was generally transferred at the death 
of the father to the son, uncles or the closest male heir.  As land was 
generally plentiful due to the low population density, clan disputes regarding 
cultivation were generally few and far between. Cultivation of the land had 
always been a communal endeavour with every member of the clan 
participating in the work. This form of group work was generally conducted by 
the ‘wang kweri’, a group of able-bodied men in the community who agreed to 
work together during cultivation seasons. They would be led by the ‘rowt 
kweri’ (chief of the hoe) who would be tasked with mobilising the workers and 
designating tasks among other things. Traditionally this work group would not 
be paid but instead food and other non-monetary provisions would be 
provided. This was to ensure that the aim of the group would remain helping 
members instead of profiting directly from group work. This in a sense was a 
traditional co-operative society that was beneficial to the group as a whole 
and the individuals that participated in them.  Every member would have the 
right to call upon the ‘wang kweri’ if they needed their land to be cultivated or 
harvested.343 
As more Acholi started to become involved in private business 
enterprises or migrated in and out of the districts, the communal system of 
farming inevitably faced challenges. Among communal labourers an informal 
system called ‘piece work’ was gradually introduced during the mid to late-
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colonial period which meant that each individual would have a specific task to 
do, which could only be completed by that person. This ensured that those 
who were avoiding their duties and concentrating more on personal 
enterprises would be forced to do their fair share of group work. As the 
colonial drive for progressive farming increased, other factors began to affect 
traditional systems of group work. The introduction of a tractor hire system in 
the late 1950s reduced the number of labourers who were needed to cultivate 
the land. Added to this, new farming schools took in young Acholi men and 
taught them how to look at farming as a business instead of as a means for 
sustenance. A number of Acholi Makerere University students, through the 
Agricultural Department were allocated funding to go and research farming 
mechanisms in their relevant ancestral lands with an emphasis on how 
progressive farming could benefit the areas.344 The success of these farming 
institutions seems to be negligible and there is very little evidence to suggest 
that the skills taught in the schools were actually applied in the field. When 
some farmers in West Acholi were instructed to plant cotton in mid-May and 
mid-June, as this would produce a better crop, they disregarded the advice 
believing instead that the earlier the crop was planted in the year, the better 
the yield. Furthermore, the advice to use narrower lines while planting seeds 
was ignored, with farmers believing that larger lines would encourage larger 
crops. Moreover if they were forced to adhere to these teachings, they would 
ensure that next time they were cultivating they would it do somewhere where 
the authorities were not present. Such cotton plots became known as 
‘mukungu kwiya’, which translates to ‘parish chief does not know.’345   
Inevitably, this belligerence towards the teachings of the Department of 
Agriculture meant that those who choose to work with department, in 
particular the progressive farmers were treated with hostility. As some farmers 
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started to officially demarcate land and apply for land titles, they faced 
opposition from neighbours who evoked tribal land tenures to challenge the 
new civil ones.346  In 1959 the chief of Omoro raised an issue concerning a 
secret society in the county called Koro Anywali (Koro citizens/natives). They 
had held several meetings some of which were attended by prominent 
politicians, former chiefs and some progressive farmers in the area. It was 
reported that one of the tasks of the society was to look after the wealth of the 
people of Koro, including matters pertaining to land, forests and rivers. The 
members argued that the local council had in the past been giving away this 
land to individuals without the consent of the people within the divisions. The 
society’s activities were reportedly directed against progressive farmers and 
property connected to progressive activities. The DC was informed of the 
growing numbers of land and clan disputes in Koro and the time and effort 
that was being spent with clan leaders and chiefs in the local council trying to 
settle them.347 Colin Leys argues that the reputation of the Acholi in Uganda 
for inter-clan rivalry is often explained by the segmentary nature of Acholi 
society where the main social obligation of an individual is determined by 
his/her clan. As such, a clan member can claim economic aid from other clan 
members, including securing a government job for some highly placed clan 
members or even swaying an election. If you were a chief or a member of the 
local council it would not be unusual for these clan ties to inform 
administrative decisions as well. The inter-clan feuding that occurred in pre-
colonial Acholi became replaced with intra-clan feuding for political office.  
Consequently, political rivalry in Acholi is often explained in the terms of clan 
affiliation. However, the assessment of Acholi politics in these terms is 
reductive and easily exaggerated. Firstly, the role of clan and chiefdom 
allegiances is mostly important in relation to political office, and as such it only 
affects the internal politics of the ruling party or the administration that controls 
the appointments.348 For the Acholi in the 1950s there was no ruling party that 
controlled appointments in the local councils other than the British 
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administration. The only Acholi who held any political capital and that could 
realistically influence appointments were the chiefs and the local 
administrators who had positions in the local councils. It was they, under the 
umbrella of the colonial government who could play the politics of patronage, 
clientalism and nepotism. During this period, the politics of clan affiliation 
would inevitably have a greater role than any party affiliation. Clan conflicts 
were not simply internalised in local council debates, non-political actors were 
also drawn into the land and clan conflicts, primarily because for the Acholi 
the importance of the clan predated that of colonial institutions. In fact as Leys 
himself points out, ‘most Acholi to whom I talked to could tell me the chiefdom, 
and often the clan, of any prominent Acholi.’349 As chiefs gained more prestige 
through the Native Administrative, clan allegiances inevitably became more 
pronounced.  
 
 
3.3. The Ocols, Party Politics and the Fight for the Locality  
 
My father was a county chief and he was very well respected in the 
area. He never dabbled in politics but privately he also had his own 
opinion. He believed that Uganda was not ready for independence and 
was very fearful of the politics that was taking place in the region. 
People were rushing and they had no idea what it would be like after 
the British had left.350        
 
Obote’s political rhetoric regarding the ‘underdeveloped North’ was translated 
back to the locality, particularly within the Acholi Local Government and Acholi 
politicians. A vast majority of the policies that the UNC put forth to mobilise 
the peoples of Acholi were very similar to the ones that the Baganda had 
demanded after the 1949 riots. In the mid to late 1950s, the UNC branch in 
Gulu started to demand, like their Baganda counterparts, direct elections to 
the local councils. This was an undeviating attack on the Native 
Administration system, and served two purposes. Firstly, the young party 
leaders understood that the ‘the existence of the chiefs who needed to be 
wooed meant that district leaders could not expect a monopoly of power at 
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district level.’351  To gain political support Acholi UNC and DP politicians knew 
they had to convince the populace that the chiefs rule of force in the region, 
such as collecting taxes and coerced agricultural labour, was not only a 
burden to their daily life but also grossly unfair.352 Immediately, accusations of 
nepotism were directed against chiefs in the ALG, particularly their 
manipulations of the indirect LC elections whereby voting was engineered so 
that certain pre-selected candidates would gain a seat in the council.353 
Inevitably there was some resistance to the proposed changes within the LC 
among chiefs, but even they could not stop the tide, especially when both the 
DP and UNC added their political weight to the campaign, joining forces to 
pave the way for direct elections to the LC in 1958.354  
 The inclusion of directly elected councillors into the ALG opened the 
door for open political confrontation between the ‘Ocols’ and chiefs, as well as 
adding to the political hostilities between the UNC/UPC and the DP. Directly 
elected council members were impatient and unwilling to listen to advice 
being given by experienced staff and chiefs, and took any criticism as an 
attempt to undermine the authority of the new council. The British DC 
complained that some councillors were only concerned with pursuing 
personal, political and clan vendettas.355 By 1961 the disputes within the ALG 
had escalated to a point that the 1959 council was dissolved because the 
Acholi people had lost faith in it due to its ‘poor record, walkouts, boycotts and 
endless delegations to Entebbe.’356  
The colonial government’s response to the arrival of the UNC in Acholi 
was one of hostility. As the party started to attract a larger following, 
particularly in the rural areas, the District Council, perhaps fearful of a 
repetition of the events that were occurring in Kampala, passed a resolution 
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banning all public meetings outside of the main towns of Gulu and Kitgum, 
with restrictions only being lifted in 1956.357  The banning of public meetings 
and the arrest of Party chairman Peter Oola in 1953 for inciting civil 
dissidence however only served to arouse more sympathy towards the UNC, 
with its members gaining increased success in elections to the Acholi District 
Council.358 Political rivalry between the UNC and DP was particularly 
prevalent in Kitgum and the surrounding areas where the DP had a wider 
support base in comparison to West Acholi. Both parties tried to discourage 
supporters from giving money to the opposition, levelling allegations of 
corruption and embezzlement.359 Some overzealous party activists even went 
as far as demarcating political territories. In one instance UPC members 
informed the DP that they would no longer be allowed to hold meetings in 
Paloga, Kitgum, as it was their area.360 The UNC’s hotly contested 
battlegrounds were mainly in North-East Acholi in districts such as Lamwo 
and Chua which had a strong Catholic missionary presence. In these areas, 
the VF did their part to encourage converts to show allegiance to the DP by 
emphasising partisan religious-politics. The UNC continued to draw 
considerable support in West Acholi, which was a CMS stronghold.361 In many 
ways, the British were perhaps justified in their reaction to party political 
activity in the Acholi, particularly considering the effect that pronounced 
political factionalism would have within an independent Uganda. Factionalism 
erupted almost immediately as not long after the 1961 elections Acholi 
politicians started to challenge ballot results.362 DP member Tibero Okeny 
who had been defeated in North Acholi signed an affidavit one day after the 
results were announced alleging irregularities and lodging an election petition 
claiming that his ballot box was tampered with. He made a statement to The 
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Uganda Argus claiming, ‘that if there is a new election I will get into the 
Legislative Council in any case.’363 The same challenge was made in South 
West Acholi where the DP had only won by a margin of fifty-two votes. Mr 
Alexander Latim, the unsuccessful UPC candidate, requested that the 
elections results be declared null and void as there were concerns regarding 
the validity of the votes. He was successful in his appeal and the Legislative 
Council seat for the constituency changed hands from DP to UPC.364  
Competition among Acholi politicians was not just limited to DP and 
UPC rivalries; internal divisions within both parties also became more 
apparent. During the 1962 general elections UPC member Otema Allimadi 
opted to run against the official UPC candidate Peter Oola to contest the seat 
in North West Acholi, reflecting the power struggle within the party. Both 
candidates were strong UPC activists and had already amassed strong 
support bases within the constituency. In fact when it was reported that 
Allimadi might be expelled for attempting to stand against Oola, a meeting of 
delegates from various branches of the UPC was organised in his support, 
with attendees declaring that any move to remove Allimadi was detrimental to 
the future of the party.365 Although Allimadi’s election bid eventually failed, 
these examples set a precedent for the contestation of election results that 
would come to characterise national and local politics in Uganda and 
continues to do so today.366 However, the appeals against election results in 
Acholi should not be seen as a rejection of the election process or even a lack 
of confidence in it. In fact, there was a great belief among Acholi politicians in 
the power structures that dictated national and local politics. Rather, the 
political hostilities should be viewed in the context in which these debates 
were taking place. Decolonisation and independence reinforced the 
mechanisms of power that had encouraged the young to challenge the old 
systems. The majority of politicians who put themselves forward as 
candidates for political office were younger men who had worked diligently 
towards acquiring the ‘right education’, strengthening their support base and 
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preparing themselves for the day when they would lead Uganda to 
independence. However, the ethnically demarcated electoral map of Uganda 
and the colonial emphasis on strong local government institutions meant 
Acholi politicians were inevitably restricted in where they could run for political 
office. They would not have the same appeal in Buganda or Busoga, and so 
there was really only one place in which they could practice their politics: 
within their various constituent bases in Acholi.  
In his analysis of political structures in Latin America, Charles 
Anderson argues that given the multiplicity of power contenders operating 
within political structures, elections are never definitive. 
 
They are consistently held, just as they are conscientiously and 
consistently annulled. They are part of an on-going process of 
structuring power relations in which elections are important to some 
contenders, but not to all. Since there are other contenders in the 
political process, whose power is not contingent on this type of support, 
(the ability to aggregate mass consent) elections do not define political 
relations. Rather the results of an election are tentative, pending the 
outcome of negotiations between other power contenders and groups 
that have demonstrated a power capability through election.367  
 
As another group of power contenders in the locality, Acholi politicians 
marked out the election process as a means of gaining political access to the 
centre. Internal competition for political office meant that election results in 
Acholi were continually challenged because electoral defeat had far greater 
ramifications for the Ocol’s wider political ambitions. In the centre, party 
politics was characterised by religious and ethnic factionalism rather than any 
pronounced class based identities. It was only by emphasising ethnic 
demarcations through local economic and political grievances that Acholi 
politicians could access the political centre. However, these politicians needed 
the support of the locality to be given permission to speak nationally for their 
constituent base: if they lost the locality, they lost their access to the centre.  It 
is then unsurprising that Allimadi defied his party by running independently 
hoping that it would split the UPC vote in his favour and even encourage 
some wavering DP supporters to come on his side. Nor should it be a surprise 
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that Tibero Okeny and Alexander Latim decided to challenge that election 
results when it transpired that they lost.  
Consequently, political activity within Acholi was lively and contentious, 
leading the DC in Acholi to remark on the eve of the 1962 National Assembly 
elections that, ‘right from the beginning of registration it was evident that the 
political parties were out to fight the election with all their strength.’368 Party 
agents from both sides placed themselves strategically at registration posts 
and campaigned energetically, taking care to ensure that the process of voter 
registration was widely publicised. Nearly all the candidates who put 
themselves forward were drawn from a pool of relatively well-educated Acholi 
men who had had various degrees of experience in politics, local 
administration, teaching and/or the military. Filling in an unofficial 
questionnaire one thirty-two year old candidate commented on his first class 
certificate in education received during his tenure in the army, and the fact 
that he was widely travelled.369  
The differences between the new leaders and the colonial chiefs who 
had long held a monopoly over power in the district are never more apparent 
than in the observation made by an election supervisor regarding the 
employment of local polling staff. Wanting to replicate the procedures for 
elections in the previous year the British decided that once again non-English 
speakers would not be considered for the positions. Not only did this mean 
that many of the chiefs were excluded, but the supervisor of the election 
complained that he, ‘had considerable difficulty in getting enough English 
speakers as staff and had to retreat to the mission schools.’370 The upside of 
this was that he was able to get chiefs to concentrate on maintaining law and 
order during the elections.371 The difficulties faced by the election supervisor 
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highlight two problems. Firstly, there was a lack of educated lower-ranking 
local chiefs within the region. Of all the candidates listed as running for 
political office, none were chiefs. This was mainly because under the 
Protectorate government, chiefs were forbidden from directly participating in 
any political activities that may have result in a conflict of interest or interfered 
with their chiefly duties. They were consequently excluded from the political 
mainstream and were essentially forced to simply sit and watch as politicians 
campaigned for power within their domains.372 Yet, even if they had been able 
to put themselves forward as political candidates for seats in the Legislative 
Council, would they have been successful? They already had an established 
support base they presided over which they could easily mobilise to gain 
votes. They had a vast amount of administrative experience and for many 
years had been dutifully collecting taxes, dealing with squabbles and 
maintaining law and order among their subjects. These were all the traits that 
would arguably make for a successful political candidate. However, many of 
the chiefs, particularly at sub-county or parish level, lacked one major 
credential: very few had a strong command of English, the language of 
national politics. As Leys asserts, education in Uganda was not simply a 
means of widening a person’s understanding of the world, it was in itself a 
political issue.373 In his work on political values and the educated class in 
Africa, Ali Mazrui highlights the contradiction between primary and secondary 
education and the higher education institutions in Africa which has contributed 
to a crisis a of identity within cultural societies. 
 
At the level of primary and secondary schools part of the aim of 
education is to inculcate in the children the values and norms of the 
society to which they belong. Such inculcation must be a form and 
moral and cultural indoctrination. And then, the child duly indoctrinated, 
may enter Makerere as an undergraduate. What happens at this level? 
What I am suggesting seems to imply a sudden change. Instead of the 
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child being taught what to value, the young person is now taught to be 
critical of almost every value. Instead of cultural indoctrination, there is 
now partial cultural challenge and self-criticism.374 
 
Primary and secondary education in Acholi was monopolised by missionaries 
and centred on ‘civilising the natives’ within their cultural communities through 
Christian doctrine. However, higher education institutions outside the region 
allowed for more plural cultural and political debates, as the few Acholi 
students came into contact with students from other ethnic groups. Strong 
colonial and post-colonial ethno-political borders ensured that the select few 
who had access to institutions such as Makerere were restricted to expressing 
their emerging political cognizance within their ancestral bases. This inevitably 
set the stage for a confrontation between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
mechanisms of power. Peter Ekeh ably discusses more generally the legacy 
of colonialism, and the emergence of what he calls ‘the two publics’ in Africa. 
He differentiates between the educated African bourgeoisies, born out of 
colonialism, and the uneducated ‘native Africans’ living within the ‘primordial’ 
political domain.      
 
In the course of colonization a new bourgeois class emerged in Africa 
composed of Africans who acquired Western education in the hands of 
the colonizers, and their missionary collaborators, and who accordingly 
were the most exposed to European colonial ideologies of all groups of 
Africans. In many ways the drama of colonialism is the history of the 
clash between the European colonizers and this emergent bourgeois 
class. Although native to Africa, the African bourgeois class depends 
on colonialism for its legitimacy. It accepts the principles implicit in 
colonialism but it rejects the foreign personnel that ruled Africa. It 
claims to be competent enough to rule, but it has no traditional 
legitimacy.375  
 
Many lower level Acholi chiefs could not compete with the immaculate oratory 
skills of Obote, delivered in the Queen’s English, nor the extensive 
educational backgrounds and international experiences of Peter Oola or 
Otema Allimadi. They spoke the language of culture and tradition, the 
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language of the locality, and in many ways the language of the colonial native 
authority. In fact, much of the correspondence written by chiefs to the DCs by 
sub-county and parish chiefs was written in Acholi, and later translated for 
their recipients. Post-independence, there was a real danger that unless they 
countered the growing dominance of this new breed of local politician, the 
chiefs risked being marginalised.  
 
My father was a county chief and he was very well respected in the 
area. He never dabbled in politics but privately he also had his own 
opinion. He believed that Uganda was not ready for independence and 
was very fearful of the politics that were taking place in the region. 
People were rushing and they had no idea what it would be like after 
the British had left.376        
 
Acholi party politicians understood that before they could properly find their 
footing within the national politics, they needed to gain firm control of the local 
government apparatus, at the expense of the chiefs. Four months before 
independence, the Acholi Local Administration tabled a new local constitution 
that equated to a complete reworking of the council. The amendments to the 
constitutional regulations would have the effect of removing county chiefs 
from ex-officio membership in the council. The only positions that were to 
remain the same were the positions of Secretary-General and Treasurer. To 
reinforce their impending independence from colonial rule, Protectorate 
government workers were banned from the council as well as any staff 
working for the DC.377 The first council meeting held in the same month 
without council chiefs was tense, leading the DC to open up the session by 
appealing for unity and co-operation.378 But if the British DC and his advisors 
were looking for someone to blame regarding the events in Acholi District 
Council, he need only have looked to his government’s policies leading up to 
Ugandan independence. By encouraging strong ethnically demarcated local 
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institutions as a mechanism to deal with Baganda separatism, they actually 
reinforced ethnonationalism in the localities at the expense of the centre.379 
The UPC and the DP in Acholi consequently understood the importance of 
gaining control of local government, with each party of the manoeuvring to get 
their candidate elected. The children of the Young Acholi Association had 
matured and were no longer sated by youth groups, club houses and sports 
tournaments: they wanted real political power that would allow them to control 
and eventually transcend the Native Administration. 
 
3.4. The Chiefs Fight Back: The Acholi and ‘Laloyo Maber’  
 
To combat the growing dominance of party politicians within the ALG, chiefs 
sought to exploit the success they had had with the British in the installation of 
Lawirwodi in 1950. In this endeavour they were prepared to go to any means 
necessary to re-assert their position within the locality, even if it meant a ‘re-
invention of tradition.’  As with the position of Lawirwodi, chiefs within Acholi 
District Council had continued on their quest to install a paramount leader who 
would garner the same pomp and circumstance that the Kabaka of Buganda 
inspired.380 The neighbouring Lango had already created a similar post of the 
Won Nyaci (Paramount Chief) in 1960, fuelling the campaign in Acholi for a 
similar post. The colonial government had already conceded to the request, 
but disputes arose regarding exactly how much executive power such a 
position would have. The British had once again insisted that the role would 
be purely ceremonial with no functioning power, similar to restrictions placed 
when the post of Lawirwodi was created. They wanted to ensure it was made 
clear to the Acholi that any person elected to the post of Laloyo Maber (Good 
Ruler) would have no executive or official political powers whatsoever. In 
response to a letter written by district council members who had asked that 
one of the tasks that Laloyo would be responsible for would be the power to 
‘inspect services’, the acting British Secretary-General A.C. Badenoch 
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remarked, ‘I think the words “inspect services” are slightly dangerous in that 
they may lead the Laloyo taking executive action. Perhaps some other word 
instead of “inspect” may be used.’381 If such a head was to be elected the 
British wanted to ensure that there would be no recriminations in the future by 
making sure that the Laloyo’s post was as undisputed as possible and 
unifying for the Acholi.382 There were further concerns regarding the financial 
provisions that the District Council was asking to be earmarked for the Laloyo. 
They had requested more money than was being paid to the Lango 
equivalent, which, in itself, was not as problematic as the proposal to use 
council revenue to pay a person who was not be an officer, chief, employee or 
member of the council. Yet there was an urgency to appoint, not least 
because of the proposals popularity among the Acholi, but also because the 
colonial government felt it was important to resolve the matter before 
independence, so as to oversee any potential political fallouts.383  
Neither the UPC nor the DP in Acholi could see a practical need for a 
Laloyo, but they were forced to accept the idea due to its local popularity.384 
But if both parties were to throw their political weight behind the election of 
Laloyo, they needed something in return. The campaign for Laloyo provided 
an opportunity for Acholi politicians to further expand their support base by 
utilising clan loyalties. As discussed previously, the chiefdom of Payira, which 
had already proved a formidable opponent against the British during the early 
years of colonialism, still stood as one of the most prominent chiefdoms in 
Acholi. In both the general elections of April 1962 and the district elections in 
September of the same year, politicians drawn from the Payira chiefdom had 
played a disproportionately large role. The official UPC candidates for the two 
parliamentary seats in West Acholi (which is also the location of the Payira 
chiefdom), Peter Oola and Alex Okera, were both Payira men.385 As with all 
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the candidates in Acholi, Okera and Oola had relied partly on chiefdom 
loyalties during their election, promising their supporters that the retired 
County Chief Yona Adida would become Laloyo Maber of Acholi. When Adida 
was defeated, Secretary-General Peter Oola used the support of the UPC in 
Kampala to delay the official installation of the Laloyo to his post for two 
years. It was not until Oola was voted out of office in 1965 that the Laloyo was 
officially instated.386 This scenario ‘illustrates the interplay of social and 
traditional ties with party and area loyalties.’387 More importantly, it shows that 
politics in Acholi was not a straightforward contest between old and new 
power structures. As much as these new breed of local politicians saw their 
place in post-independence Acholi as the new leaders of the local government 
apparatus, internal cultural politics ensured that pre-colonial and colonial 
structures of governance could not be completely disregarded. Chiefly power 
and clan loyalties were still an essential part of the Acholi polity. Public 
support and clan ties meant that chiefs could not simply be dismissed and 
contained politically to the periphery. If the Ocols wanted to succeed in their 
political ambitions, they needed to engage with these traditional political 
institutions.   
As a result of the internal political rivalry, the appointment of Laloyo 
became a valuable tool that was used by council members, chiefs and 
politicians.388 Prior to the appointment, there were lengthy debates in the 
District Council regarding all matters including pay and length of term. One 
such session lasted for up to nine days and when a decision had still not been 
reached the council shelved the decision for another three months, refusing to 
sit any longer. Divisions between East and West were further emphasised 
when the Kitgum council members requested that the post should be 
temporary with elections every six years to elect a new candidate, while in 
Gulu council members stipulated that it should be a permanent position. 
Councils in Kitgum and Gulu put forward their own candidates for the position. 
The British requested that candidates from for the position be drawn from an 
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unrestricted field of candidates. In contrast, Acholi council members favoured 
those with a chiefly background or someone that already held an esteemed 
position within Acholi society. Acholi chiefs and clan leaders waded into the 
debate convening meetings under the Acholi Cultural Association (ACA: Ker-
Kwaro Acholi) specifically to discuss the matter.389 By mid-May one of the only 
things that was agreed upon regarding the Laloyo issue was how much he 
was going to be paid.390 The candidate elected to the post would be granted a 
salary of £1000 per annum, offered a £6000 official residence, and given a car 
worth £1500. He was also to be given provisions for a private secretary, 
driver, ceremonial robe and an entertainment allowance of £60.391 This was 
despite the fact that the Acholi District Council was in a dire financial situation, 
a matter that was continually being reported in the national media.392 
However, the need to create a ceremonial head for Acholi was believed to be 
so urgent that the council were willing to ignore the huge financial burden that 
the post would have on local government finances.  
The elections were held under in a tense political atmosphere and had 
served as a point of heated discussion among the Acholi.393 The increase in 
media outlets, particularly in Gulu, including radio coverage and vernacular 
newspapers meant that the topic became widely discussed in bars, 
restaurants and streets across Acholi.394 After months of negotiations, the 
former Lawirwodi, Mr Philip Adonga, the DP candidate from East Acholi was 
finally elected as Laloyo Maber. But the political fallout from the results 
continued for two years after the results were announced. In April 1964, eight 
UPC councillors walked out of the District Council led by the Vice Chairman 
during a meeting in Gulu after the Laloyo arrived to open the proceedings. 
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The Uganda Argus reported that a number of UPC supporters demonstrated 
outside the building in protest against the paramount chief. The Publicity 
Secretary for the UPC added that the protest was carried out primarily 
because many UPC supporters in the region had been opposed to his 
election.395  
More opposition to the election of Mr Adonga as Laloyo came from 
those arguing that since he was not a hereditary tribal chief he had no claim to 
the position. His opponents argued that he should step down in favour of 
Yona Odide, who was not only the candidate favoured by those in West 
Acholi but was also a hereditary chief. Others were more philosophical and 
put forward the argument that since there was no such thing as ‘kingship’ in 
Acholi, these criticisms were moot.396 Most of the disagreements were derived 
from clan and political affiliation and had very little to do with any claims to 
‘royal’ blood. The interesting point that this debate brings to the forefront is 
that, among some people in Acholi, there was a real attempt to create a ‘King’ 
along the Buganda model. This was not simply a matter of elevating a chief to 
a ceremonial role, nor was it just a political issue: the Acholi were willing to 
borrow and invent tradition in an attempt to adapt to the political landscape of 
post-independence Uganda. Buganda had throughout the history of the 
Protectorate served as a central point of reference for Acholi looking outside 
of their region. Not only that, the Kingdom monopolised British, economic and 
political attention in the decade leading up to independence. The Acholi had 
seen the adoration and political power that the Kabaka held and watched the 
status of the Kingdom grow. As it became clear that the Kabaka would 
become a ceremonial President of the new Ugandan nation state, it became 
imperative that the Acholi should have a representative that could rival the 
status of the King, if they were to be able to compete with the other kingdoms 
in the country. The election of the Laloyo was also an attempt by Acholi chiefs 
to contest power and in the process underpin their relevance within Acholi 
polity. The position of Laloyo transcended the conventional roles of the chiefs 
in Acholi, as the position holder was elevated to a cultural and political 
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figurehead with centralised political powers that far surpassed those of a 
native chief. It was a hybridisation of identity forged within traditional Acholi 
cultural structures, to be adapted and centralised in post-independence 
Acholi.  
 
3.5. Religious Politics and the Ocols  
 
Politicians from both parties were aware that the peoples of Acholi would be 
harder to mobilise behind a unilateral political or economic issue. 
Consequently both parties focused their attentions on mobilising the Acholi by 
emphasising religious and clan identities as well as developmental 
inequalities between East and West Acholi. The DP’s historically close 
relationship with the VF served as a valuable tool for the UNC/UPC during the 
run up to the elections. During a meeting in Madi Opei, East Acholi, DP 
politicians had to address accusations by the UPC that the VF mission had 
been trying to purchase land without the consent of the people. Both parties 
played upon anti-colonial/foreign rhetoric as a means to diminish the 
opposition, accusing each other of selling land to Europeans and Americans 
in exchange for Acholi students receiving scholarships to study abroad. In 
defence of their denominational base the DP argued that the VF had only 
asked to lease land so that they could build more schools in their attempt to 
increase the educational facilities in East Acholi. 397 Nationally, both the 
Anglican and Roman Catholic churches were acutely aware of the religious 
rivalries that were plaguing the country, and tried to subdue some of the 
animosity, at least officially.398 The Anglican Church was also embarking upon 
its own journey for independence, as from 1962 it would become the Church 
of Uganda in its own right. The division of the new Church into new dioceses, 
coupled with the upsurge of tribal, nationalistic and racial tension was cause 
enough for the Anglicans to tread as carefully as possible. During a sermon, 
the Bishop of the Upper Nile in 1960 urged the Church to: 
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Resist the temptation to identify our particular Archdeaconry or Diocese 
or Province with a particular tribe or race. We must also be on our 
guard against the acceptance of the Church of pagan traditions and 
nationalistic slogans. Future nationalist governments and indeed 
present tribal jealousies may well attempt to glorify the new African 
states at the expense of truth and Christian unity.399  
 
The Church had reason for concern, particularly given political tone of some 
high profile Ugandan politicians at the eve of independence. As the UPC 
leader, Obote had staunchly warned religious organisations to keep out of 
politics and declared that he would not permit one religion to dominate or run 
the country. To his mind tribalism and religious associations in politics were 
thwarting self-rule.400 Obote’s views were unrealistic in the new Ugandan 
state, and if he hoped that Ugandans would automatically take on a more 
secular identity after independence, he was to be bitterly disappointed. Yet 
the situation also proved to be a catch-22 for the young, educated politicians 
who had had the chance to travel outside of the Protectorate and had been 
exposed to different systems of governance grounded in more secular political 
systems. Growing anti-colonial sentiments had opened the door to a critique 
of colonial institutions and their place within an independent Uganda. In this 
sense criticisms of Western religious institutions could also serve as a 
valuable tool against colonialism itself. However, given the growing 
attachment to religious institutions in Uganda, any talk of secularism would 
not have proved popular, as UNC leader Musazi found out.  In 1956 Musazi 
had made a speech denouncing the introduction of religion into politics. He 
urged listeners to forget their religious differences, as essentially all 
monotheistic religions were introduced by foreigners and must then be treated 
as foreign objects. One reader took exception to this statement asking Musazi 
to explain whether Ugandans should similarly do away with cups, basins and 
English, because they too were foreign objects. Furthermore, he expressed 
apprehension at a UNC lead independent Uganda as it seemed that by 
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Musazi’s own words, ‘religion under the UNC would have a hard time.’401 Both 
religious institutions continued to hold substantial political capital, inspiring 
new converts and retaining the old. Obote was politically astute enough to 
recognise this, and a month before independence, he changed tack and took 
a more pragmatic view of religion in Uganda, conceding that it was here to 
stay.402 This was a clear attempt to appeal to Catholic voters in Uganda who 
were more inclined to vote for the DP.  
In Acholi, the DP capitalised from one of the only print mediums in the 
Northern districts owned by the VF.  The Catholic Church in Acholi was able 
to convey its denominational and political doctrine through a bi-monthly family 
newspaper called Lobo Mewa (Our World), printed in the vernacular. Added to 
the political rivalries at the time, ‘the press was developed to promote 
[Catholic] political ideals and programmes.’403 Up until 1966 the contents of 
the paper were largely political as it strived to push the Catholic agenda in 
national and local politics. The Acholi were urged to go and vote with details 
of the number of registered voters in the various counties printed and space 
given to DP candidates to air their political manifestos. In Lobo Mewa the 
Catholic Church was keen to remind to Acholi voters of the work that Catholic 
missionaries were doing in the region. Articles would frequently highlight new 
hospitals, parishes and schools funded and built by the mission. Often the 
number of Catholic schools were printed according to counties and compared 
to Protestant ones reiterating how much more work the Catholic missions 
were doing.404 Recipients of Catholic mission scholarships were published 
along with their full names and counties of birth. Disputes between DP and 
Protestant members of the Local Councils were often publicised highlighting 
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the perceived mistreatment of DP council members by their UPC 
counterparts.405  The DP victory in the 1961 national elections received a full 
cover page spread, detailing how each of the counties had voted.406 
Another reason as to why the two-party system became more 
pronounced in Acholi, as opposed to Lango, was not only because of the 
diverse chieftain system, but also because of underdevelopment and regional 
demarcations within Acholi itself. Gulu, in West Acholi, was the home of the 
colonial headquarters in the region and from this, its status as a major town 
grew faster as it was afforded more commodities than the next largest town, 
Kitgum, located in East Acholi. The river Acwa that runs in from Lira all the 
way to South Sudan separates the two regions geographically, and for a short 
time in the 1930s the British had attempted to administer them as two 
separate districts. However, due to its large geography, sparse population and 
much drier climate, Eastern Acholi proved much more difficult to administer 
and it was subsequently run as a sub-district of Gulu.407 
Gulu was afforded more educational facilities, including farm schools 
run by either the CMS or the VF, was the first town in the region to be 
electrified and had better transport links to the capital city in Kampala. It was 
also home to the headquarters of the CMS and the surrounding areas around 
Gulu were the first to have CMS missionary schools opened. Being the most 
urbanised town in the region, Gulu inevitably attracted a large number of 
migrants from other districts in Acholi and was particularly attractive to the 
young who longed for a more profitable life than that offered in the 
countryside. This is supported by the 1959-69 censuses which showed Gulu 
to be one of the fastest growing towns in the Protectorate with an annual 
growth of fourteen per cent.408  
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Map 3:  Eastern and Western Acholi Districts:409  
East Acholi: Kitgum, Lamwo, Agago, Pader 
West Acholi: Nwoya, Amuru, Gulu 
 
The fact that there were fewer local services in East Acholi than in the West 
was a continual bone of contention for the DP, and by the late 1950s there 
emerged voices within the Local Councils for the separation of the two, giving 
Kitgum official district status.410 On the eve of independence, one of the few 
major infrastructural projects on track to be finished by 1963 was the Karuma 
Bridge connecting Gulu to Masindi in Bunyoro.411 It was hoped that the bridge 
would provide a much-needed boost to the cotton industry by making it easier 
to transport produce. In this regard, Gulu’s status as a communications and 
trading centre seemed assured, as did the prospects for economic 
development in West Acholi. This development came at the expense of 
Kitgum and East Acholi which were still lagging behind economically. The last 
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British DC in Acholi, J.P. Twining, conceded that unless something was done 
to rectify the situation, the gap between East and West would only continue to 
widen.412 Consequently, the DP strategically placed itself as the advocate for 
economic development in East Acholi capitalising on its strong support base 
in the region and the dominance of the VF mission in the region.  
UNC/UPC and DP politicians knew that it was imperative to incorporate 
religious groups into the target demographic of supporters if they were to have 
success in local and national elections.  In Acholi the VF assumed an even 
greater role in the political mobilisation of Catholic identities against the UNC 
and Protestants. In 1958 an argument erupted among UNC supporters and a 
Catholic priest who had refused to permit a number of UNC supporters to 
draw water from a borehole near his mission ground in Agago County.  
 
Malandra is stopping my wives from collecting water from the borehole. 
.  . [They] say we are Protestants and that my wives should not draw 
water from there since the Protestants caused the failure of Antonio 
Opwa in the District elections. Since presently all the people within and 
around the mission are at present drawing from the pumps, why should 
my wives and I not?413 
 
When asked to respond to the allegations, the Italian priest at the centre of 
the argument, Father Malandra, replied that because the borehole was on 
mission ground, it was his prerogative to choose who could draw water from 
it. This was despite the fact that such boreholes were public property and 
were free for all to use. The wider political implications of this disagreement 
should not be overlooked. Firstly, the complainant Danyeri Curu, had at his 
disposal another borehole which was only 300 feet from the one at Malandra’s 
mission ground. However, he decided that he would try to use that particular 
borehole instead. When he was denied access to it, he sent a letter of 
complaint straight to the DC at the behest of the UNC. The dispute provided a 
political opportunity for the UNC to stoke anti-Catholic sentiments in Agago. 
UNC leaders quickly sent a letter to the DC complaining about how the 
Catholic priest had treated Curu. This is not to say that Acholi Catholics 
unflinchingly sided with the heads of their Churches, in fact as the DC noted 
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their continual involvement in local politics, in particular in Agago district, had 
created a feeling of antipathy towards the Italian Catholic Fathers. There were 
a few Acholi Catholics who felt that the Italian Catholic Father went a little bit 
‘too far into politics.’414 The hostility between Catholics and Protestants in 
Agago was attributed to the uncompromising nature of the Catholic priests 
and their unfortunate involvement in local politics.415 In this matter the British 
were aware that it was important not to appear to be taking sides, and when 
the request was made by the UNC to remove Malandra from his position, they 
concluded that this would be politically unwise. ‘Acholi Catholics would not 
meet any action that may be viewed as beneficial to the UNC with much 
sympathy. As such it was important that it should not be viewed as a victory 
for the UNC or the NAC.’416 
The success of the UNC in the 1958 local elections further antagonised 
the political situation within DP and VF strongholds in Acholi. Following the 
election results, the church and schoolhouse of the NAC at Patongo and a 
church in Waal were damaged by fire. The local council agreed that these 
were cases of arson and allegations were made that some Catholics in the 
area had carried out the attacks. The council decided that the rebuilding of the 
Churches should be a matter of public service and that ‘all members of the 
community should be involved.’417 Although the resolution was passed 
directing community members to provide labour, the county chief informed the 
DC that Father Malandra had insisted that Catholics would not be permitted to 
assist in the reconstruction of Protestant Churches, as it was against the 
principles of the religion. This was despite the fact that Muslim and ‘Pagan’ 
groups in the area had accepted the order without any remonstrations.418  
Mission schools became a breeding ground for religious tensions as 
schoolmasters of both denominations encouraged their students to show their 
faith through their political affiliations. The administration deemed teachers to 
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be particularly active in this endeavour, so much so that the most antagonistic 
ones were considered for transfer outside of respective districts.419    
For the Acholi swept up in these religious confrontations, the question 
needs to be posed as to whether these divisions were purely ideological and 
spiritual, or simply politically or economically pragmatic?420  The conversion 
rates in the region in the 1950s certainly show a steady increase of Christian 
converts and would indicate that the missionaries were gaining success in 
their quest for the conversion of souls (or at least bodies).421  Both missionary 
groups wanted to ensure that the Acholi were not merely paying lip service to 
Christian doctrine, and were also applying it to their day-today lives. The 
Anglican Church in particular wanted to ensure that this message was taken 
to even the remotest parts of Acholi, resulting in increased missionary 
presence in rural areas. Church statistics for the Acholi region for 1955-56 
show that there were around 121 village churches, with forty-two in Gulu, 
fifteen in Kitgum and twenty-eight in Paluo. For that year they registered 3622 
baptisms alone, with 217 of those being infants. The following year around 
twenty-two new village churches had been built and a further 2539 people 
baptised, with the biggest increase in Kitgum, in East Acholi.422 These 
statistics, added to the political rivalries between Catholics and Protestants in 
the late 1950s, would suggest that the Acholi conversion to Christianity was 
anything but superficial.  However a closer look at the numbers presents us 
with a more nuanced picture concerning the Christian conversion of Acholi.   
The increases in baptisms, particularly the annual increases of the 
number of infants being baptised, should not be taken as a direct indication of 
a spiritual religious conversion. Baptism into a religious denomination was 
predominately driven by the need to access certain commodities, be it 
education, health facilities, or employment through becoming a Christian 
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teacher: ‘In those days teachers were the only ones who wore shoes.’423  
Furthermore, training institutions such as farming schools were largely run by 
churches and as such admission to them was easier if one were affiliated to 
the denomination that had administrative control of that institution.424 To 
ensure that your children could attend a missionary school, they had to be 
baptised as infants, consequently increasing parental demands for more 
Churches and missionary schools to be built in remote areas.425 In some 
cases proximity to a church or mission school would determine whether one 
would become a Protestant or a Catholic: 
 
My father was not a religious man, but he moved the whole family from 
Atyak (North West Acholi) to Kalongo (East Acholi) because he was 
told that there was a very good school there. My brothers and I were 
enrolled and we became Catholic. To this day I am still a Catholic and I 
still go Church regularly. I also became a very strong DP supporter 
when I saw how we Catholics were being treated in Uganda. We 
needed to stand up for our beliefs and our religion.426  
 
Religion offered an alternative means to acquire resources, be it medical, 
farming institutions or access to education. As more and more Acholi 
converted to Christianity, religious identities provided a strong base for 
political parties to mobilise. The demarcation between Catholics and 
Protestants was effectively used to further reinforce religious political 
affiliations both nationally and locally.  
Even as the number of baptisms and churches increased, one area 
that the missionaries still could not effect change was in eradicating Acholi 
indigenous religious practices, particularly concerning polygamy.427 In 1955 
the NAC accepted that it was not known how many Christians had more than 
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one wife. In some cases it has been reported that Christian teachers married 
their wives according to native custom, but would then go and hide them from 
their Christian colleagues/friends. The Bishop of the Upper Nile complained 
that their task in dealing with the matter was being made more difficult 
because parents and other more ‘responsible’ citizens were simply not 
reporting the offenders.428  This defiance of Church teachings by the Acholi 
was not the result of a fundamental disaffection with Christian doctrine and 
symbolism.429 Nor were the Acholi who continued to engage in native 
marriage ceremonies seeking to consciously organise, revive or perpetuate 
selected aspects of Acholi indigenous culture in the face of Christian 
indoctrination.430 It was merely the incorporation/Africanisation of Christian 
symbolism and teachings in Acholi traditional religious beliefs and 
practices.431 Thus among the Acholi it was acceptable to have both identities 
and still be able to call oneself an Acholi and a Christian.  
If the missionaries were hoping for a holistic conversion to Christianity 
by the Acholi, then they were to be disappointed. During a conference in 
Ngora, Eastern Uganda, some members of the CMS acknowledged some of 
the obstacles they were confronted with while trying to 
Christianise/Westernise the tribes of the North. Notwithstanding their ‘lack of 
faith’ and inherent belief in several spirits, the Northern tribes had no effective 
written language until perhaps the 1920-1930s. As the ideas and practices of 
Western systems of economics and politics permeated the African 
consciousness, they in turn sought successes in the physical world by 
acquiring the material standards that were afforded to their European 
counterparts. There was a concern that as more young Africans became 
educated, they would begin to think that the Church had no relevance to their 
individual progress, and that it served even less purpose in the economic and 
political development of his or her tribe or land. However, the CMS believed 
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the biggest obstacle to African progress was the fact that these ‘tribes’ were 
so closely linked to the past, it hindered their ability to be able to progress and 
modernise.432 The Anglican missionaries bemoaned Acholi political 
allegiances, which appeared to be based on ‘tribal feelings and land 
consciousness that defeated reason and individual initiative.’433  In the eyes of 
the CMS representatives, this unyielding connection indigenous practices and 
traditions meant that political leaders were given support based on tribal/clan 
ties instead of merit.434 What members of the CMS who attended the Ngoro 
conference failed to realise, was that rather than tribal ties being a hindrance 
to the advancement within their prescribed systems of modernisation, it was 
actually as Young described a ‘realisation of an authentic African socio-
political system that incorporated both the Western and indigenous political 
and social structures.435 It was the continued negotiations between the two 
systems that eventually created and shaped politics and society in post-
independence Uganda. In this sense, the introduction of Christianity in Acholi 
did not lead to a holistic conversion. Christian ideology was simply another 
layer to add to the established social, religious, political and economic 
structures within the region. 
 
3.6. Cultural Caretakers? Domesticity as an Ethnopolitical Factor 
 
In the conventional male dominated political field of the 1950s, Acholi women 
did not feature significantly in local politics, and if a minority did, their 
participation was not deemed significant enough to place them on the radar of 
the colonial government, or so the archives would suggest. All those Acholi 
selected to participate in the tours to England were male chiefs or 
councillors.436 Even when an attempt was made by the British to be more 
inclusive of women, they were unable to find any ‘suitable’ Acholi women who 
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could participate in a similar tour in 1959. In fact, when the Lawirwodi was 
asked to suggest a suitable female candidate from the region, the only name 
that was considered was that of a Muganda schoolteacher positioned at Lira 
Paluo, who ‘had a sufficient knowledge of English.’437 Driven by increasing 
international pressure to recognise women’s rights as a key marker of 
civilisation and progress, the colonial government started to seriously consider 
ways in which they could encourage African women to participate more in 
local and national politics. Impending self-governance in the Protectorate and 
party politics was another motivation as new political organisations such as 
the Southern-based Progressive Party (PP) sought expand their electoral 
base by courting women voters. From its formation in 1955 the PP could 
count thirteen women in their founding membership group.438 However, Acholi 
women’s professional participation in local, let alone, national politics was 
severely limited. Any women who were working in local councils were 
generally employed in restricted gender specific roles such as secretarial and 
cleaning duties.  
Missionary agents involved in the education of women in Uganda were 
keen to improve domestic skills within the native household as they saw it as 
a stepping stone to women’s achievements in both the public and private 
sphere.  
 
All mission schools, whether run by Protestants or Roman Catholics, 
stressed ‘domesticity’ for girls. Domesticity, the idea that good women 
would remain in the home, concentrating on their husbands and 
children and utilizing their practical skills as housewives, was a bulwark 
of middle-class patriarchy in late Victorian Britain and on much of the 
European continent. When it was carried to Africa by missionaries and 
colonial officials, it was seen as central component of the civilizing 
mission.439  
 
                                                
437 GDA Box 532: Letter from DC Acholi to Lawirwodi, 11 November 1958.  
438 ‘New Political Party Formed: Progressive Party The Uganda Argus, 31 January 1955; 
Policy Statement by Progressive Party, The Uganda Argus, 7 February 1955. 
439 G. Bantebya Kyomuhendo and M. Keniston McIntosh, Women, Work and Domestic Virtue 
in Uganda, 1900-2003 (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 54. 
 154 
I                
Missionaries believed that it was women’s domesticity that gave them certain 
essentialised attributes for conveying an interest in human welfare, thus 
making their indirect contribution to the public sphere all the more 
important.440 Consequently, there was an emphasis on domesticity through 
Christian doctrine.441 Ugandan women were encouraged through clubs and 
associations to move away from the homestead and become more involved in 
community organisations. Women’s organisations emphasised participation in 
activities within the fields of health, welfare and the extension of home craft 
and mother craft activities, all centred on roles already being played in the 
private sphere. Memberships to associations such as the Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA), formed in 1952, and the Family Planning 
Association of Uganda (FPAU), formed in 1957, were encouraged specifically 
for this endeavour.442 The YWCA emphasised the role of women in farming, 
through the agricultural extension programme, taking its teachings to 
Ugandan women in the villages.443 However, even this was gendered: 
whereas farming programmes taught men how to produce a better yield for 
their cash crops, the founder of the YWCA Barbara Saben remarked that the 
importance of the programme was to teach women how to get better nutrition 
from what they grow as ‘they don’t know how to feed a child.’444 Even within 
these institutions Acholi women were still marginalised. Both the YWCA and 
the FPAU were initially formed in Kampala and their activities centred on the 
surrounding areas. Lack of finances and human resources prevented the 
effective implementation of these programmes in Acholi.445  
                                                
440 A. M. Tripp, ‘A New Look at Colonial Women: British Teachers and Activists in Uganda, 
1898-1962, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vo. 38. No.1 (2004), 124. 
441 D. Gaitskell, ‘Housewives, Maids or Mothers: 
 Some Contradictions of Domesticity for Christian Women in Johannesburg, 1903–39’, 
The Journal of African History. Vol. 24. No, 2 (1983), 241-56. 
442 M. Tadria, ‘Uganda’s Women’s organization: Their Contribution towards Raising Uganda’s 
Standard of Living’, African Spectrum, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1973), 217-226. 
443 ‘Clubs for women will benefit from UN Grant’ The Uganda Argus, 20 April 1957. 
444 The Blade, Toledo Ohio, 25 November 1962. 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1350&dat=19621125&id=hP1OAAAAIBAJ&sjid=LA
EEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4455,2245635, [Accessed 2 December 2012]. 
445 Ibid. 
 155 
I                
Even overtly political organisations such as the African Uganda’s 
Women’s League (AUWL), formed in 1953, which encouraged women to run 
for political office and to vote lacked membership among Acholi women.446 
Interviews with Acholi women in the region showed that very few of them in 
the 1950s had joined any of these organisations, citing lack of transport and 
rural isolation as well as time constraints as factors limiting their political 
engagement.447 Tripp makes the argument that unlike their counterparts in 
Kenya and Tanganyika, education for women in Uganda had a head start 
compared to other colonies, primarily as a result of early missionary work of 
the CMS. Ugandan women were already attending secondary schools in the 
early 1930s and some had even entered Makerere College as early 1945.448 
This may be true for some women in the more developed South, but for Acholi 
women this was not the case. By the 1950s only a handful of Acholi men had 
entered Makerere. As higher education facilities were skewed in favour of 
men, it stands to reason that if their male counterparts were being 
marginalised regarding their access to these institutions, Acholi women stood 
even less of a chance. In short, women in the North were not given the same 
educational opportunities as their male counterparts. In fact, even by 1958 
there was still no senior secondary school for girls in the Northern Province.449 
As Acholi households tended to have multiple children, if money was available 
for education, boys would always take priority over the girls. 450 Thus, in the 
field of education at least, Acholi women faced a double marginalisation. 
In his book on Acholi indigenous education, J.P. Ocitti details the status 
of women in pre-colonial and early colonial Acholi societies.451 The male heir 
was the most prized of the children as marriages practices in Acholi meant 
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that it would always be the women who left the clan to marry, and the men 
would remain to carry on the clan bloodline keeping the homestead alive. The 
Acholi homestead was an institution where Acholi children learnt the cultural 
norms that reinforced their Acholi identities internally and externally. This, as 
Barth and Lonsdale describe, provides the foundations of a cultural group that 
underpins the ‘external face’ of an ethnic identity.452 As such, etiquette 
regarding marriage, death and birth rituals, language, religion, the foods that 
were to be eaten and connections to the environment all informed what it was 
and is to be Acholi. When the question was posed to a group of Acholi women 
regarding the determinants of Acholi identity, the general arguments 
expressed were derived from the cultural norms that were taught in the 
homestead. Acholi girls were taught how to be Acholi in the household, while 
the boys received their education with the men around the ‘wang oo’, a 
traditional practice where men would gather around a fire in the evening in 
their villages and exchange stories and teachings while the young boys 
listened.453 
It is difficult for archival historians to fully research the social, political 
and economic role women from indigenous African societies have played. 
Many of the archives presented have a distinct gender bias meaning that the 
history that has been recorded is that of the male narrative.454 In an attempt to 
give voice to this subaltern group, most of the literature concerning women in 
the pre-colonial and early colonial eras tends to emphasise oral traditions, 
histories and testimonies. When women do appear in the archives, it is 
generally because they behaved or done something exceptional that did not 
conform to the designated gender roles.455 In Acholi, the ‘mass/silent 
majority’, did not feature in the archives primarily because their contribution to 
Acholi politics did not fit into the masculine perceptions of the political actor. 
However, they should not be dismissed as insignificant or somehow apolitical 
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or disinterested in what was going on around them. Even if Acholi women’s 
interaction with colonial institutions were limited to missionary teachings of 
Christianity and domesticity, their role within this sphere cannot be overlooked 
and must be considered as a contributing factor to the politicisation of Acholi 
cultural and ethnic identities. They were the ones who stayed at home, 
brought up the children and instilled in them the norms and values that they 
and others attributed to ‘being an Acholi.’ As the men joined the army, left to 
study or migrated for work, the children, the next generation of Acholi, stayed 
at home with their mothers and extended family. Another aspect to consider is 
that Acholi women tended to migrate less than their male counterparts, and if 
they did they would generally be travelling with their husbands or another 
male from the clan. Consequently there was very little opportunity for them to 
mix with men and women outside their cultural regions. This isolation of the 
Acholi rural woman, both internally in the homestead and externally in the 
region, reinforced a contextual identity grounded in traditional cultural 
institutions governed by ‘moral ethnicity’ rather than more politically salient 
ethnically driven identities derived from ‘political tribalism’.456  
During a group interview with Acholi women in Koro, the question was 
posed as to whether any of the women had ever considered or had the 
opportunity to marry a man outside their ethnic group, in a particular a 
Southerner.  Surprisingly, all the women in the group answered that they had 
not, but only because as one women said ‘they never came here so we did 
not have the opportunity to do so.457 Whilst the women were a mixture of 
ages, ranging from fifty to eighty-two, even the eldest, who were of marriage 
age during the 1950s and 1960s, responded in the same manner. This 
reinforces that argument that women migrants during this time were few and 
far between and if they married outside the ethnic group it was with an 
incoming migrant. Undoubtedly, there would have been some female migrants 
who could have moved unofficially and not returned to the region, however 
cultural practices and expectations placed restrictions on the permanent 
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migration of single women away from their ancestral lands. It would stand to 
reason that number of women who migrated and did not return would have 
been very small. 458 Moreover, cultural isolation did not automatically mean 
that Acholi women held negative feelings towards men outside of their tribe 
and ethnic group. The fact that they were willing to consider marrying outside 
of the tribe is a small testament to this.  
Contrary to p’Bitek’s depiction of Lawino and Ocol, indigenous and 
missionary systems of education were not mutually exclusive of each other. 
The existence of one did not negate the other; rather there emerged a 
symbiotic relationship that allowed the Acholi to have a stake in both worlds. 
Just as the mothers and caregivers wanted their children to receive a Western 
education, learn English and participate in the politics of their land, those that 
already had those attributes continually returned to the homestead and drew 
solace from their cultural upbringing. Returning to Barth’s work on social 
boundaries and culture, the exclusion of Acholi women from male dominated 
political institutions and their internal isolation in the homesteads actually 
served to reinforce the Acholi cultural identities, sharpening the cultural tool 
kit. The patriarchal social order that governed Acholi ensured that men were 
situated as the external face of the cultural group engaging with the politics of 
‘political tribalism’. Internally, the inclusivity of ‘moral ethnicity’ provided a 
platform for women through domesticity to reinforce cultural norms and 
values. This was a reciprocal relationship whereby the domestic sphere 
strengthened and maintained the foundation of the cultural group, while within 
the public or political sphere Acholi men manipulated, sharpened and utilised 
the same cultural tools to reinforce the Acholi ethnic identity.  
 
Conclusion 
From its inception Ugandan nationalism was a localised movement driven by 
ethnically homogenous local governments and Kingdoms. It was a by-product 
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of British indirect rule which placed emphasis on local institutions through 
ethnic demarcations. Strong local identities meant that political leaders drew 
most of their support on a national stage from their region, district or ethnic 
group. The political and economic prominence of the Buganda Kingdom 
provided educated Northern politicians and Acholi chiefs the opportunity to 
engage in comparative politics, whilst utilising discourses of the Northern 
Provinces’ economic underdevelopment to make demands on the colonial 
state. To combat Buganda political dominance, British officials further 
reinforced the political importance of local governments and ethnic identities 
by extending power within the Native Authority. In Acholi, the recognition of 
the loosening grip of colonialism heralded a new dawn of political negotiations 
led by local council members, politicians and chiefs. Acholi chiefs saw an 
opportunity to extend their authority further by advocating for a unitary 
paramount chief who could place the Acholi Local Government on the same 
political platform as the Lukiko and the Kabaka. However, pre-colonial clan 
and chiefly allegiances meant that the Acholi Native Authority remained 
fragmented, placing limits on the creation of a chief who could politically unite 
the peoples of Acholi.  
Strong local institutions meant that even with the emergence of party 
politics, political allegiances were driven by local rather national 
considerations. Thus the UNC/UPC and DP in Acholi developed as 
autonomous local institutions as opposed to a national political movement. 
Internally, economic disparities between East and West Acholi provided the 
local politicians the mobilising tools to reinforce a two-party system driven by 
partisan religious politics. As demands for education, health and training 
facilities and mission institutions grew; Acholi voters began to place more 
political emphasis on their Christian identities. In the same vein the rural 
masses who continued to live within the periphery of the colonial political and 
economic economy, drew on Acholi traditional teachings and practices to 
govern their day-to-day lives, while striving to bring up the next generation of 
Ocols who could one day use education to leave the mundane life of 
subsistence farming. The factors that drove ethnonationalism in Acholi from 
1950 to 1962 all therefore emphasised the economic, political, social and 
cultural importance of the locality.  
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4.0. Independence and Myth of Ugandan Nationalism, 1962-1970. 
 
In divided societies, ethnic conflict is at the centre of politics. Ethnic 
divisions cause challenges to the cohesion of states and sometimes to 
peaceful relations among states. In divided societies, ethnic affiliations 
are powerful, permeative, passionate and pervasive.459   
 
Ethnic conflict in post-independence Uganda from 1966 was a consequence 
of the confrontation between strong ethnically divided local institutions and the 
post-colonial push for political centralisation, under the guise of nation 
building. To strengthen one, the other had to be weakened.  Self-governance 
meant that the stakes for political power sharpened at national and local 
levels, ensuring that ethnic antipathies became more pronounced. Ugandan 
independence opened the door to a national stage within which political 
negotiations could take place. Politicians who had succeeded within local 
polities were elevated to represent their various regional and ethnic groups at 
the centre. However, these politicised ethnic demarcations were not, and 
should not, be considered simply as a product of the Ugandan post-colonial 
state. Rather they were a continuation of pre-colonial and colonial political 
structures that had emphasised locality, ethnicities and the ‘tribe.’ These were 
the structures of power that were left embedded within Ugandan politics at the 
eve of independence.460 Furthermore, it was not that Ugandans lacked the 
imagination or the initiative to create a state that was completely altered from 
the colonial state, but rather that the post-colonial state was and should be 
considered an African reality, steeped in the politics of tradition, patriarchy, 
clientialism, nepotism, and strong localised political structures.461 The 
emphasis on, and institutionalisation of, tribal allegiances by the colonial state 
ensured that in the fight for control of the centre, ethnic identities became a 
viable tool to make localised political demands. Consequently, the 
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discrepancy between the political reality (ethnonationalism) and the political 
rhetoric (detribalisation) meant that by the end of the decade, the nationalist 
project had comprehensively failed as Ugandans witnessed an army mutiny, 
the suspension of the constitution, the eradication of traditional leaders and 
Kingships, and the installation of one party rule.  
The euphoria of uhuru (freedom) meant that at independence most 
Ugandans hoped self-governance would eliminate all the years of political 
mistrust, social, economic marginalisation and colonial control.462 Despite the 
political turmoil that was to characterise the decade, the handover of power on 
9 October 1962 was not preceded by the protracted violent clashes that had 
been witnessed in neighbouring countries such as Kenya. In fact at 
independence, Uganda was left relatively economically and politically 
stable.463 However, political independence did not bring an end to the forms of 
colonial ‘native’ control that emphasised tribal or ethnic identities.464 Nor did it 
bring an end to the established networks of patrons, kingships and clientele, 
which had subjugated the majority to the rule of an elite minority.465 
Consequently, the rhetoric of nationalism, detribalisation and democracy did 
not translate effectively to the locality. This was primarily because the very 
same political actors that were advocating against tribalism and imperialism 
were reliant on the politics of ethnic differentiation to secure their own footing 
within central and local government.  
The new Ugandan constitution reflected the political disunity of the 
newly independent state, and was primarily a document of compromise. The 
constitution was: 
 
engineered on the basis of an unusually complex formula: a 
constitution which provided for the existence of four Kingdoms within 
an independent state, one of which (Buganda) was to enjoy a federal 
relationship to the central government, the three others to have quasi-
federal powers, while the rest of the country was to be administered 
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through a form of district government which left a fair amount of 
discretion to the local administration.466  
 
With the UPC and KY coalition securing victory in the 1962 elections, Obote 
was sworn in as Prime Minister with the Kabaka as the ceremonial President.   
Within two years of the KY/UPC election win however, relations between the 
two parties had rapidly deteriorated. Aided by opportunistic defectors from 
other political parties, the UPC had by 1964 formed an overwhelming majority 
in parliament to the extent that it no longer needed the coalition to remain in 
power.467 To further consolidate the UPC’s authority, Obote sought to 
suppress the political apparatus of the Baganda Kingdom by diminishing the 
power of the KY.468 He warned KY party officials that they had no political 
power outside Buganda as, ‘Kabaka was not a policy and people could not be 
expected to live from day to day merely by joining an organisation whose 
major policy was to uphold the prestige of an individual ruler.’469 The 
relationship between the KY and the UPC was further exacerbated with the 
on-going issue of the ‘lost counties’ of the Kingdom of Bunyoro. The two 
counties of Buyaga and Bugangazi had been allocated to Buganda during the 
1900 agreement with the British. Bunyoro had always contested the 
arrangement and the counties were the subjects of several deputations to 
London during the colonial period. The British had left the issue unresolved 
before independence and the task of resolving the conflict fell on Obote who 
in 1964 resolved that the matter should be left to the peoples of the lost 
counties to decide. In the same year the peoples of the two counties were 
asked to decide whether they wanted to remain part of Buganda or to return 
to Bunyoro. When they inevitably opted for the latter, the Kabaka was 
outraged. The fallout from the referendum results caused irreparable damage 
to the already fragile coalition.470   
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Matters were made worse for Obote when on 22 January 1964 several 
units of the Ugandan Rifles in Jinja mutinied, demanding higher pay and a 
new system that allowed for accelerated promotions. After the British 
negotiator who was sent in to reconcile with the mutineers was held hostage, 
Obote in the end conceded many of the demands made by the rebellious 
units. This resulted in the rapid ‘Ugandanisation’ of the army, as young 
officers were quickly promoted and British officials reduced to an advisory 
role. A new intelligence operation was created known as the General Service 
Unit (GSU), a paramilitary group tasked with monitoring subversive behaviour 
and potential threats against the government. Headed by Obote’s relative 
Akena Adolo, GSU recruits were drawn mainly form the Northern region, 
consisting of junior officers recruited for their political allegiances rather than 
on merit, and who were largely untrained for their anti-subversive operations. 
The GSU was to become well known for its recruits’ ‘amateur gullibility and 
dubious items of evidence, resulting in a number of wrongful arrests and 
detentions.’471 The 1964 mutinies and the creation of the GSU proved to be 
the first stage of the militarisation of politics in post-colonial Uganda.472 From 
this stage onwards, Obote systematically continued to marginalise civil 
liberties under the guise of thwarting subversive behaviour. He utilised many 
of the same tactics used by the British during the 1950s, as they had 
attempted to diminish political activity and contend with continued riots and 
strikes in Buganda. In 1968 Obote introduced the Emergency Act giving 
ministers the power to make and implement regulations for the maintenance 
of national security. The Act was an extension of the 1967 Public Order 
Security Act, which provided for the preventive detention of suspected 
subservient and the continuation of the state of emergency in Buganda that 
been sanctioned after the deposition of the Kabaka.473 Thus the government, 
like its colonial predecessor, legally institutionalised military surveillance of its 
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own citizens, with security units spying on Ugandans inside and outside of the 
country, setting a dangerous precedent for years to come.474 
  As Obote’s fear of internal opposition increased, he continued to recruit 
and promote a disproportionately large number of Northerners into the army, 
following the colonial pattern. In a passing out ceremony in 1966, seventy per 
cent of the 800 recruits were Northerners.475 In this respect Obote followed 
the colonial trend of targeting a particular region for recruitment into the army. 
While this trend can be viewed as a specific political ploy, it was also 
circumstantial. As in the colonial period, Northerners, particularly the Acholi, 
remained an easy demographic to recruit. Employment opportunities in Acholi 
within the formal economy were few and far between, making the army an 
attractive avenue for employment. Furthermore, limited opportunities to gain 
higher education in Acholi placed limitations on social mobility from the farm 
to the office.  The army provided a relatively quick way to gain access to a 
regular wage. Furthermore, soldiering was a profession that still commanded 
respect among the Acholi. Young boys seeing a soldier in full uniform walking 
around the villages would dream that someday that could be them.476  It was a 
means to escape the monotony of rural life and a way to obtain a relatively 
respected profession.477 The tribal composition of the KAR and the politics of 
underdevelopment in Acholi became intrinsically linked in late colonial and 
post-independence Uganda. Acholi men joined the army because there were 
few employment opportunities in the locality. However, their high profile in the 
army corps post-independence ensured that they became a representation of 
state authority/power nationally. They were to be feared or encouraged 
depending on who was leading the country and what regional identity they 
ascribed to or was inscribed on them.  
In trying to break down tribal barriers and forge a centralised national 
identity, Obote still resorted to tribal ties to consolidate his power. By 
challenging the supremacy of the Kabaka, Obote evoked anger from pro-
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Kabaka supporters in parliament, who in turn began to plot against the Prime 
Minister’s inner circle of supporters. This cumulated in the arrest of the 
plotters and the official cessation of the coalition.478 A new constitution was 
enacted placing Obote as paramount leader of the Uganda. When the Kabaka 
and the Baganda rebelled in reaction, Obote ordered the Kabaka’s palace to 
be stormed, essentially driving the King into exile.479 Horowitz argues that the  
 
weakening of the coalition partner entailed an attempt to undermine its 
ethnic strength. Consequently, the dynamics of the coalition 
relationship, especially the desire to be free of it, fostered that very 
ethnic conflict that was at the root of the electoral cleavage that had 
made the coalition necessary in the first place.480  
 
Ali Mazuri’s assessment of shifts in Obote’s leadership style in the 1960s from 
reconciliatory to confrontational can be viewed by his ‘shaken faith in the 
viability of institutionalised pluralism in his country.’481  At independence, 
Obote believed that he could continue the colonial policy of encouraging 
strong ethnically demarcated local institutions as a mechanism to deal with 
Baganda separatism. This policy was reinforced after independence with the 
Local Administration Ordinance of 1962, which stipulated that in the future all 
local administrations would consist of ruler/ministers and a council, or a chief 
executive officer and a council, and all would enjoy the same authority and 
responsibility.482  However, the continued political challenge from the KY and 
the Kabaka meant that from 1966, Obote decided to embark on the gradual 
elimination of the divisive elements, particularly the Kings who were symbols 
of regional autonomy, in an attempt to establish national unity and regain 
control. However, as Mazrui continues:  
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The trouble with the politics of confrontation is that it can release forces 
which make the politics of reconciliation more difficult in later years. 
[Consequently] in 1966 the big issue for Obote was not only how to 
keep the system going, but how to survive politically.483 
 
Given the internal threat against his leadership, from 1964 Obote’s selection 
of political allies stemmed from his ethnic ties to Northern Uganda, calling 
upon those from whom he could command absolute trust and loyalty.484 His 
promotion of the physically imposing but under-qualified Idi Amin to Major- 
General and later to Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda army was a direct 
reaction to the events in 1964. However, just like the riots in Buganda during 
the late colonial period, the mutiny had not been an attempt to overthrow the 
Prime Minister but was instead a result of the growing economic hardships 
faced by many Ugandans at the time. They had not been planned for any 
length of time and did not involve any high-ranking army officials, nor were the 
420 men that were eventually discharged for involvement following any 
specific orders.485 Nonetheless, the actions of these mutineers were to set a 
dangerous precedent in the relationship between the army and central 
government.  
The ethnic composition of the army started to became a matter of 
acute political sensitivity. In 1968 when an American Peace Corps teacher 
asked about the tribal composition of the Ugandan army while drinking in bar 
in Kitgum, he was immediately placed under surveillance.486 Fearful of being 
labelled a ‘tribalist’ Obote continued to defend himself in the national media 
urging his critics to believe that his government was not in the business of 
‘corrupting tribes to ensure his political position.’487 But his protestations were 
to no avail as his political opponents, particularly in Buganda, now saw the 
military as Obote’s personal Northern militia: 
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Southern politicians questioned the army’s recruiting preferences in the 
National Assembly but Obote’s allies defended the practice on the 
grounds that northern Nilotic-speakers were natural soldiers. [Defence 
Minister Felix Onama] claimed that the army had to retain its KAR 5’8” 
height that made it difficult for shorter Southern recruits to enlist 
because “we do not want our soldiers to look like totos (small children). 
In reality the KAR had used a 5’3” height requirement for most of the 
1950s.488  
 
 
From 1966 Obote started to tour the Northern Provinces more frequently, 
often visiting army barracks and attending passing out parades.489 During one 
ceremony celebrating Uganda’s second year of independence, Obote made 
sure that it coincided with the unveiling of the new Ugandan Air Force. The 
speech given by the President during the ceremony was filled with analogies 
of Uganda as the ‘troublesome child’, mirroring colonial discourses of the 
‘child-like’ African.490 ‘The child is now two years old. I am the custodian of 
that child and I am delivering you the child. The child is in good health and it is 
your responsibility as witness to see that the child grows.’491 As the child 
became more petulant, measures had to be taken to discipline it and make it 
obedient, and this was the responsibility of all Ugandans. With the 
progression of his presidency Obote continued defending the methods by 
which the child was being raised, stressing the importance of having a strong 
army and police force as a mechanism to protect and ‘preserve Ugandan 
culture.’492 As such from 1964 onwards Obote’s presidency would be defined 
as one that sought to retain control at all costs through the threat and use of 
military force, creating what Kasozi calls the first ‘military dictatorship’ in post-
colonial Uganda.493 
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4.1. Uniting the ‘Northerners’: The Battle for the Centre. 
 
The removal of the Kabaka in 1966 by Obote was met with widespread 
support among the Acholi. This support had its basis in the rivalry that had 
been promoted in late colonial Uganda between the Kingdom and the Acholi. 
The historical social, political and economic dominance of the Buganda 
Kingdom was a matter of sensitivity among the less developed regions within 
the Northern Province. The perception that Buganda was not conforming to 
the post-colonial nationalist agenda was seen by the Acholi as a deliberate 
attempt to emphasise the kingdom’s political supremacy at the expense of 
wider economic and political progress in the rest of the country. As one 
interviewee stated, ‘Obote’s government was purely developmental, nobody 
was taking about tribal issues at that time. I mean in Buganda they only 
wanted recognition for their King.’494 Even ardent DP supporters among the 
Acholi put aside their rivalry with the UPC and expressed approval at the 
deposition, arguing that it was the only way that Uganda could move forward 
politically. One Acholi civil servant who was living in Kampala in 1966 during 
the storming of the Kabaka’s palace commented on the atmosphere of that 
day: 
 
When the Kabaka was exiled in 1966, there was fighting. I could hear 
gunshots. I was at Makerere and I could see smoke from the palace. I 
did not attend lectures for two days. The Baganda are always united 
when it comes to their King, a feeling that we do not have in our 
area.495 
 
The Acholi Local Administration reacted positively to the declaration of the 
Ugandan Republic and the removal of the Kabaka, expressing their 
endorsement in the national media. Shortly after the deposition, the 
Secretary-General of the Acholi Local Council, issued a statement expressing 
his support, asserting that Obote’s actions were not only welcomed in the 
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region, but that the rest of Uganda ‘should rally behind the Acholi people to 
support the government.’496 Even in parliament and despite their rivalry some 
prominent Acholi DP politicians were publically sympathetic to Obote’s 
actions. DP politician Mr Alexander Latim, speaking on the behalf of eight 
other opposition leaders, stated that whilst they did not ideologically agree 
with the actions taken, it was the duty of politicians and Ugandans to unite 
behind the President in his time of need.497  
In an interview with the author, one Acholi DP supporter who was old 
enough to remember the events of 1966 also reiterated his support for Obote. 
‘I supported the man, but not the party, even if you belong to a different party, 
you appreciate something that is good, and we understood that there was no 
democracy in being King.’498 In fact, the overwhelming perception of Obote 
and his first administration by interviewees of different backgrounds and 
classes still living in Acholi was largely positive. This should not be seen as 
definitive verdict of Obote’s regime however. The men and women who were 
interviewed spoke about Obote’s Uganda purely retrospectively.  Their 
memories were shaped by the decade that followed with the rule of Idi Amin, 
and to some extent the current administration. As such, many of the views 
were comparative, overwhelmingly favouring Obote. Statements such as ‘we 
Acholi were happy under Obote’, or ‘our children were going to school under 
Obote,’ and ‘at least we had proper roads when Obote was in power’ were 
recounted time and time again.’499 The recollections are undoubtedly a 
judgement on what the peoples of Acholi believed then and now to be what 
politicians need to deliver to be considered successful and positive influences. 
In comparison to Amin’s regime and the political turmoil of the 1980s, which 
further stunted economic development in Acholi, Obote’s first administration is 
unsurprisingly placed in a more positive light. But in reality, Acholi had not 
benefitted much from Obote’s economic policies. From 1964 the Acholi 
District Administration frequently reported large deficits in their budget.500 This 
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was a complete departure from the colonial period where district accounts 
were kept relatively balanced. However, even if the Native Administration had 
deficits in its accounts these were not large enough to warrant a report in the 
district account audits.501 Added to this, the region was among the poorest in 
the country, with the 1969 census showing that Acholi had the fourth highest 
infant mortality rate out of all the districts in Uganda.502 Even for staunch UPC 
supporters the economic situation in the region compelled some to complain 
directly to central government. The UPC Youth Wing in East Acholi, the most 
economically and socially deprived region of Acholi, were so dissatisfied with 
Obote’s economic policies that they were mobilised to write a memorandum 
directly to central government requesting more amenities to be provided in 
Kitgum.  Particular requests were made for hospitals and schools for girls, and 
they placed the blame for the continued underdevelopment of Acholi districts 
on institutionalised nepotism that allowed only certain individuals to benefit 
financially.503 The youth group requested that the government explain why the 
interests of those in the higher echelons of the party appeared to be greater 
than the villagers who had placed them in power in the first place.504  In fact, 
as Frimoni Banuguire argues, during Obote’s first presidential term there was 
no evidence of any substantial economic development in the North, as Obote 
structurally continued the colonial trend of underdevelopment of the region 
relative to the South.505  However, even despite the harsh economic 
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conditions being faced in Acholi, there was a general consensus that support 
should be shown to the President over the Buganda and Kabaka issue.506 
As matters with Buganda became more strained, and as the Northern 
identity increasingly became associated with Obote and the UPC, there was 
at least one politician who sought an electoral base outside his ancestral 
region. Daudi Ocheng was a prominent Acholi politician who was not only an 
outspoken critic of Obote and the UPC, but also a member of the KY party. 
Ocheng was instrumental in raising accusations against Obote for smuggling 
gold and ivory tusks from the Democratic Republic of Congo and embezzling 
funds from Uganda. In 1964 he stood in parliament alongside another Acholi 
DP politician Alexander Latim, and publically accused the President and the 
then Commander of the Uganda Army, Idi Amin, of corruption. This action 
resulted in Ocheng’s arrest and subsequent death under suspicious 
circumstances a few years later.507  There is little evidence regarding 
Ocheng’s earlier life or indeed what motivated him to become an ardent 
Kabakarist. He is known however to have had close personal ties with the 
Kabaka and was instrumental in negotiating the coalition terms between the 
UPC and KY in 1961.508 In his assessment of Ocheng’s political allegiances 
Jan Jørgensen states that 
 
the fact that a major leader in the so-called Nilotic or UPC centre 
faction was [Godfrey] Binaisai, a Muganda, and that a major leader in 
the so-called Bantu or conservative faction was Daudi Ocheng, an 
Acholi who owned land in Buganda and served as Secretary-General 
of Kabaka Yekka, should warn us that class interest could and did 
override ethnic identity.509 
 
 
 One interviewee who knew Ocheng personally gave some insight into his 
earlier life: 
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His father was a chief in Acholi here. He sent his kids from primary to 
study at Kings College in Buda. Ocheng was in the same class as Sir 
Edward Mutesa II (The Kabaka). They developed a very close 
friendship and this continued. Daudi became a member of the Lukiko. 
He spoke excellent Luganda. At independence he became a member 
of the KY after the Kabaka nominated him and Ocheng became 
completely on that side.510 
 
Ocheng certainly did not fit the stereotype of the Acholi politician. He was not 
content to be just another Acholi politician trying to make his way in central 
government advocating regional and ethnic policies. 
 
Most of the UPC leaders were notables who derived their authority 
from colonial appointments as traditional chiefs or civil servants. Many 
were lineal successors of chiefs or clan leaders, and a number had 
gone to boarding school based on the British public school system. 
With the exception of Daudi Ocheng, and a few others, their political 
bases were confined to the districts were they were born, and they 
were influenced by the ethnic and religious composition of, and 
competition within their home districts.511 
 
Ocheng was not the only Acholi politician apposing Obote at the time; many 
DP supporters had publically critiqued the President. In fact, Ocheng 
frequently joined Alexander Latim, the DP Minister for North West Acholi, in 
publically denouncing Obote’s increasingly authoritarian political policies.512 
He was however the only prominent Acholi to become a card-carrying 
member of the KY. For his part, Obote was astute enough to capitalise on his 
two opponents regional identities to combat accusations of tribalism within his 
government. He argued that as both Ocheng and Latim were from the North 
and still opposed him, his presidency was therefore far from tribalistic.513 
Among the Acholi back in the villages and in Kampala, Ocheng was 
something of a paradox: 
 
When he [Ocheng] visited here he would come and go as he liked 
nobody cared and nobody bothered him. Ocheng’s father was very 
enlightened. At that time the Acholi thought he was a traitor. Why send 
                                                
510 (IF/M) NAU: interview with retired civil servant, Gulu, 9 June 2012  
511 Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 61-62 (Quotation paraphrased). 
512 ‘Acholi for Buganda Jinja Plantations’ The Uganda Argus, 2 February 1966. 
513 ‘Obote action saved many lives’ The Uganda Argus, 2 February 1966. 
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your kids to learn Luganda? I personally refused to learn the language 
in Makerere, the Baganda were so proud of their language. I was in the 
Capital of Uganda, why should I learn Luganda?’514  
 
The latter part of the statement indicates that even among educated Acholi 
migrants working in a white-collar profession in Kampala, there was still 
prejudice against Buganda materialised through their conscious and sub-
conscious rejection of Luganda. Some Acholi who had lived in the region for 
years and brought up families had either refused to learn Luganda or just 
simply did not have the time to do so. As one Acholi student at Makerere 
remarked, ‘English is the language of the educated, when I was at university I 
was only friends with those that spoke it, why would I waste my time learning 
Luganda?’ Yet many were happy for their children who were being brought up 
in Kampala to learn the Bantu language. However, some drew the line when it 
came to speaking it at home, although this is mainly due to the fact that in 
most cases both parents were unable to speak Luganda. The reinforcement 
of Acholi identity through linguistics was important among these migrants as 
the majority married Acholi wives and emphasised to their children the 
importance of speaking their mother tongue.515 
The tendency to reject Luganda or Lusoga (spoken in Busoga) was not 
only prevalent among educated white-collar workers living in Buganda and 
Jinja. Although those whose professions were not in the civil services did not 
necessarily have the same objections to the language, it was still uncommon 
to find fluent Luganda-speaking Acholi. Acholi soldiers and policemen 
stationed in the South offer a good example in this regard. Among the army 
personnel Kiswahili became the lingua franca, negating the need to learn 
Luganda or even English for lower ranking soldiers. Because of the 
disproportionately large numbers of Northerners in the Army, Kiswahili 
became identifiable with that group. Consequently in post-independence 
Uganda as it was during the colonial period, English quickly became the 
language of civility and Kiswahili the language of the soldiers.516 Interestingly 
                                                
514 (IF/M) NAU: Interview with retired civil servant, Gulu, 9 June 2012.  
515 Formal and informal Interviews in Kampala, Jinja, Entebbe, November 2011-August 2012. 
516 P. Oketcho, ‘The Retrospective Development of Uganda’s Educational language Policy 
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among the soldiers and service workers interviewed by the author none 
expressed discomfort in regards to their children speaking Luganda at home. 
As one soldier who was stationed in Kololo Kampala in the 1960s recalled, ‘I 
brought my kids to Kampala to get a better education. This was the only way. 
The children were all fluent in Luganda and even though they could speak 
Acholi they did not to do so at home.’517  Those of older generations who had 
lived their whole lives in Kampala admitted during the interviews that that they 
were still unable to speak Luganda.518 The high-ranking army officials who 
had had an education that exceeded primary level deemed that it was more 
important for their children to learn English by attending the top schools in the 
capital. But even despite this, the households that these children were being 
brought up in generally consisted of two Acholi-speaking parents. Although 
the children learnt the languages of the region they were living in, at home 
most were still socialised into Acholi culture, be it the food being cooked, 
hearing their parents converse in Acholi, or even seasonal trips back to the 
village to visit family.  
For Acholi living outside other regions the Northern identity was not 
and could not easily be erased or superseded by another. In fact, even the 
names given to these children immediately made them identifiable as 
Northerners. Luo/Nilotic names are easily distinguishable from Bantu ones. 
The names are derived from particular, cultural, environmental, social or 
political circumstances and have spiritual significance developed from 
everyday language.519 Male and female names are easily distinguishable with 
girls’ names commonly start with an, ‘A’ as in Arach or Apiyo, and boys 
starting with an ‘O’ as in Okello. In some rare cases a child’s name could also 
begin with an, ‘L’ as in [L]abong or [L]apat. The names are almost 
indistinguishable from Lango names and as such it is harder to identity a 
Lango or Acholi through name to without hearing the dialect being spoken.520  
                                                                                                                                      
Ssekamwa, History and Development of Education in Uganda (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 
1997), 138.   
517 (F/M) NAU: Interview with private security guard, Kitgum, 1 August 2012.  
518 Formal and Informal Interviews, Entebbe, Kampala, November - March 2012. 
519 D. S. Okello, The Acholi Ritual Ceremonies (BA Thesis Makerere University, 1969), 28. 
520 Ibid., 28. 
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It is not uncommon for an Acholi meeting someone from outside the region, 
and upon hearing their non-Christian name to ask ‘where in the North are you 
from? Thus one’s ‘Northern’ identity is made apparent simply by divulging a 
name. This had unfortunate repercussions for Acholi migrants living in the 
South at the time the palace of the Kabaka was stormed. As Baganda hostility 
towards the ‘Northerner’ Obote grew, Acholi migrants and students living in 
the capital found themselves in an uncomfortable position. Many had made 
friends with students from all over Uganda on campus and although none of 
them could recount any overt hostilities from the Baganda students towards 
them, there were cases where they were made to feel uncomfortable about 
their Northern identity. One student recounted having a conversation with his 
Baganda friends at the time in which they stated that all Northerners were 
murderers because of what they had done to the Kabaka.521  
Whilst it was easy to externally identify someone as Acholi, another 
process of internal identification was also taking place. A vast number of 
Acholi students studying at Makerere in the 1960s chose research topics on 
Acholi culture, economy and agricultural practices that enabled them to go 
back to their villages to conduct research. Very few, if any, were writing about 
agricultural and marriage practices among the Baganda or Basoga. Nor were 
they researching any other cultures but their own. Lecturers at Makerere such 
as Okot p‘Bitek were popular with Acholi pupils, with one student remarking 
on how he chose the Acholi poet’s class because of its cultural content and 
praised him for speaking Luo during classes at the expense of non-Luo 
speakers.522 In this way they were defining themselves as Northerners and 
Acholi whilst pursuing in their education subjects that would prepare them to 
find jobs back in their respective regions.  
With events going on within national politics, an army that was now 
perceived as being Northern and tensions between Buganda and Obote, 
Acholi migrants in the South were continually defined by the politics of the 
centre. In an attempt to challenge the idea of Baganda superiority, the 
educated Acholi felt that it was their right as Ugandan nationals to speak only 
                                                
521 (F/M) NAU: interview with retired civil servant, Gulu Town Centre, 15 July 2012. 
522 Ibid. 
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English in the capital and contested the need to learn Luganda. Acholi 
soldiers found a ready-made home within their barracks where Kiswahili was 
the language of preference. Blue-collar workers living and working in the 
capital simply left it to their children to acquire language skills as they settled 
into small communities of other migrants from the North. However, the main 
commonality among these groups of migrants was the unbroken connection 
to their homesteads in Acholi. That even someone like Daudi Ocheng who 
went against the political grain would still make regular visits to his village 
indicates that ancestral ties for Acholi migrants were almost never fully cut. 
 
4.2. Politics of the Belly: The Acholi Local Government  
 
We must never forget that the colonial state in Africa was an 
authoritarian bureaucratic apparatus of control and not intended to be a 
school of democracy.523 
  
When looking at the dichotomy between change and continuity from the 
colonial state and post-independence Uganda, Acholi Local Government 
(ALG) actually offered little change from colonial administrative and political 
structures. The symbolic and evidential argument for continuity rather than 
rupture, can be seen when comparing the last British DC’s annual report to 
his Acholi successor. Not only is the layout of the report the same, but also 
the tone, rhetoric and style of writing mirror each other. If one were to take 
away the signatures signed at the bottom, the two reports could have well 
have be written by the same person.524 In fact, internal politics in Acholi within 
the local councils included many of the same debates that had occupied local 
government members during late colonial period. Council meetings were still 
characterised by walkouts, boycotts and staff complaints. It took months to 
reach decisions as members failed to give clear directions to staff and then 
became angry and frustrated when nothing was done. Financial 
mismanagement and corruption meant that the local councils were unable to 
                                                
523 Berman, ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State’, 329. 
524 MUL/AS EAU/A (058) 1: J.P Twining, Acholi District Commissioner: Annual Report: Acholi 
District Council 1962. 
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provide many of the services needed for the people.  With many of the council 
members now affiliated to the two major parties in the region, party political 
rivalries continued to dominate committee meetings, making it difficult to 
engage in any meaningful and productive debates.525  Economic disparities 
ensured that the political demarcation between West Acholi and East 
continued to be emphasised as local politicians sought to strengthen their 
constituent base. The separation of the two districts had been continually 
discussed in the late 1950s and was finalised on the eve of independence. 
News of the separation was received with ‘great happiness’ among the 
populace in East Acholi.526 However, the move from being quasi-
governmental to a fully-fledged governing body was rushed, as by 1962 
Kitgum had no town clerks and only one permanent staff member.527 The 
administrative and political division of Gulu and Kitgum was largely instigated 
by the political rivalry between the UPC and the DP in the region. The two 
parties were more concerned with the political benefits of the division rather 
than the practicalities.528 As the UPC and DP acquired more power in the 
centre, in the locality the two parties fought to gain control of the local councils 
and mobilise the populace. Thus whilst political grievances were channelled 
through ethnic discourses at the centre, in Acholi regional, religious, class, 
and clan identities were given more prominence. The British DC in his parting 
report expressed concern at the way the District Councils were running, 
adding that ‘without a medium for the creation of policy or for planning . . .[the 
district council] will develop into a talking shop with no aims but to talk about 
staff grievances.’529  
Whilst the 1962 constitution had emphasised the political semi-
autonomy of the four major Kingdoms, it had also left the ALG with a large 
amount of political authority, continuing with the colonial system of indirect 
                                                
525 Ibid; MUL/AS EAU/A (058) 1: Y.H. Wacha Olwol, Annual Report Acholi District Council 
1963.  
526 MUL/AS EAU/A (058) 1: Y.H. Wacha Olwol, Annual District Report 1963.  
527 Ibid. 
528 Ibid. 
529 MUL/AS EAU/A (058) 1: J.P Twining, Acholi District Commissioner: Annual Report: Acholi 
District Council 1962. 
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rule. In Acholi, the 1962 constitution gave local politicians, ALG mid to high 
level staff control of the locality, public funds and reaffirmed their control of the 
patron-client network.530 Services such as the routine maintenance of law and 
order, control of raising local tax rates, maintenance of inter district roads, 
control of primary schools, and provisions of medical services all fell under 
responsibility of the Acholi District Administration (ADA). By 1965 the ADA 
employed 1,600 people, 1000 of which were teachers.531 However, political 
rivalries between the UPC and DP, and financial mismanagement continued 
to hamper administrative duties. By 1963 at least two senior council members 
had been charged and convicted for embezzlement of public funds.532 The 
district finances remained poor and the collection of taxes unstable resulting 
in only two-thirds of estimated taxes being collected for the year ending 
1963.533 Attendance by council members was low and sporadic, resulting in 
numerous meetings being postponed simply because there were not enough 
people.534 Social services in the region were still few and far between, with a 
dangerous shortage of primary and secondary educational facilities.535 
Regional development programmes being propagated by central government, 
such as the extension of progressive farming methods to the masses, were 
hampered by nepotism and corruption within the local district administrations 
which placed economic and political power in the hands of a select few.536 
This ensured that social mobility from the farm to the office was mainly limited 
to those who had the right education or tribal lineage. In 1967 just over one 
per cent of the population in Acholi was employed in occupations outside of 
agriculture.537 
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Table 3: ADA CAPITAL EXPENDITURE APPROVED ESTIMATES 1965.538 
 
 Draft 
Estimates 
1965 
 
Main Items 
 Approved 
Estimates 
1965 
 
Main Items 
      
1. Laloyo £ 8,000 Official residence 
… … … … … … … … 
(1) nil  
2. Administration £ 50,150 Councillors’ Hostel £ 6,150; 
Quarters for two senior officials 
in Gulu £ 5,000; Rent of 10 
junior staff quarters in Gulu; 
building 4 divisional 
headquarters in permanent 
materials £ 32,000. Extension of 
Central Offices, Gulu £ 2,000. 
(2) £ 16,000 Two divisional 
headquarters (Loan 
from Local Authorities 
Loans Fund) 
3. Police and Prisons £ 2,000 Tractor implements (for prison 
farms) … 
(3) £ 1,000 Improvements to 
prison (balance of £ 
2,000 grant made by 
central government in 
1964) 
4. Subventions and 
Miscellaneous 
£ 1,500 Development Grants to County 
Councils £500; Improvements to 
Pece Stadium £ 1,000 … … … 
… … … … … … … … … 
(4) £1,000 Improvements to Pece 
Stadium (balance of 
grant made from King 
George V Memorial 
Fund in 1964) 
5. Education   (5) £ 4,750 District Education 
Offices (central 
government grant)8 
6. Health £ 80,501 Ambulances £ 8,000; improving 
dispensaries £ 1,000; new 
maternity and health centres and 
dispensaries £ 71,500. 
(6) £ 10,000 Two Maternity and 
Health Centres (Loan 
from Local Authorities 
Loans Fund) 
7. Water supplies £ 15,270 Borehole drilling £ 12,000; 
motor vehicles and Tractors £ 
3,270. 
(7) £ 10,000 Boreholes (Loan from 
Local Authorities 
Loans Fund) 
8. Public Works £ 11,001 Improvements to bridges £ 
1,000; lorries £ 10,000. 
(8) Nil  
Total 
£ 168,422 
Total 
£ 42,750  
 
 
Practices of nepotism and corruption were particularly common within local 
institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture.539 The main problem was that 
the land planning services were biased towards those who held posts in the 
civil service or those with capital to invest.540  This occurred at the expense of 
Acholi peasant farmers who actually required the most help. One prominent 
Acholi politician was criticised for having a large farm in Kitgum, causing the 
                                                
538 Ibid,. 38. 
539 D.Q.R. Laboke, Socio-Economic Aspects of Farm Planning in Acholi District: Northern 
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local council to wonder how he had the time to attend to ministerial duties as 
well as his farm.541 Full-time peasant farmers in the region were being 
neglected and passed over by the Department of Agriculture, and they 
complained that the government did not attach any importance to them.542 As 
one Acholi student complained ‘[members of parliament] lobby for subsidies 
for the ‘poor Acholi’ yet they are the first to exploit these subsidies.’543 Obote’s 
progressive farming policies, like those of the British, were supposed to focus 
on trying to encourage peasant farmers away from subsistence farming to 
progressive methods that were more financially lucrative. Under the Public 
Land Act of 1962, promulgated just after independence, Ugandans now had 
the right to occupy any unalienated public land without prior consent. The 
rights regarding customary land tenure were again extended with the 1969 
Public Lands Act, which meant that any land fully occupied by customary 
tenants could no longer be alienated without the consent of its occupants.  
Customary tenants could apply for a lease over the lands that they 
occupied.544 The legal changes that were being implemented actually had 
very little impact, as very few peasant farmers were aware of the laws and 
continued to hold and to farm land communally.545 It was still common to find 
a farmer working on land with no clear boundaries, cultivating until he came 
into contact with a neighbour. 546   
Added to this, education was not compulsory at this time and those 
who wanted to send their children to school had to pay fees, further limiting 
social and economic advancement. In 1962 there was a drop in school 
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enrolment due to parents being unable to afford school fees.547 There were 
more opportunities at primary level where the number of schools in the mid-
1960s stood at around 196, compared to only ten secondary schools, mostly 
located in West Acholi.548 Mission schools remained popular as they were 
considered to provide a better standard of education than state schools, and 
thus presented a better opportunity to progress to higher education549 Mission 
schools could also depend on subsidises from foreign donors and offered 
more opportunities for individual scholarships, lifting some of the financial 
burden from Acholi parents.550 Missionaries in this sense provided the 
institutions that were not being made available by local and central 
government. As the ALG continued to lose credibility, religious institutions, 
particularly in the more rural areas gained increased local authority.  
However, just as the Lawinos had to contend with a life of poverty, the 
district accounts for the ADA from 1962-1965 showed a marked increase of 
expenditure on salaries and provisions for council members. 
 
One prominent item in the growth of expenditure has been the 
overhead cost of politicising the district administrations, the salaries 
and allowances of constitutional heads, secretaries-general, finance 
secretaries, boards and the councils themselves have been 
substantial. Between 1962-1965 about 15,000 was added to Acholi’s 
overhead costs in this way, expenditure which was approved because 
it flowed logically from the decisions to create these posts, and to have 
elected councils. It must be recognised though, that the people who 
have benefitted also constitute an influential pressure group in favour 
of increasing these expenditures. The sphere of finance, local and 
central politics are very much intertwined 551  
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Acholi council members continued to lobby for increased personal allowances 
and in 1965 they unsuccessfully requested funds for a hostel to be built in 
Gulu for themselves funded through the public purse.552 Peter Ekeh discusses 
the rise of tribalism in post-colonial Africa as a conflict between ‘segments of 
the African bourgeoisie regarding the proportionate share of the resources of 
the civil public to the differentiated primordial (ethnic) publics’.553 Thus the 
Ocols as the political leaders of the ‘primordial public’ saw no problem in 
taking money from the civil public to feed individuals within their ethnic group. 
However, one of the ironies of the struggle for independence is that although 
the Ocols had boasted of their education, qualifications and advocated for the 
development of their ethnic regions, the reality was that they were driven 
largely by personal political and economic motivations.554 Consequently, 
whatever money was being obtained, or embezzled from the public purse, 
was not redistributed to the Lawinos, but was instead retained by individuals 
in the higher echelons of Acholi society.555 The Ocol’s aspirations to join the 
patronage network superseded any need to distribute resources equally to the 
Lawinos, as Bayart argues more generally;  
 
One of the decisive breaks with the past at independence lay in the 
ability of indigenous elites, previously restrained by the coloniser’s 
tutelage, to have access to state resources. The end of the colonial 
occupation lifted a number of constraints, political, economic and 
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administrative, which had frustrated the aspirations of the African 
accumulators.556 
 
The Ocols had in late colonial Uganda witnessed the prestige and authority 
bestowed on chiefs and British officials. They had seen the lucrative salaries 
and houses offered to government chiefs by the British. They had grown up 
with a political economy built on patronage and client networks that 
emphasised the authority of the ‘big man’ over his subjects. The more 
resources the patrons had the more power he could command in the locality. 
Furthermore, the weakness of the colonial state had left a substantial amount 
of power to the Native Administrators, who could use their political discretion 
in regards to tax collection and law and order, further emphasising the political 
authority of the chiefs. As the new power players in the locality, the Ocols 
simply copied their predecessors, accumulating power and money to reinforce 
their status as the patrons, the political elite and the ‘big man.’ At the centre, 
they emphasised the Northern identity to combat Buganda political power and 
secure their own positions within national government. The symbiotic 
relationship between control of the centre and control of the locality meant 
that as much as they sided with Obote against the Kabaka, when their 
authority within the locality and access to state resources was eventually 
challenged, the Acholi ethnonational identity became the dominant tool for 
making demands against central government.   
 
4.3. Acholi Ethnonationalism: Fragmenting the ‘Northern Identity’  
 
[We] are very proud of having one of our own as Prime Minister.557 
 
The UPC’s victory in the 1962 elections intensified the political hostilities 
between the UPC and the DP in Acholi. As Obote’s political star continued to 
rise nationally, among some Acholi politicians there was a growing feeling of 
unease towards the UPC leader. This hostility was derived from the growing 
perception that the Acholi were being treated less favourably than their Lango 
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counterparts. Even before Obote became Prime Minister, there were public 
accusations of nepotism and corruption directed against him by Acholi 
politicians. In his capacity as Legislative Council member he was accused of 
bypassing the proper protocols by awarding his brother a scholarship to go 
and study law in the United Kingdom. The Legislative Council members 
argued that it was wrong of Obote to give his brother another scholarship 
when other applicants had been refused the chance to study abroad.558 One 
DP supporter at the time recalled his growing distrust of the Obote:   
 
When we got independence, I was already doing my A-Levels. Being a 
Catholic I was suspicious. The way Obote behaved regarding 
scholarships made me even more suspicious.  He gave scholarships 
for people to go to the Soviet Union; he only favoured his tribe and 
Protestants. This was also the same for promotions. There was already 
tension between the two tribes, the Lango and the Acholi. Even though 
Obote was a Northerner, behind him we were still suspicious. The 
division in 1985 was something waiting to happen.559 
 
 
District intelligence reports and the minutes for the local council meetings 
reflected a growing enmity between the Acholi and the Lango with on-going 
hostilities over border disputes. One informant was so concerned about the 
volatile situation he recommended that officers posted in Acholi should not be 
of Lango origin.560  Regionally, the main disputes between the two groups, as 
with the colonial period, centred on the political and economic border between 
the Acholi and the Lango. The Acholi chiefs whose task it was to collect taxes 
within their constituencies were generally the main protagonists of these 
arguments, as they sought to protect their tax and constituent boundaries. 
They made official complaints to the local council about Lango farmers and 
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herders repeatedly crossing into Acholi and attacking Acholi sub-county 
chiefs.561  
Acholi DP politicians were resourceful in utilising the border disputes 
with Lango to their own political gains, as they attempted to paint Obote as a 
dictatorial tribalist. Following the army mutiny in 1964 and the deposition of 
the Kabaka, Obote’s rule had become increasingly authoritarian, which 
inevitably had a major impact on political activity in Acholi. This is reflected in 
the proliferation of intelligence reports in the district archives, gathered by the 
GSU surveying political meetings.562 The documents are indicative of the 
continued militarisation of the centre and the locality. In Acholi, the military 
presence was even more pronounced, given the districts close proximity to 
the Sudanese and Karamojong borders.563 There was a continued flow of 
refugees and rebel group members coming from southern Sudan. This had 
begun in the late 1950s as the civil war between northern and southern Sudan 
escalated.564 In some instances Acholi chiefs were stationed near the border 
to stem the ‘influx’ of refugees. As well as frequent reports of rapes, beatings 
and thefts by the refugees, some Acholi chiefs capitalised on the situation by 
attempting to illegally extort tax payments from unsuspecting Sudanese 
refugees.565 There were a least two major settlement camps opened for the 
displaced Sudanese in Acholi, with the biggest one in Awach County. Mission 
schools, particularly those run by the VF were in some instances used to 
house a small number of refugees as the Acholi Local Council struggled to 
deal with the displaced population.566 The flow of refugees showed no sign of 
abating, and in 1969 the Kitgum intelligence sub-committee wrote that the 
situation in and around the border of Acholi and Sudan was now ‘a common 
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state of affairs.’567 Obote capitalised on the situation by dispatching extra 
security to the region, under the guise that some of these refugee camps 
could be used for ‘illegal night meetings.’568 The state’s increasing use of the 
military force as a mechanism of political control, continued the colonial 
pattern of the politicisation and militarisation of quotidian violence in Uganda 
through organisations such as the GSU and legal directives such as the 
Emergency Act. The military and police were utilised to ensure that it became 
increasingly difficult for a political party other than the UPC to operate 
effectively in Acholi. By 1968 Obote had issued a life ban on all DP and 
Progressive Party rallies, an action that evoked considerable anger from DP 
supporters nationwide:  
 
We have a government in which the people have no voice. The people 
are refused the right to elect their own representative in parliament, 
district councils and municipal and city councils. We refuse to call UPC 
a representative of the people and as soon as the ban is lifted a 
general election should be held.569 
 
In response the DP set about trying to expose all the wrongs of Obote’s 
regime. Whilst the party could no longer mobilise support officially in Acholi, it 
retained its previously elected members in the Local Council ensuring that it 
was still a political force to be reckoned with, especially in East Acholi.570 
District intelligence reports showed that although many Acholi remained quiet 
about their support for the DP, there was still a strong underground network of 
supporters. They continued to hold meetings under religious pretexts where 
supporters would collect money and high-ranking DP politicians would visit 
the region to hand out financial incentives to supporters to encourage loyalty. 
This activity was particularly strong in Kalongo, where the DP had always had 
a strong support base. 
 
                                                
567 Ibid. 
568 Ibid; GDA Box 542: Minutes: Meeting in Agoro to Discuss Acholi Karmojong Border 
Conflicts, 21 July 1966; Dr Obote Hails Special Force’ The Uganda Argus, 4 April 1968. 
569 ‘Life Ban on DP rallies’ The Uganda Argus, 20 April 1968.  
570 Leys, Politicians and Policies in Acholi. 
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Mr Obonyo MP (DP) for the South Eastern Constituency . . . is trying to 
stop people of Kalongo from doing anything for the national interest. 
Telling people not to give funds to the President’s police appeal, this 
can be seen that compared to other counties less has been collected 
here by the chiefs. It has been alleged that Mr Obonyo is distributing 
letters purporting to prevent people from participating in anything that 
that the government advises them to do, such as maintaining their 
roads and paths. Members of the public are defying the chief’s 
authority and telling them to ask the government to do the jobs that the 
chiefs have been urging the people to do.571 
 
In 1964 DP Catholics in Gulu, Anaka, Awach, Opit, Pabbo and Atyak in West 
Acholi published a resolution criticising Obote’s policies, which they argued 
favoured their UPC and Protestant counterparts. The resolution cited 
numerous incidents of discriminatory attitudes by the Acholi Appointment 
Board and unwarranted dismissals of Catholic members of the Acholi Local 
Administration.572 The main criticisms were directed at the then Secretary-
General Peter Oola and the Finance Secretary who had allegedly made 
inflammatory statements during a UPC rally inciting violence against 
Catholics.573 They alleged that Oola had instructed UPC youth wingers to kill 
any Catholic priests who were found to be going to the villages to provide 
religious instruction. A similar incident was again reported a few years later 
involving UPC youth wingers who attacked a priest because he did not have a 
permit to pray.574 The petitioners criticised the tax system in the region that 
asked Catholic missionaries to pay a flat graduated tax of 300 shillings per 
year, although this reassessment had excluded Protestant and Muslim 
missionaries. The proposed amalgamation of Protestant and Catholic schools 
by the Acholi Education Committee was another bone of contention as 
petitioners argued that Catholic pupils being moved to the Church of Uganda 
schools would confuse the children’s beliefs. This, they believed was a 
                                                
571 KDA: District Intelligence Report, September 1968. 
572 KDA: Resolution by Catholic Christians in the Parishes of Gulu Town, Anaka, Awac, Opit, 
Pabbo and Atyak passed by a public rally of the Christians held in Gulu on 5 September 
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Acholi Signed A.L Oloya: President, 7 September 1964.  
573 Ibid. 
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of Gulu, 3 October 1969. 
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deliberate attempt by the UPC to convert Catholics to Protestantism and to 
further diminish the role of Catholics in Uganda.575  
The DP was instrumental in mobilising supporters to protest against 
what they deemed to be their unequal treatment in comparison to UPC and 
Protestants in Acholi, and the under-development of East Acholi in 
comparison to the West. In one DP rally, groups of Acholi in Kitgum gathered 
in protest, holding placards lambasting the UPC to ‘go west now.’576 They 
urged the government to facilitate adequate supervisions of schools in Acholi 
and to build an education office in Kitgum. Other placards asked why there 
was ‘education in Uganda but not in Kitgum.’577 This particular placard is 
interesting as it designates Kitgum as separate from Acholi and Uganda, even 
though the whole region was suffering from a lack of educational facilities. 
The DP in the area had successfully convinced their supporters that West 
Acholi, in particular Gulu, was now in the same situation as the more 
economically developed districts in Uganda, although this was far from the 
truth.578     
Although the UPC party hierarchy in Kampala and Acholi increasingly 
began to consider DP members as persona non grata in the locality, the DP 
continued its campaign against the UPC-dominated district councils and the 
President, albeit clandestinely. GSU intelligence officers were often tasked 
with infiltrating and reporting on illegal DP meetings. The general contents of 
the reports consisted of purported assassination plots against the Obote being 
planned in Sudan and conspiracies with the exiled Kabaka to overthrow the 
government.579 The allegations made in these reports are questionable, 
                                                
575 KDA: Resolution by Catholic Christians in the Parishes of Gulu Town, Anaka, Awac, Opit, 
Pabbo and Atyak passed by a public rally of the Christians held in Gulu on 5 September 
1964. Sent to Hon Prime Minister of Uganda, Dr. M.A. Obote from Catholic Christians West 
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576 KDA: Letter from the District Special Branch Officer, U. Oloya East Acholi regarding DP 
rally in Kitgum, sent to Senior District Special Branch Officers, 21 January 1965. 
577 Ibid. 
578 Ibid. 
579 KDA: ‘Secret meetings by DP and KY 1968-9’. Report from the Chief General Service 
Officer Kitgum sent to Mr Akena-Adoko Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 8 
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mainly because the intelligence officers were predominately Acholi men and 
clearly had something to gain by staying loyal to the government. They often 
reiterated what was already being reported in the national media. However, 
interviews with DP members still living in Uganda support the argument that 
the party was still very active even under political and military scrutiny.580 One 
police report stated that in August of 1969 the DP in East Acholi held at least 
seven illegal meetings. ‘The meetings can no longer be called secret 
meetings; they are simply political meetings. They are being held openly 
without any request or information given to the police, nor to the chief in that 
area.’581  Instead of town halls and market places however they were held in 
private homes.582 DP members were not alone in their growing opposition to 
the President. Even within the UPC there were sharp divisions, particularly 
within the Acholi District Administration.583 The UPC in Acholi district was 
divided into two factions led by Alex Ojera and Eric Lakidi. The party already 
held forty-four out of the fifty possible seats in the council and the seats were 
in turn divided almost equally between the pro-Ojera and pro-Lakidi 
supporters. Both men represented the power struggle within the UPC in 
Acholi, with Lakidi not afraid to side with the few DP members in the council if 
it suited his own political ambitions.584 Thus even among his own politicians, 
Obote could not expect unwavering loyalty in Acholi.  
Matters between the Acholi and the Lango came to a head in 1968 
when the Acholi Local Council passed a resolution criticising Obote’s 
economic policies in the region. On 16 and 17 February The Ugandan Argus 
published a report detailing the discussions and resolutions made at a 
                                                                                                                                      
August 1969; KDA: DP Meeting Orom. Report from Q.C Police Kitgum to the District Police 
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meeting of the Acholi District Council on 13 February 1968.585 The fallout from 
the article was to prove detrimental to the already fragile relationship between 
the Acholi and Obote. The resolutions were primarily concerned with the 
treatment of the Lango in comparison to the Acholi in the region. Council 
members made numerous allegations against the government for giving the 
lion’s share of industries to Lango when they had previously been promised to 
the Acholi: 
 
They were angry that the nearest television station was in Lira (the 
main town in Lango), even though they had requested that one be built 
in Gulu. The Acholi the councillors felt that they were being forced to 
leave their homes in search of employment simply because Obote had 
not included them in the economic revolution that was going on in the 
rest of the country.586  
 
Armed with their resolutions the council sanctioned a six-man delegation to 
take the matter directly to the President. Obote’s response to the allegations 
was swift and decisive. Outraged by the accusations of tribalism, he penned a 
twenty-six-page report the following month, countering every allegation made 
by the council members. The President was keen to stress that Acholi 
districts, like all others in Uganda, had been treated fairly and all possible 
efforts were being to develop the region by the government without the 
influence of tribal preferences. Furthermore, he stressed that central 
government budgets had hindered development in all other districts and it was 
not just the Acholi who were suffering: 
 
What is disturbing is that although nearly every other District is affected 
by the cuts of 31 December 1965, the Acholi District Council has taken 
the cut for the district to mean an action by the Government against the 
people of the District. The Council’s resolution directed the Secretary-
General to give publicity to these allegations in order to indicate the 
degree of anger of the Acholi people against central government. That, 
as anyone can see, was an open attempt to use the name of Acholi as 
a whole in order to promote their personal and group interests.587 
 
                                                
585 GDA Box 542: Memorandum by the President, 23 March 1968 (points summarised). 
586 Ibid. 
587 Ibid. 
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Obote’s swift response was a clear indication of his government’s sensitivity 
regarding accusations of tribalism. After all, his political rhetoric had always 
been about anti-tribalism, a slogan that he continually propagated during his 
tenure as Prime Minister and President.588 However, Obote did not just stop at 
a written response. A month after his memorandum against the Acholi Council 
was published he went about completely re-organising the Acholi District 
Administration, relieving those who had criticised him from their duties. Even 
UPC members were not spared. He then proceeded to re-appoint his long-
time supporter Peter Oola back to his previous position as Secretary-General, 
replacing Mr Akera. These steps, he argued in The Uganda Argus were 
necessary because: 
 
Some people held mistaken views about the role of the district council. 
They believed that they were separate from central government, an 
unfortunate consequence of colonial politics that allowed them to 
ignore the authority of the central government. The Acholi needed to 
understand that there should be no competition between the local 
administration and the Ugandan government and as such steps 
needed to be taken to remind them of this. The fact that council 
members felt that they could pass such a resolution under their own 
authority was an indication of the utter confusion reigning in the minds 
of the councillors.589  
 
The reworking of the council was presented nationally as an attempt to 
rejuvenate Acholi, which was lagging behind economically, and needed new 
life injected into its administration. The President publically accused the 
council of failing to provide their constituents with roads and other services, 
while only being concerned with passing useless resolutions. Furthermore, he 
condemned clan and tribal rivalries that had separated the region between 
East and West and the constant attempt by council members and politicians 
to stir up hostilities between the Acholi and the Lango 590  
Many Acholi did not see it that way however, and supporters of the 
dismissed councilmen responded strongly against the President’s actions. 
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The following month the DP penned an anonymous memorandum to the 
Acholi people reiterating many of the allegations made by the council and 
accusing Obote of being a tribalist and acting unconstitutionally.591 Utilising 
these regional hostilities, Acholi and Lango politicians proceeded to challenge 
each other during parliamentary debates. 
 
All Acholi know that some years ago Acholi were promised a textile 
industry and that it would be in Gulu. This would have promoted wealth 
in Acholi and provided employment for school leavers . . .Okae a 
member of parliament and a Lango, stood up and said he was 
surprised [that such] a motion was allowed to be discussed in 
parliament since it was advocating development for a particular region 
and that this equated to tribalism. In fact, Okae argued, since Uganda 
had achieved independence the Lango had got nothing.592  
 
 
The DP memorandum urged the peoples of Acholi to welcome as heroes 
those who had been dismissed, as they were being punished simply for 
standing up for the rights of their constituents.593 The condemnation levelled 
against Obote transcended all political lines, drawing in both UPC and DP 
supporters.  Although many of the members of the six man delegation that 
had sought an audience with the President were predominately UPC 
supporters, such was the public support for the motion Acholi politicians 
argued that it should instead be considered as a delegation representing the 
Acholi people and not just UPC supporters.594 Those who remained in the 
Obote camp were continually harassed and accused of betrayal. There were 
open confrontations between Eric Lakidi, who was considered one of the 
architects of the council rebellion, and Peter Oola. In return Oola used his new 
position as Secretary-General to threaten pro-Lakidi members of the council 
that they were liable to lose their jobs if they continued to disregard 
department protocol.595 On their part, central government continued to target 
                                                
591 GDA Box 542: Memorandum from the DP office in Gulu to ‘All Acholi People’ April 1968 
Received in the office of the DC, 1 May 1968. 
592 Ibid. 
593 Ibid. 
594 KDA: Intelligence Committee Minutes, 30 March 1968.  
595 KDA: Intelligence Committee Minutes, July 1968. 
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DP meetings and gatherings were often dispersed with force.596 In Acholi, 
various complaints were made to the Police Commissioner and in some 
instances directly to the President himself, about the maltreatment of DP 
politicians at the hands of police in Acholi and within the local councils.597 In 
trying to centralise control of the country through military force, Obote’s 
increasingly authoritarian rule served to alienate him internally in Acholi. As 
members of the ALG’s political authority was challenged, Obote’s Lango 
identity became a valuable tool used to diminish his credibility as a leader. As 
a consequence, the ‘Northern’ identity, presented largely by the Acholi and 
consumed by external observers as unified and unyielding, had by 1968 
become internally politically fragmented. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ugandan politics post-independence were characterised by the contest 
between the attempted creation of a unitary nationalist state and the politics of 
ethnonationalism, driven by local governments and Kingdoms. Uganda’s post-
colonial legacy emphasised the political and cultural importance of the locality 
and each ethnic group jealously guarded its territory. It was only by adopting 
more authoritarian mechanisms that Obote was able to challenge the 
authority of local governments. For Acholi politicians the ‘Northern identity’ 
proved a valuable tool for challenging the political aspirations of the Kabaka 
and his Kingdom, as political actors from opposing parties united in their 
support of the President. However, Obote’s increasingly authoritarian rule also 
served to alienate him in Acholi. As the Ocol’s authority in the locality was 
threatened, there emerged a more politicised and centralised Acholi 
ethnopolitical identity that dominated any regional affiliations. For Acholi 
soldiers, lack of employment opportunities in the locality meant that they were 
easy recruits for the Ugandan army. However, Obote’s transition from 
reconciliatory to confrontational leader meant that Acholi and Northern 
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soldiers became the face of military oppression, dictatorship and state 
violence, reinforcing the colonial stereotype of the ‘martial race’.  
Educated and uneducated Acholi migrants in the South retained the 
connection to the locality through marriage, migratory trips home and 
language. Acholi civil servants and politicians rejected Luganda, choosing 
instead to speak the language of the colonisers, of detribalisation, and of the 
‘Ocols’. Yet in the locality, the Ocols who had waited for so long to gain 
political control of the ALG, immediately started to engage in the politics of the 
belly, strengthening patron networks at the expense of the Lawinos. For the 
Ocols the material rewards drawn from access to political power, fed 
administrative and political rivalries, which stunted the function of the Acholi 
District Administration. For the Lawinos, restrictions on social mobility and 
access to political power and material resources kept them largely contained 
within the client network. Thus the symbiotic relationship between the Ocols 
and the Lawinos continued, with the Ocols reliant on the Lawinos to legitimise 
their claim to power, whilst the Lawinos, unable to speak the language of 
national politics were reliant on the Ocols to take their political grievances to 
the centre. Once again, the political interplay within Acholi during the first 
decade of independence emphasised the political and cultural importance of 
the locality.     
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5.0. Acholi in the 1970s: The Politics of Survival? 
 
When Amin took over I thought that it was not real. I did not believe it. 
After all he was from a small tribe.598  
 
 
There is no denying that Amin’s regime was brutal, and the body of literature 
on his dictatorial rule tends to reflect this violent legacy.599 This has 
contributed to a historical narrative of unbridled violence, destitution and a 
state in suspension, placing the emphasis on what Amin did to Ugandans 
while paying little attention to how Ugandans adapted, survived and lived 
under his rule.600 For the Acholi, historical narratives of Amin’s rule have 
continually emphasised the violence perpetrated against the peoples of the 
region. Acholi dominance in the army, as well as their perceived political 
adherence to Obote, immediately placed them at odds with the new regime, 
making them viable political target for Amin. Consequently, there was an 
instant migration of prominent Acholi politicians and soldiers, with many self-
exiling in fear of their lives, while others fled to Tanzania and Sudan to join the 
anti-government rebel groups.601  However, the vast majority of Acholi 
remained in Uganda and continued with their day-to-day lives.  This 
demographic have largely been ignored by existing histories of the period. 
They are the people who did not have the capital to escape, and whose 
memories and experiences of living in Idi Amin’s Uganda are often 
marginalised in favour of a narrative from the ‘big men’. However, what the 
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district archives in Gulu and Kitgum show is that whilst experiences in the 
region were characterised by fear, constant surveillance and economic 
hardships, the politics of identity still continued.   
 The violent and repressive nature of Ugandan politics in the 1970s and 
the lack of political parties to channel local grievances through the lens of 
‘political tribalism’ meant that political activity within Acholi became even more 
focused on the locality. The flight to the villages by migrants and the exile of 
local political power brokers served to weaken the connection between Acholi 
and the rest of Uganda politically, isolating the peoples of the region while 
emphasising their connection to their ancestral land. Migration back to the 
homestead, combined with increased competition for jobs in the district 
contributed to the social, political and economic tensions in the locality. 
Debates regarding clan, religious and gender identities increased, as cultural 
and religious identities provided a safer means for expressing political 
grievances in absence of formal party politics. 
The Ocols, with their high political and economic profiles, immediately 
began to engage in the politics of survival, with some self-exiling to avoid 
Amin’s retribution. More significantly, the displacement of the local politicians 
and their patrons from formal politics allowed chiefs to regain control of the 
locality. The government sanctioned politicisation and militarisation of chiefly 
roles fragmented communal discourses as clan identities came to the 
forefront, further emphasising internal allegiances to individual chiefs. As it 
was no longer safe to engage in ‘political tribalism’ externally, the locality 
provided a relatively safe haven from the violence being perpetrated by the 
state apparatus. Amin’s rule was about more than purging ethnic opponents; it 
was about opportunism, presenting a shift in the hierarchy of power 
contenders in the locality. The social contract between the Ocols and the 
Lawinos was altered and within this eight-year period we see the Lawinos 
moving closer to the source of power as they were forced to speak directly to 
the ‘big man’. Thus this chapter will seek to look at how the Acholi coped and 
adapted to a dictatorship and ask the question whether, Uganda under Amin 
really was ‘unhinged’ or a state in suspension.602  
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5.1. The fall of the Ocols  
 
Obote’s increasingly dictatorial rule inevitably resulted in widespread national 
disillusionment with the UPC regime. By 1970, this disaffection had 
permeated the top echelons of the Ugandan army corps. Following his rapid 
promotion during the 1960s, the ambitious Army Commander Idi Amin had by 
1971 built up a substantial amount of military support, particularly from tribal 
groups from West Nile, whom he had been steadily recruiting and training 
during the 1960s. By the time Obote tried to counter Amin’s growing control of 
the army, it was already too late.  While Obote was attending a summit in 
Singapore, Amin capitalised on the President’s absence by successfully 
staging a military coup on the 25 January 1971.603   
 A.B. Kasozi refers to the rule of Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979 as being 
shaped by the ‘politics of survival.’604 In his attempt to consolidate power, 
Amin used fear and intimidation to subdue the population. He continued to 
manipulate religious and ethnic cleavages in Uganda, and embarked on a 
systematic campaign to eliminate political and military rivals to ensure his 
regimes survival.   
Genocide is not the word for Amin’s rule; it was far more chaotic than 
that. He simply killed or caused to be killed those who got in his way, 
while allowing his troops considerable licence to carry out personal 
grudges and further their economic aims.605  
 
During his eight-year rule it is estimated that 80,000 to 300,000 Ugandans 
were killed.606 ‘Amin used violence more openly and certainly more brutally 
than his predecessors.’607 Amin’s rule was further characterised by disruptive 
economic policies that infamously saw the expulsion of 50,000 Ugandan 
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Asians, bringing Uganda to the brink of economic collapse. ‘Within three 
months of coming into power Amin had suspended all democratic rights’ and 
continued his predecessor’s ban on all political parties.608 This period is still 
considered to be one of the darkest in Ugandan history.  
 Whilst the premise of this chapter is not to reiterate the brutality of 
Amin’s military regime, it is still important to convey how the Acholi adapted to 
an environment driven by the ‘political economy of death’ and violence, which 
was both implied and enacted.609  From the moment that the army staged the 
coup, Amin was on the defensive.610 He had to face external threats from 
Obote and his supporters who were exiled in Tanzania and Sudan plotting his 
downfall. Uganda was placed in a heightened state of alert as army patrols 
increased around the Tanzanian and Sudanese borders, resulting in a 
dramatic increase of defence expenditure.611  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the ‘Northern’ and ‘martial’ identities were instrumental in linking 
Obote to the Acholi both internally and externally. This proved dangerous in 
Amin’s Uganda as the Acholi and the Lango were instantly associated with 
the overthrown regime. All that was wrong with Obote became all that was 
wrong with the Acholi and the Lango. The Baganda blamed them for the exile 
and death of their King, while Amin was mistrustful of them because of their 
dominance in the army.  
The first period of Amin’s direct retribution against prominent 
Northerners came in 1972 following an unsuccessful attempt to invade 
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Uganda by Obote’s supporters from their base in Tanzania. This added to 
Amin’s growing paranoia regarding internal and external subversive activity, 
and he actively began to purge government and the military of any suspected 
dissidents particularly those from Acholi and Lango. Prominent politicians who 
had dared to remain in the country such as the former Minister of Labour Eric 
Lakidi were summoned to Kampala and incarcerated out of fear that they 
would encourage anti-government activities.612  The reaction to invasion in 
Acholi reflected the uneasy atmosphere in the region. When the news 
regarding the invasion reached Acholi, district reports described an air of 
euphoria and jubilant celebrations. However, when they learnt that the 
Ugandan Army had driven Obote’s troops back to Tanzania, ‘the people 
became despondent.’613 Within a few days of the failed counter-coup, at least 
ten prominent civil servants, chiefs and businessmen in the region had 
‘disappeared’ from their homes, believed to have escaped into exile.614 
It was not simply the fear of violence that drove Amin’s unpopularity 
among the Acholi. F.J. Ravenhill argues that from the onset of the military 
dictatorship there could be no doubt as to Amin’s genuine popularity among 
large sectors of the ordinary Ugandans. Because he was an ordinary man 
with little schooling, the common man could identify more with him than the 
intellectual leaders who had been educated abroad.615 Undoubtedly, Amin 
received a considerable amount of support from the Baganda, where he was 
able to capitalise on the tensions between his predecessor and the 
Kingdom.616 As Kasozi argues, ‘The Baganda would have welcomed anyone 
who replaced Obote.’617  In Acholi however, local political elites, were pushed 
into exile by the new regime through fear and/or force, and those who could 
not leave withdrew from political life. Even those who held prominent civil 
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service positions in the region retreated further from the towns to the villages:  
‘My father who was a chief judge in Gulu retired as soon as Amin came into 
power. He said he could not work under a military man. He left Gulu and went 
to Anaka to work on his farm.’618  
As the previous chapter demonstrated, Acholi politicians had previously 
used local and national political arenas to challenge Obote’s authority, and 
while the relationship with the former President was often tumultuous it still 
adhered to certain established rules of political engagement. These rules 
recognised social, political and economic hierarchy, and were centred on a 
certain degree of local political autonomy. Under this political contract, Obote 
and the Acholi were able to bargain and share commodities, while central 
government deterred ‘competitors from overplaying their hand and 
endangering state control.’619 But, as in all matters regarding high politics, 
there were rules regarding participants. Those who sought to engage in 
politics at this level needed certain credentials if they were to be taken 
seriously by their peers. Within the Acholi polity, these credentials could be 
derived from education, gerontocratic authority, chiefly power as well as 
monetary capital. Those who had these credentials were elevated to power by 
the masses through the power structures that governed life in Acholi. Amin 
however did not adhere to these rules: he lacked education, came from a 
small tribe, and had no connection to royalty. Consequently although the 
Ocols publically declared their support for the new President, privately there 
was an intellectual and ethnic mistrust of Amin. Firstly, the Kakwa tribe to 
which he belonged was small and had played a negligible part in Ugandan 
national politics. How, then could a man of no education and no connection to 
no familial connections to political authority, become President of Uganda? In 
this regard, Amin’s regime unbalanced the relationships between high and low 
political structures.620  
 
Amin did not care about education. His ministers were very junior 
people. My secretary became my boss at the time because she was 
                                                
618 (IF/M) NAU: Interview with retired civil servant, Gulu, 9 June 2012.  
619 Lonsdale, ‘Political Tribalism and Moral ethnicity’, 76. 
620 Ibid. 
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his friend. Can you imagine? He employed anyone he liked. One day 
she was serving food; he looked at her and decided there and then that 
she would be promoted. This woman had no qualifications for the 
job.621  
 
Furthermore, the historic marginalisation of Acholi economically in comparison 
to the South meant that the acquisition of education had become one of the 
only means to progress economically and socially. Consequently, social 
prestige was placed highly by the Acholi on the acquisition of formal 
education. ‘When you are educated and if you have been to study away you 
are treated like a King when you came back to the villages. They look at you 
differently as if you are more important than them.’622 As such, p’Bitek’s 
character of Lawino, the village wife who despised her husband’s Western 
education and viewed it as a threat to Acholi traditional practices, is an 
unrealistic depiction of the normative relationship between the educated and 
the uneducated in Acholi. The internal contestations between these two 
groups did not take place because the latter resented the other. Firstly, the 
relationship was based on the redistribution of resources through the 
reciprocity of privilege. The Lawinos encouraged the educated Ocols to 
access and occupy positions of power that they were unable to. They hoped 
that the privileges and resources obtained from these high-ranking positions 
would be redistributed back to them.623 Thus the internal contest was derived 
from the Lawinos wanting to access the commodities that came with being an 
educated Acholi in Uganda. Similarly, because of the prominence of ethno-
politics in the centre, the local politicians needed to maintain effective 
connections to the locality to bolster their legitimacy. Within these structures 
of legitimate political authority, Amin did not appeal to the ‘common’ Acholi 
because he did not represent what many of them aspired to be. He was an 
outsider, both ethnically and politically. He was not like Obote, drawn from the 
political elite who had gained their political education at district level before 
moving to the national platform. Nor was he the son of a prominent King or 
                                                
621 (IF/M) NAU: Interview with retired civil servant, Gulu, 9 June 2012  
622 (F/M) AU: interview with UPC politician, Kampala, 4 February 2012.  
623 K. Davis, Human Society, (New York: Macmillan Co, 1949), 367; G. E. Lenski, Power and 
Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966). 
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chief. His lack of education and cultural prestige, rather than being an appeal 
to the ‘common man’, actually served to diminish his credibility as leader and 
a politician on the local stage.    
Publically there remained an unspoken tension between the Acholi and 
Amin’s regime, as each side represented a risk to the other. The Acholi’s 
perceived allegiance to Obote in Amin’s view meant that in his capacity as 
President he had to play a balancing game. Firstly, Amin initially needed to 
reassure the Acholi that his regime would not intentionally victimise the 
peoples of the region in revenge for the sins of his predecessor. Seven 
months after the coup Amin embarked on a tour of the North. Its main premise 
was to encourage the people to stand behind him and not to be fearful. He 
sought to legitimise his own claim to power by stressing that without the 
Acholi he would not be where he was now, as they were the ones who 
recommended him for promotion in the army.  Amin worked to ensure that 
that district administrators explained to populace the necessity for the military 
coup.624 Three months after the take-over, the Acholi District Team and 
Planning Committee held a meeting to discuss some of these points. Unlike 
the previous minutes prior to the military takeover, this particular one reads as 
political manifesto for the government, and it is highly probable that officials in 
central government had prepared the contents. The topics discussed had little 
to do with matters regarding the day-to-day workings of the local councils, but 
were instead a list of justifications for a military takeover.625 Amin also 
recognised the importance of manipulating the existing tensions between the 
Acholi and the Lango and as such the committee were reminded of Obote’s 
‘favouritism’ towards the Lango. During a gathering to welcome the new 
President in Padibe, East Acholi, Amin reiterated that even though Obote was 
from the North, he still had not trusted the Acholi.626  It was made clear that 
there should be no sympathy for the former regime, as it had done nothing to 
help the peoples of the region. The minutes of the meetings show a marked 
change in the content of the discussions by the Acholi administrators and 
                                                
624 KDA: Minutes of Acholi District Team and Planning Committee 9 March 1971. 
625 Ibid. 
626 ‘President warns refugees’ The Uganda Argus, 24 September 1971. 
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councilmen. Previous council meetings were characterised with heated 
debates and participants had not pulled any punches when it came to 
criticising Obote or his government. They were not inhibited in voicing their 
opinions or bringing to light any disagreements. However, this meeting was 
merely a formality and exercise to praise Amin. This was indication of the 
power and fear that Amin was already creating at the district level. It was a 
sign that the district councils would no longer be a forum for debate and 
political negotiations.  
Amin’s tour of the North had another more ominous motivation. 
Geographically, the Acholi border with southern Sudan served as an entry 
point for some of Obote’s soldiers. The Acholi were warned not to join the 
guerrillas and that anybody suspected of being a rebel would be punished. 
The people of Padibe were asked to tell any of their ‘brothers and sisters’ who 
had run away to Sudan and Tanzania after the military coup to come back 
home ‘and report to the police as the government would not do them any 
harm.’627 Publically Amin could not admit his immediate distrust of the Acholi, 
as his policy in the beginning was to pursue a charm offensive by endearing 
himself to the peoples of the region. Privately, given the proliferation of 
intelligence reports that outlined the hostility in the region towards his 
Presidency, and the number of Acholi that were ‘self-exiling’, Amin must have 
understood the difficulties in engaging in a battle for hearts and minds of the 
Acholi.  
An indication of the number of Acholi and other Ugandans leaving the 
country was the implementation of the missing person’s decree brought into 
effect in 1973. Dependants of missing persons were instructed to wait for six 
months before they applied for the missing relative’s estate to be 
administered.628 This was a tactical ploy by the government as it coerced the 
families to formally report their relatives missing before they could receive 
money for their estate. If they did not, the properties remained under 
government ownership. Added to this, it was a direct attack on civil servants 
                                                
627 Ibid. 
628 GDA Box 541: Letter from the Minister of Provincial Administration to all the DCs, 14 
November 1973. 
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and soldiers who had fled Uganda. Family members left behind who were 
occupying government properties in place of the missing person were 
expected to vacate the property within three months of the relative being 
posted as missing.629 The government used the decree to help compile a list 
of missing persons to be designated as enemies of the state, as under the 
regime flight became an indication of one’s treason. In Acholi, movement out 
of the districts was frequently reported in intelligence reports, indicating that it 
was not merely high-profile politicians and soldiers who were ‘self-exiling.’ In 
April 1971 nine workers listed as missing from a camp-spraying unit were 
suspected to have fled to Sudan. Another fourteen workers had not reported 
to their jobs in Akweri camp. In the month of April 1971 eighty-six workers 
were unaccounted for with the most missing people registered in, Kilak, Patiko 
and Chua, all of which were in East Acholi directly bordering South Sudan.630 
These intelligence reports were distributed secretly at the top level of 
government and there is no indication to suggest that they were merely a 
façade by the regime to try and cover up those who had been illegally 
detained or murdered by state.  
The distribution of local political power dramatically changed under 
Amin’s government. High profile local politicians were now considered 
enemies of the state. In Obote’s regime, particularly before 1966, ‘the 
compromise guaranteeing the welfare of the middle classes and 
administrative elites had made it possible to ensure the survival of the post-
colonial state and provide it with authentically indigenous roots.’631 Following 
the deposition of the Kabaka and the installation of one-party rule, this 
‘compromise’ was inevitably renegotiated. Amin’s regime however further 
diminished the avenue in which these negotiations took place. The Acholi 
political and administrative elite represented all that Amin was afraid of, as 
they were seen to be the political mouthpiece of the former regime and could 
potentially mobilise the Acholi populace against the military government. They 
had been the political face of the Acholi during Obote’s presidency and were 
                                                
629 Ibid. 
630 GDA Box 541: Letter from W.B Masolo, Tsetse Officer Spray Unit to Senior Tsetse Ofiicer 
Acholi/Karamoja , April 1971; KDA: East Acholi District Intelligence Report January 1972. 
631 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 51. 
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immediately marked out as potential collaborators with the rebels groups in 
Sudan and Tanzania. As one former soldier under Obote recounted, ‘Amin 
only killed those in Kampala, if you had a big belly then you were killed.’632 
Those that ‘dressed well and spoke Luo’ in Kampala were placing themselves 
at risk.633 The ‘big belly’ reference can be viewed symbolically and evidentially 
as a two-side analogy. Firstly, it offers insight into how the Acholi non-political 
actor viewed the ‘big men’ or in this case the Ocols. These were the men, as 
Bayart argues, who controlled the local and national political apparatus and 
made themselves powerful and rich at the expense of the masses by 
manipulating and creating networks rooted in the politics of clientalism and 
patronage, largely sanctioned by the state.634 They could be visually identified 
through the clothes that they wore, where they ate, and whom they conversed 
with. In some instances their physical size betrayed their status, as the more 
power and money you had, the more food you could buy and consume, 
creating the physical and symbolic ‘big belly’. In Amin’s Uganda it became so 
that ‘if you showed that you were somebody you would be killed.635 In some 
instances Acholi politicians who had been living in Kampala would flee back to 
the villages in fear of the lives only to be followed and arrested, although 
family members without their own political profiles were often spared. The 
government believed that those who did not have a ‘big belly’ had little 
involvement or interest in the negotiations of high politics and as such they 
were deemed to be relatively harmless.636 The fall of the Ocols meant that 
local Acholi politicians who had utilised the district councils to bargain for 
power were marginalised, exiled or executed. Those who remained would find 
that their basic rights, such as the freedom of movement and political 
engagement to be severely restricted.   
 
 
                                                
632 (IF/M) NAU: Interview with private security guard, Kitgum Town centre, 4 June 2012.  
633 (IF/M) NAU: Interview with local business owner, Gulu, 18 June 2012.  
634 Bayart, The State in Africa; Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 50-51 
635 (F/M) AU: Interview with local youth leader, Langol-Nwoya District, 15 July 2012  
636 KDA: Kitgum District Intelligence 1974-1976; Interviews, Gulu, Kampala, Kitgum, Entebbe, 
London 2012-13. 
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5.2. State Surveillance and the Rule of Fear  
 
Immediately after the coup d’état, Amin was mindful to distance himself from 
the authoritarian rule of Obote, and stressed in the national media that the 
new military government was simply a transitional one that would allow 
Ugandans to regroup and recover before democratic elections could take 
place.637 But he faced an uphill battle to deliver on this promise, not only 
because of the ethnic tensions in Uganda, but also the growing economic 
crisis, something that his predecessor had failed to deal with. Uganda was at 
this time facing its most serious financial crisis since independence, with a 
national debt of nearly three hundred million shillings.638 From September 
1970 the balance of payments were in a constant deficit and the reserve 
levels were running dangerously low. The country was saddled with heavy 
public debt repayments for loans acquisitioned from abroad. A drought had 
jeopardised the main agricultural exports, particularly coffee, whilst regional 
instability in East Africa meant that the prospects of future trade were 
threatened. The Finance Minister E.B. Wakhweya addressed the cabinet 
immediately after the coup warning them of the dismal financial situation: ‘I 
would like to inform my colleagues that the government has by now utilised to 
the very maximum of all the short term borrowing facilities.’639 The Minister 
recommended that the only way to prevent an economic collapse would be to 
drastically decrease defence expenditure. However, he conceded that even if 
the defence budget were cut by fifty per cent, there would still be a deficit of 
100 million Ugandan shillings.  Although aware of the economic state of the 
country, due to the security situation, Amin actually went on to spend double 
the amount his predecessor had spent on defence, rather than heeding 
Wakhweya’s advice.640  
                                                
637 The Army takes over’, The Uganda Argus, 26 January 1971.  
638 UNA/E Box 8 Ref 28: ‘Uganda’s financial situation Budget review 1971/72 (secret) Agenda 
for cabinet meeting due to be held on 5 October 1971.  
639 Ibid. 
640 Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 111. 
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Amin also wanted to appear presidential. He was not an educated man 
nor could he claim to have Obote’s extensive political experience.641 To 
compensate, and create a façade of legitimacy he spent a large amount of 
money on cars, residencies and lavish ceremonies. When the Finance 
Minister was advocating spending cuts, Amin requested one million shillings 
to buy Mercedes-Benzes for all his ministers and a further nine million on 
personal security units.642 Soldiers loyal to the regime were rewarded with 
financial incentives and property, and a large amount of money was spent on 
building new barracks. Army personnel became the main beneficiaries from 
the expulsion of the Ugandan Asians in 1972 as they were given first priority 
in auctions of Asian property and cars property.643 To ensure absolute loyalty 
from his ministers and soldiers, Amin’s rule, just like his predecessors, 
became dependent on the distribution of material benefits to feed the patron 
client networks.644 Amin used material and financial incentives to ‘induce 
unconditional submission’ among the army corps, yet these resources did not 
and could not be extended to wider populace.645 Consequently, 
authoritarianism, violence and military coercion served as a mechanism to 
ensure ordinary Ugandans remained obedient. 
Amin’s initial purge of the army corps of Acholi and Lango was brutal 
and violent. 
In March 1971 more than thirty Lango/Acholi soldiers were dynamited 
at Makindye Barracks. On 22 July 1971 about 150-500 Acholi and 
Lango from Simba Battalion, Mbarara were herded into trucks, taken to 
an isolation ranch, and gunned down. Further massacres of these 
                                                
641 Amin’s insecurity regarding his lack of education is evident from the numerous titles he 
bestowed on himself. Some of these titles included a CBE, Victoria Cross, and a Military 
Cross. He conferred on himself a Doctorate from Makerere University, and asked to be 
referred to as ‘President for Life, Field Marshal Al Hadji Doctor Idi Amin Dada.’ 
642 UNA/E Box 8 Ref 28: ‘Uganda’s financial situation Budget review 1971/72 (secret) Agenda 
for cabinet meeting due to be held on the 5 October 1971.  
643 Ravenhill, ‘Military Rule in Uganda, 229-260. 
644 Berman, Dickson Eyoh, Kymlicka, Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa, 5 
645 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 42.  
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ethnic groups occurred at military barracks at Massindi, Soroti and 
Kitgum.646 
 
A year after the military coup Amin reorganised the army corps, retiring 
twenty-two senior officers, many of whom were from the North and suspected 
of remaining loyal to Obote.647 By the mid-1970s it was estimated that only a 
third of the pre-coup army remained and around ten thousand new recruits 
had been incorporated into the Ugandan army, mainly from Amin’s home 
region of the West Nile.648 Following in the footsteps of his predecessor, Amin 
created his own secret intelligence units, replacing the GSU with the State 
Research Bureau (SRB) in November 1971 whilst the Special Force Unit 
(SFU) replaced the Public Safety Unit (PSU) in 1972. The Anti-Smuggling 
Bureau was created circa 1972-3 in response to the worsening economic 
situation and tasked with targeting ‘successful businessmen accused of 
smuggling and hording.’649 The intelligence units, particularly the SRB, 
became infamous for their brutality in dealing with whomever its members 
designated as a suspected dissident. 
The external threat from Obote and his supporters was instrumental in 
the increase of military expenditure and reinforced Amin’s belief that 
authoritarian rule was a necessity to contend with any potential internal and 
external challenges to his military government.650  Along the Acholi and South 
Sudan border continuous reports of robbing, extortion, killings, as well as the 
illegal movements of arms and food across the border to Sudan, were noted 
by intelligence reports and local chiefs. These reports were more prominent 
                                                
646 Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 111; ‘Twelve are sentenced to death in 
military tribunal accused of treason’ The Voice of Uganda, 6 September 1977. 
647 UNA/E: Box 7 Ref 27: Letter from the President’s Office to all Permanent Secretaries and 
all heads of departments, 23 May 1972. 
648 Ravenhill, ‘Military Rule in Uganda’, 241. 
649 Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 113. 
650 Give readers correct Info’ The Uganda Argus, 12 September 1971. UNA/E: Box 8, Ref 20: 
Minutes of the Meeting between Ministers and DC’s held in the Cabinet Library on the 28  
April 1971. 
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during the first two years following Amin’s takeover.651 The conflicts around 
the border can be attributed to remnants of Obote’s supporters fleeing the 
country as well as more opportunistic individuals taking advantage of the 
immediate political and military post-coup chaos. The activities around the 
border were also an indication that at this time at least, the government did 
not have absolute military control in Acholi. An indication that movement to 
and from southern Sudan was easier than would have been expected given 
the increased security measures, can be found in a report written by the DC of 
East Acholi in 1972. Sudanese migrants who had legally settled in Uganda 
often crossed back across the border to go and visit their relatives. The DC in 
Kitgum commented that it was sometimes hard to differentiate between those 
who were permanent residents of Uganda and those who had crossed the 
border illegally. Added to this were clashes between Sudanese refugees and 
local Acholi clans, which continued to inflame already contentious situation. In 
1972 a fight over cattle broke out between Lotoku tribesmen from Sudan 
around Kitgum resulting in three serious injuries and fifty arrests. The quarrel 
between the two sides became so violent that around 500 Sudanese refugees 
fled to the local police station for protection, while the rest simply crossed the 
border back to their villages.652 The situation around the border was made 
worse because many of the chiefs and local residents who were ordered to 
report anyone suspected of being an ‘illegal’ entrant and those harbouring 
them, were not doing so because they feared repercussions from intelligence 
units for allowing illegal entry into Ugandan territory. More worrying for the 
regime was that the majority of those who had been apprehended were found 
to be in possession of illegal firearms.653 Food supplies were being smuggled 
across the bordering counties of Atyak and Palabek without much hindrance 
from the local population, indicating that there was local support for Obote’s 
rebel movement.654 The families who remained awaited their relatives’ return 
                                                
651 KDA: Acholi District Intelligence Report January 1972; GDA Box: 541: Security Report 
from County Chief of Kilak to DC East Acholi, 14 December 1971.  
652 KDA: East Acholi District Intelligence Report, December 1972. 
653 KDA: Acholi District Intelligence Report, January 1972. 
654 KDA: Acholi District Intelligence Report January 1972; GDA Box: 541:  Security Report 
from County Chief of Kilak to DC East Acholi, 4 December 1971.  
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and did all that they could to support those in exile. Amin could no more cut 
these familial and kin ties than he could persuade the Acholi that he had their 
best interests at heart. 
Permission had to be asked in writing to travel in and out of the district 
to any other counties in the region. Local chiefs were instructed to send 
fortnightly reports to the DC ‘covering all aspects of events in their areas, 
especially wrongful ones’, updating security reports and naming suspected 
subversives.655 Rather than being an indication of the strength of government 
surveillance, these instructions were more indicative of a weak state that was 
fearful of the potential subversive capabilities of its civilians. All parish chiefs 
were instructed to immediately hand over a full list of people living in their 
area who were Tanzanian nationals or had Tanzanian parentage, regardless 
of whether they were permanent residents of Uganda.656 Any unauthorised 
visits to neighbouring counties were to be immediately reported to the DC: 
 
Today I will again reiterate the points I made on my safari. These 
points are very important and anybody who does not follow them is 
committing a grave offence punishable without mercy. Anybody who 
wishes to go on a journey must make a report to my office as to where 
he is going, how long for, what he is going to do and whether the 
purpose of the journey is true or false will then have to be ascertained. 
The Jago, introducing the person to the authorities concerned, will 
issue them with a letter of permission. The rwot kweri (cultivation team 
headsman) must immediately report to my office any visitors that come 
into the area. The visitors must be asked why they are there and where 
they will be staying, if they do not make clear these answers they 
should immediately be arrested and brought to me so that I can report 
them to the police. Every week the rwot kweri must make two reports to 
the mukungu (parish chief) concerning absentees and one to me to 
transfer to the county chief.  When the Jago (community leader) is 
farming the villages roll calls shall be made to make sure that 
everybody is present. Nobody is allowed to go to the market place 
without the intention of selling or buying goods.657 
 
                                                
655 KDA: Letter from Jago of Padibe to all Wakungu Chiefs, rwodi kweri in Padibe Division. 24 
May 1971; KDA File: DEC/1B ‘Applications for Permission to Leave the District’ 1972-1973. 
656 GDA Box 541: Letter from County Chief of Nwoya to all Jagi, 26 February 1975. 
657 KDA: Letter from Jago of Padibe to all Wakungu Chiefs, rwodi kweri in Padibe Division. 24 
May 1971 (quotation paraphrased). 
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Adopting the language and rhetoric of central government, county and sub-
county chiefs sent similar instructions to all parish chiefs and community 
leaders in the region. Herbst argues that ‘states are only viable if they are able 
to control the territory defined in their borders. Control is assured by 
developing an infrastructure to broadcast power and by gaining loyalty of 
citizens.’658  Without effective local institutions, loyalty from the peoples of 
Acholi and the paucity of economic resources to administer power and 
authority through formal channels, Amin resorted to violence and fear to 
ensure civil obedience. State surveillance executed by units such as the SRB 
and PSU became the means by which Amin could in Acholi, survey, coerce 
and control the Acholi population through the fear of violent retribution and/or 
detention: 
These were the principle organs which were responsible for the 
kidnapping and liquidation of countless Ugandans at all levels of 
society, and they operated on unlimited budgets both within and 
outside the country. These, unlike Amin’s army, recruited their 
personnel from all areas of Uganda and their informers were literally to 
be found everywhere as their license to kill, main, detain or extort was 
not subject to any restrictions.659 
 
Thus, the borders became prison walls for those who did not have the means 
of escape and the Acholi became the ‘inmates,’ used to gather information 
and coerced to act as state collaborators.660 The threat of violence, the 
constant presence of uniformed personnel and the fear of detention at any 
given time because of often faulty or manipulated intelligence reports meant 
that Acholi became a region of direct and indirect terror. The latter was 
mediated through what Michael Taussig describes as ‘the coils of rumour, 
gossip, story, and chit-chat where ideology and ideas become emotionally 
powerful and enter into active and social circulation and meaningful 
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Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3 
659 Karugire, The Roots of Instability in Uganda, 79. 
660 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punishment. 
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existence.’661 On the national stage, Amin and his security units became the 
representation of death, fear and direct violence, perpetuated through public 
executions, ‘disappearances’ and mass killings with bodies dumped for public 
view.662 Massacres of soldiers took place in barracks in Masindi, Soroti and 
Kitgum, with further of purges in Lango and Acholi districts in 1973 and 1977 
specifically targeting Acholi elites.663 The arrest and sometimes public 
execution of high profile figures such as Bishop Benedicto Kiwanuka in 1972, 
and author Byron Kawada and Archbishop Janani Jakaliya Luwum, in 1977 
fed into the emerging persona of the violent tyrant in the national 
conscious.664 In Acholi, the coils of ‘rumour, gossip and chit-chat’ pertaining to 
the military regime created a self-perpetuating political climate creating a 
‘culture of terror and a space of death.’665 Consequently, for the populace in 
Uganda life became consumed by the fear of what was being done and what 
could be done if one was accused of being a subversive.  
In Acholi, fear was reinforced through surveillance, with the most 
visible level involving the police and army personnel monitoring suspected 
subversive activities. These soldiers were outwardly visible and their role was 
clearly understood by the Acholi who encountered them. They wore the 
uniforms and badges of the state and they became the key representatives of 
state control and violence. They were soon seen as ‘Amin’s soldiers’, an 
identification with the personal office of the presidency that had not existed in 
the region during Obote’s presidency.666 While this was due primarily to the 
replacement of Acholi and Lango of top army officials with Amin’s own 
recruits, in part it also had a lot to do with the perceived illegitimacy of the 
soldiers and their increasing authoritarian activities in Acholi. Army personnel 
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were often sent into the villages to arrest suspected spies. The levels of 
arrests and detentions increased so much that by 1973 the district treasurer 
for East Acholi commented on the increasing financial strains of feeding 
central government remand prisoners who were being detained in the 
locality.667 As fear of the men in uniforms grew it became progressively more 
difficult to travel around freely, even for simple tasks like collecting firewood. 
In some instances families who were hiding a wanted person would send 
scouts into trading centres to check if there were any soldiers present before 
going to sell goods.668 Soldiers in Acholi came to be the embodiment of state 
violence, to be feared, obeyed and avoided if possible.   
Although it is estimated that around two-thirds of the pre-coup army 
was eventually replaced, interviews in the region show that there were still a 
few Acholi soldiers left within the Uganda army.669 Archival documents offer 
little insight into their treatment or motivations, but interviews in the region 
suggest that for those who remained, it became a ‘catch-22’ situation. In this 
instance, there needs to be a differentiation between politically minded career 
soldiers, and low ranking army recruits. The latter, restricted by familial and 
financial ties, stayed behind and continued with their jobs. As one former 
Acholi soldier under Amin recounted, ‘I had a large family. At that time I had 
three wives and eleven children, I still needed to work to send them to school 
and provide food for them. Yes things were dangerous under Amin, but as 
long as you kept yourself clean, you could carry on.’670  Given the economic 
situation in the region, being a soldier under Amin gave recruits access to 
certain valuable commodities, particularly food. When a situation arose where 
food was not available the populace were sometimes instructed to feed the 
soldiers with their own supplies. In 1975 the county chief of Lamwo in East 
Acholi instructed all the sub-county and parish chiefs to inform their people 
that some army men who had been stationed at Madi Opei barracks to 
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Acholi men remained serving in the army during Amin’s regime.  
670 (IF/M) NAU: Interview with private security guard, Kitgum Town centre, 4 June 2012.  
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‘protect’ them did not have enough food to eat. The parish chiefs were asked 
to go and collect chickens, cows and goats from the villages so that the 
soldiers could be fed.671 Nonetheless, families were aware of the dangers of 
allowing their sons and daughters to join or remain in the army, and often 
discouraged them from doing so: 
 
None of my brothers joined the army; my father discouraged us 
because of the dangers. But even when Amin was in power, many of 
my friends still joined. Nobody hated them, after all when you are in the 
army you are just commanded and have to do what you are told. You 
don’t have any independent thinking. We all understood that this was 
the case.672 
 
The situation was not as black and white as simply stating that the army corps 
under Amin became a Kakwa army, nor is it true to suggest that it was simply 
a Northern army under Obote. The Acholi in the region did not single out the 
Acholi soldiers who remained in the army, or policemen, as traitors or 
collaborators primarily because they did not represent the political branch of 
Amin’s government. They were simply doing their jobs just as they had under 
Obote. Unlike the soldiers from outside the region many of the Acholi soldiers 
had a cultural connection to the land and the people as well as family ties, and 
as such there were sympathies and a certain level of support in the region for 
them. Interviews with Acholi soldiers under Amin indicate that there were 
support networks among soldiers in the locality to assist those who wanted to 
flee after becoming fearful for their lives. One interviewee recounted how he 
was forced to escape to Sudan after a fellow officer told him that his name 
had appeared in a list of men to be summoned to a barracks in Kitgum for 
questioning:  
This man told me not to go into work that day that it would be 
dangerous for me. He gave me the contact of a friend who was already 
hiding in the mission in Kalongo. The man had arranged for me to be 
smuggled out with a pickup that was also taking others to Sudan. That 
night I escaped with my life.673  
	  
                                                
671 KDA: Letter from County Chief Lamwo to all Jagis, 3 May 1975.  
672 (F/M) AU: interview with subsistence farmer, Omoro County, 2 July 2012.  
673 (F/M) NAU: Interview with private security guard, Lukung, 1 August 2012.  
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There are also reports of Acholi soldiers and policemen allowing suspects to 
escape after being captured, claiming to have been overpowered, indicating a 
small level of internal social and political resistance against the regime. 
Although their motives do not clearly emerge from the archival records, it is 
likely that they were motivated by loyalty and clan obligation to friends and 
family.674  
Despite the internal fears faced by Acholi recruits in the army corps, if 
they kept themselves ‘clean’ soldiering could still provide access to power and 
material resources in the locality. By wearing the uniform one automatically 
became untouchable, unchallenged by the civil society and other units of law 
enforcement. The ‘uniform’ allowed them to move about safely without the 
fear, harassment and potential detention faced by Acholi civilians. The Gulu 
and Kitgum archives show an increasing number of reports of Acholi men 
being apprehended for impersonating a government soldier. ‘At least under 
Obote everybody knew who was a soldier. They had to carry badges and be 
able to identify themselves at any time. Under Amin, these rules were not 
being obeyed.’675 It is unlikely that these ‘badgeless’ army personnel were 
members of the secret police and army units, as government military 
intelligence reports were the ones highlighting the these incidents. They could 
have been members of the rebel groups entering Acholi from Sudan, or they 
could have been opportunistic Acholi civilians trying to capitalise on the 
symbolic power of the uniform. The consequences of being caught posing as 
a soldier were severe as military units were instructed to apprehend and some 
cases shoot anyone caught committing the offence.676 The uniform in this 
instance became a representation of fear to those that observed it and a form 
of protection to those that wore it. Because of the clear visibility of the police 
and soldiers in the region, there was perhaps less reason to be fearful of 
them. After all you could always avoid somebody that you could identify, or at 
least mind your words and actions in their presence. In this respect, the 
                                                
674 GDA Box 541: Acholi District Monthly District Intelligence Reports, 12 March 1974- 
November 1977. 
675 (F/M) NAU: Interview with subsistence farmer, Anaka, Nwoya District 21 June 2012.  
676 GDA Box 541: Acholi District Monthly District Intelligence Reports, 12 March 1974- 
November 1977. 
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surveillance of these armed personnel was not as clandestine or as 
dangerous as the second level of surveillance that can also be observed in 
Acholi at this time.  
 
5.3. The Militarisation and Rise of the Chiefs 
 
It was not only groups of armed militia who were instrumental in ensuring that 
this culture of fear was maintained: the Acholi themselves became complicit in 
their own surveillance as fear reinforced the very mechanisms of control that 
were being utilised by central government. As in Foucault’s assessments on 
governmentality, ‘he who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own 
subjection.’677 Furthermore, Mbembe’s discussion of the ‘intimacy of tyranny’ 
highlights the postcolonial subject’s ability to assume  
 
multiple identities’ and thereby to ‘provide his or her loyalty, and by 
compromising with the corrupting control that state power tends to 
exercise at all levels of everyday life, the subject is re-affirming that this 
power is incontestable . . . precisely the better to play with it and modify 
it whenever possible.’678 (Italics in original). 
 
Archival records show that Acholi county, sub-county, and parish chiefs were 
the most prolific providers of intelligence to the security units. This is primarily 
because it was their task, and failure to comply would have placed them at 
great personal risk. Although they were positioned as spies they were at the 
same time being spied upon themselves. Chiefs were expected to attend 
regular security meetings and anybody who failed to attend would be noted 
and asked to provide a written response as to why within seven days. 
Absentees would automatically be designated as uncooperative or, worse still, 
                                                
677 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment, 202-203. 
678 Mbembe, On the Post Colony, 129.  
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in league with anti-government rebels.679 In this way they were coerced into 
fully participating in the surveillance of their subjects.  The strain placed on 
chiefs can be seen through reports of increased alcoholism impeding their 
abilities to carry out their daily tasks.680 There are very little archival sources 
available regarding what the consequences were for chiefs accused 
subversive behaviour, but the little that does exist indicates that they were 
relieved of their posts or remanded in prison.681   
Facing such threats, chiefs and local administrators were forced to 
become the eyes and ears of the government. To ensure that chiefs were 
identifiable as employees of the state, Amin decided that standard uniforms 
were to be issued. There was a hierarchy of the cost of the uniforms ranging 
from over 700 hundred shillings designated to county chiefs and around 400 
hundred shillings to the lower level chiefs such as the jago and the mukungu 
(parish and sub-parish chiefs).682 Each chief was required to have two sets of 
uniform including matching shoes, the costs of which were met by the district 
administration and recoverable directly from the chief’s wages. This was to 
guarantee that financial restraints could not be used as an excuse not to wear 
the uniforms.683 
The process of uniforming chiefs is indication of the role they were now 
expected to play in Acholi. They were to be utilised as another vector of state 
control in monitoring the peoples of the region. Generally chiefs complied with 
the instructions from the state and sent frequent reports to the DC and to the 
police reporting and alleging subversive behaviour. Added to their compliance 
with the state, this increased power also provided an avenue for private gain 
and pursuing personal vendettas against rival chiefs, mirroring activities within 
previous Native Councils.  In March 1973 the sub-county chief of Alero sent a 
letter to the DC in West Acholi regarding an illegal meeting that had taken 
                                                
679 GDA Box 541: Letter from Rwot Aswa Acholi to all jagi Paicho, 11 February 1971; GDA 
Box 541: Intelligence Report, 16 November 1977. 
680 GDA Box 541: ‘Acholi District’ Monthly District Intelligence Reports, 12 March 1974- 
November 1977. 
681 GDA Box 541: Letter from J.Y Owe Jago of Alero to DC Gulu, 11 November 1973. 
682 KDA: East Acholi District Treasurer with Auditors Comments, 25 October 1977. 
683 KDA: Letter from the Ministry of Provincial Administration to DC Kitgum, 4 October 1976. 
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place in his area. The alleged culprits listed were other chiefs in the region, 
indicating that it was not only politicians or military rebels who were being 
reported on. 
 
Image 1: Saza (county) Chief’s Uniform: East Acholi District, 1977. 684  
 
Other reports to the police and the intelligence unit consisted of alleged night 
meetings, public statements by individuals condemning the government and 
the distribution of anonymously written letters accusing the government of 
murder and illegal detentions. All the informants listed names of the 
individuals involved, their home villages and gave detailed reports on the 
contents of the meetings.685 The fear of reprisals for not reporting suspicious 
activities was so great that some chiefs became proactive in their fortnightly 
security reports, detailing any incident that could be misinterpreted as 
                                                
684 KDA: Letter from County Chief Chua to Treasurer East Acholi District, 2 July 1977. 
685 GDA Box 541: Report from Jago of Alero to DC Gulu, 20 March 1973; GDA Box 541: 
Letter from County Chief Alokolum Koich to the military station, Kitgum, 17 December 1973. 
 219 
I                
suspicious or implicate them in any wrong doing. Unknown visitors were 
promptly reported to the authorities alongside a plea to the intelligence unit 
denying any wrongdoing or knowledge of why the visitor was in the area.686  
Another motivation for ‘informing’ was derived from opportunism, as 
some of the security reports went further than merely a mandatory obligation. 
Although chiefs were coerced to participate, they were not above 
manipulating the political situation for their own goals. Some chiefs saw the 
situation as a chance to settle personal vendettas and further their own 
interests. This was not a new phenomenon: chiefly rivalry for commodities 
and power pre-dated the colonial institution and had continued to thrive post-
independence. Under Obote, they had squabbled over land, boundaries, 
taxes and titles. Under Amin it became possible to take a rival out of the 
equation completely. As a result, chiefs made frequent allegations of 
subversive activities against each other that mostly had a personal content. In 
1975 the sub-parish chief of Alero made an impassioned plea to the DC of 
West Acholi responding to allegations that had been made against him by a 
fellow chief. ‘I have been accused of taking a gift given to the people by the 
government and stealing community materials. They also say that I released a 
medicine woman who had been accused of murder, because I was bribed. 
These people are all setting me back in my work.’687 In a similar incident 
another chief accused the county chief of Kilak of participating in the 
recruitment of anti-government guerrillas, an allegation the latter vehemently 
denied. The frequency of such allegations were remarked upon by the 
intelligence officer who singled out two chiefs who had become prolific in 
reporting each other on false grounds and had been reprimanded for wasting 
police time.688 This is not to say that previous debates regarding land and clan 
affiliation were brushed to one side. They continued much in the same vein 
that they had prior to the military coup. In fact, tribal and clan disputes were 
further emphasised because of central government policies that sought to 
dictate which chiefs were placed in particular regions.689 This meant that in 
                                                
686 GDA Box 541: Letter from County Chief of Kilak to DC Gulu, 11 February 1974. 
687 GDA Box 541: Letter from Jago of Alero to DC Gulu, March 1975. 
688 KDA: District Intelligence Monthly Report, 22 June 1976. 
689 Ravenhill, ‘Military Rule in Uganda’, 229-260. 
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some cases lower ranking chiefs at the sub-county and parish levels were 
often placed in districts where they did not have any ancestral ties, as 
occurred under the colonial Native Administration. These chiefs had a difficult 
task in mobilising the populace of the counties because, despite still being 
Acholi, they were considered as outsiders. Feeling threatened by these new 
recruits, the chiefs drawn from within their home regions turned their people 
against the new appointees. Such disputes were documented in the division 
of Alero where the DC in West Acholi was made aware of the ‘embarrassing 
situation’ that had arisen because of continued clan disputes:     
 
The people of the area are fond of discriminating against people on 
tribal and religious differences. People tend to disregard and try to 
undermine other people who are non-Alero assigned by the 
government to perform some duties in the area. [These people include] 
the parish chiefs, sub-parish chiefs and those who claim to be from the 
royal families [in the area]. In fact sir, these are the people who all the 
time are trying to convince the public not to follow any policy put to 
them by the jago. Just recently the public were asked to dig a road, 
collect charity funds, and come to help in erecting some buildings in a 
school, yet you find that the characters mentioned above in the villages 
telling people not to come to work simply because the jago and the 
head-master of the school are not Alero by birth.690  
 
It was not just ‘outsiders’ who were causing disputes in Alero. Internal tribal 
rivalries between the various clans that lived in the division were becoming a 
matter for great concern, as individuals were discriminated against solely 
because of the clan they were born into.691 As with Moerman’s and Swidler’s 
work on cultural identities, definitions of ‘Acholiness’ change according to 
social and political contexts. In stable societies cultural groups can be more 
inclusive and less stringent requirements are placed on individual 
membership of the group, precisely because settled cultures constrain 
political action over time.692 In unstable societies popular culture is often 
replaced by ‘high culture’ as members of cultural groups sharpen specific 
cultural tools to contend with internal and external threats. Thus, the content 
of ‘Acholiness’ is more readily scrutinised as blood ties and ancestral 
                                                
690 GDA Box 541: Letter from Jago of Alero to DC Gulu, 11 Nov 1973.  
691 GDA Box 541: Monthly Security Report, July 1976. 
692 Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, 284. 
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connections are used to identify those who could potentially pose a threat to 
the group. This can be observed with the practice of inter-ethnic marriage:  
 
My husband was an Acholi and I am Lango. When we married I had to 
leave my home in Aduku [Lango] and go to his village in Lukung 
[Kitgum]. We married in 1980, but when all the problems with Obote 
and the Acholi became worse, the Acholi started to hate me. They said 
I was weak and could not cook and clean like an Acholi women. They 
would say that I was sent there to spy on them and that I should go 
back to the Lango. My auntie also married an Acholi man after 
independence. She said that she was accepted by his village and lived 
well there. But they even started to abuse her in the 1980s saying that 
she was not one of them.693 
 
Yet even internally with the wider Acholi ethnic community there was a further 
fragmentation. Inter-clan disputes and attacks against ‘outsiders’ became 
more prominent as economic commodities became harder to come by. The 
effects of the national economic crisis on the Acholi was reflected in the rise of 
thefts and the increase of break-ins into properties such as missions and farm 
schools to retrieve goods for re-sale on the black market.694 There were 
increased attacks on non-Acholi working in the region by locals, as reported in 
1979 in Aswa where local villagers attacked non-Acholi ranch workers, 
spearing and killing the cattle in the ranch and destroying property in protest 
at jobs being given to ‘outsiders’.695  The political climate meant that ‘people 
started staying more and more in their birth place’ as they went home to 
hide.’696 Basic commodities became harder to come by and even when they 
were available very few could afford them. In some areas people became 
accustomed to eating food without salt. ‘Things were very expensive under 
Amin, we would return to our villages in poverty with no jobs while all of 
Amin’s men grew richer in the towns.697  
 
                                                
693 (F/F) NAU: Interview with retired widow Jinja, 27 December 2012.  
694 GDA Box 541: Letter from County Chief Aswa to DC Gulu, 8 December 1976. 
695 GDA Box 532: Letter from Ranch Manager in Aswa to DC  Kitgum, 22 November 1979. 
696 (F/M) AU: Interview with local youth leader, Langol-Nwoya District, 15 July 2012  
697 (F/F) NAU: Interview with Acholi housewife, Kampala, 3 February 2012.  
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5.4. The Internal Adjustment to a Dictatorship.  
 
Although Amin’s economic and political policies resulted in the basic functions 
of the local councils falling into disarray, including tax collection, maintenance 
of essential services and council budgets, they did not all together cease to 
exist. Chiefs were still travelling to collect taxes promptly every year in April, 
although whether the money was there to pay them was another story. Those 
who worked in minor roles in the local administrations recounted in interviews 
that their wages were paid on time, although now the amounts fluctuated. 
Cooperatives were still functioning to some degree and progressive farmers 
who needed help were able to utilise them. Chiefs and district administrators 
carried on paying into their local pension plans, although the numbers of 
contributors declined year on year.698 Employment appointment records were 
recorded diligently and staff appraisals carried out every year without fail.699  
The administrative bureaucracy continued much in the same way as the 
previous regime, with application for licence trades and annual account 
estimates written and sent to central government. The bureaucratic 
capabilities of Amin’s regime indicate that even with an autocratic military 
government, there was still a need to show a semblance of administrative 
structures used to effectively govern sovereign a state. In as much as Amin 
became primarily reliant on the rule of fear as a mechanism to rule and control 
the population, he also sought to legitimise his authority by imitating inherited 
bureaucratic colonial structures of governance.700 It also an indication that 
despite economic constraints, the government was still able to financially feed 
                                                
698 MUL/AS GEA U/A (088) 2: East Acholi District Admin: Approved 1971 Estimates 
Confirmed 1972.  
699 Ibid; KDA: Letter from J.M. Masarenhas, Ministry of Public Administration to Town Clerk 
Kitgum. 6 December 1971; Report to the treasurer East Acholi District Administration, 17 
August 1973; Report to the treasurer East Acholi District Administration 26 April 1973; GDA 
Box: 553: Gulu Municipal Council Accounts for the year ending1979, 31 December 1979. 
700 Young, The Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, 283. 
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into this bureaucratic system, challenging the notion that Uganda under Amin 
was a state completely ‘unhinged’.701 
However, the content of these documents give a clear reflection of the 
disorganisation of the local administration and district councils and the 
economic situation in Acholi. To acquire more revenue the government 
emphasised the criminal implications of not having a license fee for fish 
mongering, trading in liquor or running restaurants. The number of traders 
being pursued because they had not paid their licence fees was increasing 
sharply.702 The number of civil servants and local council members asking for 
personal advances because they could not meet their monthly expenses, and 
the number of staff debtors were increasing year by year. The 1973 accounts 
show that the total amount of debt incurred by staff in the district 
administration stood at just over two 206, 000 shillings, of which only one 
173,000 had been recovered.703 The figure becomes remarkable considering 
that in the same year only 13,812 shillings had been spent on education in 
East Acholi.704 By 1978 the financial situation was so dire that the National 
Curriculum Development Centre in East Acholi was only saved by an injection 
of 2, 200,000 shillings from UNICEF.705 The misappropriation of fees among 
teaching staff and headmasters further exacerbated the situation.706 Requests 
for increased financial expenditure for ammunition, for the destitute and food 
for prisoners appeared in the 1974 district administration accounts, appeals 
that had never been made in previous account estimates. In fact the 
                                                
701 D. A. Low, ‘Uganda Unhinged’ International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1973), 219-228. 
702 MUL/AS GEA U/A8 (058) 59: East Acholi District Admin: Accounts with Report, 1973. 
703 Ibid. 
704 Ibid. 
705 Unfortunately the archives from this period do not convey a dialogue between the Acholi 
and international humanitarian agencies. Consequently we are unable to assess how, if at all, 
the Acholi engaged politically with organisations such as UNICEF and the Red Cross. This is 
also an indication that international human rights discourses emerged primarily from the mid 
to late 1980s in Uganda as there seemed to be a large number of sources within the archives 
in Gulu and Kitgum pertaining to aid and humanitarian organisations and the peoples of the 
region.   
706 GDA Box: 553: Gulu Municipal Council Accounts for the year ended 1979 with and the 
auditor’s report and opinion, 31 December 1979. 
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administration accounts for the Acholi districts showed a year on year 
decrease in revenue and expenditure from 1969 to 1978.707  By 1979 the 
system had failed so comprehensively that the auditor general admitted in his 
annual report that there ‘had been no proper tax assessment and no register 
of eligible taxpayers had been kept.’708  
Whilst the decay of state and district institutions was primarily 
documented in the archives through financial records, its effects were felt 
across state and society. The disintegration of the state apparatus permeated 
all aspects of Acholi political, economic and social and cultural institutions. In 
the 1970s the local district councils could no longer provide the platform 
whereby internal and external political grievances could be openly debated. 
By the beginning of the decade the local councils were already struggling to 
pay staff their salaries and provide essential services to population. This 
process had begun under Obote but was further exacerbated by Amin’s 
economic and political policies. By targeting the middle class and forcing them 
into exile, the government essentially purged the local councils of the 
educated administrators and politicians who had run the institutions: ‘Amin 
targeted important Acholi. People went underground or went into exile. These 
were the people who made things work.’709 Adam Branch argues that Amin’s 
regime destabilised the order that had pertained inside Acholi, and that Amin 
destroyed ‘the link between the Acholi and the national state.’710 Undoubtedly 
the exile of the Ocols had a detrimental effect on the relationship between the 
centre and the locality, however those that remained behind adjusted and 
found new ways to connect to central government and to engage with the ‘big 
man.’    
Political activity in Acholi did not cease to exist during Amin’s regime. If 
anything, Amin’s rule actually reinforced informal political mobilisation at a 
grass roots level. Although the Ocols who remained in the region could no 
                                                
707 MUL/AS GEAU/A8 (058) 58: National Curriculum Development Centre Financial 
Statement, 1974-78.  
708 GDA Box: 553: Gulu Municipal Council Accounts for the year ended 1979, 31 December 
1979. 
709 (F/M) NAU: Interview with civil servant, Entebbe, 4 January 2012  
710 Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 57. 
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longer openly participate in politics, they found new avenues of political 
engagement, which provided an alternative to simply disappearing back to 
rural life. Spurred on by the news of the anti-government rebels in Tanzania, 
some were even implicated in mobilising food supplies and arms to those 
fighting to liberate Uganda.711 Many remained optimistic that the government 
would collapse and that they would be reinstalled in their previous positions.  
Despite the constraints placed on local politicians, party political rivalries that 
ensued during the late colonial and post-independence period were still 
evident in the 1970s. Rivalries between individual administrators for higher-
ranking political and administrative positions continued outside the constraints 
of the local district councils and political parties. The weakening of the local 
administrative bodies meant that the opportunities to manipulate the system 
for further personal gain were more readily presented. As Acholi politicians 
could no longer contest power at a national level, clan, tribal and religious 
identities became further politicised. As was the case previously, constituency 
elections were still contested based on clan affiliations and candidates who 
put themselves forward often found that their success largely depended on 
whether they could claim ancestral and clan ties to that constituency.712  This 
in itself was not unique to the 1970s; clan affiliation had always been a 
significant factor in determining local elections in Acholi. What is significant is 
despite the political climate, heightened state of violence and constant 
surveillance, local politics continued to follow the same patterns as before 
Amin came to power.   
Amin, just like his predecessors Obote and the British, still needed 
Acholi power brokers to administer control Acholi. Distinct ethnic 
demarcations of districts in Uganda meant that he could no more successfully 
install ‘outsiders’ to govern the Acholi than Obote or the British could. 
However, this did not mean that he did not try to do so. There was at least 
one definitive attempt by the regime to ‘de-Acholilise’ the leadership hierarchy 
in the region. In 1971 Amin appointed Paulo Mugoyo as DC of East Acholi 
District. He was a Muguishu from central-eastern Uganda and had no known 
                                                
711 KDA: District Intelligence Report, July 1974. 
712 KDA: East Acholi District Intelligence Report, April 1973. 
 226 
I                
ancestral ties to Acholi.713 These were deliberate attempts to install an 
administrator from outside Acholi who would not be swayed by any clan or 
political affiliations, and whose loyalty would be only to central government. 
Ironically, it soon became clear, that in order to maintain some level of 
administrative cohesion within the local councils, the government needed 
leaders who understood the populace, could speak the language and had a 
cultural connection to the land. As party politicians were now marked as the 
enemy of the state, this left only Acholi chiefs who could be utilised to 
implement government policies, generating a return to the colonial system of 
governance that emphasised the authority of traditional chiefly power. In this 
endeavour, the government attempted to reinforce chiefly power through the 
creation of cultural institutions. In 1972, the DC of East Acholi sanctioned the 
revival of the Acholi Cultural Association (ACA), an organisation comprising of 
Acholi chiefs and community leaders, which had all but died out under Obote 
after the state abolished traditional leaders and monarchical heads in 1967. 
Furthermore, the Acholi Department of Town and Regional Planning 
earmarked ten acres of land for a cultural village to be built that would 
showcase local arts and crafts as well as Acholi cultural traditions for visitors 
to the region.714 The initiative to invest in and revive cultural institutions was 
an indication that Acholi culture at least was seen as an apolitical identity by 
the government. In this sense cultural activities were permitted to take place, 
as they were not seen as a threat to security in the locality. Thus cultural 
institutions and activities were utilised to displace the political forum that had 
been previously been occupied by the Ocols. As cultural rather than political 
                                                
713 KDA: East Acholi District Intelligence Report, November 1971; KDA: Kitgum District 
Intelligence 1974-1976. In 1977 the appointed DC of East Kitgum was Kuba Hussein. 
Although his ancestral origins are unknown, it is unlikely, given his name that he originated 
from Acholi. As previously discussed Luo names are easily identifiable. Even if Mr Hussein 
had converted to Islam and  changed his name in the process, it is unlikely that he would not 
have retained his Luo surname, as is the common practice for Acholi Muslim converts 
714 GDA Box 540: Letter from DC Gulu to All County Chiefs and Sub-county Chiefs, 7 
September 1974. 
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leaders, chiefs could be utilised to provide the link from local to central 
government without the fear that informed Amin’s treatment of the Ocols.715  
Furthermore, by continuing the ban on all political parties Amin had 
effectively lost a key channel of communication between central government 
and the populace. To remedy this, all chiefs were recognised as official 
representatives of the central government. A directive for the election of new 
chiefs in the villages who would be able to work loyally with the government 
and the army was immediately initiated, but many of the election results 
indicated that people simply voted for their former chiefs. ‘Amin's 
dissatisfaction with this caused him to cancel a large number of election 
results and instructed that elections were to be re-held with only "suitable" 
candidates being allowed to stand.’716  During the 1973 elections of chiefs in 
East Acholi, the DC and the intelligence unit monitoring the proceedings 
complained that some of the chiefs were not selected because they did not 
belong to a clan in the area, or were not affiliated to the dominant religious 
denomination in the area being contested.717  
Political mobilisation was not just limited to clan ties and the election of 
chiefs. Just as DP members had remained active in Acholi in spite of Obote’s 
attempt to stifle political activity, local political actors continued to conduct 
secret political meetings under Amin using institutions such as co-operative 
societies to reinforce allegiances to their respective political parties prior to the 
military coup.718 During a meeting organised by the West Acholi Co-operative 
Society, it was reported that former UPC members were trying to manipulate 
the elections of the co-operative members to ensure that all the candidates 
put forward for election were former UPC members.719  In a similar report, this 
time for the East Acholi Co-operative Society, it was reported that former 
politician Tibero Okeny had held a meeting in his house to ensure all UPC 
sympathisers were voted out of the society and replaced by former DP 
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717 KDA: District Intelligence, April 1973. 
718 GDA Box 541: District Intelligence, March 1974. 
719 GDA Box 541: District Intelligence, July 1976. 
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members at the union’s upcoming general election.720 There were minor 
reports early in 1971 of former DP supporters actively mobilising people along 
religious and political lines in Kalongo and Agago districts in East Acholi. The 
main perpetrators were teachers at Kalongo secondary school who were 
holding illegal night meetings to discuss political and religious issues.721 In 
1971 Acholi members of the Uganda Teachers’ Association (UTA) openly 
heckled the DC and Administrative Secretary during a welcome party held in 
honour of the District Education Officer. The incident was put down to 
religious disputes as the leader of the UTA in East Acholi was Catholic and 
had had some disagreements with some of the Protestant members that 
spilled over into the meeting. However, the consequences of heckling 
government representatives were made all too clear, as the perpetrators were 
marked out by intelligence units as subversive elements, placed under 
surveillance, and warned not to dabble in any political activities that could 
threaten regional security.722  
Outside of party politics, local elites were able to capitalise financially 
on government economic policies for development in the region that still 
centred on progressive farming by manipulating Acholi class identities. In 
1972 a presidential directive announced that all the regions were to amend 
their agricultural shows within the districts to ensure that the people were 
made fully aware of the benefits of progressive farming. The shows were to 
stimulate interest in intensive farming, teach farmers better methods of 
producing greater yields and create a spirit of competitiveness among local 
farmers and farming businesses while showing the importance of fixed pricing 
for produce.723 The farming institute in Kitgum remained the focal point of 
government training in the district, offering short residential courses to chiefs, 
farmers, their wives, and children. Day courses were to be run to stimulate 
youth interest in progressive farming and change ‘non progressive’ traditional 
attitudes towards crops and animal husbandry. Members of the Young 
                                                
720 KDA: District Intelligence Report, June 1972.  
721 KDA: District Intelligence Report, January 1972. 
722 Ibid. 
723 GDA Box 546: Letter from the Permanent Secretary to all Regional Agriculture Officers, 29 
March 1972.  
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Farmers’ Union (YFU) were asked to attend from each county although the 
numbers were more weighted towards male attendees as progressive farming 
was still considered to be a male endeavour.724  
In 1974 a special research project was commissioned by the 
Agricultural department, which was conducted by an Acholi student studying 
at Makerere University. The premise of the research was to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the East Acholi farming school. Admittance to the institute 
was highly competitive but was informed by class and gender and clan 
biases. Of the twelve staff employed in the institute, only four were women, 
working as secretaries, cleaners and cooks. The female staff devoted most of 
their time to domestic duties and caring for babies.725 Often recruitment would 
be left to local chiefs, village leaders and politicians who recruited people on 
nepotism rather than merit. Among the women attending the course sixty-per 
cent were found to be the wives of businessmen, teachers, parish chiefs ‘or 
any recognisable person within local politics in the rural areas.’726 Under the 
system, many peasant farmers and their wives who did not have a noticeable 
political or economic standing in the community were inevitably excluded from 
these institutions. Among the peasant farmers who did attend the courses, 
gender divisions were strongly emphasised. The institute generally accepted 
men who were married, had families, and could claim some sort of ownership 
of land, reiterating the economic importance of the Acholi male over the 
woman.727 Furthermore, it placed unmarried males and Acholi youth at a 
disadvantage as their marital status hindered them from being accepted into 
the courses. ‘The disadvantage with these defaults was that these ‘big people’ 
were frequently liable to be transferred together with their wives,’ draining the 
region of the knowledge that had been gained and furthering the economic 
                                                
724 W.W. Opiyo, Evaluation of East Acholi District Farm Institute Programme.1973-1974 (Bsc. 
Special Project: Department of Agriculture, Makerere University 1974). 
725 Ibid. 
726 Ibid. 
727	  When making the distinction between the Ocols and Lawinos this scenario illustrates that 
Acholi peasant men, despite sharing a similar economic status as their female counterparts, 
were still regarded as the heads of the Acholi household and village. Consequently, whilst 
they may have been marginalised from the world of educated local political elite, they were 
afforded access to certain commodities primarily because of their gender and marital status.	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gap between those that had resources and education and those that did 
not.728  
Among the graduates of the farming school who had applied for loans 
through banks and co-operatives, research found that most of the approved 
loans had been granted to local politicians, businessmen and teachers. Some 
businessmen would then go on to use the loans to buy heavy farming 
equipment only to go on and sell it at double the price.729 The agricultural staff 
often favoured these people of means, offering them excellent references and 
providing help to fill out the loan application forms. In turn the staff members 
were often bribed with lower prices for crops at market.730 In a similar project 
conducted on farming practices in West Acholi, it was found that only eighteen 
per cent of farmers in the region had received an education level beyond 
primary school, with around ten per cent having not attended school at all. 
The number of those who had attended a farm school course was around 
twenty per cent. Furthermore those who held a legal land title and not just 
customary title only constituted seven per cent of the farmers.731 Of the 
farmers who had received loans from the department of agriculture, one 
hundred per cent had received an education level of up to secondary school. 
Consequently, the higher the education level, the more likely a farmer was to 
receive a loan.732 This is partly to do with the illiteracy levels in the district 
meaning the under-educated would have found it more difficult to fill in the 
complex loan forms, but the internal bureaucratic system and practice of 
nepotism and gender discrimination also, meant that economic, political and 
social resources were still monopolised by educated well-to-do Acholi men.  
 
 
                                                
728 Ibid. 
729 Ibid. 
730 Ibid; A.O. Paotto, A study of Constraints on Greater Groundnut Production in West Acholi, 
1974 (Bsc Thesis: Makerere University, 1974).  
731 J.O. Acima, An Appraisal of the Impact of the Co-op BANK Ltd as a Source of Farm 
Commercialism in West Acholi District 1978-79 (Faculty of Agriculture, Makerere University, 
1979). 
732 Ibid. 
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5.5. Religious Identities as an Avenue for Political Engagement 
 
One tool for political mobilisation that local actors could still utilise somewhat 
freely was that of Acholi religious identities. Amin wanted to take advantage of 
Obote’s failure in dealing with religious cleavages in Uganda as a means to 
consolidate his support base. His predecessor was blamed for interfering too 
much in religious affairs, particularly in his treatment of Ugandan Catholics. 
From ‘the moment he grabbed power, Amin began to portray himself as an 
impartial God-fearing religious man, an ecumenical mediator who would see 
that there was complete religious tolerance.’733 As a Muslim, the President 
delivered the majority of government financial support to the Muslim 
community.734 However, in an attempt to keep the other denominations on 
side, he bought the heads of the three main religious groups a Mercedes 
each. In 1971 he announced that the government would donate 100,000 
shillings each to the Muslim, Catholic and Protestant faiths.735 In Acholi, the 
political pandering to the religious denominations by central government 
manifested itself in the continued politicisation of religious identities. Those 
who had been active in party politics continued challenging competitors 
through politicised religious discourses.  
Amin’s criticism of Obote, particularly the belief that the UPC was 
predominately a party of Protestants, meant that Catholics and DP 
supporters, privately at least, hoped that they would have an easier ride under 
the new regime. In 1972 it was announced that an investigation into the 
employment of civil servants in Acholi District Administration had revealed that 
Obote had continuously made appointments on the basis of religious 
affiliation. The DC of East Acholi promptly announced that under Amin, 
employment in local government would be considered regardless of religious 
denomination.736 It is difficult to assess whether this directive translated into 
                                                
733 Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence, 107; A.A. Mazrui, ‘Religious Strangers in Uganda: 
From Emin Pasha to Amin Dada’. African Affairs Vol. 76 No. 302, (1977), 21-38 
734 Amin never wrote or authorised a biography of his life. It is unknown when he converted to 
Islam. Most references regarding his ‘conversion’ do not state a specific date.   
735 Ravenhill, ‘Military Rule in Uganda’, 229-260. 
736 KDA: District Intelligence Report, January 1972. 
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the local councils because elections to the councils had been so corrupted by 
central government. Furthermore, because all political parties were effectively 
banned under Amin those who were appointed could not openly identify 
themselves as DP or UPC sympathisers.  
The marginalisation of political activity from the local councils allowed 
for religious disputes to become more prominent at grass root levels.  
Following previous patterns, religious disputes among the Acholi in the 1970s 
involved quarrels over land and church buildings being erected in Protestant 
Catholic dominated and areas. In Agago, Kilak and Chua counties, Acholi 
Protestants became incensed by Catholic chapels being built in a 
predominately Protestant dominated areas. Protestant leaders sent letters 
directly to the Bishop of Northern Uganda outlining their complainants. The 
letters were a result of months of bitter correspondences between the two 
denominational groups.737 Religious disputes continued to provide and 
avenue for expressing economic, political and social grievances. These 
grievances were more pronounced in East Acholi primarily because the region 
suffered disproportionately from underdevelopment in comparison to West 
Acholi. The 1970-71 annual report from the Gulu diocese stated that the 
number of Catholics grew in areas that were being served by Catholic 
hospitals. Thus there was a direct correlation assumed between the number 
of converts and the amenities offered by a particular denomination. In West 
Acholi, there were more hospitals and schools whereas in the East Acholi, the 
numbers were limited with only one major hospital served by the Catholic VF 
mission in Kalongo.738  Furthermore, the number of Catholics proportional to 
the population was far greater than the number in West Acholi. Consequently, 
religious rivalries were more intense in East Acholi, despite being more 
sparsely populated in comparison to West Acholi. The importance of religion 
and religious affiliation to the populace of East Acholi can be observed in 
1973 when the Archbishop of Kampala asked for Catholics in the region to 
organise a collection to build a shrine in Namugongo, near Kampala. A total of 
                                                
737 KDA: District Intelligence Report, October 1973. 
738 RCA: 5 Year Report on the Diocese of Gulu, 1970-1975. Report By Dr Cipriano Kihangie, 
1 May 1976. 
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41, 915 shillings was collected from individuals, schools and parishes. East 
Acholi contributed nearly 2,000 shillings more compared to the West, and 
more individuals contributed from East Acholi than from the West.739 To place 
this number in context, Acholi Catholics contributed just 20,000 shillings less 
than the amount that had been paid to all the sub-parish chiefs in East Acholi 
district in 1971.740  
Parish pastors and priests continued to be instrumental in mobilising 
converts along denominational lines. In 1975 an argument broke out between 
the pastor in charge of the Bobi division parish and an Italian priest named 
Father Santo when the latter started lobbying for the erection of a Catholic 
church building near a Protestant school. The pastor was involved in stoking 
grass roots opposition to Father Santo, accusing him of bribing Protestant 
converts with clothes and medicine to gain support for his chapel.741 Sub-
county chiefs continued to play their part in promoting religious rivalries and 
used their growing political authority to undermine religious institutions, often 
for personal gain. Because of the economic crisis in the region, one of the 
tasks of the chiefs was the distribution and sale of scarce resources such as 
salt and sugar to the populace. In 1975 sub-county chief of Amuru provoked 
an outcry from the Christian population when he deliberately chose to sell salt 
on a Sunday, knowing that many of the parishioners were at service. The 
parishioners of Acwera village made an official complaint to the DC after the 
sub-county chief reportedly told them that there was no need to attend the 
church service, and that if they wanted to buy salt they could do so only on 
Sunday. After being threatened with retaliation from security units, the 
Chairman of Trade was coerced into supporting the chief’s instruction and the 
sale went ahead on Sunday as planned. The sub-parish’s actions cannot be 
observed as a direct attack on Catholic and Protestants as both 
denominations placed Sunday as the day of worship. It is also not clear which 
if any religious group that the chief belonged to and what his motivations 
                                                
739 GDA Box 541: ‘Archbishop of Kampala Namugongo Shrine’, 18 September 1973. 
740 MUL/AS GEA U/A (088) 2: East Acholi District Admin: Approved 1971 Estimates 
Confirmed 1972.  
741 GDA Box: 541: Summary of Meeting of the Acholi District Council, 4 February 1975. 
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were. However, several observations can be made in regards to the incident 
and how it reflected the political and religious climate in Acholi at the time. 
Firstly, it is an indication of the growing political, economic and military power 
that chiefs now had in the region. The fact that a sub-parish chief had enough 
influence to coerce the Chairman of Trade into compliance by threatening him 
with potential violent retribution from soldiers indicates the shift in power 
dynamics in Acholi. With the power to distribute resources, maintain law and 
order and act as wards of the state, incidents of chiefs taking advantage of 
their authority at the expense of the populace steadily increased. Secondly, 
the reaction by the parishioners, particularly the fact that they felt it was 
important enough to mobilise themselves and Christian communities by 
reporting the incident directly to the DC, indicates that maybe they too were 
not above manipulating their religious identity for political gains. The sub-
parish chief in question was not very popular within the village that he was 
stationed and there had been several complaints made against him by 
individuals and other chiefs around the district.742 The parishioners in Amuru 
took advantage of the political rhetoric of religious freedom being propagated 
by central government. Thus what religion and religious identity provided was 
a tangible means of expressing political grievances, without the imminent fear 
of reprisal from central government.  
However, there were limitations as to how far central government and 
local governing bodies could be challenged through religious channels. As a 
Muslim, Amin began to emphasise Islam as the religion of the state from 
1972, a shift that permeated into local institutions. Many of the religious 
disputes reported in the district intelligence reports in Acholi during this time 
did not involve Muslims or Islamic institutions. This was partly due to the fact 
that there were few Acholi Muslims living in the region. A report into the 
demography of the faithful by the Gulu dioceses estimated that in 1971 there 
were around 3,500 Muslims in the district. This was up by 420 from the 
previous year, compared to over 300,000 Acholi who defined themselves as 
                                                
742 GDA Box 541: Complaint from the Christians at Amuru Letter to the DC Gulu, 8 May 1975. 
 
 235 
I                
Catholic or Protestants.743 This slight increase could be attributed to the 
inclination among the Acholi to favour a ‘state’ religion.744 By 1976 the 
population of the Christian parishes in the region varied from a maximum of 
56,000 to a minimum of 14,000 in the lesser-populated parishes, with the 
number of Catholics in the parishes ranging from 20,000 to 7,000.745 
Politically, the low number of disputes against Muslims and Islamic institutions 
in Acholi and the rest of Uganda was because an attack on Islam would have 
been have been perceived as an attack on the state and the President. 
Following a land dispute arising from a Protestant campaign against the 
building of a Catholic chapel in Gulu, the DC commented that he saw no 
reason why the Protestant leaders were against the Church building as a 
Protestant Church was standing metres away from the Muslim Supreme 
council, yet there had been no conflicts reported regarding this.746   
 
Amin wanted men to convert to Islam. The villagers blamed him for the 
bad luck that they had, because they believed that if you changed your 
religion then you would get bad luck. Some were converting to Islam 
simply to survive. On Friday there would be no school, because that 
was the Muslim holy day.747  
 
 
Central government policies that emphasised Islam above all other religions 
meant that for the first time Islam come out of the shadow of the two Christian 
denominations. Some Acholi Muslim converts saw conversion as an 
opportunity to access employment opportunities:  
 
I was looking for a job as a security guard in Kampala and I found out 
that my boss was a Muslim. Even though I was a Catholic at the time I 
converted so that I could get the job. When I went back Kitgum I 
                                                
743 RCA: 5 Year Report on the Diocese of Gulu 1970-1975. Report By Dr Cipriano Kihangie, 1 
May 1976. 
744 C.Y.L. OCaya, The Other Face of Acholi (BA fine Arts Thesis, Makerere, 1974).  
745 RCA: 5 Year Report on the Diocese of Gulu 1970-1975. Report By Dr Cipriano Kihangie, 1 
May 1976. 
746 GDA Box: 541: Summary of Meeting Acholi District Council, 4 February 1975. 
747 F/M) NAU: Interview with retired civil servant, Gulu Town Centre, 9 June 2012  
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converted back to being a Catholic. In those days you did what you 
could to survive.748 
 
Muslim converts in Amin’s Uganda were afforded a certain amount of political 
and economic bias. Consequently, some Acholi chiefs began to see the 
benefits of identifying as a Muslim or becoming an advocate for the 
President’s chosen religion. In 1975 the county chief of Kilak wrote a letter to 
the DC complaining of actions of a Catholic Father and his treatment of the 
Governor of Northern Uganda during a dinner organised in the latter’s honour. 
The Governor, being a Muslim, had asked for the meat that was to be cooked 
for the dinner party to be slaughtered by another Muslim who understood the 
Islamic teachings on the preparation of food. Although Governor missed the 
dinner, it was observed that the Father had ignored the instructions and had 
instead allowed one of the sisters in the mission to slaughter the animal 
instead. ‘This happened again and again with other Muslims and it seemed 
like the Father was doing this deliberately. This practice is very bad 
considering that Muslims are now proud and they are the highest people in 
the Country.’749 The county chief had on-going issues with the Catholic 
Father, alleging his refusal to co-operate with the local administration and ‘his 
disregard for the instructions given by the sub-parish and parish chiefs.’ ‘He 
would often use land without consulting the chiefs first even though the 
government had asked all religious leaders to co-operate with the local 
administrators.’750  
Another reason for the frequent reports regarding disputes among 
Acholi Christians is that both the Anglican and Catholic churches still held 
considerable power in the region and even during Amin’s regime the crusade 
for the conversion of souls did not abate. To make sure that converts were 
made aware of the ‘true Christian life and spirit of worship’ the Catholic 
Dioceses in Gulu would often make apostolic safaris to villages to preach the 
word of God. Audio-visual and written instructions were used to make the 
faithful aware of the obligations to attend mass regularly and not only when 
                                                
748 (F/M) NAU: Interview with private security guard, Lukung, 1 August 2012.  
749 GDA Box 541: Letter from Rwot of Kilak to DC Gulu, 10 March 1975. 
750 Ibid. 
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priests visited them. Baptisms were held once a month at the chapels in 
dioceses as well as frequent communions among school children. Priests 
were encouraged to preside over many of the traditional funeral services held 
in the villages. The Roman Catholic (RC) Church was active in operating and 
opening institutions to try and alleviate many of the social hardships in the 
parishes, opening elderly people’s homes in Gulu and Kalongo in East Acholi, 
as well as a centre for polio victims in Opim. In 1975 the Bishop of Gulu 
commented the work that was done in the region remarking that ‘the Christian 
religion is accepted by a great majority with enthusiasm and dedication.’751 
However, the RC still felt that conversion and the diffusion of Christian 
teaching were being hindered by local customs.752 Even though the number of 
children being converted through schools and baptisms was growing annually, 
the Bishop complained that parents and guardians were usually indifferent to 
the religious instructions of their children.753 The issue of traditional versus 
Christian marriage ceremonies was brought up again as the Acholi continued 
to engage in polygamous relationships and conducting traditional marriage 
ceremonies in the village. Gulu diocese reports remarked on the increase of 
bridewealth across the region, which was often set above the means of the 
man asked to pay it, with families trying to capitalise on the economic value of 
their daughter. For wealthier or urban families bride wealth could be paid in 
                                                
751 RCA: 5 Year Report on the Diocese of Gulu, 1970-1975. Report By Dr Cipriano Kihangie.  
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752 A.O. Paotto, A study of Constraints on Greater Groundnut Production in West Acholi, 1974 
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cash whilst rural areas it was more common to offer cattle as payment. 
Bridewealth prices vary according the financial situation of the husband to be. 
In his book Lak Tar (White Teeth) Okot p’Bitek makes a satirical commentary 
on the changing prices of bridewealth in Acholi and wider implications for 
Acholi men. p’Bitek noted that in the early colonial period bridewealth was 
reasonably priced and affordable to the common man. However, as Acholi 
became incorporated into the colonial political economy, bridewealth became 
extortionate, with families sometimes asking for thousands of shillings.754  The 
economic implications of the payment of bride wealth were remarked upon 
when it became apparent that the governmental policy of encouraging 
progressive farming was being hindered because families were rearing cattle 
not for wholesale but to secure payment marriages payments within the 
clan.755 The financial restraints on Acholi households, and the continued 
adherence to traditional religious practices meant that between 1970 and 
1975 marriages in Churches were steadily decreasing compared to the overall 
increase of the Christian population.756 Thus while Acholi Catholics and 
Protestants continued to politicise their Christian faith as a means to access 
material resources, indigenous religious practices still continued to provide the 
social guidelines within Acholi villages. The increased number of infant 
baptisms in the 1970s indicates that although financial restrictions may have 
impeded participation in Christian marriage ceremonies, Acholi parents were 
still motivated to have their children baptised into the Christian faith. By doing 
so they provided the next generation with a denominational identity, and 
access to the social and educational resources which being a Catholic or 
Protestant in Acholi would provide.  
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5.6. Moving Closer to the Source of Power: Individual versus Collective 
Agency 
 
Whilst the rule of fear drove the political economy in Acholi, it did not paralyze 
daily life. The Acholi who remained in Southern and Northern Uganda during 
Amin’s regime, and who avoided being indentified as a potential enemy of the 
state, often found that after the initial turmoil following the coup, they were 
generally left to their own devices, carrying on much as they did before. As 
one student in the 1970s remarked:  
 
Actually during my graduation [in Makerere] Amin was the one who 
conferred me. Many students ran away when the killings started in 
Kampala, but otherwise being an Acholi was ok. The civilians were 
very sympathetic towards us. A Southerner hid me when it started 
because I was fearful. I decided to stay and finish my degree. The 
students from the West Nile were really good. They were the ones 
helping us. The people who were not involved in politics were good.757 
 
Others claimed that while they were aware of the killings going on in Kampala, 
they themselves had not been affected and had simply carried on working on 
their farms as they had always done.  By concentrating on just the violent 
aspects of Amin’s rule scholars have ignored the quotidian realities of many 
Ugandans who simply got on with their lives as best as they could, despite the 
political situation. This section of the population made up the ‘silent majority’ 
who generally kept their political views to themselves unless a policy affected 
them or their families personally.758 
 
I was in the village when Amin took over and I heard that he had 
suspended the constitution and banned political parties, but this did not 
really mean anything to me. I had my children and my wives and we 
continued what we were doing.759  
 
Another common remark among interviewees was the assessment that after 
by 1977, when most of the publicised massacres by Amin’s forces had taken 
                                                
757 (F/M) AU: Interview with civil servant Gulu, 9 May 2012  
758 C.C. Gibbs, The Great Silent Majority: Missouri's Resistance to World War 1 (Missouri: 
University of Missouri Press, 1988).  
759 F/M) AU: Interview with subsistence farmer, Omoro county, 2 July 2012  
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place, the country fell into an uneasy routine whereby everybody knew what 
was expected of them and how to keep within the periphery of the 
authorities.760 Within this demographic were those who were completely 
disinterested in politics or simply avoided any political engagements. These 
were the people whose only concern centred on maintaining a job and feeding 
their families. However, regardless of their formal political ‘inactivity’ the 
connection between the ‘silent majority’ and central and local political 
institutions was fundamental to the survival of Uganda as a nation state. This 
is primarily because local and national politicians were reliant on this 
demographic to provide the foundation for their political base. In turn the 
‘silent majority’ left it to these political actors to take their grievances to the 
centre. In this way they were never completely dislocated from high politics.  
A year after Amin’s coup, there was confusion within this demographic 
regarding what exactly had gone on and what was expected of them. Central 
government had to send a memorandum to local chiefs commanding them to 
inform the people that they were still obligated to pay their taxes as false news 
had reached the districts that Amin no longer expected them to do so.761 This 
point is not to underplay the brutality of Amin’s rule, but to indicate that rather 
than simply being based on formal lines of communication, the relationship 
between the ‘silent majority’ and central government was characterised by 
rumour and gossip. More widely this point reiterates the importance of local 
politicians as the mediums of political dialogue between the locality and the 
centre. With the exile and political displacement of this demographic in the 
1970s, this line of communication was gradually diminished. More generally 
the power of rumour and gossip is indicative of the exclusive nature of high 
politics, which reinforces the positions of those in the ‘inner circle’ by keeping 
those in the periphery ‘ignorant’, thus making them easier to control. Rumour 
can also be used by those outside the periphery of formal political power to 
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construct their own political reality by validating or indeed delegitimizing the 
authority of those in the ‘inner circle’ of high politics.762 
Azarya and Chazan argue that in weakened states there is a 
disengagement of social forces from the public sphere, and ‘as the state 
withers, new arrangements and interactions (both state-society and society-
society) move into the political void that is left in its wake.’763 With the lack of a 
functioning effective local government, political discourses in Acholi became 
more of an individual endeavour as the dangers of being affiliated to particular 
groups, institutions, or organisations became too great. When the avenue for 
political engagement via the politically minded Ocols was diminished under 
Amin, individual actors took on an ‘each to their own’ mentality. The 
obligations governing ‘moral ethnicity’ that defined people’s rights, 
responsibilities and that protected people when they were most vulnerable 
and alone were challenged as individuals were forced to adapt to the rapidly 
changing political environment.764 This scenario, as Chabal argues, is one of 
the benefits of dismantling the often-ambiguous concept of ‘agency’, 
particularly when assessing how Africans have dealt with post-colonial 
political changes at a local, regional and national level. Chabal states that the 
idea that the individual in modern or ‘Western societies’ is deemed 
subjectively to be more of a free agent than in so called ‘traditional societies’ 
does little to reveal how Africans have adapted rapidly to changes in their 
environment, and fails to highlight the potential for grass roots movements to 
influence high politics.’765  
The breakdown of local political institutions in Acholi meant that 
responsibility fell increasingly on the individual to prosecute their own political 
                                                
762 N. Kastfelt, ‘Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria’ African 
Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 350 (January, 1989), 83-90; S. Ellis, ‘Source, Rumour and Power in 
Togo’, Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 63, No. 4 (1993), 462- 476. 
763 V. Azarya and N. Chazan, ‘Disengagement From the State in Africa:  Reflection on the 
Experiences of Ghana and Guinea,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29 (January, 
1987), 106-31,cited in J. W. Harbeson, N. Chazan, D. Rothchild (eds.) Civil Society and the 
State in Africa, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 270 
764 Lonsdale, ‘Political Tribalism and Moral Ethnicity.’ 
765 Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Smiling and Suffering, 10-12. 
 242 
I                
grievances. As a result, the district archives showed an increase in letters and 
statements of support being sent directly to heads of local and central 
government and sometimes directly to the President himself. These 
correspondences align with the previous argument that in Acholi, the fear of 
Amin’s regime was immediate. For some individual actors the need for self-
preservation forced them to open a direct line of communication to the 
President, distancing themselves from Obote and in some respects the 
‘Northern identity’. The increased levels of surveillance and the fear of being 
informed upon by political, clan or economic opponents meant that individuals 
became proactive in their engagement with the state. Whilst fear motivated 
these interactions, they also served to indirectly legitimise the authority of 
Amin’s regime. However, the archives show that although these letters were 
circulated amongst local government officials, the intended recipients rarely 
received or responded them, indicating that even in this endeavour one could 
never gain direct access to the source of power. Despite this, there was a 
need to formally put one’s case across before some else did. Three months 
after the coup, a superintendent of the Tobacco Co-operative Unit and former 
member of the town council sent a letter expressing his personal support for 
the military government while reassuring the administration that he had 
always been a loyal citizen of Uganda: 
 
I have never worked against the colonial government, Dr Obote 
Regime and now I am fully behind the military government. I have been 
carrying out my duty as normal since the military government took 
over, and I have never spoken a bad name about the government and I 
will never do. Sir as there other people who are against me for this 
personal hatred would like you as you know me personally to make it 
clear to the head of government General Idi Amin Dada that I am a 
man who is fully behind him and working in support of him.766 
 
But in the same vein the superintendent wanted to make it clear that while he 
carried out his work under Obote, he was never privy to any high profile 
political activities nor was he an active member of the UPC, and as such he 
was not a danger to the regime. In a similar appeal, a retired policeman from 
                                                
766 GDA Box: 541: Letter from the Superintendent of Works Tobacco Co-operative Union Ltd 
to DC West Acholi 16 May 1971. 
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West Acholi penned an appeal for compensation for his house, which the 
former DC had instructed him to destroy to make space for a local 
government project. ‘Your Excellency the life president of Uganda and you is 
the father of everybody in Uganda and therefore I kneel down before you and 
humble beg to allow me to present my appeal before you for consideration’ 
[sic].767 Individuals who had previously relied on politicians and local 
institutions to bargain on their behalf now had to contend with the political 
vacuum that had been left behind. The disruptions in the hierarchy of power 
meant that non-political actors in the region started to feel that the only way 
that they could get things done would be to speak directly to ‘the big man.’ In 
this way they moved closer to the source of power. As Lonsdale asserts, the 
low politics of survival quickly replaced the high politics of patronage, ‘in such 
situations ordinary people who cannot act in their own cause may find that 
they have no option but to fend for themselves, being unable any longer to 
trust in the powerful to protect their lives and livelihood.’768 However, in Acholi 
it was not simply lack of trust of the patrons within high politics, it was that 
local elites had through Amin’s economic and political policies seen their 
power greatly diminished. They could no longer control the patron-client 
network. Consequently, Amin’s regime indirectly emphasised individual 
agency primarily because the government had diminished the means by 
which collective agency could be channelled. Furthermore, the nature of these 
appeals was unique to the 1970s, primarily because there was mortal danger 
in making yourself politically visible. Yet these men officially bypassed their 
chiefs, local administrators addressing their letters specifically for the 
President’s attention. Undoubtedly they were motivated by the fear of being 
informed upon or implicated in any subversive activities. However, much like 
the chiefs who informed on their rivals, there was also an element of 
opportunism; a chance to redress the political and social nepotism that had 
kept the ‘Ocols’ in a position of power for so long. Amin’s leadership style held 
little regard for the social hierarchies that had previously dictated the 
relationship between high and low politics in Obote’s Uganda. In Amin’s 
                                                
767 GDA Box 532: Letter from Ezekeri Abwoch to President Idi Amin, 6 Februray 1979. 
768 J. Lonsdale, ‘Political Tribalism and Moral ethnicity’, 76-77. 
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Uganda power and leadership in the locality was no longer constituted by a 
network of Ocols: it was linear, coalescing in the hands of a single ruler. In 
certain ways this presented more opportunities for a direct dialogue with the 
Lawinos. 
Even after Amin was overthrown the damage to the national and local 
administrative bodies remained extensive. This was partly due to the 
disorganisation and damage that was caused in the region during the 
liberation war. Months after Amin was deposed, the economic and security 
situation in many of the Acholi districts, particular in East Acholi, was still in 
complete disarray. As one interviewee noted, ‘it took nearly three months for 
the liberating soldiers to reach Gulu and even longer to reach Kitgum. Many of 
us did not even know what was going on.’769 In the meantime, goods were not 
getting through to the districts and those that were on route from the South 
were often looted by remnants of Amin’s soldiers escaping on their way to 
Sudan.  In August 1979, the District Security officer in Kitgum sent a heartfelt 
plea to the Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda National Liberation Army 
(UNLA) to provide armed escorts for essential commodities that were being 
sent to the area as they were either being looted or sold before they reached 
the district by opportunistic drivers.770 In addition, there were frequent reports 
of shootings, rapes and robberies being committed by remnants of Amin’s 
units who were still hiding in the region.771 It would be fair to say that during 
the eight to twelve months after Amin was deposed there was no effective 
system of government in Acholi. Thus the politics of individual survival 
continued with direct appeals and correspondences being made to the DC’s 
office and the members of the interim government of the NCC (National 
Consultative Council (NCC) bypassing local administrative hierarchies.772 The 
                                                
769 (F/F) NAU: Interview with subsistence farmer, Lamwo District, 2 August 2012  
770 KDA: Letter from the Commander in Chief UNLA Kitgum to DC, Kitgum. 23 August 1979. 
771 GDA Box: 541: Letter from A.O. Opobo, Chairman of ACA to DC, Gulu. 7 September 
1979.  
772 GDA Box 532: Staff Records, June 1980-November 1989; GDA Box 533: ‘Letter from Sub-
county Chief returning from exile to Permanent Secretary, Kampala, 6 May 1980; GDA Box: 
533: File; Staff Salaried and Complaints, 1972-1980. From 1975 onwards there was marked 
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letters being written by individuals generally related to requesting financial 
assistance. They would emphasise the personal toll that the Amin regime and 
the liberation war had taken on their livelihoods, families and future prospects 
and late payment of salaries.773  
However, these letters should not be viewed as overly audacious as 
this was a brief time in Ugandan history when there existed a general sense 
of national unity and a belief that everyone, regardless of their ethnicity was 
‘in it together.’ This collective anger towards the previous regime briefly 
ignited a belief that the liberating Tanzanian and Ugandan forces and the 
interim government that followed would provide more than they actually did. 
The empowerment of the individual is reflected in the hundreds of application 
forms that were sent by Acholi men from all walks of life applying for jobs 
within the newly installed NCC in 1979. The NCC announced that they would 
be expanding the council by sixty-one new members and were looking for 
candidates from all the various districts in Uganda to fill the posts. This was 
an attempt by the new government to encourage the ‘silent majority’ to 
engage directly with state structures. The Entebbe District Archives holds 
some of the applications sent from Gulu district by Acholi men to the NCC, 
with one folder containing fifty-four separate applications. Similarly the Kitgum 
district archives hold all the applications from East Acholi. A large number of 
the applicants were teachers, local businessmen and former political party 
activists whose main stated aims were ‘to teach the populace about the 
policies of the new government.’774 However, there were also a notable 
number of applications from the Lawinos, with uneducated rural farmers and 
menial labourers also seeking to work for the NCC. The applicants varied in 
                                                                                                                                      
disintegration of Acholi Local Administration. Lack of finances, staff indifference and 
corruption meant that the local councils could no longer operate effectively.  
773 GDA Box 532: ‘Problem for Government Assistance’ Letter from corporal G.O. Anying 
addressed to DC Gulu, 23 November 1979; KDA: File: ADM/44 ‘UNCC Correspondences’ 11 
October 1979-August 1980; GDA Box: 532 File: C.MISS.12: Petitions and complaints, 20 
October 1980; UNA/E Box 3 Ref 8: U.N.C.C Kitgum District, Expansion of UNCC 1st Passes 
Only, 1979; UNA/E: Box 5 Ref 8: U.N.C.C Gulu District, Expansion of UNCC 1st Elimination 
Failures. 1979; KDA: Letter from A.K Ocayo to DC, Kitgum. 3 July 1980. 
774 UNA/E Box 3 Ref 8: U.N.C.C Kitgum District, Expansion of UNCC 1st Passes Only, 1979; 
UNA/E: Box 5 Ref 8:U.N.C.C Gulu District, Expansion of UNCC 1st Elimination/Failures. 1979. 
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age from an eighteen-year male student at secondary school to a seventy-
year-old uneducated subsistence farmer. The education and literacy levels 
varied dramatically with applications being sent in from Makerere University 
graduates and civil servants quoting Winston Churchill and J.F Kennedy, to 
uneducated labourers who could barely write their own name. Several 
applicants listed their occupation as ‘villagers’ and ‘peasants.’ However, even 
among this demographic, there was still an attempt to appropriate much of the 
political jargon used by the politically minded Ocols in the previous regime: ‘I 
want to join the NCC to fight against tribalism in local villages and to help my 
neighbours who had a lack of proper treatment from the former 
government.’775 Others expressed the need for national unity and the creation 
of a Ugandan government that would treat all ethnicities equally, creating a 
true democracy that would allow all voices in Uganda to be heard. The 
adoption of the language used by local and national politicians by some of the 
applicants shows that whilst Lawinos wanted to engage in a dialogue with the 
political elite, they were aware that if they were to be taken seriously they 
needed to adopt the same expression and political rhetoric as those at the 
top. Consequently, they rehashed many of the political slogans and 
sentiments that had been used to mobilise them by national and local 
politicians used during the height of political activity in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Yet despite references to eradicating tribalism, nepotism and 
religious rivalries, many of the applicants inevitably conveyed the reality of 
Ugandan politics, which had been and continues to be driven by localised and 
ethnic allegiances.  Whilst on one hand paying lip service to the wider national 
debates regarding democratisation, the applicants placed emphasis on 
advocating for resources for their specific villages and districts. Even within 
this however there was a sense of collectivity among the applications written 
by Acholi peasant farmers. Through the applications they were able to 
condemn the historic and continued marginalisation of the peasant farmers 
and rural dwellers who had been continually neglected by central 
government’s economic policies. The principal sentiment in the applications 
was that the masses should have more of a say in all political affairs. Although 
                                                
775 Ibid. 
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the applications were an individual endeavour, we are able to conclude that 
among the Acholi peasant farmers potentially unifying political and economic 
grievances existed. Although Acholi progressive farmers faced some 
resistance from peasant farmers from the late 1950s to the 1980s, the attacks 
were sporadic unorganised and were driven by individual rather than any 
centralised agrarian movement. Even the Koro Anywali Society, which had 
targeted progressive farming institutions, was mobilised by chiefs, and 
politicians defending their political and economic territories. Consequently for 
Acholi peasant farmers, class, education, nepotism, clan debates combined 
with Ocols political and economic ambitions placed limits on any collectivised 
movement in the locality.   
Despite the inflow of applications to the NCC, many of the applicants 
still expressed apprehension towards the new government. Two decades of 
failed economic policies, broken promises, oppression and regional 
marginalisation meant that as much as the Acholi hoped for a different 
political system to emerge, history dictated that this might not transpire. As 
one applicant wrote, ‘the NCC can only improve the county by not just 
preaching the doctrine of unity but also practicing it. The people will only 
accept things they can see. They will not accept the NCC if they cannot see 
the aid which the government says that it will provide [sic].’776  The 
applications show clearly the mind of the individual Acholi man who made up 
the ‘silent majority.’ While their motivations for applying to the NCC may have 
been skewed towards economic considerations such as acquiring waged 
employment, they were still aware of the politics that dictated the land, even if 
they generally remained inactive in formal politics. The nature of governance 
in colonial and post-colonial Uganda, which directly and indirectly emphasised 
ethnopolitical identities at the centre, meant that this demographic remained 
largely contained within the structures of localised politics.  
Whilst central government’s rhetoric permeated political discourses in 
Acholi, little effort was made to boost state investment in the region’s 
                                                
776 UNA/E Box 3 Ref 8: U.N.C.C Kitgum District, Expansion of UNCC 1st Passes Only, 1979; 
UNA/E: Box 5 Ref 8, U.N.C.C Gulu District, Expansion of UNCC 1st Elimination/Failures, 
1979. 
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economy. By continuing colonial patterns of underinvestment in Acholi, the 
rural masses soon realised that that they could not rely on state resources 
and institutions.  In this regard, it could be argued that the Ugandan nation 
state politically and economically needed the rural masses more than the rural 
masses needed or were reliant on the state. However, to reinforce their 
political position, the local and national politicians continued to propagate the 
potential capabilities of the state, primarily because their relationship with 
central government validated their claims to power in the locality. In his work 
on democratisation in Uganda, Amii Omara-Otunno discusses more generally 
the relationship between African political elites and the civil society which they 
‘advocate’ for:  
 
The gap between the rhetoric of democratic rights by the political elite 
and their enjoyment by the citizenry has rendered problematic the 
substantive meaning of any participatory system of government, and its 
realisation in many countries. It is a tragic irony of African nationalism 
that the potent weapon of democracy, which indigenous politicians 
wielded so effectively to dislodge European colonialism from the 
continent, has been misused and perverted in the independence era 
despite its continuing historical and moral appeal. Although many 
leaders passionately expressed commitment to the achievement of 
democracy before attaining state power, their actions thereafter have 
for the most part proved that they had appropriated this popular 
concept mainly for its instrumental value; namely, in order to mobilise 
mass support in the contest for power with the aid of an ideological 
slogan. Many of the most regrettable acts by African leaders may be 
attributed either to opportunism and cynicism or to a genuine 
incomprehension of the principles of democracy, because their 
implementation ought to have enhanced the human dignity and quality 
of life of all concerned.777 
 
In Acholi, belief in the ‘possibilities’ of the state meant that although the ‘silent 
majority’ continued to be let down by local and national politicians, they still 
strived to remain a part of a national identity. Even with the exile of high profile 
local political patrons in the 1970s, they continued to turn to the ‘big man’ in 
their time of need, yet they had become accustomed to receiving very little in 
return. Had the optimism and national unity that immediately followed the 
                                                
777 A. Omara-Otunnu, ‘The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda.’ The  
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30 No.2 (1992) (Abstract), 443-463. 
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overthrow of Amin been harnessed, promises not broken, and strong central 
government with a functioning district administration created, perhaps the 
‘silent majority’ could have seen these possibilities materialise into tangible 
economic and political policies. But as it was to transpire, the years following 
Amin’s rule were to place Uganda and the Acholi into a continued cycle of 
political instability and violence 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The eradication of political parties and the weakening of the local councils and 
administrations meant that debates regarding ‘moral ethnicity’ came to the 
forefront within the Acholi polity in the 1970s. The fear of the state, and its 
monopoly of the mechanisms of inflicting violence and death, drove Acholi 
either back to their ancestral homes or out of the country in search of safety. 
Migration back to the homestead, combined with increased competition for 
jobs in the district contributed to the social, political and economic tensions in 
the locality. Furthermore, the emphasis on chiefs as political and cultural 
leaders contributed to the sharpening of clan identities. As a result, even 
within the Acholi ethnic identity, the social stratifications of ‘moral ethnicity’ 
were internally fragmented, reinforcing traditional structures of clan groupings.  
In religious terms, the increase in baptism and conversion to 
Christianity with the decrease of church marriages and the continued 
disregard for Christian teachings back in the villages, was a reinforcement of 
indigenous cultural norms and values. Yet it was also an acknowledgement of 
the growing attachment the Acholi had for their post-colonial Christian identity 
as well as the resources that could be obtained by affiliating with a particular 
denomination. The flight to the villages by migrants and the exile of the Ocols 
served to weaken the connection between Acholi and the rest of Uganda 
politically, isolating the peoples of the region while emphasising their 
connection to their ancestral land.  The Ocols, marginalised once again to the 
locality, used their intellectual and material resources to acquire scarce 
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economic commodities at the expense of the Lawinos.778 Yet this did not 
translate into a breakdown of relations between the two groups. There were 
no mass uprisings by the peasant farmers, urban and rural labourers or 
housewives aimed at the Acholi middle class, nor were there reports 
regarding major clashes stemming from the unequal distribution of wealth.  
Although the Lawinos were not being ‘protected’ or ‘rewarded’ by those who 
held power, they continued to maintain the status quo through their silence 
and indifference to formal political and social structures in the locality. 
Undeniably, even if the Lawinos were inclined to change their socio-economic 
status, they lacked the means and resources to compete with the Ocols at this 
level. However, even if one were to somehow acquire the resources to do so, 
one automatically entered the domain of the patrons whose primarily role 
would be to reinforce the social, political and economic structures that kept 
the ‘haves’ on top and the ‘have nots’ below.  
Thus a cycle becomes self-perpetuating, where the Ocols strive to gain 
more power, while the Lawinos push to enter the world of the Ocols.  As high 
politics moved from the centre to the locality, the Lawinos were displaced to a 
lower level of political negotiation. This was only allowed to happen because 
of how each of the two groups viewed their positions within Acholi. The Ocols 
expected to be placed within a higher pecking order because they had the 
political and economic resources. In turn, by placing education, money and 
cultural capital as the pinnacle of achievement and as a means to alleviate 
one from poverty, the Lawinos inadvertently confirmed the Ocols positioning 
within this pecking order.779 The two groups thus understood their roles as 
symbiotic; the existence of one validated the other. However, this process of 
validation could only take place with the enclave of an Acholi moral economy 
where kinship, clans, ancestral ties, language and cultural customs provided 
the umbilical cord connecting the various hierarchies. This can be observed in 
                                                
778 Berman and Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity & Democracy in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective, 7 
779 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’ in J. Richardson (ed.) Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 241-258. 
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how those with ‘the big bellies’, rather than being abandoned when they were 
in trouble, were actually sheltered and protected by the Lawinos and allowed 
to resume their positions after the liberation war. Rather than dismantling 
Acholi ethnic identity at a time when it was dangerous to be an Acholi, the 
overall effect in this shift of political dynamics in region, actually served to 
strengthen it. The repressiveness of Ugandan politics in the 1970s and the 
lack of political parties to channel grievances through the lens of ‘political 
tribalism’, meant that when Idi Amin was overthrown, Acholi politicians who 
returned to the region found that tools within the ‘cultural tool kit’ had not 
rusted or eroded with time, but had in fact been sharpened considerably.  
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6.0. A State in Turmoil: 1979-1980.  
 
 ‘. . . After Amin, we understood politics better.’780  
 
Rather than providing a return to some sort of normality in Uganda after Amin, 
Obote’s re-election under controversial circumstances in 1980 obliterated any 
hope of political cohesion, sending opposing political figures to the bush to 
fight against the new regime. Government resources were spent fighting the 
rebels at the expense of reconstructing state and local institutions. The 
country was once again left with an ineffective central government, riddled 
with ethnic rivalries, governed by military force and crippled economically. 
   
Adam Branch argues that, following Obote’s election in 1980, the 
political and economic vacuum left by Amin’s rule meant there could be ‘no 
return to the massive patronage machine of the Obote I regime. 
Consequently, there was no ‘wide-scale revival of the Acholi middle class’, as 
there was not ‘much to redistribute’ through the patron-client network.781 
Whilst Amin had utilised chiefly authority to maintain some political and 
administrative connection to the Acholi locality, Obote’s increasing fear of 
political challenges from Acholi politicians and high-ranking military personnel, 
meant that, rather than attempting harness political support form his northern 
counterparts, he became reliant on political and military support from 
members of his own tribal group. This meant that once again, Acholi 
politicians lost their position as the centralising force between local and 
central government.  
Within Acholi, the failure to establish an effective administrative, 
economic and political connection between the locality and the centre meant 
that during the five years of Obote’s rule, the political cataclysm at the centre 
was reflected back into the locality. The economic and political collapse of the 
state, and consequent weakening of the patronage machine, opened an 
avenue for political pluralism, giving multiple ‘power contenders’ the 
opportunity to engage outside of their previously established political domains.  
                                                
780 (F/M) NAU: Interview with retired civil servant, Gulu Town Centre, 15 July 2012  
781 Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 58.	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Furthermore, the return of the Acholi political elite from exile and the 
resumption of party politics reignited old political rivalries with each faction 
now willing to infringe on the others previously established political territories. 
For the local population, the failure of central government to re-establish law 
and order cumulated in violent civil disorder as some members of the 
populace sought to acquire basic goods, often at the expense of ethnic 
‘outsiders’ living in the region by redefining the cultural boundaries of 
‘Acholiness’. Thus, political activity in Acholi during this period therefore 
became primarily centred on the locality, as formal negotiations for economic 
and political resources could no longer take place within the national arena.  
 
6.1. ‘Coup d’état Politics’ 
 
Amin’s dictatorial rule and economic policies, whilst detrimental to the 
administrative function of the state, were able to utilise unilateral violence and 
fear to keep internal political disobedience in check and stifle any opposition 
to his authority.  However, from the moment Amin was ousted, the Ugandan 
state faced challenges of monumental proportions: primarily how to go about 
reconstructing a civilian political order that would replace the former military 
regime. The military coup immediately negated the political, economic and 
judicial structures that had been installed by the former administration, all of 
which ceased to function as Amin’s troops fled the capital in 1979, leaving 
what Gertzel describes as a ‘broken-backed state’ [with] a serious institutional 
and political vacuum.’782 There was no functioning police force, army, judiciary 
or civil service, and those who did remain in their posts were left in limbo 
unsure whom they were to serve. The National Consultative Council (NCC) 
was essentially left with the task of building a civilian government from 
nothing. Several senior appointments were made in quick succession, 
including the installation of a Chief Justice and Inspector-General of the 
Police.783 The political vacuum left by Amin generated a destructive dialogue 
                                                
782 C. Gertzel, ‘Uganda after Amin: The Continuing Search for Leadership and Control’ African 
Affairs, Vol. 79 No. 317 (1980), 461-489. 
783 Karugire, The Roots of instability in Uganda, 85-87. 
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between national and local political actors who were all vying to gain control of 
Uganda:  
 
Within a matter of weeks the new rulers were submerged in a political 
debate that produced a 'total paralysis of administration' and a struggle 
for power within their ranks, which severely constrained decision-
making at the centre. The attempt to re-establish legal and normative 
rules were inhibited by the fact that no single group proved able to 
impose its ideas and interpretations upon the others. The inability to 
achieve a new consensus gave greater encouragement to old political 
divisions. Hence those who sought to restore order to Uganda in 1979 
had to engage in the same quest for legitimacy and control that had 
posed the fundamental dilemma for the former civilian regime before 
1971.784 
 
The liberation war had been years in the planning and prior to the Tanzanian 
and Ugandan troops entering the Kampala, Julius Nyerere, the Tanzanian 
President, had hosted in March 1979 a gathering of all the would-be-liberators 
to discuss what sort of government would be formed after Amin’s deposal. 
Attendees were comprised of more than 100 Ugandans from over twenty 
separate exile groups with a wide spectrum of political views and loyalties 
represented, all stating their claims for political representation in a post-Amin 
government. UPC politicians made a request for special recognition for their 
members on the grounds of being one of the oldest parties in Uganda, while a 
request by The Front for National Salvation (FRONASA)-an anti-Amin rebel 
group formed around 1972 and headed by future President Yoweri Museveni-
that exiles with a military base should play a central role within any 
government, was swiftly rejected.785  
Added to this, Obote was still regarded as ‘the president in exile’ by his 
loyal supporters from the UPC caucus.786 Nyerere had remained a constant 
advocate for the former president, even providing him safe exile in Dar-es-
Salaam.  Among Obote’s old and new political opponents, there was a real 
fear that the Tanzanian president was clandestinely orchestrating his friend’s 
return to the Ugandan presidency, yet they remained reliant on Nyerere’s 
                                                
784 Gertzel, ‘Uganda after Amin’, 461-489.  
785 R. Posnett, ‘Uganda after Amin’ The World Today, Vol. 36 No. 4 (1980), 147-153; 
Karugire, The Roots of instability in Uganda, 85-87. 
786 Gertzel, ‘Uganda after Amin’, 461-489.  
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political and military support for any successful coup. Following heated 
debates in Moshi it was agreed by the Ugandan groups and Nyerere that an 
umbrella governing body named the Uganda National liberation Front would 
be formed, comprised of a National Consultative Council which would act as 
an interim legislature and a National Executive Committee of which the 
chairman would act as an ex-officio President. Yusuf Lule, a Muganda, was 
installed as the chairman and became acting President of the NCC 
immediately after Amin was overthrown.  However, as Samwiri Karugire 
observes, the problem was that many of the debates that had taken place in 
Moshi a month earlier had not been resolved and this ‘disparate collection’ of 
individuals were tasked with reinstalling civilian rule in Uganda.787 
Amin was eventually overthrown a year after he unsuccessfully tried to 
invade Tanzania in October 1978. The invading Tanzanian and Ugandan 
rebel resistance quickly overpowered any resistance, taking Kampala on the 
10 April 1979. By this time Amin had already escaped to Libya where he 
remained in exile until 1980. Despite the national euphoria that followed 
liberation and support from the civilian population, the UNLF and the NCC 
faced the same problems of legitimacy that had thwarted Amin and Obote. 
Internal divisions within the interim government, its largely military 
composition, and inability to centralise political control, meant that within a few 
weeks of the coup not even the national cries of post-liberation joy carry the 
new government past its political stagnation. Furthermore, the predominately 
Northern composition of the old army cadre still posed many of the same 
problems that had challenged Obote and Amin. The installation of Yusuf Lule 
as President of the NCC meant that army personnel who had remained loyal 
to Obote and still considered him as the legitimate president of Uganda were 
inherently hostile to Lule’s government.788 There were accusations against 
Lule by pro-Buganda groups that the President’s cabinet was 
disproportionately weighted with pro-Obote elements. The installation of Oyite 
Ojok, a Lango, as Chief-of-Staff was viewed by the Baganda as an attempt to 
fill the administration with pro-Obote Northerners. The Baganda still had little 
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regard for Obote, blaming him for many of the political and economic 
hardships that had befallen the Kingdom since the 1960s. Despite 
protestations by Obote that he had no intention of returning to reclaim the 
presidency, the situation was tenuous given that the former president still 
continued to play a prominent role in political affairs across the border.789 
Unsurprisingly, considering such tensions, after only two months there was a 
change of leadership within the NCC as another Muganda, Godfrey Binaisa 
was appointed as President, replacing Yusuf Lule in June 1979. When 
Binaisa fired the military Chief of Staff Brigadier David Oyite Ojok, Paulo 
Muwanga, a close associate of Obote, staged another coup ending Binaisa’s 
presidency in May 1980. Muwanga ruled for just a few days until the 
establishment of the Presidential Commission of Uganda under the 
chairmanship of Muwanga and deputy chairmanship of Yoweri Museveni, with 
Oyite Ojok and General Tito Okello acting as heads of the army. On 27 May 
1980, Baganda fears were realised when the Presidential Commission 
announced that Obote would be returning to Uganda and that in December of 
the same year, the country would hold its first multi-party elections since 
independence in 1962.790  
In response to the political divisions within the NCC and across the 
country, new political parties were quickly formed while old established ones 
such as the UPC and DP started to harness their support base. To prevent a 
return to the status quo of a two-party state, rebel military leaders such as 
Yoweri Museveni formed political wings of their military groups to challenge 
DP and UPC political dominance. On 4 June 1980, the Uganda Patriotic 
Movement (UPM) was formed creating a political wing of FRONASA. In the 
same month the Uganda Labour Party (ULP) and the Uganda Nationalist 
Movement (UNM) were formed, with members drawn from the NCC and 
several cabinet ministers. The general consensus among these new parties 
was that the UPC and the DP had had the opportunity but had failed to 
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address the country’s problems.791 These new political parties provided the 
means for a new generation of politicians and army personnel to challenge 
the old cadre of political actors. 
 
 
 
Image 2: Ugandan Presidents 1979-1986 
   
Yusuf Lule: 13 April-20 June 1979     Godfrey Binaisa: June 1979 -May 1980    Paulo Muwanga: 12-22 May1980 
 
Milton Obote: 17 Dec.1980-27 July 1985  Tito Okello: 29 July 1985-26 Jan. 1986   Yoweri Museveni: 29 Jan 1986- 
 
 
The main political problem was that the various rebel groups which had 
come together under the UNLA/F, had all operated as separate political and 
military entities while they were in exile prior to the Moshi conference. Trying 
to join these various military wings into one national army proved problematic 
given their diverse political allegiances to their leaders. The situation was 
clearly causing great concern among the populace, prompting Museveni to 
reassure Ugandans that contrary to appearances there was ‘no single 
Ugandan with his private army’ and that all army personnel were completely 
devoted to the UNLA: ‘We can afford to have more political parties but not 
                                                
791 ‘A new political Party formed’ The Uganda Times, 5 June 1980. The Military Commission 
was set up as a branch of the UNLA. 
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more than one army.’792 Yet, within a few months, this statement would prove 
untrue.  As soon as it was announced that Obote had won the general 
elections in December 1980, several rebel groups including Museveni’s 
quickly mobilised their armed forces and retreated to the bush to wage a 
guerrilla war against the new government. This was despite the promise made 
by David Oyite Ojok in 1980 that once the elections were over, ‘the soldiers 
would return to their barracks.’793  
The announcement that Obote was returning to Uganda to run for 
President had a favourable impact on UPC’s support base in Acholi.  Amin’s 
rule of fear only served to remind the Acholi how of good they had had it 
under Obote’s first administration.794 It was no wonder that even hardened DP 
supporters often resorted to looking back at Obote’s first presidency with the 
retrospective hue of rose-tinted glasses. Some voters who had been to loyal 
to the DP changed allegiance as they bought into the party rhetoric that the 
UPC was the only party that cared about development in the North. The re-
election of Obote in 1980 has proven controversial among political activists 
inside and outside of Acholi, particularly regarding the question of whether or 
not elections were rigged in Obote’s favour. Academic and political observers 
generally agree ‘that the 1980 elections were rigged to give power to the UPC 
can now not be doubted.’795 Karugire offers documentary evidence supporting 
the claim that prior to the election, the UPC, with the backing of the Military 
Commission had laid down plans to ensure that the outcome of the elections 
would be favourable to the party and its leader. As such it became a regular 
occurrence that the army systematically dispersed rallies by political 
opponents.796 Of the Acholi interviewees who were consulted in Uganda and 
the Diaspora in the United Kingdom for this project however, the vast majority 
disputed the claim that there was any corruption during the elections. As one 
informant said, ‘even if the election had been stolen, was that a good enough 
                                                
792 ‘No private Army Museveni declares’ The Uganda Times, 11 June 1980.  
793 ‘Soldiers will return to the barracks’ The Uganda Times, 11 June 1980. 
794 Formal and informal interviews, Gulu and Kitgum, June - August 2012. 
795 Karugire, The Roots of Instability in Uganda, 88. 
796 Ibid. 
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reason to go the bush and shed all that blood?’ 797 Whilst the emphasis of this 
thesis is not to try and argue whether or not Obote rigged the elections in 
1980, it is however important to understand why so many Acholi dispute this 
claim. Primarily, any concession that the 1980 elections were rigged would 
somehow justify Museveni taking up arms against Obote and paving the path 
for a brutal civil war, which some prominent Acholi politicians now call a 
‘genocide against the Acholi people by the Ugandan government.’798  In many 
ways, the animosity towards the current regime has favourably shaped 
understandings of the second Obote administration, reinforcing yet again the 
political divide between North and South.  Furthermore, the idea of a self-
interested rebel leader who had run to the bush because he was defeated 
was a valuable political tool that Obote used at any given opportunity. The 
‘bush war’ absolved him of responsibilities for his failing regime. Any 
hardships being faced by Ugandans could be attributed to the activities of the 
rebels.799 Consequently, Museveni and his rebel fighters provided the 
government with the ideal scapegoat for all its failings. This was a rhetorical 
device that a vast majority of the Acholi bought into, and to some extent still 
do.  
 
6.2. Civil Disobedience and the Continued Militarisation of Acholi  
 
If this brief narrative of Ugandan political history following Amin’s ousting 
reads like a convoluted political nightmare, it is precisely because it was. 
Unfortunately, this coincided with a crucial time when Ugandans needed 
coherency from their political leaders the most. Amin’s regime had all but 
crippled the economy. Furthermore, the liberation war had proved to be 
costly, both economically and socially. Remnants of Amin’s armies who were 
trying to escape the capital looted, raped and killed as they made their way to 
Sudan. Members of the UNLA, many of whom had volunteered to fight 
                                                
797 (F/M) NAU: interview witth civil servant, Entebbe, 4 January 2012.  
798 Olara. A. Otunno.‘The Secret Genocide.’ Foreign Policy. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/06/09/the_secret_genocide [Accessed 20 October 
2013]. 
799 ‘Luwero School Reopens’ The Uganda Times, 14 April 1983. 
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alongside the Tanzanian army with minimal training and knowledge of military 
conduct, returned to their villages riding the wave of liberation euphoria and 
wanting to stake their claim to the spoils of war. Very soon the liberating army 
became synonymous with corruption, the highjacking of vehicles carrying 
basic goods to rural villages, robberies of individual persons, and the illegal 
acquisition of property: ‘They thought because they had freed us that they 
deserved everything.’800 ‘Very soon “liberation” became a nightmare for the 
people of Uganda as lawlessness mounted and the government seemed 
powerless to contain it.’801   
Returning soldiers entered Acholi in glory only to find that their financial 
rewards would not be found through official salaries, but through other 
avenues steeped in corruption and the manipulation of the symbolic power of 
their uniform. Local administrators and police officers quickly lost any hope of 
central government coming to the rescue and found other ways to manipulate 
the system. A lack of political cohesion, functioning administrative hierarchy, 
or economic funds ensured that adherence to administrative bureaucracy was 
almost non-existent. Under Amin, local chiefs and military personnel had been 
installed as replacements of the exiled or murdered local political elite, 
reinforcing the connection between the centre and the locality. Consequently, 
there had been a semblance of administrative bureaucracy whereby local 
leaders knew what was expected of them and the consequences of not 
following the established chain of command. In attempt to fill the 
administrative vacuum, the NCC initiated a heavy recruitment drive into the 
police force to counter increased incidents of civil disorder. This was born out 
of the realisation that unless the fragile NCC was seen to be taking control of 
the country, the government would lose the little legitimacy it still held among 
the populace. In Acholi, the recruitment drive translated into a free for all 
whereby men and women who were deemed physically capable were given 
the opportunity to join the local police force.802 Protocols of vetting and 
                                                
800 (F/M) NAU: Interview with retired civil servant, Gulu, 9 June 2012.  
801 Quoted from Karugire, The Roots of instability in Uganda, 85-87; Gertzel, ‘Uganda after 
Amin: The Continuing Search for Leadership and Control’, 481. 
802 District staff records indicate that the vast majority of the recruits were Acholi men. Only 
two appraisal records for female officers were found, one of which was illiterate. 
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training were bypassed, resulting in the recruitment of under-qualified and 
often ill-disciplined recruits. The staff records indicated that a vast majority of 
low-ranking police officers recruited in the 1980s had little or no experience 
prior to their post. The majority had at best only received a primary level 
education with little or no understanding of English. Staff discipline within the 
police force became an immediate problem. Disciplinary actions were taken 
against frequent lateness, rudeness and disregard to superiors and cases of 
excessive alcohol consumption during shifts.803       
Because of Acholi’s close proximity to the Sudan, the region had to 
contend with a serious security crisis immediately after liberation. The West 
Nile, being Amin’s birthplace and benefiting from his patronage, had provided 
the former president with a considerable support base. 804  After his overthrow 
Amin’s men used the border between Uganda and Sudan as an escape route 
out of the country, while some soldiers still loyal to the former President were 
making the exodus back to their villages in the West Nile. Consequently, the 
UNLA concentrated most of their efforts in West Nile region in an attempt to 
flush out remnants of Amin’s soldiers and civilians who were still considered 
loyal to him. Amin’s persecution and massacres of Acholi soldiers and 
civilians inevitably meant that questions of recriminations were immediately 
raised. Almost immediately some Acholi soldiers and civilians took the 
opportunity to avenge the wrongs that they felt had been inflicted on them by 
‘Amin’s soldiers.805 The situation became more fraught when it was 
announced that Obote had won the general elections, resulting in the creation 
of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), a rebel group based in the 
West Nile and led by Amin’s former Minister of Finance, Moses Ali. The UNRF 
was comprised of those who politically opposed Obote and the UPC as well 
                                                
803 KDA: Report from G. Pibo, Senior Internal Auditor sent to Treasurer Kitgum District 
Administration Kitgum, 22 January 1985; GDA Box 532 ‘Staff Records’, June 1980-November 
1989. 
804 M. Leopold, Inside West Nile: violence, history and representation on an African Frontier 
(Durham, NC: Duke University, 2005). 
805 GDA Box 541: Letter from the DC of Gulu to the Military Commission, 17 October 1980; 
GDA Box 541: Letter from the Vicar General of the Gulu Diocese to DC Gulu, 15 October 
1980. 
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as some members that were still loyal to Amin.806 This placed Acholi in a 
precarious position, bordering as they did a region harbouring the UNRF, a 
group that was completely hostile to a President whom they had 
overwhelmingly voted for.   
In Gulu, lawlessness rapidly spread across the municipality allowing 
civilians to openly satisfy personal vendettas against ‘outsiders’, in particular 
people from the West Nile, Arua, Sudan and Zaïre living in the region.807 
Reports of murders of non-Acholi in the district became more frequent.  In 
1982, a Madi man who had lived in Gulu for over fifty years was killed in the 
town trading centre simply because he originated from the West Nile.  Those 
living in the district but designated as non-Acholi because of their natal ethnic 
identities were often targeted for lootings and their properties attacked.  In 
1982 a public meeting was organised by the local council advising people ‘not 
to kill in cold blood any non-Acholi without a proper investigation’ as many of 
those being targeted had lived in the district for decades and were innocent of 
the war or any wrong doing.808  
By the end of the 1980 the attacks had become so frequent that the 
Vicar-General of the Gulu Diocese felt compelled to write an open letter 
describing the violence that he had witnessed, including brutal killings by men, 
women and youth, and the forcible removal of individual property: 
 
It is well known to all the people around Gulu that of late some 
Ugandans from the surrounding districts have been innocently 
victimised as a result of tribal hatred planted by the former dictator 
Amin. The situation has not changed for the better but has worsened. 
The Church is the champion of peace, justice and brotherly love, the 
defender of the poor and the oppressed besides being impartial 
towards any political parties and anyone in particular, this needs no 
added emphasis, it is an axiom. We are not doing anything wrong by 
                                                
806 Will Ross, Uganda signs peace deal with rebels. BCC World News. Africa. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2607683.stm [Accessed 18 July 2013] 
807 GDA Box 541: Report, Security Meeting for West Acholi held 25 October 1982, 29 October 
1982; GDA Box 541: Letter from the Vicar General of the Gulu Diocese to DC Gulu, 15 
October 1980; GDA Box 541: Letter from DC Gulu to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kampala, 
22 February 1980. 
808 GDA Box: 541: Report, Security Meeting for West Acholi held 25 October 1982, 29 
October 1982:  
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saving the life of innocent people threatened by some citizens who, in 
so doing, are working against the real good of our country. We would 
like to see civil authority openly support our stand.809 
 
Attacks against ‘outsiders’ continued long after Amin’s soldiers had left.  
Whilst initially the civilian attacks were arguably derived from a genuine fear of 
the presence of Amin’s soldiers, they became quickly opportunistic: a means 
to acquire goods, food, documents and sometimes property. Thus, civil 
disorder in Acholi became more prevalent primarily because of the 
government’s economic policies, or lack thereof. Against the backdrop of the 
on-going war between the government and the rebels in Luwero, the 
government’s economic and military resources were primarily being utilised to 
fight the rebels. There was very little money going into Acholi and much of 
Uganda, and essential services such as road maintenance, hospitals and 
schools were neglected. The condition of the roads in Gulu, the main town in 
the Acholi was so bad that in 1983 the DC in Gulu requested that since the 
government could not repair them because of other priorities, the chiefs 
should mobilise the people to go and do the work themselves, resorting to the 
colonial system of mobilising  ‘labour gangs.’810 The DC stated that it was up 
to the people to get themselves ‘out of this acute situation.’811 Community 
development programmes operated in name only and many of the 
organisations could do little developmental work because there were simply 
no resources available to facilitate the any activities. Institutions such as the 
Federation of Development, which was tasked with promoting club and scout 
membership among women and youth, conducting adult literacy programmes 
and rural farm training, could not even afford the materials to attract new 
members. The only heavily attended programme initiated by the Federation 
was a youth development course held in 1983 indicating the high level of 
                                                
809 Appeal for Justice and Security for Law Abiding Citizens: Diocese of Gulu. Letter to DC 
Gulu from the Vicar General of the Gulu Diocese.15 October 1980. 
810 In colonial Uganda labour obligations began in 1912 whereby was forced to provide labour 
to the government in exchange for paying tax. ‘From 1924 certain groups could exchange the 
luwalo (labour) by paying cash, but initially very few people had the cash to do so.’ Qoute in 
G. Carswell, Cultivating Success in Uganda: Kigezi Farmers & Colonial Policies, 15. 
811 GDA Box 527: Letter from Acting DC, Gulu to all county chiefs, 14 November 1983. 
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youth employment in the region and lack of investment among this 
demographic.812  
In annual reports detailing the economic situation of youth in Kitgum 
district, the local council made a plea to the government to provide axes, 
hoes, bicycles and footballs so that the young in the region could have 
facilities to farm and participate in recreational sports to keep them 
occupied.813 In fact, annual district reports from 1983 to 1984 all make for grim 
reading as the district administrators appealed for funds to buy bricks to build 
schools and help alleviate the price hike of essential goods as a result of high 
inflation.814 The disappointment with the government’s perceived nonchalance 
towards the continued welfare of the people prompted the Community 
Development Officer to write to the DC in Gulu outlining the complaints that 
were streaming into his office written by civilians.  
 
Some clubs in the district have made numerous complaints especially 
from the women’s clubs [sic]. The Women are hard-working and have 
managed to increase production of various cash and food crops. It is 
however sad to note that they live a miserable life. It has become very 
difficult for me to convince them that the government is committed to 
them.815  
 
Consequently, the failure of central government to re-establish law and order, 
invest money in Acholi, or reconstruct local institutions allowed for civil 
disorder to continue as some members of the populace sought to simply help 
themselves to the resources that the government was not providing. 
Moreover, the central government’s withering grasp on power meant that as 
opposed to abating civil disorder and demilitarising the population, the state 
actually utilised civilians in its fight against the ‘enemy’ in the bush.816  
                                                
812 GDA Box 527: Department for Community Development Annual Report for Gulu District 
Year Ending 1983.  
813 KDA: Memorandum by Parabongo Division to Central Government, 26 March1984.  
814 KDA: Kitgum Town Council Annual Report 1984.  
815 GDA Box 540: Letter from the Community Development Officer to the DC of Gulu, 24 
March 1983 (quotation paraphrased) 
816 GDA Box 541: Letter from District Police Commander to Gulu Municipal Council: The 
Town Clerk, 12 April 198; Interviews Gulu and Kitgum, June August 2012. 
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Ugandan soldiers and Acholi exiles who had fled the region in the 
1970s were now returning home via Sudan and Tanzania as the slow process 
of repatriation began. A centre was opened in Gulu to temporarily house up to 
200 returnees, many of whom had no homes to go back to.817 Within this 
climate of fear and suspicion of ‘outsiders’, some of the returnees found that 
their reception was less than welcoming.  In February 1980 around twenty-five 
returnees were reported to have crossed the border via Nimule in southern 
Sudan and clashed with Acholi villagers as they tried to re-enter the country. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs commented that in some instances people 
were wary of these individuals, unsure as to who was connected to Amin, and 
who was a genuine returnee. People were being refused entry in Acholi and 
those who managed to get through the border faced being molested and 
robbed of their property.818 Some members of the local population actively 
participated in this civil disorder sweeping the region, seizing the opportunities 
that a weak state presented. District security reports detailed increased 
incidents of cattle raiding among the Acholi, house raids, lootings and 
robberies. In January 1985 a report detailing prison statistics in Gulu 
municipality showed a sharp increase in the number of individuals being 
detained for matters pertaining to civil disobedience and robberies.819 Those 
designated as ‘outsiders’ bore the brunt of the attacks instigated by 
government propaganda that rebels were trying to infiltrate the districts. The 
government had advised civilians to arm themselves with machetes and sticks 
so that they could defend themselves against potential rebels.820 This in many 
ways validated violence against ‘outsiders.’ However, the realisation that the 
state could no longer control the populace resulted in a last ditch attempt from 
                                                
817 GDA Box 533: File: ‘Intelligence Refugees’, 1964-1983. 
818 GDA Box 541: Letter from DC Gulu to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kampala, 22 
February 1980. 
819 KDA: District Intelligence report, 20 March 1985; GDA BOX 529 File: PR1/2. ‘Prisons 
Uganda Government’ ‘Gulu Prison’ Departmental Brief for Report from Uganda Government 
Prison Gulu (author unknown) sent to DC Gulu, received 28 January 1985.  
GDA Box 529:  Gulu Prison Departmental Brief for January, 1985 
820 GDA Box 541: Letter from District Police Commander to Gulu Municipal Council: The 
Town Clerk, 12 April 1984. 
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1984 to disarm civilians as those with firearms were instructed to hand them 
in to the police force. In a region characterised by insecurity and violence it is 
not surprising that this message was not heeded as Acholi civilians, like their 
counterparts in Lamogi over seventy years earlier, defiantly kept their arms 
and ammunitions.821  
This was in many ways a continuation of the rule of fear and violence 
utilised by Amin during the 1970s. However, under Amin the state had control 
over the tools of violence. In the 1980s, the civil population was able to take 
ownership of these tools largely because of the political weakness of central 
government and its inability to completely subjugate the populace through 
military force. Consequently, lawlessness permeated the locality as reports of 
robberies, murders, and public disorders associated with excessive drinking of 
home-brewed spirits and prostitution increased.822 Frequent incidents of night-
time shootings were reported as the local police lost the ability to control the 
steady flow of illegal arms into the region. Combat uniforms and ammunition 
were even being stolen from the police and sold in the black market and used 
to stage armed robberies.823 Within Gulu municipality the situation had 
escalated to the point that the DC suggested the only way to combat 
lawlessness would be if the Ministry of Internal Affairs could send the Special 
Security Forces to the district.824 Had the government had the resources to 
adhere to the DC’s request, the security forces sent would have found that a 
vast majority of the incidents that they would have had to deal with would 
have involved other military personnel. Complaints against soldiers stationed 
in the region by civilians reached an all-time peak in 1984.825 Of the civil 
complaints made to the police the majority were against men in uniform, 
although at this point it was becoming harder to ascertain who was a 
                                                
821 GDA BOX 545 File ARM.1: Arms and Ammunition Policy’ Correspondences for Gulu, May-
July 1985. 
822 GDA Box 541: District Security Report, 22 February 1980. 
823 GDA Box 541: Letter from DC Gulu to Ministry of Local Ordinance, 5 Aug 1982; GDA Box: 
532 File: C.MISS.12: Petitions and complaints, 20 October 1980. 
824 GDA Box 541: Letter from District Police Commander to DC Gulu, 11 May 1984. 
825 KDA: Letter from District Cooperative Officer to DC Kitgum, 16 March 1984; GDA Box 541: 
‘Amin’s Soldier’s’ Letter from Acting County Chief of Kilak to DC Gulu, 6 May 1980. 
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legitimate soldier and who was using a uniform to commit robberies. However, 
the fear of the state which allowed Amin to control the locality was no longer 
all-encompassing and civilians now felt able to report and challenge 
government representatives and soldiers. 
 
I was on a bus waiting to depart to Kampala and this soldier entered 
the bus and tried to grab a girl who was sitting near me. We knew he 
was taking her to rape her so we surrounded him and chased him 
away. We were not scared because there were many of us and only 
one of him.826  
 
In 1980 staff members of the Uganda prison farm in Patiko sent a letter of 
complaint to the DC in Gulu expressing their growing fear of Tanzanian 
soldiers who had been stationed nearby. Their wives and children were fearful 
of travelling to the market to buy food on their own as they were either 
propositioned or molested by wayward soldiers who saw no problem in taking 
another man’s wife or his daughters. The staff warned the DC that if 
something was not done soon, there was bound to be a violent clash between 
the two groups.827  
In this regard, Acholi and Tanzanian soldiers stationed in the locality 
were simply taking advantage of the disorderly political situation within central 
government. As the state had little control over their activities in the locality, 
they were left largely to their own devices and could dictate the rules of their 
own engagement. Individual motivations superseded any attempts of 
establishing a centralised military force, as soldiers placed unofficial curfews 
while illegally acquiring commodities through violence and intimidation. ‘They 
would go to bars, drink as much as they wanted, then refuse to pay.’ Some 
even took control of local businesses by force, using marker pens to write ‘this 
is my property’ in front of the shops and force the owners out.’828 Rather than 
assisting the government in supplying a region starved of essential 
commodities, soldiers were instead accused of stealing and smuggling food 
                                                
826 (IF/M) NAU: Interview with local business owner, Gulu, 18 June 2012  
827 GDA Box 532: Letter from Prison Administrator to DC Gulu, 2 January 1980.  
828 Ibid. 
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from their units and civilians transporting goods to Sudan where they could 
sell them on the black market.829  
 
They were very excited that they had won and they expected us to 
immediately respect them and give them what they wanted even if they 
were being unfair. Most of them were not even properly trained 
soldiers, but they came back and started to think that they were really 
somebody because they a gun.830  
 
 
The vast majority who deserted from the army still kept their arms and 
uniforms and continued to use both to terrorise civilians. In 1985 alone the 
district security reports stated that 757 soldiers had been arrested for 
desertion, and it was suspected that many more had joined some of the rebel 
groups in the bush. Clashes between reinforcements from outside the district 
and Acholi recruits arose as members from each division competed for the 
material bounties of internal disorder.831 The inconsistencies of the salary 
payments, confusion in the chain of command within the army corps and 
uncertainty in the authority of central government meant lower ranking army 
personnel felt it was within their rights to acquire resources by any means 
possible since the government was not fulfilling its obligations to them:            
 
It has on a number of occasions been reported to this office that 
soldiers from 13 Battalion are threatening the lives of civilians in this 
district. The above issue has been reported to the commanding officer 
13 battalion but the response was not only negative but it was 
worsened the situation since the army men have ordered residents of 
Mr Tito Kidega’s house to leave and said that it now belongs to the 
army. People are very bitter unless the situation is resolved and they 
may stage a strike or demonstrations. This office is requesting that you 
send the police to manage the situation.832 
 
As large numbers of the complaints made against soldiers in the region 
involved the illegal acquisition of property, and robberies, it stands to reason 
that the primary motivations were drawn from economic motivations. Attacks 
                                                
829 GDA Box 532: Letter from County Chief of Atyak to the Commanding Officer 12th Battalion 
Gulu, 23 March 1983. 
830 (F/M) NAU: Interview with Civil servant, Entebbe, 4 January 2012.  
831 KDA: Monthly Intelligence Reports, 20 March 1985. 
832 KDA:  Letter from DC Kitgum to District Police Commander, 23 May 1984. 
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on civilians were not carried out because of a particular disdain for the 
populace but were a means to acquire resources during time where access to 
commodities were severely limited. What transpired is that the individuals 
targeted by the soldiers were generally the Ocols, consisting of cooperative 
leaders, businessmen, teachers, civil servants and local politicians. The 
breakdown of state control opened the avenue for lower ranking soldiers, 
many of who had been happy to simply carry out their tasks and collect their 
wages, to challenge the confines of their economic and social status. In this 
way, they became in Charles Anderson’s term, credible ‘contenders for power’ 
in the locality.833   
Neither Acholi chiefs nor the police knew how to handle the situation, 
what channels to follow to report the incidents, or how they could acquire the 
resources to do so. Civilians were left to defend themselves and their property 
and those who were driven to ask for help often bypassed chiefs and local 
senior administrative staff, instead appealing directly to the DC or to officials 
within central government. Staff who had held personal grudges against 
superiors took the opportunity to undermine the bureaucratic hierarchy at any 
given opportunity, whilst chiefs and the DC in Gulu and Kitgum could only 
appeal for co-operation.834 The disorganisation of the security and police 
forces in the region contributed to a large extent to the continued civil unrest 
and lawlessness. During a security meeting for West Acholi in 1982 attended 
by the DC, Minister of Power and Communications, and several police 
personnel, accusations were made against the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) who had failed to maintain law and order in the various 
districts. In Amuru and Alero, civil disorder had been particularly prevalent and 
members of the Police Special Branch were accused of being directly 
involved in either causing the unrest or allowing it to continue because of their 
incompetence and practices of corruption.835 After surveying the issues being 
presented during the meeting, the minister in attendance was forced to 
conclude that as far as he was concerned the system was so broken that at 
                                                
833 Anderson, ‘Towards a Theory of Latin American Politics’, 2. 
834 GDA Box 532: Staff Records, June 1980-November 1989.  
835 GDA Box 541: District Security Report, 29 October 1982. 
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the present time ‘there was no real Special Branch unit in Gulu district.’836  
The levels of corruption and ineptitude among the police force were further 
exacerbated because of the financial constraints faced by the local 
administration. Officers complained about the lack of transport and money to 
purchase fuel that was making their jobs even harder. They were unable to 
effectively investigate criminal offences or even arrive at call outs in a 
reasonable time.837  
Added to this was the historical pattern of disproportionately employing 
those who were natives to the district. By staffing a large number of 
indigenous officers in their home districts, it was becoming increasingly 
difficult for these officers to arrest and prosecute ‘their own people or arrest 
their relatives.’838 Most of the officers favoured staying close to their villages 
and relatives and were reluctant to be stationed far away from their homes. In 
this way they could maintain their clan connections and would find it easier to 
manipulate the administrative structure within a locality that they were familiar 
with, as opposed to trying to compete for power elsewhere. The districts 
provided an opportunity to create micro-fiefdoms for officers willing to take 
advantage of the weakening control of central authority allowing agents at the 
local level to effectively manipulate the political and administrative cataclysm 
in the locality.   
Corruption among Acholi police and army officers in Acholi was not 
only a wider reflection of what was going on within the central and local 
administration, but an indication of the struggle for political and economic 
power in the locality. The failure of central government to affectively 
administer and control the locality actually allowed for the reinforcement of a 
decentralised political ‘system’, which inevitably opened a space for Acholi 
cultural identities and indigenous religious practices within formal political and 
administrative discourses. Consequently, among the perfectly written letters in 
flawless English dealing with mundane subjects such as road works and 
council meetings, one comes across a letter to a DC from an army official 
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asking for time off for one of his soldiers because he has been bewitched. 
‘This is to report to you that the above soldier has been bewitched at home 
and had been undergoing local treatment. We request that you sympathise 
with his case as the matter is genuine.’839 Other correspondences follow a 
similar pattern requesting time off for employees and officers that ‘had gone 
mad’ and were unable to attend work because they were undergoing 
traditional treatment in the village.840 Even high-profile politicians were not 
above declaring their participation in traditional ceremonies as they explained 
their absence from their constituencies by claiming that they ‘they had to 
return to the village to undergo a traditional ceremony.’841 The archives and 
oral interviews suggest that requests through official channels for access to 
‘traditional’ cultural-medical resources would not have ordinarily been made. 
However, now they were not only being received but also entertained by the 
formally educated Acholi middle who had meticulously presented themselves 
as a progressive demographic contemptuous of the ‘backward’ and 
uneducated ways of the rural masses.  
In his assessment on the origins of the HSM and the LRA Tim Allen 
argues that Acholi adherence to spirit mediums, was a mechanism for 
establishing ‘social accountability in a world where the state had largely lost 
credibility and had collapsed . . .’842 Similarly, Lawrence Cline’s work on 
religiously-based mass violence in Northern Uganda focuses on the 
importance of Acholi traditional religious identities in creating a world where 
spirits were heavily relied upon, regarding ‘laws concerning morality and 
codes of conduct.’843 Heike Behrend further reinforces this narrative on the 
use of indigenous religious practices, breakdown of the state and outbreak of 
violence in Acholi, attributing it to the failed assimilation Acholi former soldiers 
                                                
839 KDA: Letter from Acting DC of Kitgum to the Adjutant school of infantry Jinja, 15 July 1983. 
840 KDA: Letter from DC Kitgum to Police Commander, Kitgum, 8 August 1983.  
841 GDA Box 541: Letter from Saverino Lanek to Inspector General of the Police, Kampala, 19 
October 1983. 
842 T. Allen, ‘Understanding Alice, Uganda’s Holy Spirit Movement in Context’, Africa: Journal 
of the International African Institute, Vol.16 No.3 (1991), 399. 
843 L E. Cline,’ Spirits and the Cross: Religiously Based Violent Movements in Uganda’, Small 
Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.14, No.2 (2003), 115. 
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back to their villages after the NRA victory in 1986.844 All three analyses 
emphasise 1985-6 as crucial turning point within the Acholi polity, whereby 
the link between the state and locality was broken, with Acholi becoming a 
politically dissociated region hostile to the central government apparatus. As a 
consequence, other mechanisms of governance centred on traditional cultural 
standards and religious practices took the place of state sanctioned political 
institutions. However, what the archives show is that from 1980, rather than 
the peoples of Acholi protesting against an unpopular government by 
emphasising localised cultural standards above the national identity, it was 
actually a two-way process whereby the state invested in Acholi cultural 
institutions as a means to maintain the link with the locality, without 
economically and politically overburdening itself. In an attempt to disperse any 
potential rebellious voices among the Acholi, Obote’s administration continued 
to emphasise cultural institutions as space for formal political engagement.845 
In this way the government could provide politically minded local actors with 
an avenue to satisfy their political ambitions, whilst keeping the populace 
politically confined within the locality. This in itself was not new; this 
decentralised system of governing was initiated during the colonial period with 
the Native Authority and continued through to the early 1960s. Furthermore, 
Obote’s attempt to centralise control and diminish the power of traditional 
leaders in the late 1960s resulted in widespread political protests against his 
administration, illustrating once again the political importance of localised 
authority. Coupled with his government’s rule of fear which instigated the 
physical ‘return to the village’ even Amin was forced to utilise chiefly authority 
as a means to contend with the institutional weaknesses within his 
government following the exile of the local political elite. Thus the emphasis of 
the ‘village’/locality should not be seen as a rejection of the state, but simply a 
continuation of the historic pattern of utilising localised cultural institutions as a 
mechanism to maintain the political connection between the centre and 
locality.  
                                                
844 Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirit Movement, 24. 
845 GDA Box 540 File: Gulu District Executive Cultural Committee.  Minutes of meeting held at 
District Council Hall, Gulu, 18 December 1981.   
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From 1980 the government made a deliberate attempt to engage the 
population in cultural activities as means of contending with the economic 
demands being made the populace. The formation of the Gulu District 
Executive Cultural Committee in January 1982 was an attempt to install ‘pride 
and strong unity.’846 The task of the committee was to reinforce the 
importance of Ugandan culture, which the Chairman stated was the only way 
of distinctly identifying one society from another.’847 Similar organisations 
were established across the country each urging the rejection of European 
cultures that were eroding ‘authentic’ African traditions. Whilst on paper the 
premise of the committee appeared to be centred on emphasising a unified 
Ugandan cultural identity, in reality the committees only served to emphasise 
regional ethnic identities in much the same way that local governments in 
Uganda had been divided. The committee in Gulu was tasked with guiding the 
Acholi to the ‘desired cultural standards’ by streamlining cultural activities 
particularly among clubs in the district including dancing, language and 
traditional ceremonies.848 The Cultural Committees were divided by districts 
and headed by leaders drawn from the locality. Consequently, they could only 
ever encourage the cultural practices of their specific ethnic group. As such 
any premise to develop ‘Ugandan’ culture, would inevitably come second to 
the various ethnically divided cultural identities and practices within each 
district.  
Among the Acholi populace central governments increased emphasis 
on localised cultural practices and institutions was embraced whole-heartedly, 
even by local politicians and educated youth who had historically viewed 
indigenous cultural practices as an endeavour of uneducated villagers, 
indicative of that demographics’ lack of social progression in post-colonial 
Uganda. Externally the ‘Ocols’ had continued to blame traditional ceremonies 
concerning marriage, funerals and indigenous religious practices for stifling 
                                                
846 Ibid. 
847 Ibid. 
848 GDA Box 540: Gulu District Executive Cultural Committee.  Minutes of meeting held at 
District Council Hall, Gulu, 18 December 1981; GDA Box 542: Letter to County Chief of 
Omoro to DC Gulu, 16 June 1983. 
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Acholi progression into modern society.849 And whilst they participated in 
these ceremonies in the villages, their adherence to these customs was 
generally kept outside of the periphery of the more ‘progressive’ circle of 
educated Acholi elite. In a study conducted in 1983 regarding attitudes of 
educated Acholi towards traditional marriage ceremonies, around fifty-two per 
cent of the respondents were still not participating in church weddings and 
preferred the traditional ceremonies. The respondents were recorded 
anonymously and as such were free to express their preference for 
polygamous marriages.850 Tellingly, the author of the study, an Acholi student 
at Makerere University, whilst being sympathetic to local cultural practices, 
remarked that the popularity of traditional marriages was an indication of the 
lack of progression among the participants. Similar reports including, research 
on the extent of practices and belief in witchcraft among the Acholi, convey a 
society actively participating and engaged in these traditional practices.851  
 
In Acholi, education has no affect at all on witchcraft. Witchcraft 
practiced in secret is an impeding factor in development. Unless 
serious steps are taken, witchcraft I believe will continue to be a 
stumbling block on the path of progress in our land.852 
 
However, the researchers still acknowledged the importance of preserving the 
past while at the same time not letting ‘rural backward practices’, impede 
Acholi modernisation.853 This attitude among the Acholi students had been 
consistent up until the 1980s. However, from 1980 onwards some researchers 
began to take a more defensive view of Acholi traditional cultural practices 
and identities, particularly when compared to Western-derived identities.  
 
                                                
849 A.O, p’Amari, Attitudes of Educated Acholi towards traditional marriage ceremonies in 
Gulu District (MA Thesis. Makerere University, 1983).  
850 Ibid.,13. 
851 M. Bernard, ‘The Extent and Practices of Witchcraft Among the Acholi: An Exploratory 
Study (BA Thesis, Makerere University, 1983). 
852 Ibid., 14-17. 
853 S. Baker, Attitudes of Acholi Men towards Family Planning in Gulu District  (BA Thesis, 
Makerere University 1981), 71. 
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The Acholi with the coming of Christianity and education have come to 
hate their customs. Many illiterate Acholi [still] observe these customs. 
Those who have gone to school do not mind whether the traditional 
ways die or not. This is because they have taken up the modern way of 
looking at things instead of preserving our customs.854 
 
As organised cultural activities increased, an opportunity presented itself to 
some Acholi politicians to politicise cultural activities in the locality as they 
attempted to reassert their relevance within the locality. In 1983 the minister 
for Gulu West constituency sent a letter to the Administrative Secretary raising 
concerns about the growing number of traditional dance activities being 
conducted in the municipality. As a member of the UPC the minister was 
particularly concerned that youths participating in these dances were using 
them as a disguise to conduct unlawful political meetings.   
 
I have written regarding this matter to members of the district council 
and religious leaders. The district has power to pass by-laws governing 
and regulating certain intricate and local matters such as marriages 
and dances, particularly the frequency of youth dances could be 
regulated. Organisers of dances could be taxed, for instance. A specific 
by-law on this subject can go a long way to give a clear directive to 
your chiefs as to know what to do. At this moment it is not clear what 
your chiefs would do in this matter, and what they may do may be 
unlawful.855 
 
This correspondence indicates growing participation in cultural activities in the 
district as well as the increasing need to control them by local and central 
government. This was born out of political insecurity on the government’s part, 
but consequently it served to provide local politicians a political space to 
further assert their authority. More importantly, it provided the populace the 
opportunity to engage as a cultural collective reaffirming clan and ethnic ties 
and establishing social order in a region contending with economic, social and 
political decay.  
                                                
854 C. Achieng, Birth Customs Among the Acholi: 1980-81 (BA Thesis, Makerere University 
Library, 1981). 
855 GDA Box 540: Letter from Akena p’Jok, (MP) UPC Chairman to Charles Alai, 
Administrative Secretary Gulu District, 20 June 1983. 
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The attempt to politicise and institutionalise Acholi cultural identities 
saw an increase in various groups lobbying the government to fund and 
facilitate individual organisations focused on promoting Acholi culture in the 
locality. The endeavour was particularly inclusive, especially for Acholi 
women. Acholi cultural norms had always served as an institution for 
governing the homestead. This was a domain where women were could take 
centre stage as they reared children and inoculated cultural norms and 
practices to the next generation. As such, cultural politics provided a platform 
for political engagement that was not wholly dominated by men. In 1983 
members of a women’s group calling themselves ‘Won Ngom Odwogo’, (the 
father/owner of the land has given back), petitioned the District Community 
Development Officer in Gulu asking for assistance in building a ‘cultural 
village’. Their aim was to build and furnish a village in ‘the real Acholi manner’ 
with the houses showing cultural utensils, tools and implements. Entrants to 
the huts would pay a fee and all others could enter the village free if they 
simply wanted to purchase traditional Acholi food and crafts. The target 
market would have been international visitors as at this time Uganda was 
receiving a substantial amount of the international monetary aid, and 
organisations such as UNICEF and the Red Cross who were actively 
monitoring the human cost of the on going  ‘bush war’. As well as small 
number of international tourists and well-to-do visitors from outside the region, 
the women would have certainly had a small local market for their cultural 
village.856 Since the Cultural Committee was tasked with promoting culture in 
all its various forms, the women requested they should be allocated land and 
given advice on how to start the project.857 Yet even within this request it is 
evident that Acholi women still remained on the periphery of formal politics. 
The name of the group alone is an ode to the patriarchal social order of Acholi 
society with man held up as the owner of the land, village and all its 
                                                
856 ‘Uganda gets 95 million dollars from world bank’, The Uganda Times, 17 July 1983; 
‘UNICEF signs 25 million dollar pact’ The Uganda Times, July 9 1983; ‘Red cross Luwero 
Report’ The Uganda Times, August 1983.  
857 GDA Box 540: Letter from Mrs Ochora Women’s leader Gulu East, to the District Cultural 
Officer 29 March 1982.  
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occupants. Furthermore, the contents of the request itself show that even 
within a domain as plural as cultural identity, their political engagement was 
still limited to specific gender roles the centred on the household. The cultural 
village would simply serve as an extension of that. The fact that the women 
felt encouraged to seek funding for their cultural village, is still indicative 
however of central government’s directive to control the connection between 
the centre and the locality, by entertaining funding cultural institutions, at a 
time when it could not feasibly maintain strong political or economic ones.  
 
6.3. Culture and Party Politics: The Ocols versus the ‘Elders’ 
 
Economic mismanagement, the inability to invest in social and economic and 
social services, coupled with constant internal insecurity meant that Obote lost 
much of his immediate post-liberation support from the peoples of Acholi. 
Things took a dramatic turn in 1984, the last year of the President’s rule when 
it became clear that he was not only losing the battle against the rebels, but 
had seemingly lost command of his own administration. The President’s 
growing weakness encouraged some high-ranking Acholi politicians within 
central government to begin challenging his authority. In much the same way 
that Obote’s earlier presidency had been smeared by accusations of nepotism 
and tribalism, the same debates that had contested the idea of a unified 
‘Northern identity’ emerged once again. In an attempt to distance themselves 
from the ailing presidency, Acholi politicians returned to defining Obote not as 
a president from the North but a president from Lango. These accusations 
were not without foundation. Obote’s promotions for high-ranking military 
positions became increasingly skewed towards candidates from Lango. The 
final straw came when, following the death of Chief of Staff Major General 
Oyite Ojok in a plane crash, Obote filled Oyite Ojok’s position with a relatively 
inexperienced junior officer from Lango.858 This, ‘profoundly displeased the 
Acholi who felt that they were being sacrificed in a war they could not win to 
promote Lango interests.’859 Accusations that Obote favoured promoting 
                                                
858 Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, 94. 
859 Ibid., 94. 
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members of his own tribe, led to internal wrangling within the government and 
the high-ranking army corps. Fearing a coup, Obote started to target Acholi 
army officials whom he believed were a credible threat to his authority. By 
turning on members of his own administration Obote set forth a chain of 
events that would lead to a complete breakdown of Lango-Acholi relations 
and the eventual overthrow of his regime in 1985 by Tito Okello, an Acholi 
Army General.       
The power struggle within central government translated into open 
political warfare in Acholi. Much like the Moshi liberators who had returned to 
stake their claim to power, in Acholi it was the return of the ‘Ocols’ from ‘exile’ 
that would pose a political challenge to the President. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, a good number of those who ‘self-exiled’ during Amin’s rule 
had fled abroad but some removed themselves back to their home villages in 
Acholi. They included civil servants, politicians and a large number of the 
Acholi middle class. After liberation, the Acholi local administration was faced 
with the task of absorbing these returnees back into their respective districts. 
In 1980, Yusuf Lule and his successor Godfrey Binaisa announced that any 
citizen who had been dismissed under Amin would be able to return to their 
jobs with full support from the government.860 The directive affected both the 
internal and external returnees. Internally, those who had remained in the 
district during the previous eight years felt that they had a legitimate right to 
claim their old jobs back. Externally, those in exile now had more of an 
incentive to return as they had now been promised that they could seamlessly 
reclaim their old lives. Applications for reinstatement started to flow into the 
local administration, from chiefs, clerical officers and administrators who had 
either been in exile or had been dismissed by the previous regime, placing a 
huge financial and human resources strain on the local administration. Those 
already working in the civil service were already contending with irregular 
wage payments, administrative nepotism, corruption and bureaucratic 
inconsistencies.861 However, central government could not address these 
concerns because it simply did not have the resources or the infrastructure in 
                                                
860 ‘I did not create Amin’ The Uganda Times, June 4 1980.  
861 GDA Box 553: File: staff discrimination/Corruption’, 1972-1980. 
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place to do so. The financial situation of some administrative personnel was 
so dire that in one instance a clerical officer in Atyak wrote a letter to his 
superiors explaining that due to lack of transport money and a bicycle he was 
unable to attend a mandatory consultative meeting.862 Local chiefs, much like 
police personnel and Acholi soldiers resorted to other means of securing 
power, engaging in debates concerning tax boundaries, clan affiliations and 
personnel vendettas. There were seventy documented incidents of land and 
clan disputes in Gulu municipality between August and November 1982 alone 
extant in the archives.863   
 
I was appointed in 1979 and since that date the county chief of Nwoya 
has started to show lack of cooperation and hatred for me and I think 
that the reason is tribalistic as he is a man from Kal and he wants only 
his tribesmen to work in this area as their old county chief was 
responsible in this area of Kal. He confiscated my appointment letter 
that you gave to me. He has refused to pay my salary and plans to 
demote more and place his brother in my place.864  
 
This particular complaint was sent to the DC in Gulu and is indicative of the 
administrative limbo among the county and parish chiefs in Acholi. While the 
contents of the complaint may have had some truth to them, the accusation 
that that county chief was in the process of installing his brother as a parish 
chief was rebutted by the DC who explained that only his office had the power 
to appoint chiefs. The lack of awareness or disregard for administrative 
hierarchy was reflection of the disarray that had now befallen the Acholi 
District Administration. Nobody knew who to complain to and staff felt that 
they could do as they pleased.865  
Although incidents of staff corruption and ineptitude were being 
frequently documented, these complaints and investigations did not result in 
anything other than a stern reprimand, with the ‘culprits’ generally allowed to 
keep their jobs.866 Nepotism within the local councils and administrations 
                                                
862 GDA Box 541: Letter from Mr Oyoo, Assistant Clerical Officer in Atyak, 2 March 1981.  
863 Ibid. 
864 GDA Box 553: Letter from Parish Chief of Koich Kal to DC Gulu, 20 February 1980. 
865 Ibid. 
866 GDA Box 532: ‘Staff Records’, June 1980-November 1989.  
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reinforced a structure whereby once power had been acquired it was very 
hard to remove. Even though wrangling persisted within the administration 
each person could draw upon a certain level of support either from clan 
members, fathers or local politicians. As such it became increasingly difficult 
to remove employees from office regardless of their individual shortcomings. 
The situation was further compounded by the inability of the local and central 
administration to deal effectively with these human resources complaints. 
Central government could ill-afford to embark on a firing spree and waste 
money training new personnel. As a result staff that had little interest in 
carrying out their task effectively were retained rather than fired, and those 
that actually had an interest in doing the job were left out in the cold.867  
A further burden was placed on district finances as in some cases 
applications were made by the returnees for back payments to cover the 
period that they were in exiled or the period that they had had been 
unemployed due to unfair dismissal.868 This government directive, born out of 
the euphoria of liberation and political naivety would have serious 
ramifications in Acholi. Firstly, it emphasised the role of the returnees at the 
expense of those who had remained behind. Secondly, it failed to deal with 
the needs of a growing demographic of Acholi youth who had grown up under 
Amin, remained in education and were now ready to take their place within 
Acholi adult society. This new generation would reach the age of employment 
only to find that they were not only competing against members of their 
generation, but also the established cadre of politicians and administrators 
who were returning home or to public office.   
The UPC and the DP political machines were quick to utilise the 
political freedom that followed the liberation war. Acholi politicians returned to 
the locality determined to reassert their control after an eight-year hiatus. This 
set the stage for a political confrontation between returning politicians and 
local chiefs who had controlled the region during Amin’s presidency. During a 
consultative meeting in 1981 administrative staff members in Gulu were 
                                                
867 Ibid. 
868 Ibid; GDA Box 533: ‘Letter of Reinstatement from sub-County Chief to Permanent 
Secretary, Kampala, 6 May 1980. 
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invited to discuss several complaints that had been reoccurring concerning 
the role of local chiefs. Amid the younger staff there was a consensus that 
chiefs in the region were ineffective as many were unable to carry out their 
tasks because of old age. Chiefs were accused of acting arrogantly because 
many believed that they could not be removed from their posts, making them 
highly contemptuous of local government authority.869 The attacks on the 
chiefs seemed to be coming from all corners, often instigated by politicians 
and the more progressive civil servants. During a rally in Kalongo Kitgum, the 
Minister of Animal Industries and Fisheries, Dr Joseph Otim, made a scathing 
attack on ‘lazy’ and ineffective chiefs in the area that were ‘hindering 
development in the constituency.’ He articulated that chiefs were failing in 
their task to maintain roads and increase food and cotton production. The 
minister appealed to political parties in the region to ‘join hands’ and help to 
develop the region and eradicative the ineffective local authority system.870  
As chiefly and gerontocratic roles continued to be challenged, some 
Acholi clan elders unsurprisingly seized the opportunity to extend their 
traditional political authority outside of their clan groups. In 1985, Acholi elders 
from various districts convened to discuss the potential for creating an Elders’ 
Association that would be tasked with promoting peace and solidarity within 
the region.  Acholi clans had always emphasised the social importance of the 
‘elder.’ Outside of chiefly authority, these groups of men would traditionally 
gather to discuss and resolve issues affecting the clan, be it marriage, death, 
drought or interactions with other groups. The Luo word for elder ‘ladit’ (the 
big man/person) conveys age as well as social ranking within an Acholi 
community. With the post-colonial growth of educated middle class however, 
the title was internally adopted by the Ocols and the Lawinos to encompass 
an individual’s education level, economic and/or political standing. The 
creation of the Elders Association followed the trend of politicising cultural 
institutions in the 1980s, and it was as much about re-imagining traditions as it 
was about the elders trying to extend their political authority outside of the 
homestead.  
                                                
869 GDA Box 541: Staff Consultative Meeting held in Gulu, March 1981.   
870 ‘Lazy chiefs warned’ The Uganda Times, 11 June 1981. 
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The association was to have branches in every division and would 
incorporate around two hundred elders from all around the Northern regions 
including Lango, Madi, Alur and Karamojong.871  By doing so the elders hoped 
that members would aid in strengthening and ‘preserving the fraternal and 
brotherly co-operation with all the neighbouring tribes.’ Other tasks would 
include assisting the government in educating the youth to prepare them for 
‘total peaceful democratic living and respect for human rights.’ During the first 
meeting of the Gulu division, the DC was invited to open the proceedings at 
the district council hall and remained to preside over the processions.’872  
Initially the association seemed to undergo a seamless formation as elders in 
Kitgum and Gulu organised themselves by electing members to the 
committee.  Fifteen elders were elected to the Kitgum branch and a further 
fifteen in Gulu. The two groups organised meetings to introduce their 
respective representatives and to layout the committee’s plans of action. From 
its formation in Gulu, the Elders Association started to amass attention from 
the local council and politicians. After the announcement was made that the 
elders from Gulu and Kitgum would be meeting, the DC sent a memorandum 
to all the county chiefs in Gulu instructing them to attend the ‘meeting without 
fail alongside their parish chiefs.’873 The DC’s involvement with the group not 
only validated the Elders Association but it gave it a specific political 
credence. The Elders themselves had made sure that the organisation’s 
structure was mirrored on that of a political party. Candidates were nominated 
for committee positions, a manifesto was drawn out, public meetings were 
organised and delegations were sent to the President to lobby for resources 
and social amenities. By seeking legitimisation from local government 
officials, the Elders were able to develop the association from a simple 
cultural organisation to a legitimate political mobilising force.  
This of course did not go unnoticed by some of the Ocols, and soon 
conflicts between political actors within the local councils and the Elders 
emerged.  Rather than viewing the organisation as a valuable addition to local 
                                                
871 GDA Box 572: File: ‘Elders’ Association’, July 1985-December 1985. 
872 Ibid. 
873 GDA Box 572: File: ‘Elders’ Association’, July 1985-December 1985; KDA: Letter from J. 
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institutions, some Acholi district administrators and politicians saw it as an 
opportunity to manipulate the situation in an attempt to further their own 
interests. Within months of the association’s formation there was an attempt 
by local administrators and politicians to form a rival organisation that would 
challenge the positions of the elected Elders. To further legitimise the original 
committee, the Elders in return requested that the DC in Gulu send an official 
letter listing all the elected members of the committee to ensure that that 
everyone was aware of who the official members of the Association were. The 
Elders started to adopt the rhetoric of national politics, accusing their 
opponents of trying to organise a ‘coup against committee’ while at the same 
time calling them ‘unpatriotic elements working against national unity’.874 
Following the military coup of Tito Okello in July 1985, the elders took it upon 
themselves to send a letter of support and a delegation to Kampala stressing 
their allegiance to the new president, whilst denouncing the previous regime: 
 
We welcome this historic change, and hope that it will eradicate 
dictatorship forever. Obote brought a bad name to the Luo and the 
Acholis. We call upon your government to respect human rights and 
humanity of which Ugandans have been deprived of since 
independence.  We would like to make the following proposals to help 
the government. We ask that you form a national government 
comprising of selected members of the armed forces and civilian 
personnel of respectful personality and dignity. The government should 
have a national outlook and promote the interest of nation rather than 
tribe by allowing open participation in the national government.875 
 
 
The installation of the first Acholi president of Uganda boosted the Elder’s 
confidence regarding the relationship between the organisation and central 
government. The rhetoric changed from wanting to promote tribal unity with 
neighbouring ethnic groups to promoting national unity, and even going as far 
as instructing the government on how to do this. There was an element of 
ethnic solidarity and the premise that an Acholi president would be more 
                                                
874 GDA Box 572: Minutes: Meeting of the Elders Committee Gulu District on 16 November 
1985. 
875 GDA Box 572:  Letter from the Chairman of the Elders to the DC’s office, 27 July 1985 
(Quotation paraphrased). 
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approachable and sympathetic to regional concerns. By taking this step, the 
Elders hoped to expand from a localised cultural institution to a full-blown 
political organisation that could formally engage with national affairs.  
 
6.4. Party Politics the Ocols and Obote II  
 
It was not a coincidence that the political challenge against chiefs and elders 
coincided with the resumption of formal political activity in Acholi, which 
brought back many of the political hostilities which had ensued under the first 
Obote regime. Coupled with increased internal competition for political and 
economic commodities, this created an atmosphere of political opportunism, 
driven by individual rather than collective interests. Immediately after Amin 
was ousted, new political parties such as the UMP and Conservative Party 
(CP) tried their luck in Acholi as they attempted to expand their support base. 
However, their impact was negligible in the face of the established powers of 
the UPC and DP. The two older parties offered staunch resistance against 
political opponents, hindering any attempts by the new comers to arrange 
political meetings and public rallies. In some instances politicians outside the 
UPC and DP faced arbitrary arrests from overzealous chiefs keen to ensure 
that their own parties held the political monopoly in their respective districts.876 
The fact that post-liberation political parties other than the DP and UPC were 
unable to make tangible gains in Acholi can be explained through historical 
patterns of party politics from as early as the 1950s. The Acholi had a long 
established relationship with the UPC and DP creating strong political 
allegiances. Although Amin’s regime had stipulated that all party politics 
should cease, party political allegiances were not destroyed. If anything they 
were kept alive by the Acholi in exile and those who had remained behind, 
hoping that liberation would come sooner rather than later. Thus after 
liberation the UPC and DP were able to seamlessly resume political 
mobilisation, rehashing the same rivalries that had made party politics in 
Acholi so contentious.  
                                                
876 KDA: Letter to the Political and Diplomatic Committee in Kampala signed UNLP watch 
Dogs, Kitgum Division, 19 March 1980. 
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The UPC’s main point of attack was to associate DP supporters with 
the various rebel groups that had dispersed across the country following 
Obote’s re-election. Catholic churches carrying out their pastoral duties were 
accused of housing rebel members in hospitals and mission institutions. By 
associating the rebels with the Catholics the UPC were linking them with the 
DP, painting the party as anti-liberation and anti-Ugandan.877 Parishes were 
marked out as DP or UPC territories, and confrontations ensued if an 
opponent encroached on the area. Once again it was East Acholi that bore 
the brunt of hostilities. In Akworo Parish, DP supporters threatened to boycott 
companies and businesses of known UPC supporters and confronted anyone 
walking around with a UPC shirt bearing the image of the President. Those 
identified as the ringleaders included teachers, businessmen and priests, all 
notable members of the community.878 However, the biggest advantage that 
the UPC had was that it was able to utilise a vast majority of state resources 
during the campaign trail, sending large convoys to rural areas and urging 
supporters to ‘use persuasive means to win the election’, with the use of the 
term ‘persuasive means’ being left open for interpretation.879  
It is not surprising that one of the first steps taken by the politically 
minded Ocols was to usurp the local chiefs from their positions as they 
attempted to regain control of the locality.  But even among themselves the 
local politicians were not a unified political force and their attentions turned to 
competing against each other. Returning to the tactics utilised during the 
1950s and the 1960s, Acholi politicians used personal and political vendettas 
to tarnish their opponent’s name, disrupt meetings and made defamatory, 
often unfounded, accusations to eliminate political competition.880 Within the 
UPC, members disregarded party directives, challenging election results and 
establishing micro-opposition groups. In 1981 a dispute arose regarding the 
official UPC appointment for the candidacy of the Gulu South constituency. A 
politician claiming to be the official ‘elected’ MP for the constituency wrote a 
                                                
877 GDA Box 541: Letter from the Vicar General of the Gulu Diocese to DC Gulu, 15 October 
1980. 
878 KDA: District Intelligence Committee Meeting Summary, 28 July 1983.  
879 ‘Akena p’Jok backs UPC’ The Uganda Times, 25 June1980. 
880 GDA Box 541: Letter from DC Gulu to the Military Commission, 17 October 1980  
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letter of complaint to the UPC Secretary-General claiming that another high-
ranking UPC politician had started a campaign to remove him from office.      
 
I am the popularly elected MP of the constituency and a UPC and that 
there is no confusion among the people although there are some 
sowing the seeds of hatred [sic]. High-ranking government ministers 
have since declared that another politician is the official chairman of 
the Gulu South constituency. They repeated this claim on the UPC 
anniversary celebrations to the public and then again on radio Uganda. 
He is now being introduced everywhere as the chairman and he is now 
touring the parishes making these claims.  Even now the police are 
even involved in this confusion and if this is allowed to continue it will 
have a deeper impact on the long-term stability of the constituency.881  
 
The dispute resulted in a political stalemate as each candidate continued to 
lay claim to the chairmanship. The UPC headquarters in Kampala was made 
aware of the situation, and soon after the police in Gulu South were instructed 
to prevent any meetings by the MP challenging the official candidate ‘by any 
means possible.’882 UPC supporters who were identified as ‘undesirable’ or 
potential troublemakers faced constant harassment by the police. This 
generally followed if a more senior and trusted member made a complaint 
against an individual to the Party Secretary. The accused would often find that 
private gatherings in their homes were raided and they faced arbitrary arrests 
and questioning.883 There were also a growing number of individuals posing 
as card-carrying UPC members canvassing districts under the guise of 
collecting money for the party retaining the funds for their own personal use. 
This became a worrying trend that prompted the UPC party officials to issue a 
warning to administrators to be vigilant against fraudulent membership. The 
police were asked to distribute an up-to-date list of all official UPC 
representatives in the various districts and the chiefs were instructed to arrest 
                                                
881 GDA Box 542: Letter from Gulu MP Y.Y Ongweng (MP) Gulu South Constituency to the 
UPC Secretary General, Kampala, 17 July 1981. 
882 GDA Box 542: Letter from UPC Secretary of Gulu South Constituency to the Police 
Headquarters, Gulu, 10 May 1981. 
883 GDA Box 541: Letter from Saverino Lanek to Inspector General of the Police, Kampala, 19 
October 1983; GDA Box 540: Letter from Akena p’Jok, MP UPC Chairman Gulu District to 
Charles Alai, Administrative Secretary, Gulu, 20 June 1983. GDA 
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anybody they suspected of fraudulently identifying themselves as 
representatives of the UPC.884  
When it was announced that the UPC had won the elections in 1980, 
there were immediate reprisals against DP supporters. In Bobi, the parish 
chief complained in his monthly security report that a group of UPC 
supporters had gathered around the division headquarters, insulting all the 
staff members within the headquarters who were known to be DP supporters. 
‘A UPC councillor was leading the mob instigating them to throw stones at the 
building and insulting me because I had allowed a DP politician to campaign 
in the division.’  Within two days of the elections four similar incidents had 
been reported in Bobi alone.885 The internal insecurity faced by the 
government meant that Obote was forced to use many of the old tactics of 
military intimidation utilised by Amin. Opposition leaders in Acholi were 
stringently monitored and their political activities continually impeded. Civilians 
and police officials were once again sent to infiltrate DP party meetings. 
Individuals that were seen to be behaving belligerently towards the 
President’s administration were accused of being rebel sympathisers.886  But 
even among those targeted there was still air of defiance in their response 
towards Obote’s political oppressiveness. When an administrative officer was 
accused of spreading anti-government rhetoric and colluding with DP 
supporters his response to Obote when asked to resign his post was simply to 
say ‘the only one who can remove me from my position is the Commissioner 
of Veterinary Services and Animal Industry who bestowed on me this 
position.’887  
As much as he tried, Obote could not maintain this level of political 
oppression because most of the government’s resources were being depleted 
fighting the rebels in Luwero. In Acholi, political opposition against the 
                                                
884 Ibid. 
885 GDA Box 541: Letter from the Jago of Bobi to the County Chief of Omoro to Charles Alai, 
Administrative Secretary, Gulu District Administration, 19 December 1980. 
886GDA Box 545 File: Political Affairs Correspondences. June –October 1984; GDA Box 541: 
Security Meeting for West Acholi 29 October 1982. Report by Regional Police Commander 
summarising points raised during the meeting held 25 October 1982. 
887 GDA Box 542: District Intelligence Report, 27 July 1982. 
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government persisted.  In 1984 a new succession of political parties formed in 
anticipation of what would have been the general elections in 1985. This 
translated into open mobilisation of the populace disregarding any 
repercussions from central government. The National Liberation Party (NLP), 
formed by Atwoma T. Okeny, a former DP loyalist, and the Conservative 
Party, started to organise political rallies with frequency, challenging the 
political monopoly of the UPC.888 It became apparent that any restraint 
against openly criticising Obote was rapidly disappearing. Utilising global as 
well local discourses of political participation and opposition, the NLP was not 
afraid to publically hold the government accountable for its failings in the 
region. NLP party leaders highlighted ‘human rights abuses’ by soldiers and 
police officers, tribalism, administrative decay and the government’s inability 
to restore ‘peace and unity in Uganda.’889 The frequency of political rallies and 
public meetings placed further strain on the disintegrating police force in 
Acholi. In some cases, officers became so frustrated with the endless political 
rallies that in Kitgum an individual police officer took it upon himself to declare, 
without official sanction, a state of emergency banning all political 
gatherings.890 The continual disregard for central government’s authority 
transcended political party activities, permeating all levels of the local 
administration, as Acholi civil servants started to take unsanctioned control of 
the district councils. In August 1984 the Administrative Secretary for Kitgum 
district council returned after a short trip to the United Kingdom only to find 
that the old committee of council members had been replaced without 
permission from the Ministry of Local Government.891 Civil servants, teachers 
and community leaders became defiant against UPC administrators and 
                                                
888 GDA Box 545 File: Political Affairs Correspondences, June –October 1984. 
889 KDA: Nationalist Liberal Party Manifesto, 5 November 1985.  
890 KDA: Intelligence Report to the DC of Kitgum, 5 January 1984; GDA Box 542: Letter from 
the District Police Commander to the Police Commander of Northern Uganda, 20 September 
1984. 
891 KDA: Letter from the Administration Secretary Kitgum District Administration to the 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, 8 August 1984. 
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politicians, continually finding ways to undermine their authority.892 However, 
central government did not simply stand by idly as it continued lose control. 
Attempts were made by the UPC and the local police to suppress any 
opposition judged to be potentially dangerous for the regime. Individuals who 
were suspected of acting against the government’s interest were questioned, 
or illegally detained.893 Overzealous UPC supporters took the opportunity to 
mark out territories to stop political opponents from holding rallies and public 
meetings in larger towns such as Gulu and Kitgum.    
 
I would like to take this opportunity to bring to your attention that the 
UPC president Dr Apollo Milton Obote officially opened the above 
ground in 1980 when he first landed in Uganda from exile.  It is known 
as a UPC political ground. Consequently sir, I on behalf of the entire 
population of UPC in the district strongly warn you that no other party 
other than the UPC should hold their rally in the ground without the 
permission from the current chairman of the UPC Executive 
Committee. Sir, I hope you will caution those political leaders who want 
to hold their rally in the ground accordingly.894 
 
However, as much as it tried to silence political opponents, Obote could not 
contain the growing political opposition against his government.  Indifference 
to state authority did little to address the internal security problems in the 
region as incidents of lawlessness among civilians and the security forces 
continued to increase.895  Among Acholi civilians there was a growing belief 
that once again it was ‘each to their own’, as party political hostilities only 
served to feed civil disobedience. After all, if they government could not 
manage its own police and army, or stop illegal rallies and demonstrations, 
why should the populace respect its authority? 
                                                
892 GDA Box 542: Letter from the representatives of the UPC to DC Gulu, 31 December 1984; 
GDA Box 558: Letter from A. S Adimola, Chairman of PTA to the Lord Bishop Board of 
Governors at St Joseph School in Layibi, 4 April 1985; GDA Box 541: Letter from 
Administrative Secretary to the D.C to DC Gulu, 24 July 1984  
893 GDA Box: 542: Letter to the Administration Secretary, DC’s Office, 22 February 1985.  
894 KDA: Letter from Chairman of UPC Central, Kampala to Town Clerk Kitgum, 13 November 
1984.  
895 GDA Box 541: Letter from the District Police Commander Gulu to DC Gulu, Regional 
Police Commander Northern Region and Headmaster Samuel Baker Senior School, 5 August 
1985. 
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To contend with these multiple political challenges, Obote was astute 
enough to capitalise on the growing demographic of disenfranchised youth in 
Uganda. One of the first things the President did was to spend money reviving 
the ailing National Union of Youth Organisation (NUYO) that had been 
severely suppressed under Amin. This was a political ploy that sought to deal 
with two major problems facing the administration. Firstly, Obote was finding it 
difficult to peddle his manifesto of progress and development to the 
established political cadre who had returned with him from exile. Within this 
group, each political actor believed that they were the only ones who could 
solve Uganda’s political and economic woes. Rather than trying to convince 
this demographic, Obote turned his attention to the youth of Uganda whom he 
believed would be more susceptible to his political rhetoric. Secondly, 
unemployment among Acholi youth was a major problem among both 
educated and uneducated youth. Ugandans under the age of eighteen 
represented an estimated fifty percent of the population. Those between the 
ages of eighteen and thirty accounted for a further twenty percent of the total 
population of 12.6 million.896 The government needed to carefully utilise this 
demographic or face angering a large and highly impressionable section of 
society who could just as quickly turn their sympathies towards the anti-
government rebel groups. Consequently, Ugandan youth were touted as the 
only path to the country’s economic and political development.897 Of those 
youth who joined the NUYO branches in Acholi, the vast majority had been 
educated to a relatively high level with certificates or degrees in teaching, 
business and communication. The organisation appealed to them primarily 
because of the lack of job opportunities in the district and the large influx of 
educated returnees meant that many found themselves marginalised within 
local politics and local administration. Specifically because of their education, 
they were less enticed by the idea of returning to the villages to farm or 
engage in manual labour. This was the new generation of ‘Ocols’ who had 
                                                
896 2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census. Analytical Report. Abridged Version. 
October 2006. 
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grown only to find out that the previous generation had not vacated their 
seats.  
Gulu district created its own branch of the NUYO in 1984 with the 
organisation’s structure mirroring that of a political party. Parish elections 
were held to elect delegates into the group and one of the main tasks 
members had to participate in was to go into the community and mobilise the 
electorate. Other activities involved community development, building schools 
and farming.898 The UPC also had its own youth wing which it continually 
mobilised during all of its election campaigns going back to Obote’s first 
administration. While the NUYO and the UPC youth wings were separate 
functioning organisations, during the early 1980s the two organisations 
became almost interchangeable, primarily because of the government’s bias 
towards UPC sympathisers. Within Acholi districts youth members were 
tasked with facilitating elections of chiefs at the parish level as well as 
mobilising the ‘right’ constituents to vote. NUYO candidates were encouraged 
to stand for committee positions in their respective districts as well as to send 
representatives to meetings concerning district matters. The first youth 
delegation meeting in Gulu was held in offices of the UPC.  Headmasters 
were also instructed to encourage membership in the organisation and to 
ensure youths attending these official meetings were dressed appropriately.899  
Rather than acting as a stepping-stone in the education of Acholi youth 
regarding community development however, the NUYO in Acholi quickly 
turned into another arm of the UPC political machine. Members of the NUYO 
were used to intimidate opposition party members and civilians who were 
deemed to be unsympathetic to the administration. Despite the fact that 
NUYO was supposedly apolitical, youth members in fact became micro 
militias sent out to implement government directives and intimidate political 
opponents. When it was announced that Obote would be visiting the region in 
November 1981, instructions were sent to all local shopkeepers instructing 
                                                
898 GDA Box 527: File SCW.8/A ‘National Union of Youth Organisation’ Gulu District 
Correspondences, 30 October 1972- 5 May 1983; KDA: Letter from J.J Obolo-Chola (UPC 
MP) Kitgum North to DC, Kitgum, 21 December 1984. 
899 GDA Box 527: File SCW.8/A ‘National Union of Youth Organisation’ Gulu District 
Correspondences, 30 October 1972- 5 May 1983 
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them to close their shops during the visit as a sign of respect. When it 
transpired that some shopkeepers had not heeded the demand, the Executive 
Secretary of the UPC sent a strongly worded letter to the DC in Gulu to give 
him permission to send UPC youth to go and ‘investigate’ the shopkeepers 
who had refused to keep their shops closed during the President’s visit. ‘I 
would ask that drastic action be taken against these defaulters so that others 
would learn from them, our youths could be able to inform each one of them 
that they are being followed up.’900 
Young Acholi men outside of the NUYO and UPC youth wing, 
particularly between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, were targeted as 
potential recruits into the army. However, this was only if they professed their 
allegiance to the UPC. In 1985, just as Obote’s grasp on power was slipping, 
a private correspondence between the Chairman of Kitgum central 
constituency and the Chairman of the UPC showed just how far government 
were willing to go maintain control. During an army recruitment drive all UPC 
constituent heads in the Acholi districts were asked to mobilise young men in 
the region to be inspected for potential posts in the army:  
 
I have received a letter from Kampala that all the chairmen from the 
four constituencies should bring out boys for recruitment into the army. 
These boys should be members of the UPC only and not belonging to 
                                                
900 GDA Box 532:  Letter from H. W. J. Odong, Executive Secretary of UPC East 
Constituency to UPC Headquarters Kampala, 16 November 1981. It was not just in Acholi 
that the UPC Youth Wing were being mobilised. In his on-going war with the rebels in central 
Uganda, Obote was also able to utilise UPC youth to displace around 80,000 Rwandan 
refugees, some of whom had claimed citizenship in Uganda, back to Rwanda. Obote’s 
political insecurity meant that he viewed the Rwandan refugee population in Uganda political 
as ‘outsiders’. UPC youth wingers were tasked with going to villagers to search for suspected 
rebels often-utilising force and violence to apprehend targets. In 1982 Obote ordered 
coordinated attacks on Tutsi refugee camps resulting in the maiming, killing and raping of 
Rwandan civilians. This persecution was instrumental in mobilising Rwandan Tutsi to join the 
NRA rebel groups in Luwero:  D. K. Gupta, Path to Collective Madness: A Study in Social 
Order and Political Pathology (Westport, Connecticut Praeger Publishers, 2001), 168; 
Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 58; M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 
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any other parties with ages between 18-25 and should have least 
reached the standard of primary school primary seven and above. 
Strictly speaking they should be teenagers who are not yet married and 
physically fit. I am forwarding this message to you, as Chairman and 
you should inform your respective Executive Committee to be present 
at the selection order and avoid grumbling from other parts. The 
occasion will take place on the 8 March 1985 at Apollo Ground starting 
at 10am in the morning. I am requesting to select ten boys from each 
sub-constituency and bring them on the 7 March 1985. They should 
come along with their beddings and eating utensils to avoid 
embarrassment.901 
 
Obote’s political insecurity meant that it was longer enough to make sure that 
the army corps was predominately Northern, but now the new recruits had to 
be loyal the governing party. The constituency officials were tasked with 
personally selecting the men to identify any political imposters. This would 
have made it even harder for those whose employment considerations 
superseded their political affiliation, as community members would have 
readily identified those who were not loyal supporters of the UPC.  
Yet given that youth in Acholi and Uganda were a largely disaffected 
demographic, it is perhaps surprising the NUYO and the UPC Youth Wing did 
not develop into a stronger political force in its own right, instead of operating 
as a fragmented paramilitary organisation following instructions at the states 
behest. Members of NUYO and UPC Youth Wing were undoubtedly motivated 
by the need to survive by acquiring scarce economic and political resources. 
They did this by seeking state-sponsored authority, which could be used to 
elevate their status in the locality and provide the tools to challenge other 
power contenders. Because of specific historical processes that emphasised 
the political and cultural importance of the locality, Acholi youths’ grievances 
were localised, fragmented and contained within the districts that they lived in.  
Much in the same way as the Acholi Elders initially propagated that the 
Association was to be inclusive incorporating other elders from the various 
ethnic groups in Uganda, in reality the organisation operated as a specific 
Acholi group.  
                                                
901 KDA: Letter from Ezira Kibwota Chairman of the Kitgum Central Constituency UPC to the 
office of the Chairman of the UPC from, 21 February 1985.  
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This trend is symptomatic of the multiple competing political and 
economic forces in Acholi and Uganda in the 1980s, largely reinforced by the 
lack of political cohesion in the centre and the locality. Furthermore, ethnic 
divisions in Uganda would not have allowed for the amalgamation of localised 
political groups into a centralised political force, as witnessed with the 
localisation of the UPC and DP party machines in the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Each local government had its own specific regional grievances that were 
continually channelled through ethnic discourses within central government. In 
this sense Obote was able to fully capitalise on the politics of decentralisation, 
politicising specific groups in the locality, yet ensuring that they did not 
develop into an actual political force that could effectively challenge his 
authority nationally. For the Acholi, a weak government presented the 
opportunity to bypass historically established political and social hierarchies. 
Much like low ranking army soldiers, police personnel and Acholi civilians, 
Acholi youth groups exploited the internal insecurity in the region, to acquire 
material goods and political capital. Ironically, given the multiple power 
contenders that emerged in Acholi during the 1980s, Obote was to be 
overthrown by his own military in a repetition of the fate that had befallen his 
first administration and the regimes that followed. It would seem that in post-
colonial Uganda the only effective way to topple a presidency was through a 
military coup d’état.  
In many respects the military coup of Tito Okello and Bazillo Olara-
Okello on the 27 July 1985 should have heralded a new era of Acholi political 
unity and the opportunity to redress the region’s historic marginalisation. 
However, the coup was not the end result of Acholi ‘political tribalism’ but a 
specific military takeover that just happened to be largely comprised of Acholi 
soldiers. The short-lived administration had very little to do with ethno-politics 
and everything to do with the internal factionalism among the high-ranking 
cadres of the military corps. In fact, one of the first speeches Tito Okello made 
after taking power was to follow the common pattern of new Ugandan 
governments denouncing the previous regime. ‘Obote condoned the killings of 
Ugandans and employed the politics of divisions while he held on to his 
throne. He triggered tribal conflicts in the army and participated in his own 
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downfall.’902 The next step was to initiate peace talks with Museveni. This was 
a necessary step, as by December 1985 Uganda stood on the cusp of total 
institutional collapse exacerbated by the ongoing bush war.903 Okello’s six-
month presidency had very little impact among the populace in Acholi. 
However, given the fact that since the 1950s Acholi politicians had fought to 
gain a solid foothold within central government, it is perhaps surprising that 
the inauguration of an Acholi president was not met by an overflow of 
euphoria. ‘Tito’s government came and went. Some of us were not even 
aware of it. It did not really have any impact here.’904 One contributing factor is 
that prior to the coup there was no unified Acholi political momentum; 
opposition to the government was factionalised among competing groups. It is 
unlikely that even if Tito Okello’s Presidency had lasted longer, that he would 
have been able to easily harness political unity among the Acholi let alone 
nationally. Similarly, by stating a coup against a Lango President, Tito Okello 
could not even rely on the ‘Northern identity’ which Obote had utilised so 
effectively during the 1950s and early 1960s. In the end, even though a peace 
deal was eventually signed in December 1985 detailing a power sharing 
agreement between Okello and the NRA, Museveni was shrewd enough to 
recognise the Okello government had little national support and next to no 
resources to withstand a military attack.905 It was at this point the NRA troops 
took Kampala on 25 January 1986 and staged the sixth military coup in 
Uganda’s short history since independence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
From 1980, rather than providing a return to some sort of normality in Uganda 
after Amin, Obote’s election win obliterated any hope of political cohesion, 
sending opposing political figures to the bush and ensuring that Uganda 
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remained a distinctly militarised state. Government resources were spent 
fighting the rebels in Luwero at the expense of reconstructing state and local 
institutions. Consequently, the cataclysmic politics within central government 
was reflected back to the locality. In Acholi, the economic and political 
collapse of the state opened an avenue for political pluralism giving multiple 
‘power contenders’ the opportunity to engage outside of their previously 
established political and cultural domains. Acholi women, elders, youth, police 
officers, low ranking military personnel as well as the usual suspects of career 
soldiers and the Ocols, all vied to gain access an increasingly competitive 
local and national political market. The inability of central government to 
maintain law and order in the locality meant that once again the Acholi had to 
adopt and each to their own mentality as they struggled to acquire basic 
commodities, cumulating in the increased attack on ‘outsiders’. However, as 
the politics of survival continued, these power contenders pursued personal, 
rather than collective grievances, once again placing limits on the emergence 
of a unified Acholi political movement that could transcend the locality.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis has sought to look at the politics of identity among the Acholi of 
northern Uganda from 1950-1985 to ascertain why Acholi ethnic identity 
remained such a salient political tool in post-colonial Uganda. Drawing on 
previous works by Mamdani and Gertzel on centre-periphery political 
engagement in Uganda and Acholi, this research has sought to highlight the 
relationship between Acholi power brokers and those outside the periphery of 
formal politics. The focus on the political history of one local population, has 
allowed for a more in-depth understanding of the intra-group relationships. 
More specifically, by incorporating Lonsdale’s theory on ‘political tribalism’ and 
‘moral ethnicity’, this research has looked specifically at how Acholi class, 
gender and social hierarchies, religious and regional identifications and the 
much-touted ‘martial’ identity have been negotiated internally within the 
geographical and political boundary of Acholi, and externally within the 
political boundary of the Ugandan state. More significantly, this thesis has 
shown that these particular identity markers created a paradoxical political 
climate within the Acholi locality that simultaneously confirmed and challenged 
the notion of a unified and politically coherent Acholi ethnopolitical identity. 
Consequently, rather than Acholi ethnopolitics simply being an external tool 
utilised opportunistic elites to manipulate the susceptible masses for personal 
gain, the cultural tools harnessed within the locality provided strategies of 
actions through which Acholi agents could engage with, and/or challenge, 
internal and external political competitors.  
By utilising a multifocal approach, this thesis has contributed to the 
current debates regarding ethnic conflict within the post-colonial African state. 
Whilst Acholi political history, much like the history of many post-colonial 
African states is complex, challenging and sometimes paradoxical, recurrent 
and stable patterns of political engagement can clearly be observed.  In 
Uganda, these recurrent patterns have been shaped and reinforced by the 
symbiotic relationship between the Acholi locality and central government. 
Even with strong but relatively politically-inclusive governments, as can be 
observed in the early 1960s, ethnic identities were still used as a political tool 
to engage with state structures. This was symptomatic of Uganda’s colonial 
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legacy, which placed emphasis on local rather than national identities. 
Similarly, the emphasis on local and cultural institutions, which can be seen 
more clearly in the 1970s and 1980s, was a throwback to the British system of 
‘indirect rule’, highlighting a historical pattern. This pattern can today be 
observed in the Museveni regime’s directive of decentralisation through 
districticisation.906 Ugandan governments, which lack the financial, political 
and administrative resources to centralise control of their citizens become 
more reliant on localised institutions. However, whilst institutionalised ethnic 
pluralism allows these regimes to keep the locality subjugated through the 
ethos of ‘divide and rule’, it also presents the conditions for mobilising multiple 
ethnic political movements which can potentially challenge the overall power 
of the state. To combat this threat, Ugandan governments since colonialism 
have sought to maintain control of the locality by funding and retaining strong 
military forces to suppress any potential political threats.907 This can again be 
observed in the current regime’s increasingly repressive policies against 
political opponents.  
This research has also argued that the salience of Acholi ethnopolitics 
nationally was largely informed by the socio-economic conditions that shaped 
the politics of identity within the Acholi locality. Whereas Acholi from the late-
colonial period to independence remained ethnically homogenous, internal 
politics was characterised by social, political, economic and religious 
divisions, which placed limits on the emergence of a politically-coherent 
ethnopolitical identity. In part, some of these divisions had their roots within 
the colonial state, while others were cultivated from the political economy of 
post-colonial Uganda. Whilst it is widely accepted that the colonisation of 
Acholi resulted in the creation of distinct political tribal identities, colonial rule 
subsumed much of the socio-political structures that dictated the lives of the 
various groups occupying what is now Acholi. These politically-decentralised 
social groupings, living within lineage-based village communities, cultivated 
cultural tools based on shared ancestry, geographical boundaries, language, 
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symbols, rituals, stories, and established social norms and values which 
dictated the relationship between elders, youth, men and women. 
Consequently, the tools used by the British administration to establish an 
effective Native Authority accommodated the existing structures of power that 
had governed the moral economy of these pre-colonial social groupings.  
With the establishment of colonial Native Authorities and the 
politicisation of chiefly roles, pre-colonial clan identities became more 
centralised, emerging as a key political tool to engage with internal 
competitors and to challenge the authority of colonial-sponsored native chiefs. 
Moreover, indirect rule in Acholi was only intrusive on a rudimentary level, 
leaving a large amount of the Acholi population untouched by the colonial 
market and political economy. This meant that Acholi clan identities were 
largely unaffected by colonial rule as it did not permeate downwards to dictate 
the domestic lives of the Acholi rural masses. This demographic continued to 
live within lineage-based village systems that reinforced pre-colonial clan and 
chiefly allegiances. However, Christian missionary activity supplemented, to a 
limited extent, the intrusion of the colonial rule to this peripheral demographic. 
The pastoral work of missionaries within the remote regions of Acholi provided 
the means to connect the Acholi rural periphery to the colonial administration 
in Gulu. For the Acholi who converted to Christianity, the possibility of 
accessing educational and health facilities through the acquisition of Catholic 
of Protestant identity facilitated the incorporation of new Western Christian 
identities into indigenous religious practices. Within the post-colonial state, the 
politicisation of the Acholi Christian identity came to provide an effective tool 
to mobilise votes along partisan religious politics by reinforcing a two-party 
system, led by the predominately Protestant UPC and the Catholic DP, 
politically connecting the rural masses to the urban towns of Gulu and Kitgum, 
and all the way to the state house in Entebbe. All these factors placed limits 
on the creation of a centralised and politically coherent Acholi tribal identity 
within the locality.  
British colonial rule also served to create new tribal stereotypes, which 
became useful within the Ugandan post-colonial state. The colonial emphasis 
on the southern Kingdoms as the political and administrative hub of the 
Protectorate resulted in chronic underdevelopment within the Northern 
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Provinces. Fewer job opportunities in the North compared to the relatively 
prosperous South consequently made the region a prime recruiting ground for 
the army. Moreover, the designation of the Northerners as ‘martial tribes’ 
served to create a potentially disruptive concentration of military force- away 
from the political and administrative hub of Kampala and Entebbe. 
Consequently, the martial identity, whilst initially a regional designation came 
to function as an ethnic trait associated with the peoples of Acholi as a result 
of the Obote regime that continued the colonial trend of recruiting a 
disproportionate number of Acholi and Lango soldiers into the national army.  
  The roots of Acholi ethnonational identity can be found within the 
paradox of the colonial political economy. Missionary education and new 
economic opportunities created a new generation of educated Acholi men 
whose economic and political aspirations extended beyond the social 
obligations of village life. This demographic of educated young men and 
migrants were shaped by the administration to service the colonial economy. 
However, familial ties and the colony policy of divide and rule meant that this 
demographic would remain largely contained within Acholi. This set the stage 
for a generational conflict between the emerging class of young Acholi men 
and patriarchal gerontocratic clan and chieftainship systems. More 
significantly, by containing this emerging educated demographic within 
demarcated regional and ethnic territories, the British were unwittingly sowing 
the seeds for the creation a new generation of politically- minded Acholi men 
whose political consciousness would be deeply rooted within their ethnic 
boundaries. This demographic, born and brought up in the colonial political 
economy, would grow up to become the political face of the Acholi in late 
colonial and post-independence Uganda. 
Leading up to independence, the politics of decolonisation became 
centred on the locality, primarily because of the British ethos of ‘divide and 
rule’ which emphasised the locality central forum for political debate. As the 
different ethnic regions were administered separately, there was little or no 
pan-ethnic competition for resources, such as land and political office, during 
the height of colonialism. However, the promise of independence presented 
the possibility of gaining a share of the national cake. This offered an 
opportunity for the new generation of educated Acholi men to challenge the 
 301 
I                
political dominance of the chiefs through elections to the Acholi Local 
Government. Moreover, for this demographic, their political ambitions 
extended beyond the locality. In this endeavour they utilised party politics as a 
means to gain a foothold within national politics. However, the ethnically- 
demarcated electoral map of Uganda and the colonial emphasis on strong 
local government institutions meant Acholi politicians were inevitably 
restricted in where they could run for political office. They would not have the 
same appeal in Buganda or Busoga, and so there was really only one place in 
which they could practice their politics: within their various constituent bases 
in Acholi. As much as this new breed of politicians strove to usurp the 
authority of local chiefs, they were also reliant on clan and chiefly allegiances 
to secure votes and legitimise their power within the locality so that they could 
gain access to the national political stage. Consequently, with both faction 
unable to effectively diminish the other, each adopted specific tools that would 
ensure their political positions within an independent Uganda.  The chiefs 
sought to extend their powers within the locality by lobbying for the creation of 
a paramount Acholi chief who could be placed on par with the monarchical 
heads of the southern Kingdoms. On the other hand party politics provided 
the means in which local political elites could rally local constituents to secure 
votes within the local and national councils along partisan religious and intra-
regional lines.  
However, the unifying tool adopted by both factions emerged as the 
‘victim identity’. Utilising the comparative politics of underdevelopment, chiefs 
and Acholi politicians continued to lobby the colonial government for the 
development of social, economic and political infrastructures that would bring 
the peoples of the Northern Provinces to the same standard as their more 
economically developed southern counterparts. This ensured that that during 
the late-colonial period, regional rather than tribal identities became the key 
tool for external political negotiations.  After independence, individual rather 
than collective accumulation of state resources reinforced a patron-client 
network within Acholi Local Government, which kept the rural masses 
politically, socially and economically marginalised. Furthermore, chronic post-
colonial economic underdevelopment stunted the emergence of any 
organised labour and agrarian movements that could be channelled externally 
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through national party political allegiances. Thus the rural peasantry of Acholi 
were marginalised further after independence as the Ugandan government 
and local power-brokers continued to utilise colonial structures of governance 
that placed power in the hands of a select few by reinforcing the client-patron 
network. This meant that this demographic remained reliant on local patrons 
to air their grievances nationally. Rather than challenging the established 
structures of power, instead, this demographic strove to gain access to the 
world of the patrons. This meant that whilst the state continually failed to 
invest in the rural masses in Acholi, they nonetheless continued to believe in 
the possibility of state power to affect positive change in their lives.  Moreover, 
to effectively compete with regional and ethnic competitors on the national 
stage, Acholi patrons were limited to conveying local grievances through the 
lens of ethnopolitics.  Consequently, the Acholi ethnic identity emerged as the 
most effective tool to make collective political demands against the state.  All 
these factors ensured that national politics in the Ugandan late colonial and 
post-colonial remained structured along regional and ethnic lines. 
The election of Milton Obote, a regional counterpart, instigated the 
reification of the Acholi ethnopolitical identity which was subsequently used to 
challenge regional affiliations in the post-independence years.  In an attempt 
to centralise political control and break down tribal barriers, Obote instead 
resorted to tribal ties to consolidate his power. Capitalising on the dominance 
of northerners within the national army, Obote sought to diminish the political 
challenge from the Buganda Kingdom by embarking on the gradual 
elimination of the divisive elements, particularly the Kings as symbols of 
regional autonomy.  The military assault by the predominately Northern army 
personnel on the palace of the Kingdom of Buganda in 1966 resulted in the 
designation of the national army as a private Northern army loyal only to the 
President. The support given to the president by the Acholi for his actions 
against the Kabaka proved short-lived however after Obote’s attentions turned 
to challenging the authority of the Acholi Local Government (ALG). In trying to 
centralise control of the country through military force, Obote’s increasingly 
authoritarian rule served to alienate him internally in Acholi. As the ALG’s 
political authority wAS challenged, Obote’s Lango identity became a valuable 
tool used to diminish his credibility, with his depiction as a leader who only 
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favoured members of his tribe.  As a consequence, the ‘Northern’ identity, 
presented largely by the Acholi and consumed by external observers as 
unified and unyielding, had by 1968 become politically fragmented. 
Consequently, the politics of underdevelopment became specifically 
channelled through the lens Acholi ethnopolitics, as apposed to more 
collectivising regional identities. 
Whilst Acholi politicians fought to keep control of local government, the 
military coup of Idi Amin immediately eradicated any gains they had made 
within the locality.   The emigration of prominent Acholi politicians and military 
personnel following the coup, served to weaken the political connection 
between the locality and the political centre in absence of local power brokers. 
This allowed chiefs to regain control of the locality as the government sought 
to fill the administrative and political gap left in the wake of the Acholi 
politician’s political displacement. The politicisation and militarisation of chiefly 
roles fragmented communal discourses as clan identities came to the 
forefront, further emphasising internal allegiances to individual chiefs and clan 
groups. Consequently, Amin’s rule presented a shift in the hierarchy of power 
contenders in the locality, and the emergence of individual Acholi political 
agency outside of the patron-client network. During this eight-year period we 
see the rural masses moving closer to the source of power as they were 
forced to speak directly to the ‘big man’. More significantly, rather than 
dismantling Acholi ethnic identity at a time when it was dangerous to be an 
Acholi, the overall effect in this shift of political dynamics actually served to 
strengthen it as people fell back on pre-existing social and political networks. 
The repressiveness of Ugandan politics in the 1970s and the lack of political 
parties to channel grievances through the lens of ‘political tribalism’, meant 
that when Idi Amin was overthrown, Acholi politicians who returned to the 
region found that tools within the ‘cultural tool kit’ had been sharpened 
considerably.  
However, the military coups that characterised the 1980s and the 
economic and political collapse of the state meant that there was no 
immediate return to the patronage machine that had kept the locality 
administratively and politically connected to the political centre. Instead, 
government resources were spent fighting the rebels at the expense of 
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reconstructing state and local institutions. The country was once again left 
with an ineffective central government, riddled with ethnic rivalries, governed 
by military force and economically crippled. It quickly became clear among the 
rural peasantry that they could no longer maintain the belief, however 
misguided, that the patron-client network was viable tool to convey their 
grievances to central government. This meant rather than channelling the 
cultural tools which had been sharpened during Amin’s regime once again 
through the lens of political tribalism, political activity in Acholi during this 
period became primarily centred on the locality. This opened an avenue for 
political pluralism, giving multiple ‘power contenders’ the opportunity to 
engage outside of their previously established political domains.  
The cataclysmic political climate that followed Amin’s regime 
undoubtedly resulted in the military and political empowerment of some 
sections of the Acholi rural masses. Indeed the short-term roots of the HSM 
and LRA can be easily observed during the five years of Obote’s second 
presidency. Whilst it has not been the intention of this thesis to trace the 
origins of war, it is still useful to draw out the relevance of this research in 
understanding the long- and short-term roots of the HSM and LRA conflict, 
particularly because it remains critical in how the Acholi today understand and 
remember their political past. Utilising the themes discussed in this research it 
could be argued that the long-term roots of LRA and HSM conflict was directly 
as a result of the disempowerment of the Acholi rural masses by the 
structures of power ingrained within the Ugandan state and the militarisation 
of Acholi men, which both fed into the ‘victim’ and ‘martial’ identities.  
For the Acholi ethnic group, the most externally visible of their colonial 
and post-colonial identities has been that of the ‘martial race’. This identity 
was institutionalised by British colonial rule, adapted by the Acholi, and 
manipulated by successive post-independence regimes. Acholi soldiers joined 
the army largely as a means to access opportunities for personal 
advancement and economic security, but in doing so they became 
representatives of state coercion and violence. However, most Acholi recruits 
were motivated by their own unique political and economic protests against 
the state, rather than ethnic considerations or high politics. This can be 
observed in the 1970s as they joined anti-Amin groups in the bush when 
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government policies sought to displace and marginalise their economic and 
political positions in the locality. In this way the ‘bush’ provided the opportunity 
to regain power and access to state resources, specifically because access to 
economic opportunities was scarce within the locality.  The politics of regional 
underdevelopment and ‘victimisation’ inevitably permeated the local socio-
political psyche emerging as the key tool for political engagement within the 
Ugandan post-colonial state. However, the ‘victim identity’, is an accumulation 
of the historical processes that have left the peoples of Acholi feeling 
economically and politically marginalised. Chronic underdevelopment, 
institutional corruption and the militarisation of politics within every successive 
government meant that by the mid-1980s, the underlying grievances that had 
always been present among the rural peasantry, urban labourers and the 
lower rank and file of Acholi army personnel, came to the forefront.  
Unlike Amin’s dictatorial rule, the Obote II regime lacked the resources 
to effectively control the Acholi population through violence and fear. This, 
coupled with the continued militarisation of Acholi, the rise of civil 
disobedience and a lack of basic economic resources, created a climate 
conducive to the rise local paramilitary groups to mobilise disenfranchised 
sections of Acholi society. The overthrow of the Okello regime in 1985 
instigated the return of Acholi soldiers back to the locality fleeing retaliation 
from NRA troops. Heike Behrend argues that because of their experiences 
during the Luwero Bush war, these young Acholi men had become 
‘contemptuous of peasant existence’ upon their return to the locality, further 
agitating the internal crisis in Acholi in the mid-1980s.908 They showed this 
contempt by terrorising village elders and the general village population, as 
they attempted to gain economic resources and establish their position within 
the locality.  The new government further heightened these problems when 
NRA soldiers were stationed in Acholi to fight the emerging rebel factions. 
Many of the soldiers had fought against the Acholi during the Luwero Bush 
war, and, perhaps inevitably, acts of revenge and retaliation occurred.909 
                                                
908 Behrend, ‘The Holy Spirit Movements of Alice Lakwena, Severino Lukoya and Joseph 
Kony, 108. 
 
909 Ibid., 08.	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It was during the assimilation of Acholi ex-soldiers back into the 
villages that Alice Lakwena and the HSM started to gain a following.  Amidst 
the political turmoil Alice (then known as Auma) claimed to be possessed by 
the spirit Lakwena, which had instructed her to form the HSM to overthrow the 
Ugandan government. The movement itself was steeped in Acholi indigenous 
and Christian religious discourse. HSM recruits had to go through many forms 
of moral rehabilitation which banned acts such as looting, sex, drinking, and 
smoking, a reflection of the internal civil disorder and the disintegration of 
social accountability in Acholi during this period.  Through spiritual rituals and 
reinforced superstition Alice was able to lead up to 10,000 men in 1987 on a 
march towards Kampala in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the new 
government.910  Perhaps encouraged by Alice’s success, Joseph Kony set 
about forming the LRA by recruiting former members of the HSM and other 
rebel factions operating within Acholi. Kony adopted many of the same 
religious discourses as Alice and was able to control his followers by 
reinforcing the fear of the consequences of rule-breaking. Soldiers were 
covered with holy oil and told that they would be bullet proof on the battlefield 
if their hearts and minds were pure.911 However, unlike Alice, Kony adopted 
guerrilla tactics which effectively utilised violence as a weapon of fear and 
control, allowing the LRA to emerge as a transnational organisation 
capitalising on regional instability. 
Given that Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony were both uneducated 
villagers who had had no training in formal politics, their ability to amass a 
following, which in the case of Lakwena very nearly toppled a government, 
was indicative of the growing discord among the disenfranchised sections of 
Acholi society during the 1980s. However, rather than being a mechanism to 
diminish state authority in the locality, the rise of the HSM and the LRA was in 
many ways an attempt by sections of Acholi society to engage with and 
access state institutions, as the result of the failure of local patrons to 
effectively bridge the gap between the centre and periphery. The failure of 
both Lakwena and Kony to harness any substantial support within Uganda 
                                                
910 Ibid., 113. 
911 Cline, ‘Spirits and the Cross: Religiously Bases Violent Movements in Uganda’, 119.	  
 307 
I                
outside Acholi, has led to delineations of the conflict along ethnic lines. 
However, it is more realistic to conclude that those who joined Lakwena and 
Kony were, initially at least, motivated by specific class, economic and political 
grievances, as apposed to any inherent atavistic hatred towards other ethnic 
groups in Uganda. That being said, ethnopolitics does come into play, not 
least because the historical processes that emphasised the locality as the 
nucleus for political engagement meant that, even for the HSM and LRA, the 
conflict would inevitably remain primarily contained within Acholi. Both group 
leaders, like their political counterparts in the 1960s, could no more hope to 
attract a political or military following that would transcend inter-regional and 
ethnic lines.  Consequently, facing the military prowess of NRA, Lakwena was 
quickly stopped on her march to Kampala, and Kony went on to internalise the 
conflict by fighting against, rather than for, the peoples of Acholi. 
For the peoples of Acholi, nearly thirty-years of conflict has done little 
to address the region’s historic economic and social marginalisation. 
Consequently, the dominant tool used for political engagement today remains 
the ‘victim identity’, which has been further reinforced by the LRA conflict. 
Indeed as an Acholi informant emphatically stated earlier in this thesis:  
Nothing good has happened to the Acholi. Acholi are different because 
they have been mistreated. They have not been given any 
opportunities. That is what makes us different.912 
 
It will be interesting to observe how this ‘difference’ will be politically utilised 
during the upcoming 2016 elections. Given the current land disputes between 
the Acholi and the government, continued corruption in local and central 
government finances, the failure of the state to adequately invest in post-war 
reconstruction and the steady return of Acholi migrants from the Diaspora, it is 
likely that once again the fight for political power will be channelled, externally 
at least, through ethnopolitics during the next election campaign.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
912 IF/M) NAU: Interview with private security guard, Gulu, 25 June 2012.  
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Appendix:  Formal and Informal Interviews  
 
 
Interviews were conducted between October 2011 and December 2013 in, 
Kampala, Jinja Entebbe, Mukono, Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo, Pader, Nwoya, and 
Anaka. The majority of the informants requested that their names be omitted 
from the written thesis. For the purpose of uniformity the names of those who 
did not request anonymity will also be omitted. Where informants have been 
quoted or referenced in the thesis, the day month and location of the interview 
have been cited. 
 
Key 
 
M: Male participant 
F: Female participant 
F/M: Formal interview with a male participants 
F/F: Formal Interview with a female participant 
IF/M: Informal interview with a male participant 
IF/F: Informal interview with a male participant 
NAU: Non-Audio 
AU: Audio Recording 
 
 
Langol 
 
(F/M) AU: Subsistence farmer, Langol, Nwoya District, 16 May 2012  
(F/M) AU: Subsistence farmer, Langol, Nwoya District, 16 July 2012  
(M/F) AU: Local youth leader, Langol-Nwoya District, 15 July 2012  
 
Anaka 
 
(F/M) NAU: Subsistence farmer, Anaka, Nwoya District 21 June 2012  
(F/M) NAU: Farmer, Anaka-Nwoya District 19 July 2012 
 
Gulu Town and Surrounding Sub-Counties 
 
(F/M) AU: Civil servant Gulu, 9 May 2012  
(F/F) AU: Housewife, Omoro county- Gulu District, 30 May 2012  
(F/M) NAU: Retired civil servant, Gulu Town Centre, 9 June 2012  
(IF/M) NAU: Private security guard, Gulu Town Centre, 9 June 2012  
(F/M) NAU: Retired civil servant, Gulu, 9 June 2012  
(IF/M) NAU: Local business owner, Gulu, 18 June 2012  
(F/M)  AU: Small business owner, Gulu, 24 June 2012 
(IF/M) NAU: local business owner, Gulu, 25 June 2012  
(F/M) AU: Subsistence farmer, Omoro County, 2 July 2012  
(F/M) NAU: Retired civil servant, Gulu Town Centre, 15 July 2012  
 
NAU: Group Interview 1 (15 Female Participants) Nwoya District, 4 July 
2012 
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Participant 1: Subsistence farmer. 
Participant 2: Housewife 
Participant 3: Domestic worker 
Participant 4: Small business owner 
Participant 5: Housewife 
Participant 6: Widow 
Participant 7: Domestic worker 
Participant 8: Domestic worker 
Participant 9: Live-in-Housekeeper 
Participant 10: Small business owner 
Participant 11: Domestic worker 
Participant 12: Subsistence farmer 
Participant 13: Domestic worker 
Participant 14: Subsistence farmer 
Participant 15: Subsistence farmer 
 
NAU: Group Interview 1 (10 Participants, 6 women 4 Men), Koro sub-
County Gulu District, 8 June 2012 
 
Participant 1: Retired Teacher (M) 
Participant 2: Subsistence Farmer (M) 
Participant 3: Housewife (F) 
Participant 4: Domestic worker (F) 
Participant 5: Subsistence Farmer (F) 
Participant 6: Small Business owner (M) 
Participant 7: Domestic Worker (F) 
Participant 8: Live-in-Domestic worker (F) 
Participant 9: Housewife (F) 
Participant 10: Subsistence Farmer (M) 
 
Entebbe/Kampala/Jinja 
 
(F/M) NAU: Government driver, Entebbe, 23 November 2011 
(F/F) NAU: Retired widow Jinja, 27 December 2011 
(F/M) NAU: Civil servant, Entebbe, 4 January 2012  
(F/M) AU: Civil servant Entebbe 15 January 2012  
IF/M) NAU: Private security guard, Kampala, 18 January 2012  
(IF/F) NAU: Domestic cleaner, Entebbe, 2 February 2012   
(F/F) NAU: Housewife, Kampala, 3 February 2012 
(F/M) AU: UPC politician, Kampala, 4 February 2012 
 
 
 
Kitgum Town Centre and Surrounding Sub-Counties 
 
(IF/M) NAU: Private security guard, Kitgum Town centre, 4 June 2012 
(F/F) NAU: Domestic cleaner, Chua Sub-County-Kitgum, 5 June 2012  
(IN/F) NAU: Shop assistant, Kitgum, 5 June 2012.  
(F/M) NAU: Private security guard, Kitgum, 1 August 2012  
(F/F) NAU: Subsistence farmer, Lamwo District, 2 August 2012  
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Glossary 
 
 
 
Abila Ancestral Shrine (Acholi)   
 
Acholi The Acholi ethnic group and the geographical 
boundary which they occupy in Northern Uganda.  
 
Ajwaka   A spirit medium. ‘Medicine’ man or Woman 
(Acholi) 
 
Askari     Local Soldier  (Acholi: Acikari) 
    
Baganda  
(Singular: Muganda) Bantu speaking ethnic group native to the  
    Kingdom of Buganda 
 
Buganda   Largest tradition Kingdom situated in south-central 
    Uganda.  
 
Jadiya          Sudanese soldiers and official representatives of 
the Egyptian administration stationed in Northern 
Uganda in the late nineteenth century       
 
Jok (Jogi; plural)  Spirit/God/Witchcraft (Acholi) 
 
Kabaka            King of Buganda 
 
Katikiro                 Secretary-General (Bantu) 
 
Kuturia                    Arabic speaking ivory and slave traders 
 
Lagolkop Madit       Acholi Chief Judge 
 
Laloyo Maber       Good Ruler (Acholi Paramount Chief) 
 
Lawino    Character in p’Bitek’s book ‘Song of Lawino’. The 
    name is used in this thesis in reference to  
    the mostly undereducated section of Acholi society 
    situated outside the periphery of formal politics  
    who constitute the ‘silent majority’. 
 
Lawirwodi               Paramount Chief (Acholi) 
 
Luganda   Language spoken by the Baganda  
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Lukiko    Buganda Parliament 
 
Lusgoa   Language spoken by the Basoga    
 
Mukungu (Bantu)  Parish Chief  
 
Northerner    Luo speaking groups who include, the Acholi  
    Lango, Teso, Karamojong, Alur, Madi occupying 
    the Northern region of Uganda.  
 
Ocols           Character in p’Bitek’s book ‘Song of Ocol’ The 
name is used in this thesis in reference to 
members of the Acholi middle class, power 
brokers and politicians.  
 
Rwodi (Singular:Rwot) Acholi chief 
 
Rowt kweri          Chief of the hoe (Cultivation team headsman) 
 
Uhuru    Freedom (Swahili) 
 
UGS Ugandan Shillings 
 
Wang Kweri Cultivation team  
 
Won Nyaci             Paramount Chief (Lango)  
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1980. 
 
Letter from the Vicar General of the Gulu Diocese to DC Gulu, 15 October 
1980. 
 
Letter from the DC of Gulu to the Military Commission, 17 October 1980. 
 
(File: Gulu District Executive Cultural Committee).   
Programme inauguration/ Revival of District Cultural Executive 
Committee, Minutes of meeting held at District Council Hall, Gulu, 18 
December 1981. 
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Letter from the Jago of Bobi to the County Chief of Omoro, 19 December 
1980. 
 
Letter from DC Gulu to Ministry of Local Ordinance, 5 August 1982.   
 
Report by Regional Police Commander, 29 October 1982. 
 
Letter from Saverino Lanek to Inspector General of the Police, Kampala, 19 
October 1983. 
 
Letter from Acting County Chief of Kilak to DC Gulu, 6 May 1980. 
 
Letter from District Police Commander to DC Gulu, 11 May 1984. 
 
Letter from District Police Commander to Town Clerk, Gulu Municipal Council, 
12 April 1984. 
 
Letter from S.C. Alai, Administrative Secretary Gulu District Administration to 
DC Gulu, 24 July 1984. 
 
Letter from the District Police Commander Gulu to DC Gulu, Regional Police 
Commander, Northern Region and Headmaster Samuel Baker Senior School, 
5 August 1985. 
 
 
Box 542 
 
(File: ‘Acholi District’ Monthly District Intelligence Reports, January 1960-
March 1964). 
 
Memorandum by the President, State House Entebbe, 23 March 1968. 
 
Memorandum from the DP office in Gulu, April 1968. 
 
Minutes: Meeting in Agoro to Discuss Acholi Karamojong Border Conflicts, 21 
July 1966. 
 
Letter from the Minister of Provincial Administration to all DCs, 14 November 
1973. 
 
Letter from Secretary of Gulu South Constituency to the Police Headquarters 
Gulu, 10 May 1981. 
 
Letter from Y.Y Ongweng (MP) Gulu South Constituency to the UPC 
Secretary General, Kampala, 17 July 1981. 
 
(File: ADM/34). Political Parties, Meeting and Rallies and alleged subversive 
Activities, May 1981- August 1985). 
Land Disputes, 27 July 1982. 
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Letter from County Chief of Omoro to DC Gulu, 16 June 1983. 
 
 
Box 545 
 
(File: Political Affairs Correspondences)  
 
Letter from DP National Organising Committee to DP Chairman Gulu, 
27 June 1984. 
 
Letter from NLP Headquarters in Kampala to Administrative Secretary, 
Gulu District Council, 5 October 1984. 
 
(File: ARM.1 .Arms and Ammunition Policy). 
 
Letter from District Police Commander Gulu to Parongo District 
Administration 22 May 1985. 
 
Letter from General Manager of Uganda Livestock Industries Ltd to 
District Police Commander, 1 July 1985 
 
Box 546 
 
Letter from the Permanent Secretary to all Regional Agriculture Officers, 29 
March 1972. 
 
Box 553 
 
(File: Late payment of salary and staff discrimination/Corruption) 
 
Letter from District Education Officer to DC West Acholi, 1 September 
1972. 
 
Letter from Mrs Grace Ogal to Gulu District Administration Treasurer, 
16 July 1979. 
 
Letter from DC Gulu to County Chief of Nwoya, 6 December 1979 
 
Letter from Parish Chief of Koich Kal, to DC Gulu 20 February 1980.	  
 
Box 558 
 
Labour Day Speech by the Representatives of the Employees, Gulu District, 1 
May 1982.    
 
Letter from A. S Adimola, Chairman of PTA to the Chairman Board of 
Governors at St Joseph School in Layibi, 14 April 1985.  
 
Box 572  
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(File: ‘Elders’ Association 1984-1986) 
 
‘Gulu Elders’ Association: Proposed 1985 Programme, c.1984 
 
 Letter from the Chairman of the Elders Association to DC Gulu, 27 July 
1985.  
 
Minutes of Elders Association Meeting held in Gulu, DC Office, 19 
September 1985. 
 
Letter from Chairman of Acholi Elders’ Association to DC Gulu, 23 
September 1985. 
 
Minutes of the Elders Committee in Gulu District, 16 October 1985. 
 
Letter from Elder’s Association Secretary Gulu, to DC Gulu 23 October 
1985. 
 
Letter from County Chief Omoro to all sub-county chiefs in Omoro, 4 
November 1985. 
 
Letter to the Chairman of the Gulu Elders’ Association, Gulu, 29 
November 1985. 
 
Letter from S. C. Alai Administrative Secretary Gulu District to F.L. 
Okot, Chairman of Elder’s Association, 11 December 1985.  
 
Letter from F. L. Okot, Elders’ Association Chairman to Yona Odida, 8 
December 1985. 
  
 
Kitgum District Archive (KDA) 
 
This archive is almost completely un-catalogued and unpreserved. Files have 
been listed here by subject/author and in ascending date order. A few 
documents have been catalogued; these are listed in parentheses.  
 
Police Special Branch and District Intelligence Reports: Kitgum 
 
DP Meeting of 20 January1960, Agoro Divisional Headquarters. Report from 
M.M. Savage on behalf of W.B. Peskett Provincial Special Branch Officer to 
DC Acholi and Commissioner of Police, Northern Province. 
 
DP Meeting of 27 January1960, Palogo Market Place. Report from M.M. 
Savage on behalf of W.B. Peskett Provincial Special Branch Officer, Northern 
Provinc  to DC Acholi and Commissioner of Police. 
 
DP Meeting of 14 March 1960, Madi Opei. Report from G.R. Russell, 
Provincial Special Branch Officer, Northern Province to DC Acholi and 
Commissioner of Police.  
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DP Meeting of 19 March 1960, Agago. Report from G.R. Russell, Provincial 
Special Branch Officer, Northern Province to DC Acholi and Commissioner of 
Police, 
  
DP Meeting of 27 March 1960, Ligiligi P.W.D Camp Agago. Report from W.B. 
Peskett, Provincial Special Branch Officer, Northern Province to DC Acholi 
and Commissioner of Police. 
 
DP Meeting of 28 March 1960, Kitgum. Report from W.B. Peskett, Provincial 
Special Branch Officer, Northern Province to DC Acholi and Commissioner of 
Police. 
 
DP Meeting of 11 June 1960, Madi Opei. Report from W.B. Peskett, Provincial 
Special Branch Officer, Northern Province to DC Acholi and Commissioner of 
Police.  
 
DP Meeting of 11 June 1960, Pader Palwo. Report from W.B. Peskett, 
Provincial Special Branch Officer, Northern Province to DC Acholi and 
Commissioner of Police.  
 
DP Meeting of 11 June 1960, Ngoro Market Place. Report from W.B. Peskett, 
Provincial Special Branch Officer, Northern Province to DC Acholi and 
Commissioner of Police  
 
DP Meeting of 13 June 1960 near Kitgum Town Centre. Report from W.B. 
Peskett, Provincial Special Branch Officer, Northern Province to DC Acholi. 
  
DP Meeting of 18 June 1960. Report by K. Onek, Special Branch Officer. 
Patango. 
 
DP Meeting of 30 July 1960. Report by K. Onek Special Branch Officer, 
Patango. 
 
Letter from DP President to Police Commanding Officer Acholi, 31 December 
1960. 
 
Letter from U. Oloya, District Special Branch Officer to Senior District Special 
Branch Officers East Acholi, 21 January 1965. 
 
Intelligence Committee Minutes, Expulsion of UPC Members from the Party, 
30 March 1968.  
 
‘Peace Corp Teacher’ District Intelligence Report c.1968. 
 
Letter from B. A. Kidega to District Police Commander Kitgum, 13 January 
1969. 
 
Minutes of the Kitgum Intelligence Sub-Committee, 10 December 1968,  
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Minutes of the Kitgum Intelligence Sub-Committee 11 June 1969,  
 
DP Meeting in Patongo, Intelligence report to DC Gulu, 14 August 1969. 
 
‘DP Meeting’ Intelligence report to DC, Gulu. 30 August 1969. 
 
Letter from A. Sebi Special Branch Officer Kitgum to Commanding Officer 
Kitgum, 1 September 1969. 
 
Letter from County Chief Patango to DC Gulu, 4 September 1969. 
 
East Acholi District Intelligence Report January 1972.  
 
East Acholi District Intelligence Committee, Report for September 1971. 
  
East Acholi District Intelligence Report, November 1971. 
 
East Acholi District Intelligence Committee Meeting, 23 December 1971. 
 
‘Uganda Teacher’s Association Activities’, East Acholi District Intelligence, 18 
February 1972. 
 
‘DP Supporters’ Acholi District Intelligence Report, 9 June 1972.  
 
East Acholi Monthly District Intelligence Report, 26 October 1972. 
 
Acholi District Intelligence Report, 20 December 1972. 
 
East Acholi District Monthly Intelligence, December 1972.  
 
East Acholi District Intelligence Report, 13 April 1973. 
 
(Folder: MIS/21 Vol. 1. Kitgum District Intelligence 1974-1976). 
 
East Acholi District Intelligence Report sent to A.C.K Oboth-Ofumbi, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 7 May 1975. 
 
District Intelligence Committee Summary from M.B.E Odur, Director of 
Intelligence (Special Branch) to all Provincial Special Branch Officers 
11 May 1978. 
 
District Intelligence Committee Summary, 28 July 1983.  
 
Letter from F.K. Obong DC Kitgum to District Police Commander, 23 May 
1984. 
 
‘Security in Agoro’, Report by Captain O. Okot, Commanding Officer, Kitgum, 
20 March 1985. 
 
Letter from DC Kitgum to Commanding Officer Pajimo, 21 March 1985. 
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Political Affairs 
 
Letter from UPC Leaders Padibe to UPC Headquarters Kampala, 1969.  
 
‘Secret meetings by DP and KY 1968-9’, Report from the Chief General 
Service Officer, Kitgum to Mr Akena-Adoko, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, 8 August 1969.  
 
Letter from Atwoma Tiberio Okeny, National Organiser of the DP to the 
President of Uganda, 19 February 1969. 
 
Letter from P. Mugoyo DC East Acholi to Permanent Secretary President’s 
Office, 2 September 1972.  
 
Letter from ‘UNLP Watch Dogs’, Kitgum Division to the Political and 
Diplomatic Committee in Kampala 19 March 1980.  
 
Letter from T. Okeny, DP Acting President to DC Kitgum, 14 November 1983. 
 
Letter from the Administration Secretary Kitgum District Administration to the 
Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Government, Kampala, 8 August 1984. 
 
Letter from Executive Committee NLP to the Administrative Secretary, 
Kitgum, 31 August 1984.  
 
Letter from Chairman of UPC Kitgum Central to the Town Clerk Kitgum, 13 
November 1984.  
 
Letter from B. Okae-Lugina Chairman of UPC Parliamentary Constituency to 
County Chief of Lamwo from. 5 November 1984. 
 
Letter from Chairman of UPC Kitgum Central Constituency to N.C Ongabe, 15 
November 1984. 
 
Letter from J.J Obolo-Chola (UPC MP) Kitgum North to DC Kitgum, 21 
December 1984. 
 
Letter from Ezira Kibwota Chairman of the Kitgum Central Constituency UPC 
to the office of the Chairman of the UPC, 21 February1985. 
 
Letter from DC Kitgum to Jago Palabek Division, 16 May 1985. 
 
Letter from A.T. Okeny NLP Interim Committee to DC Kitgum, 1 October 
1985. 
 
Letter from J. Okello, Secretary of Acholi Elders’ Association Kitgum to DC 
Kitgum, 5 December 1985. 
 
Church Disputes 
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Resolution by Catholic Christians in the Parishes of Gulu Town, Anaka, Awac, 
Opit, Pabbo and Atyak passed by a public rally of the Christians held in Gulu 
on 5 September 1964. Sent to Hon Prime Minister of Uganda, Dr. M.A. Obote 
From Catholic Christians West Acholi Signed A.L Oloya: President. 7 
September 1964.  
	  
 
Local Administration  
 
(File:  LAN 5/3 ‘District Boundaries Acholi-Sudan Border’).  
Border Meeting Held on 20 July 1954 Biabia, Acholi District. 
 
(File ARM/1: ‘Arms and Ammunition Policy’). 
Letter from Commissioner of Police to Central Arms Registry Office 
Kitgum 9 September 1959. 
 
Letter from County Chief Agago to DC Gulu, 4 April 1966. 
 
Letter from Jago Agoro,  to District Police Commander Gulu, 29 February 
1968. 
 
Letter from Assistant DC Kitgum to DC Kitgum, 4 March 1968,  
 
Minutes of Acholi District Team and Planning Committee, 9 March 1971. 
 
‘Re: Military Takeover’, Compiled by T.Karugaba, Chairman District Team 
Planning Committee Acholi, 23 March 1971.  
 
Letter from Jago of Padibe, to all Wakungu Chiefs, rwodi kweri in Padibe 
Division 24 May 1971. 
 
Letter from J.M. Masarenhas, Ministry of Public Administration, to Town Clerk 
Kitgum, 6 December 1971. 
 
(File: FIN/28 ‘Accounts East Acholi District’). 
 
Report to the treasurer East Acholi District Administration, 17 August 
1973. 
 
Estimates 1971 Education Committee East Acholi, 2 July 1971. 
 
‘Staff Personal Allowances’, 26 April 1973. 
 
(File: DEC/1B ‘Applications for Permission to Leave the District’) 
 
Request from M. Karim, Granted by DC Kitgum, 17 January1972. 
 
Request from P.P Vyas, Granted by DC Kitgum, 16 November 1972. 
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Request from D.K Lomgoya made to DC Kitgum, 6 December 1973. 
 
Letter from County Chief Lamwo to all Jagis 3 May 1975.  
 
Letter from the Ministry of Provincial Administration Kitgum to Treasurer, 
Kitgum District Administration, 4 October 1976. 
 
Letter from J. Otto, District Police Commander to DC East Acholi, 28 October 
1976. 
 
East Acholi District Treasurer with Auditors Comments, 25 October 1977.  
 
Letter from County Chief Chua to Treasurer East Acholi District, 12 July 1977. 
 
Letter from Jago Parabongo to Treasurer, East Acholi District 26 October 
1977. 
  
Letter from the Commander in Chief UNLA Kitgum to DC, Kitgum, 23 August 
1979. 
 
(File: ADM/44 ‘UNCC Correspondences’). 
 
‘Memorandum From the People of Orom’, sent to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, 11 October 1979. 
 
Letter from the Ministry of Local Administrations to all DCs, 16 November 
1979. 
 
Letter from Secretary of Public Service Commission to the Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, Kampala, 6 November 1981. 
 
‘Re: Sgt. David Olum’, Letter to ‘Whom it may concern’ from DC Kitgum 13th 
Battalion, Jinja. 4 July 1984. 
 
Letter from Acting DC of Kitgum to the Adjutant school of infantry Jinja, 15 
July 1983. 
 
Letter from Ag. DC O. Ojok to Commanding Officer 12th Battalion Gulu, 15 
August 1983. 
 
Letter from P. Okwera, Commanding Officer 13th Battalion Kitgum to Parish 
Chief, 20 January 1984. 
 
Letter from District Cooperative Officer to DC of Kitgum, 16 March 1984. 
 
Annual Report of Ag. Senior Compliance Officer Northern Region for the year 
ending 1983. Compiled by the Ministry of Labour sent to the Director of the 
Social Security Fund Kampala, 2 April 1984. 
 
Letter from DC Kitgum to All County Chiefs, 22 May 1984. 
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Letter from M.O. Ecumu, District Education Officer Kitgum District to the 
Administrative Secretary, Kitgum, 24 December 1984. 
 
Report from G. Pibo, Senior Internal Auditor Kitgum to Treasurer Kitgum 
District Administration 22 January 1985. 
 
‘Elders’ of Gulu District, list of elected members’, Letter from DC of Gulu to 
DC Kitgum, 21 November 1985. 
 
 
Uganda National Archive, Entebbe (UNA/E) 
 
C-Series 
 
C.1329 Box 27: Letter forwarded by the Provincial Commissioner to the Chief 
 Secretary J.W. Steil of the  Northern Province, 8  December 1947.  
C.20881 Box 19:  Letter from the Governor O.E Mitchell to the Secretary of 
 State for the Colonies c.1938.  
C.2456 Box 22, ‘Mission Schools: Denominational Differences’ 1937-38.  
 
C.3824 Box 29: Letter sent by the Acholi Local Government  as a Petition to 
 James Griffiths, Secretary of State for the attention of  the Governor of
  Uganda, 11 May 1951. 
 
The Office of the President 
 
Box 3 Ref 8: U.N.C.C Kitgum District, Expansion of UNCC 1st Passes 
 Only, 1979. 
Box 5 Ref 8: U.N.C.C Gulu District, Expansion of UNCC 1st Elimination 
  Failures, 1979. 
Box 8 Ref 20: Minutes of the Meeting between  Ministers and DC’s held in the 
 Cabinet Library on the 28 April 1971.  
Box 8 Ref 28, Cabinet meetings, ‘Uganda’s financial situation Budget review 
 1971/72 (secret) Agenda for cabinet meeting due to be held on 
  Tuesday 5 October 1971.  
 
Provincial Papers 
 
Box 1 No. 0739: Northern Province, Monthly Reports for 1917.  
 
Box 1 No. 2135C: Northern Province Annual Report for 1918-19. 
Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Assistant DC in Kampala 
 regarding Labour Supply from Acholi to Bunyoro, 2 June 1919. 
 
Box 1 No. 0982B: Northern Province Quarterly Reports, 1921. 
 
Elections 
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Box 1 No. 4: Comments by Amin on Obote’s letter written on the name of 
 secret  council 777 (No date). 
Box 2 Ref 3: Letter from the DC of Lango to the supervisor of Elections, 24 
 March 1960.   
Box 2 Ref 3: Letter from the DC of Acholi to R.C. Peagram, 2  September 
 1961. 
Box 2 No. 11:  Report on the National Assembly Elections in April 1962. 
 Acholi District, 30 May 1962. 
Box 2 Ref L.155/02: Supervisor of elections: Candidates: Acholi, 10 February 
 1961-7 April 1962.  
Box 3 Ref 3/DG C124: Letter from Ag Secretary A.C Badenoch to Permanent 
 Secretary, 11 September 1961. 
Box 7 Ref 27 Ref: CRA/47: Letter from the President’s Office to all Permanent 
 Secretaries and all heads of departments, 23  May 1972. 
(Box unknown) Ref d/6/6-8 Acholi District: Political Activities: summary of the 
 Development of the  Acholi District (secret) c.1968.  
 
Uganda Christian University: Church Missionary Society (CMS) Archive, 
Mukono, Kampala.  
 
 
Uganda Notes and Diocesan Gazette, No.1 Vol.13, January 1913.  
 
Box 21 Folder 5: Minutes for a meeting of the standing committee held at 
 Ngora, 16 December 1954.  
Box 21 Folder 8: Sermon by the Bishop Usher Wilson to the Upper Nile 
  Diocesan Council, 27 April 1960. 
Box 21 Folder 5: Letter from the Northern Diocese Gulu to the Permanent 
 Secretary Ministry of Social Services, 12  September 1958.  
Box 21 Folder 5: The minutes of a meeting by the Diocesan Council of the 
 Upper Nile held in Ngora regarding marriage law proposals, 10 May 
  1955, 1955-1969. 
Box 34 Folder 11: CMS Conference Ngora: The People to whom we present 
 Christ, 8 August 1959.  
Box 34 Folder 12: Letter from the Archbishop Brown of Namirembe to the 
 Bishop of the upper Nile, 2 August 1960.  
Box 33 Folder 207: CMS Upper Nile Mission, minutes of the General Council 
 Meeting held in Gulu c.1960.  
Box 70 Folder 2: Statistics of the Uganda Mission Year Ending 1914.  
 
Box 72 Folder 1, Memorandum: The Women’s League of Buganda. Kampala,
 Uganda, August 1953.  
Box 73 Folder 56: Church Statistics for Upper Nile Diocese, 1955-56.  
Box 73 Folder 8: Church Statistics for Upper Nile Diocese Statistics for 1957-
 8.  
 
Box 92 Folder 1: Report from CMS Northern Province to the Bishop of the 
 Upper Nile, 19 August 1945.  
Box 115 Folder 4: African Rifles, 4th Battalion soldiers -Attendance at Service, 
 c. 1928-9.   
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Rubaga Cathedral Church Archives, Kampala 
 
‘5 Year Report on the Diocese of Gulu: 1970-1975’ by Dr Cipriano Kihangie.  
Bishop’s House Gulu, 1 May 1976. 
 
Birmingham University CMS Archives (BUL/CMS) 
 
ACC 265-24: Questionnaire and Church Guidelines, J. Taylor, March 1956.  
 
The National Archives, Kew (TNA) 
 
TNA/CO 1018/81, Lord Hailey Papers 1946-1955, J.W Stell to Lord Hailey, 
Native Administration and the Native Council, (1947).  
 
Makerere University Library (MUL/AS) 
 
Constitutional Commission Wild Report: Report of the Constitutional 
 Committee. 1959.  
EAU/A (058)1: J.P Twining, Acholi DC: Annual Report: Acholi District Council 
 1962.  
EAU/A (058) 1: Y.H. Wacha-Olwol, Acholi DC Annual  Report: Acholi District 
 1963. 
GEAU/A (088)2: East Acholi District Admin: Approved 1971 Estimates 
 Confirmed 1972. Printed by the Catholic Press Gulu:  
GEAU/A (088) 48: Acholi District Admin, 1965, ADA Estimates :1967, 1968, 
 1969.  
GEA U/A8 (058) 59: East Acholi District Admin: Accounts with Report and 
 Opinion from J.A. Maiku Account Auditor 1973.  
GEAU/A8 (058) 58: National Curriculum Development Centre Financial 
 Statement year ending 31 Dec 1974-78. Report and Opinion.  
  
Published Sources 
 
Newspapers 
 
The Uganda Argus 1955- 1971 Makerere University Library – Africana 
 Section. 
 
Lobo Mewa 1958-1968: Makerere University Library-Africana Section. 
 
The Voice of Uganda September 1971: Makerere University Library – 
  Africana Section 
 
The Equator 1983-1986: Makerere University Library – Africana Section 
 
The Uganda Times 1980- 1983 Makerere University Library – Africana
 Section                
 
Unpublished Theses  
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Achieng, C., Birth Customs Among the Acholi: 1980-81 (BA Thesis, Makerere
  University Library, 1981). 
Acima, J. O., An Appraisal of the Impact of the Co-op BANK Ltd as a Source
  of Farm Commercialism in West Acholi District 1978-79, Special 
 Project Report (Faculty of Agriculture, Makerere University,  1979). 
Baker, S., Attitudes of Acholi Men towards Family Planning in Gulu District 
 1981 (BA Thesis, Makerere University 1981).  
Bernard, M., The extent and practices of witchcraft Among the Acholi: An 
 Exploratory Study (BA Thesis, Makerere University, 1983). 
Dwyer, J., The Acholi in Uganda: Adjustment to Imperialism (Ph.D. Thesis, 
  Colombia University, 1972). 
Ginyera-Pinycwa, A.G., Some Dimension of pre-Independence Politics in 
  Uganda: A case study based on the Catholic Church and Politics in 
 northern Uganda in the decade, 1952-1962 (Ph.D. Thesis. University of 
 Chicago, 1972). 
Laboke, D.Q.R., Socio-Economic Aspects of Farm Planning in Acholi District: 
 Northern Uganda (B.Sc Thesis, Makerere University College, 1968). 
Laruni, E., The De-politicisation of War. Western Media Representations of 
 the Lord’s Resistance Army. 2000-2008 (BA Thesis, Exeter University, 
 2009). 
Luciyamo, L.L., The Relationship Between Traditional Farming and Social 
 Structure in Acholi 1969-1970 (Bsc Thesis, Makerere University, 1970) 
Lutaro, W.O., Agriculture in West Acholi (Bsc Thesis, Makerere University 
 Library, 1956). 
Paotto, A. O., A study of Constraints on Greater Groundnut Production in 
 West  Acholi, 1974 (Bsc Thesis. Makerere University, 1974).  
p’Amari, A.,  Attitudes of Educated Acholi towards traditional marriage 
 ceremonies in Gulu District (MA Thesis. Makerere University,1983).  
Ocaya, C.Y.L., The Other Face of Acholi (BA fine Arts Thesis, Makerere, 
 1974).  
Okello, D.S., The Acholi Ritual Ceremonies (BA Thesis Makerere University, 
 1969). 
Opiyo, W.W., Evaluation of East Acholi District Farm Institute 
 Programme, 1973-1974 (Bsc Special Project: Department of 
 Agriculture, Makerere University 1974). 
 
 
Government Reports and Working Papers  
 
Baffoe, J. K., ‘Structural Adjustment and Agriculture in Uganda,’ International 
 Labour Office, Geneva, March 2000. 
Langlands, B.W. The Population Density of Acholi District, Occasional Paper
  N.30; Department of Geography. Makerere University (Kampala, 
 1971).  
Oketcho, P., The retrospective Development of Uganda’s Educational 
 language Policy success and Challenges. (National Curriculum 
 Development Centre (Kampala, 2010). 
---------------Ugandan Protectorate, Draft Emergency Legislation (Government 
 Printer Entebbe, 1960).   
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----------------The Economic Development of Uganda: Report of a Mission 
 Organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
 Development at the  request of the Uganda Government (John Hopkins 
 Press: Baltimore,  1962). 
-----------------Yoo Neyo Kwan: Uganda National Literacy Campaign, East 
  African Literature Bureau Nairobi, Produced by the Ministry of 
 Planning and CommunityDevelopment (1964). 
------------------Department for Community Development, Annual Report For  
 Gulu District  Year Ending 1983 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1984).  
------------------2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census. Analytical 
 Report. Abridged Version. October 2006 (Government of Uganda)  
 
Published Books and Articles 
 
Adimola, A.B., ‘The Lamogi Rebellion 1911-1912’, Uganda Journal, Vol.18 
 No. 2, (1954), 170-177.  
Agar, M., The Professional Stranger: An Informal Introduction to Ethnography
  (New York: Academic Press, 1996). 
Akabwai, D. and P.E. Ateyo., The Scramble for Cattle, Power and Guns in 
  Karamoja  (Medford: Feinstein International Centre, 2007). 
Allen, T., Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s 
 Resistance Army (London: Zed Books, 2006). 
Allen, T., ‘Review: The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi of Uganda 
 Before 1800’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 
 66, No. 3 (1996), 472-475. 
Allen, T., ‘Understanding Alice, Uganda’s Holy Spirit Movement in Context’, 
 Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol.16 No.3 (1991), 
 370-399. 
Amaza, O. O., Museveni's Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman (Fountain 
 Publishers: Kampala, 1998). 
Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
 of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 
Anderson, C. W., ‘Towards a Theory of Latin American Politics’ The 
 Graduate Centre For Latin American Studies, Vanderbilt University, 
 Occasional  Paper No.2. (February 1964). 
Anguwom, E.E., ‘Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria: The 
 Marginalisation  Question’ Journal of Social Development in Africa, Vol. 
 15.  No.1 (2000), 61-78. 
Apter, D. E., The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic 
  Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1997). 
Asiwaju, A. I., (ed.) Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s 
 International Boundaries, 1884-1894 (London:  Hirst and Co, 1985). 
Atkinson, R., The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi Before  
1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania press, 1994). 
Azarya, V and N. Chazan., ‘Disengagement From the State in Africa: 
  Reflection on the Experiences of Ghana and Guinea,’ Comparative 
 Studies in Society and History, 29 (1987), 106-31. 
Barongo, Y., ‘Ethnic Pluralism and Political Centralisation: The Basis of 
 Political Conflict in Uganda’, International Seminar on Internal Conflict, 
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 Kampala, Paper 4. Kampala: Makerere Institute of Social Research
 1987). 
Baber, Z.,  ‘Beyond the Structure/Agency Dualism: An Evaluation of 
 Giddens’s Theory of Structuration’, Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 61 No. 2 
 (1991). 
Banugire, F., ‘Uneven and Un-balanced Development: Development 
 Strategies and Conflict’ in K. Rupensinghe (ed.), Conflict Resolution in 
 Uganda (London: James Currey, 1989), 45-60.  
Bantebya-Kyomuhendo, G. and McIntosh. M.K.,, Women, Work and  
 Domestic Virtue in Uganda, 1900-2003 (Oxford: James Currey, 
 2006).   
Barth, F., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Ethnic 
 Differences (Boston: Little Brown, 1969). 
Bates, D. G. and Plog, F., Cultural Anthropology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
 1990). 
Bayart, J-F., Africa: The Politics of the Belly, 2nd edition (Cambridge: 
 Polity, 2009). 
Beachey, R.W., ‘The Arms trade in East Africa in the late nineteenth century’,
  The Journal of African History, Vol. III, No. 3 (1962), 452-467. 
Behrend, H., ‘War in Northern Uganda; The Holy Spirit Movements of Alice 
 Lakwena, Severino Lukoya and Joseph Kony (1986-97)’ in C. 
Clapham,  (ed.) African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 107-118. 
Bere, R.M., ‘An outline of Acholi History’ Uganda Journal, Vol. 11 No.1 March 
 (1947), 1-65. 
Berman, B and Eyoh, D., Kymlicka, W., (eds.) Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa
   (Oxford: James Currey, 2004). 
Berman, B., ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of 
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Boonzaier, E and Sharp, J., (eds.) South African Key Words: The Uses and 
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Boserup, E., Tan, S. F. and Toulmin, C., Woman's Role in Economic 
 Development (London: Routledge, 2007). 
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 University Press, 1964). 
Carswell, G., Cultivating Success in Uganda: Kigezi Farmers & Colonial 
 Policies (Oxford: James Currey, 2009). 
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